

STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF ROMAN SEA-POWER
IN REPUBLICAN TIMES

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BY

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*To the memory of my friend and fellow-historian Dr. J. W. Berkelbach
v. d. Sprenkel, one of those brave "illegal" fighters who saved the honour
of our country during the German occupation, this book is devoutly
dedicated by the author.*

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PREFACE

This book is of a somewhat odd, provisional character. When some years ago I began my researches in the sphere of Roman maritime history, it was my bold intention to write a complete history of Roman sea-power in republican times; but I soon became painfully aware, that for the present such a vast enterprise could not well be realized from lack of preliminary analytical studies. To be sure, for the first Punic war and the maritime *réveil* in the first century b. C. there were the excellent analyses of Tarn¹⁾ and Kromayer²⁾, old and neglected, but always valuable; but especially for the important period from 218 to 167 b. C. something analogous was almost completely lacking. So this humble pioneers' work had to be done first, to prepare the way for historiography³⁾; it is contained in the large second and third chapters, which form the bulk of the book. To this *pièce de résistance* a light first course and a modest dessert have been added: the first chapter contains — by way of introduction — a discussion of some general problems of Roman maritime history, in the last the much vexed, but much more neglected question of the *corvus* has been treated. Now this weight being off my mind and the way for historiography somewhat paved, I hope — if life and health are granted to me — to bring after some more years the complete history of Roman

¹⁾ *The fleets of the first Punic war* (Journal of Hellenic Studies 27 (1907), 48—60).

²⁾ *Die Entwicklung der römischen Flotte vom Seeräuberkerriege des Pompeius bis zur Schlacht von Actium* (Philologus 56 (N. F. X), 1897, 426—491).

³⁾ It is not my intention to belittle the merits of Clark's dissertation; certainly his work has great value, but from a philological point of view it lacks thoroughness and sharpness and besides it is too succinct to go always to the bottom of things. The book of Rodgers is completely without scientific adstrutions and in connexion with this deficiency, though "real navy", not always reliable or controllable. Caddeo's recent account of Roman naval history (*Storia marittima dell' Italia* by Rinaldo Caddeo and others I, 35 sq., Milano 1942) is very disappointing: it displays that absurd kind of chauvinism which was characteristic of poor fascistic Italy and, moreover, it is such a careless and superficial compilation that now and then it downright degenerates into a comedy of errors! Adcock's delightful little book only reached me in the last days of October 1945, so that I could do no more than refer to it now and then in the footnotes.

As a matter of course the handbooks of Roman history treat naval affairs only *obiter*, not for their own sake.

sea-power in republican times, which I had planned from the beginning.

The present book was written in the years 1942—1944, that is to say in the period, when the terrorism the Huns exercised in our poor occupied country, reached its summit and when, after having been detained for some time as a hostage and been discharged from my public functions, I had, as so many others, to be constantly on my guard against a second arrestation or even worse. I have no right to complain, for I had the good luck to come through where others were destroyed or badly maltreated; but it is fairly possible, that my work bears certain marks of unrest and lack of concentration, and I ask the reader for indulgence on this point: it is no easy task to serve Science in a position of hunted game. So far as I can judge of my own work, the third and fourth chapters are more satisfactory than the first and second, but I hope that the whole of my book may prove to be of some use.

The English version is my own, but my wife with her natural faithful devotion supervised and corrected it. If the book is now reasonably intelligible for English readers, it is due to her; the blunders and slips, which possibly remain, are mine.

Haarlem, 31, 10, 1945.

Th.

CHAPTER I

THE ROMANS AND THE SEA

The assertion that the Romans were born land-lubbers has much of a truism, and of course it is not my purpose to overthrow it. But even a truism may stand in need of some elucidation, the rather, because by most people it is thoughtlessly taken for granted: the supposed "land-lubberism" of the Romans is not so simple a matter as it looks and it fully deserves the interest of the historian.

Qualifications like: "the Dutch are sea-dogs" or "the Romans were land-lubbers" are simple enough, but simplistic at the same time. Can it really be justified to qualify any people on earth as sea-dogs or land-lubbers in a generalizing way? ¹⁾ Does not even a nation of the most passionate sailors always contain large groups of landsmen at the same time, and *vice versa*? Secondly we might put to ourselves the question: what do we mean by the terms *land-lubber* and *sea-dog*? Do these words represent reasonably defined notions or does a certain vagueness and even a serious romantic misunderstanding with regard to the psychology of the two categories play an important part in the game? And even a third question might be raised: what do we mean by "Romans"? The small nation that absorbed the world, or the world, which successively *was* absorbed by that small nation, or, if not the whole world of the *imperium Romanum*, at least romanized Italy? This last problem I will eliminate at once: in connexion with the frequent absorption and assimilation of conquered nations it stands to reason, that the Romans of let me say the fourth and third centuries b. C. were not at all the same as in the age of Cicero or Caracalla; but nevertheless — it is a very remarkable fact — the Roman attitude towards the sea was not seriously modified by the absorption of alien elements: it remained substantially the same in the course of Roman history. ²⁾ But the other two questions cannot be put out of the way so easily. As a matter of course every nation which borders upon the sea is always of a

¹⁾ Only in the case of a nation not bordering upon the sea the qualification "land-lubbers" naturally always holds good: that the Swiss can't be seamen, stands to reason.

²⁾ Of course there were exceptions: they will be discussed below.

mixed character: it contains large groups of land-lubbers (peasantry, sedentary citizens, etc.) as well as seafaring and waterside folk. What then are the factors which clinch the matter and justify a generalizing judgment in one direction or the other? In my opinion this depends upon the question, whether or not a (quantitatively or qualitatively) preponderating part of such a nation exhibits strong ties of familiar intimacy with the sea, whether or not in connexion with such a tendency the sea has set its seal upon the history of that nation, whether such a nation reluctantly performs the minimum at sea which is forced upon it by economic necessities, or willingly achieves much more than this, so that in wide ranges of society it grows together with the sea. From this point of view we shall have to look at the Roman attitude towards the sea and it stands to reason that the problem of the psychology of land-lubber and sea-dog will play a certain part in my account. For, if I am not mistaken, there exists in this sphere a bad confusion of notions: perhaps under the influence of a false romanticism certain qualities are ascribed to the sea-man, which in reality he usually does *not* possess, and on the other hand people, who do not exhibit such qualities, are wrongly labelled as land-lubbers.

To begin with I will give a short discussion of Roman literature from this point of view, an enterprise which is extremely facilitated by the brilliant book of de Saint-Denis, *Le rôle de la mer dans la poésie latine* (Paris 1935), one of those voluminous, thorough and witty *thèses* which France alone is able to produce.

The verdict against the Roman land-lubber is founded chiefly on his "hydrophobia". We point out that Plautus' sailors and merchants, when they have firm ground under their feet again, use to thank the gods, because the rude and hostile element of the gruff Neptune has spared them this time; we call attention to the lamentations endlessly repeated in every key and strain about the sad fate of those who find a watery grave; of course we do not forget to refer to the *Oceanus dissociabilis* of Horace, that is to say to the fact that this poet stigmatized navigation as being in flat defiance of the holy order of things; and from such phenomena we conclude that the Roman feared and shunned the sea and therefore is to be regarded as a land-lubber. A somewhat rash conclusion; for the incriminated utterances in Latin authors often originate in Greek literature: if on this score the Romans are to be regarded as land-lubbers, the Greeks will have to share their fate, a consequence accepted by many scholars without any

pangs of conscience, but which nevertheless slaps common sense in the face. So there is serious reason to mistrust the premisses of the aforesaid conclusion: can it be right to regard the sea-dog as a man, who does not know what fear of the sea is, who feels unhappy, if he must step ashore, and whose holy ideal it is to find a watery grave, and on the other hand to conclude immediately and contemptuously from anything smelling of water-fear to the "sin" of "land-lubberism"? I will take the risk of passing for a seller of paradoxes and turn the tables: the sea *is* for the sailor a dangerous, hostile element he fears and must fear, because he knows it; of course this does not mean that he is a coward, on the contrary he belongs to the bravest of men; but is not all true courage mastered fear? To realize this it is recommendable to read the book of Scheurleer (*Van Varen en van Vechten*, den Haag 1914) or of Cooper and Werumeus Buning (*De zingende walvisch*, Amsterdam): the Dutch sailors' songs, partly from our golden age, which have been collected by these authors, are full with lamentations about the hard and dangerous business of the seaman; fear of the hostile element, sometimes even hatred and aversion form the background of the pious confidence in the mercy of God, which keeps those sailors on their legs; when at last they have firm ground under their feet again, they thank God exactly like the sailors of Plautus.³⁾ In the set of the brave traders on the Cape of Good Hope pious fear of the own foolhardiness, pious invectives in the manner of Horace against navigation as being a sin against the natural order of things were not at all unknown.⁴⁾ And if one desires to know the views of sailors about the watery grave, it may be enough to refer to Nelson's dying request, not to throw his corpse into the sea.⁵⁾ And though as a matter of course the utterances of christian sailors about this night-mare usually exhibit a more resigning spirit⁶⁾ than in Greek and Roman times, at any rate there is no question about there being anything more than resignation. Skipper Rang, the most tremendous old salt of *Hollands Glorie*, is always yearning for the moment he will be able to bid farewell to his tug-boat, to contract a marriage ashore and to take possession of a cottage . . . at Apeldoorn! Finally the man died at sea, but his longings had been very different indeed. To be sure, *Hollands Glorie* is only a novel; but at any rate it is a very lively one, which has

³⁾ E. g. Scheurleer I, 319 (from the year 1639), III, 287 = Cooper 115 (from 1750).

⁴⁾ Kalff, *De sage v. d. vliegende Hollander* (Zutphen 1923), 119.

⁵⁾ De Saint-Denis 314.

⁶⁾ E. g. Scheurleer I, 319.

much more affinity with real life than the false romanticism that has taught us to see the sailor with a quasi-heroic, in reality insipid, rose-coloured aureole of spurious attachment to the sea. On the other hand it is exactly the land-lubber that often exhibits a peculiar fearlessness towards the sea, a vice which arises from his total ignorance of maritime reality. If we wish to make acquaintance with the Romans as land-lubbers, we must not fix our attention upon utterances of water-fear in their literature, which prove nothing, because they come from the Greeks and are to be heard often enough from the mouth of the bravest seaman, but upon their rash temerity at sea, which convicts them as landsmen. *The Romans are not afraid enough of the sea, because they do not know and therefore underrate its dangers.* During the first Punic war entire fleets went to the bottom, because the self-opinionated Roman admirals ventured to sail along a rocky coast notwithstanding the approaching of stormy weather and the warnings of expert seamen and at another time rashly tried to cross the open sea on their way from Sicily to Rome; ⁷⁾ the commentary the Greek Polybius delivers upon the first of these facts is in perfect accordance with my own. And this phenomenon did not confine itself to the first great maritime war the Romans had to wage: of course they learned something from hard and sad experience, but the fact remains that in their later history they again and again exhibited the same reckless foolhardiness at sea which had proved disastrous in the beginning: Lucullus and Cesar are illustrious and lucky specimens of it, Germanicus a miserable one. Of course it is not my intention to uphold the paradox that land-lubbers are never afraid of the sea: from lack of experience they are either extremely afraid of it or extremely audacious, in both cases quite unreasonably; but the seaman knows exactly the dangers of the sea and the limits of human strength in its struggle against it: both his fear and his courage are limited by experience and reason.

As a matter of course a passion for adventure, a craving after the distant and unknown and a strong attachment to the sea are natural to the real sailor. But is this attachment incompatible with the fear of the sea I ascribed to him? Of course not: it has a strongly dualistic character. ⁸⁾ The sea attracts and the sea repels; when the seaman is ashore, the sea attracts him like the magnet does the iron, but when being on the open sea the land calls

⁷⁾ Pol. 1, 37. 39; Schultze 33—34; de Saint-Denis 23.

⁸⁾ Kalf 169.

him and he curses the hostile element, which forces him to slave and to drudge and to face mortal dangers: his attachment to the liquid element has a complex nature, it is a queer mixture of love and hatred. There is a certain tendency of romanticism to compare the relation between seaman and sea with the relation between bridegroom and bride. I can only agree to it on the understanding that such a comparison should not be taken in a too romantic sense: *if* the attachment of the seaman to the sea has some affinity with the marriage-bond, we should think of a marriage full of friction, of one of those curious, tragi-comic couples who live in constant disagreement, but cannot dispense with each other, because at heart they belong together. It may be true, that there is a tendency among sailors to address the sea as a female being; but ... it is usually abusive language they fling at her head: when she is playing treacherous pranks upon him, the French sailor scolds her "Marie Salope"! ⁹⁾ The existence of a strong attachment cannot be denied; but this attachment does not at all exclude fear, sometimes even hatred and aversion and pining for the safety of land. Of course such things are not derogatory to the courage of the seaman; on the contrary: courage without fear is no true courage at all, but only the unreasonable foolhardiness of the brute; real attachment to a difficult and dangerous calling is downright unthinkable without a certain fear, however subdued it usually may be. I shall always remember the two old fishermen, who were looking on, when long ago with two other young dare-devils I put to sea in an open boat from the harbour of Volendam in order to cross to Friesland. A storm was raging and the sea was very rough, when we sailed out; shaking their heads the old, expert fellows looked on and one of them called after us: „Moeten jullie nu met alle geweld verzuipertje gaan spelen?" ¹⁰⁾ I am still alive, because even foolish land-lubbers on the open sea sometimes enjoy the protection of Heaven (only too soon we were forced to go back on account of a violent fit of sea-sickness, which befell one of us); but is it to be wondered at that those old salts regarded us as madmen?

What then was the difference between Greeks and Romans in their relations to the sea? Perhaps we can now give the answer. A study on the Greeks and the sea in the manner of de Saint-Denis' book has not been published as far as I know. A sad consequence of this deplorable void is

⁹⁾ De Saint-Denis 131.

¹⁰⁾ I am not able to translate this phrase; it means something like: "What the devil is the pleasure of being drowned?"

the fact, that without a firm footing upon the ground of extensive materials scholars quietly use to stigmatize Greek seamanship on the strength of a few passages they accidentally have in mind: of course in this way it is not very difficult to demonstrate that the Greeks did fear or shun the sea, and to pass to the order of the day with the rather cheap remark that obviously they were no sea-dogs.¹¹⁾ But we are never to forget, that the water-fear of the Greeks is attended with a strong attachment to the sea, which grows in strength during their history. Is there any passage that better illustrates this attachment than Xenophon's famous description of the joy of the Greek soldiers, when after endless marches through the barren highlands of Armenia they at last caught sight of the sea? ¹²⁾ And don't tell me that they only wept on account of the *sight* of the sea, because it was familiar to all of them from their native country, and that they did not associate it with the possibility of navigation: the sequel of the story proves, that they had but one thought: to *sail* home.¹³⁾ Try to imagine Roman legionaries in their place; they perhaps would have sighed: "must it really be our fate after having sustained so many hardships on land to get sea-sickness into the bargain?" At any rate they would not have shed tears of joy! ¹⁴⁾

No, among the Romans you will discover but scanty traces of real attachment to the sea, whether you fix your eyes upon their literature or upon their history; and, as far as it goes, it is not the attachment of the seaman, but of the bather. It may be true, that the sea-faring man, when being ashore, will show his attachment to the sea by rambling about among the ships in the dock-area; but there is one thing he will never do: he is not going to look at the sea from a bath-chair. This belongs to the typical land-lubbers' enjoyments; to realize that it may be useful to think of the two categories of people from which in former times the public of our sea-side resorts used to be recruited in overwhelming majority: two groups *bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble*, but at any rate both categories of land-lubbers. So it was not by chance, that the snobbism of the sea-side became such a very typical and in many regards offensive exponent of Roman (and not at all of Greek) civilization. *Leur amour de la mer est*

¹¹⁾ Compare i.a. Köster, *Das antike Seewesen* (Berlin 1923), 82, Kalff 128 e.v.; much better Gomme, *Essays in Greek history and literature* (Oxford 1937), 202.

¹²⁾ *Anab.* 4, 7, 21 sq.

¹³⁾ 5, 1, 1 sq.

¹⁴⁾ See Holland Rose 178.

une acquisition; ce n'est pas une force populaire, mais une élégance mondaine, thus runs the terse and sharp characterization that concludes de Saint-Denis' study on the part of the sea in Latin poetry. If you wish to see the Roman in his typical relation to the sea, then look at Cicero, who used to pass his holidays on the sea-side, if he could, but who had to pay his tribute to Neptune, as soon as he set foot on board a ship! Nowhere this peculiarity of the Roman land-lubber, *his enjoying the sea from the beach*, is expressed with more ingenuousness and pregnancy than in the following poem, which is ascribed to Petronius: ¹⁵⁾

*Qui non vult properare mori nec cogere fata
mollia praecipiti rumpere fila manu,
hactenus iratum mare noverit: ecce refuso
gurgite securos obluit unda pedes.*

5 *Ecce inter virides iactatur mytilus algas,
et raucò trahitur lubrica concha sinu.
Ecce recurrentes qua versat fluctus arenas,
discolor attrita calculus exit humo.*

*Haec quisquis calcare potest, in litore tuto
10 ludat et hoc solum iudicet esse mare.*

Again and again and in every key this sentiment is voiced in Latin literature; ¹⁶⁾ and what is more, apart from a few exceptions the whole vision on the sea in that literature is bathers' vision. Of course it is not my intention to scorn this one-sidedly and make sport of it only. Every *défaut* is attended by a *qualité* and *vice versa*: even the snobbish beach-life of the Roman sea-side visitor delivered certain artistic values which sea-dogs might have produced to a much inferior degree or not at all. Although or rather because he was a hundred per cent rustic character, Vergil learned during his sojourn on the Neapolitan beach to render in a highly sensitive and delicate way the colouring and the orchestration of the sea on the coast; as a sharply observing and impressionable outsider he had a better eye and ear for these things than the seaman, who lives with the sea from within, but who for that very reason treats her in a rather sober, prosaic way, as a matter of fact, and undergoes less consciously her wealthy abundance of colours and sounds. The never resting immensity of the sea does not only provide the thinker Lucretius with an intellectual symbol,

¹⁵⁾ In the edition of Ernout fr. LII (p. 200).

¹⁶⁾ Compare e. g. the congenial passage Ovid. *Am.* 2, 11, 11 or the *suave mari magno* of Lucretius.

a tangible image of the world of the atoms, but moreover it fills the poet with that perplexity before the boundless space which inspires his most beautiful verses. The sea as a sentimental frame, as a sounding-board for the sensations of the lonely human being on the beach is found in the poems of Catullus and others. And there could be mentioned many other excellent achievements like these, for which, however, I refer the reader to de Saint-Denis' masterly book. And yet, however delicately and sensitively these things may have been worded and voiced by many a Roman poet, however high, artistic values been produced by them in this sphere, the fact remains, that their effusions are utterances of the observer on the beach, who is lonely perhaps, but at heart feels safe and comfortable, and not of the man who has conquered the sea or rather who in a continuous fearful struggle shares his life with her; in short, the whole of it remains within the sphere of the bather, albeit in a higher sense of the word, and not of the seaman. And immediately correlative with this phenomenon is the fact, that the Roman poet miserably fails, as soon as he has to illustrate navigation itself, life on board from within, the open with its gales and without the safe background of the shore. From his safe station the Roman poet is very well able to word the sound- and colour-effects of a storm on the beach, but when it comes to the description of a storm on board a ship in the open, he is little more than a dabbler. *Le cyclone passe-partout*, as de Saint-Denis wittily has christened it, is a stupid tralatitious element, a petrified and ridiculous rhetorical cliché, unseasonably hunted up by every poet from his reference-book, in every generation again and again "enriched" with new, always empty stage-effects: from Ennius onward it downright haunts the whole of Latin poetry. "Une mer d'opérette", cries de Saint-Denis, rightly desperate. Even Ovid, who had travelled enough by sea to know the life on board a ship in its reality, who therefore much more than Vergil was able to describe correctly a nautical manoeuvre and without any doubt had personally gone through bad weather in the open, yet in his descriptions of storms remains so strongly under the spell of the rhetorical cliché, that on the score of these *tableaux* we might have the inclination to agree with Hartman and to conjecture (if we didn't know better) that he had never left Rome.¹⁷⁾ And Seneca himself, who — I will come back to it presently — occupies an exceptional position, because he exhibits more of attachment to the main than the

¹⁷⁾ Compare de Saint-Denis 352.

lot of Roman poets, and who makes sport of the follies of the "cyclone passe-partout" in his scientific works,¹⁸⁾ for all that submits in his tragedies to the killing humdrum of this *cliché*. The traditionalism, which ruled the Roman mind in such a high degree, is naturally a *general* factor of importance in Latin literature; but nowhere it tends so much towards degeneration into a tedious jog-trot as within the sphere of the main. It is a bad sign; for doesn't it prove that the living contact of the Roman with the sea was, apart from beach-life, very small? And this applies not only to the descriptions of gales, but as well to the description of the nautical manoeuvre, which usually remains vague, flat, seen from the outside, as is to be expected from an unexperienced observer, who is standing on the shore, not succinct, sharp, exact, seen from the point of view of the active sailor. The misuse of the wind-rose is also to be mentioned in this connexion: the petrified custom of vaguely handling notions as Aquilo, Eurus, Notus, Auster, Zephyrus in the sense of winds and gales, the *direction* of the wind being quite disregarded, is *never* to be found among sailors: on the contrary, in pointing out the direction of the wind, in which they are above all interested, they will be extremely prosaic and exact.

In these respects Greek literature exhibits much stronger ties of familiar intimacy with sailor-life than Roman literature. Or we may compare our own maritime poetry with it. In truth it is no unmixed pleasure to struggle through Scheurleer's volumes: the sailors' songs from our golden age are often products of bungling, broken-winded rhymesters. But one thing is indisputable: these people were familiar with the open, with the life on board a ship, with riggings and nautical manoeuvre; here we are breathing forthwith that peculiar coarse, sturdy, humorous atmosphere of pitch, tar, cordage, fish-stench and such like, the lack of which we often feel so painfully in Roman literature. Compare the Proteus-episode in the fourth book of Homer's *Odyssey* with Vergil's imitation of it in the Aristaeus-episode of the *Georgica* (4, 415 sq.). The Greek poet snugly insists upon the intolerable seal-stench (406, 441 sq.), his humour culminating in the jocular question: "For who would by preference sleep with a sea-monster?" Ambrosia alone is strong enough to protect the human olfactory organ against something so dreadful. With Vergil the seal-stench has been completely eliminated; the ambrosia he has kept, but . . . it only serves to

¹⁸⁾ *Qu. Nat.* 5, 16, 2.

endow Aristaeus with superhuman strength! So there is a radical difference of atmosphere: a realistic sailors' story, which humorously told the tribulations of a sealing-adventure and snugly insisted upon unsavoury details, has been transformed into a dignified bathers' tale. ¹⁹⁾

We are bound however to give historical truth its due by pointing out that there are exceptions, though not numerous enough to be more than a confirmation of the rule. There is for instance Seneca: he has a more vivid knowledge of life on board a ship and a sharper notion of nautical and meteorological matters than most Roman poets; he cherishes the idea of the sea not separating, but uniting the nations thanks to the audacious navigator, and the thought of the conquest of the Ocean captivates him; ²⁰⁾ finally he is more alive to the beauty of the wild main than the average Roman poet. We state, however, that he shares these promising new aspects with Seneca the elder ²¹⁾ and Lucan and that on the other hand such things did not take root in Latin literature, but rather formed an *intermezzo*: after Seneca Latin literature fell back entirely into the Vergilian *cliché*, from which even Seneca had not been able to disengage himself completely. ²²⁾ So we might perhaps venture the supposition, that this *intermezzo* in Latin Literature was a Spanish one: does not Seneca's orientation towards the Ocean point in the same direction? Undoubtedly Seneca was a Roman, but nevertheless he remained at the same time a plant from foreign soil, an anomaly, „somebody from the colonies”, transplanted into the fatherland.

On the other side Plautus: in his plays the seaman, the merchant, the fisherman appear in the flesh before the footlights, with all their fears and distresses, but also with their robust attachment to the sea and with their coarse, succulent, jolly good nautical humour; here the sea is not a pale, discoloured, at best picturesque scenery, safely pushed into the background, but she is herself immediately in the play: we almost taste her saltish breath. And of course we cannot despatch this matter by pointing out that Plautus translated from the Greek, though this may be true to a great extent: after all Plautus wrote for a Roman public; particularly his sailorlike habit of applying nautical metaphors to human relations ²³⁾ and

¹⁹⁾ De Saint-Denis 175.

²⁰⁾ E. g. *Medea* 364 sq., de Saint-Denis 414.

²¹⁾ *Controv.* 2, 1, 13, de Saint-Denis 407.

²²⁾ *V. s.* p. 9.

²³⁾ *Miles* 986—987; *Men.* 442, etc.; de Saint-Denis 67.

generally of handling with predilection nautical expressions and jokes would be inconceivable without a public that was alive to such kind of humour. To realize this confront him with Terence, who used to adapt similar Greek models, but in whose plays the sea plainly makes default! ²⁴⁾ How else to explain this difference than by the fact, that Terence wrote for the stalls, that is to say for his aristocratic friends, who felt too grave and stately for sailors' drolleries, Plautus on the contrary for the upper-gallery, where the sailors sat? Plautus proves anyhow, that there must have existed Roman sea-dogs, who were better able to enjoy his plays than the philistine Horace. The only question is: did they really occupy such an extraordinarily subordinate place in Roman society, as Plautus' isolated position in Latin literature might make us believe, or does a visual error of the historian, caused by the predominantly aristocratic character of Latin literature, play a part in the game? Let us cast a glance on Roman history: perhaps this may give a decisive answer. ^{24a)}

The Roman at sea . . . that is something in the style of the Englishman on land! We state a constant inclination to transfer to others that part of the military task which is instinctively regarded as not agreeing with popular character, and, in connexion with this aversion, a tendency to cling to the very last to what might be called with a *contradictio in adiecto* improvisatory methods: the minimum, which circumstances absolutely claim, is done reluctantly and this means, that it is only done at the hour of the highest need in an improvisatory way; one prefers to squeeze oneself through the eyes of a hundred needles rather than to look far ahead and to build up beforehand a carefully kept up and regularly working organization of that part of the defence of the country which is regarded as strange to national tradition and with a kind of ostrich-policy pushed to the background of consciousness.

Transference to aliens. It is an almost hopeless task for the historian to form an adequate idea of what the recruitment of the Roman naval personnel was like in republican times, and the difficulty of this problem is in itself a deplorable symptom of the little interest the Romans used to take in naval affairs; for it is rooted in the fact that Roman historiography only sporadically and incidentally alludes to these matters and usually

²⁴⁾ De Saint-Denis 95.

^{24a)} For the following remarks the short, but very good chapter on Roman naval warfare in Adcock's recent book may be compared.

leaves them in the dark.²⁵⁾ Yet one thing is clear: *in the military sphere the citizen was associated with legionary service, he was regarded as unfit or (from a psychological point of view quite the same thing) too good*²⁶⁾ *for naval service; therefore this last military duty was as much as possible transferred to alien elements.* To be sure, the proper naval personnel — apart from the marine troops, which were recruited from citizens — was not *exclusively* recruited from allies and slaves, but also from citizens; yet I can't believe, that it generally was drawn from the Roman proletariat: the context of Polybius 6, 19 seems to show that the naval service of these proletarians was invested with a military character, which means that the marine troops were drawn from them, which in time of war formed the permanent garrisons of the galleys and before a battle used to be stiffened with legionaries;²⁷⁾ this is in complete concordance with the fact that, where the sources mention levies of citizens for *nautical* service, there is practically always spoken of *libertini*.²⁸⁾ In short, left aside the rarely-mentioned and certainly not very numerous citizens of the maritime colonies, the crews of the galleys were recruited from allies, slaves and *libertini*, that is to say from categories of *peregrini* and not of Romans: as a matter of course the *libertini* (= ex-slaves) were naturalized foreigners and no born Romans, though they possessed the citizenship. Is it not extremely remarkable that the term *socii navales*, which naturally *could* only refer to the *allies* in Roman naval service, became so stereotyped a phrase for crew (oarsmen and sailors both), that it was used as well of crews, composed of citizens (*libertini*) or slaves, and that it was even applied to crews of Carthage and other foreign states?²⁹⁾ This proves that the alien element was predominant in Roman naval service and that this service was associated with the *peregrinus* and not with the citizen. And if the proper Roman fleets themselves used to be manned with

²⁵⁾ If we know more about the recruitment of personnel for the imperial navy, we owe this to epigraphy and not to historiography, compare the extensive monographs of Chapot, *La flotte de Misène* (thèse Paris 1896/97), and Fiebiger, *Leipziger Studien* 15.

²⁶⁾ Compare e. g. Liv. 32, 23, 9.

²⁷⁾ Compare Tarn, *Companion*, 761.

²⁸⁾ Liv. 36, 2, 15; 40, 18, 7; 42, 27, 3; 43, 12, 9; the only other category of citizens, mentioned in connexion with nautical service, are those of the maritime colonies, Liv. 36, 3, 4 sq.; but apart from these and the *libertini* apparently no Roman citizen ever handled an oar. Compare the sections about the naval personnel in the conclusion of the second chapter and in the third chapter (separately for every war).

²⁹⁾ Compare e. g. Liv. 40, 18, 7; 24, 11, 7 sq.; 21, 50, 3; Tarn *l. l.*

predominantly alien crews, *a fortiori* the same holds good with regard to the auxiliary squadrons of allies like Rhodes, Pergamum and other maritime powers, the crews of which were naturally composed of Rhodians, Pergamenes etc. and *never* of Roman citizens. This means that the peregrine preponderance with Roman sea-power grew more and more in the course of history. For after the second Punic war Roman sea-power gravitated in an ever advancing degree towards the auxiliary system: during the Punic wars, when Sicily and Italy itself were at stake, the Romans had been forced by necessity to launch repeatedly important fleets of their own, though even these proper Roman squadrons, as I already remarked, used to be manned with predominantly foreign crews (from Italy and Sicily); anyhow the ships and the marine troops had been purely Roman. During the second century, however, Roman sea-power exhibited more and more symptoms of atrophy resulting in total decay, whereas the centre of gravity was shifted towards the excellent auxiliary squadrons of allies in the eastern seas, especially of Pergamum and Rhodes. In the maritime war against Antiochus it was Rhodian sea-power that won the game for Rome, notwithstanding the incapacity of the Roman admiral; and does not the pitiful helplessness Rome displayed in the third Macedonian war against the really not very seaworthy Macedon, because little Rhodes remained neutral, tell the same story in a negative way? And also after the large gap in the history of Roman sea-power, which then follows — we may safely say that nearly during a century and precisely in the period of her strongest expansion Rome did scarcely possess any navy at all —, the auxiliary system remains foremost. In the last decades before the maritime revival, when there was as yet no question about the restoration of Roman sea-power, but when its absence at least was painfully felt, the aid of maritime allies naturally was called in in case of emergency; Sulla's aide-de-camp Lucullus for instance went all over the eastern seas from ally to ally begging for ships. And in the days of the maritime *réveil*, when at last under the pressure of hard necessity it began to dawn upon the Romans that Italy, if it declined to go to perdition, *must* possess a good navy again, the *system itself* was not changed: the great Pompeius as well as his son Sextus, both of whom plainly realized the importance and even the indispensability of a strong navy, chiefly built upon the auxiliary system and with the latter, let alone the lower personnel, freedmen with Greek and Asiatic names ranked even next to the admiral. ³⁰⁾

³⁰⁾ Compare Robiou 104—105, Cichorius 257 sq.

One might perhaps expect that, when at last Octavianus with the aid of Agrippa reestablished a national Roman navy, of which the standing squadrons of the Empire were to be the offspring, he should have made an essential change in the recruitment of the personnel too. Does not a national Roman navy presuppose a national Roman naval personnel? In the years 90—89 b. C. almost the whole of Italy had acquired Roman citizenship. Was it not natural that the *socii navales*, who always had served in the Roman fleet, now after their naturalization should continue this naval service as citizens? Was it not to be expected that, numerous Italiots, who were much more attached to the sea than the old Roman peasantry, now being Roman citizens, public opinion in Roman society should have shifted considerably in favour of the naval service? Yet this did not happen. It is probable that between the year 89 (when all Italy received the Roman citizenship) and the establishment of the permanent imperial squadrons under the reign of Augustus no Italians were called out for naval service: the Pompeii, Brutus, Cassius and Antonius used to recruit outside Italy (from the provinces) and even Octavianus, when forced by the war against Sextus Pompeius to found an *Italian* navy, resorted to slaves.³¹⁾ Why? Obviously because since the year 89 the *Italici* possessed the Roman citizenship and therefore were now regarded as too good for naval service. And the recruitment of naval personnel for the standing imperial squadrons was but a continuation of the same system: at first this personnel was recruited, exactly like before, from slaves and freedmen and when, perhaps under the reign of Claudius, the system was changed and naval service transferred from slaves and freedmen to free-born men, it was transferred to *peregrini* and not to citizens.³²⁾ So we always find back the same categories of *socii navales* that had prevailed in republican times, and the only difference is, that the peregrines, who served in the imperial navy, now came from outside Italy, because the Italian allies had acquired Roman citizenship: up to the age of Caracalla you will find among the naval personnel of Misenum and Ravenna no Roman citizens, no Italians and during the whole imperial age naval service was regarded as inferior to service in the land army, exactly as had been the case in republican times. So the naturalization of the Italians did not modify Roman public opinion in favour of the naval service; on the contrary the Italians complied with that public opinion and Roman

³¹⁾ Dio, 48, 49, 1; Suet. *Div. Aug.* 16, 1.

³²⁾ Chapot 180—181.

prejudice against naval service remained exactly what it was: as soon as the Italians had acquired Roman citizenship, all of a sudden they became too good for the navy.

Of course one may point out, that even a maritime power as Athens was did not recruit its naval personnel exclusively from the own citizens. But firstly the civic element was much more numerous here and even the main source of recruitment, as generally the navy was a point of honour for the Athenian city-state; and secondly a rather high percentage of the non-Athenian elements were *Greeks*.³³⁾ Or we may compare Rhodes, where not only the marine troops, but also the sailors and rowers used to be citizens and where — it is a very remarkable fact — service in the land army was regarded as inferior to service in the navy.³⁴⁾ If the predominance of civic or alien elements in the navy of a nation is a reasonable standard to judge the attachment to the sea or the “hydrophobia” of that nation,³⁵⁾ then the Romans were undoubtedly a people of land-lubbers. One might argue that exactly from the first century b. C. onward *all* civic elements were badly needed for legionary service on account of the downward movement of the Italian birth rate, which resulted from the decline of the Italian peasantry, so that there may perhaps have been a downright compulsion to recruit the naval personnel from the provinces. There may be something in this argument; but don’t speak too easily of compulsion. The task of the squadrons of Misenum and Ravenna (the protection of the sea-routes), though a humble and mainly prophylactic one, was (on account of the transmarine import of indispensable victuals) of as vital an interest for imperial Italy as the protection of the frontiers by the legions. So the compulsion did not come from the birth rate, but from popular prejudice, which of old regarded legionary service as a point of honour for the citizen, naval service on the contrary as a necessary evil, hardly good enough for alien elements. For why not leave the legionary service to foreigners and reserve naval service for citizens, as a sea-faring nation, placed between the horns of such a dilemma, would have done unhesitatingly? ³⁶⁾ The *choice* was always free-

³³⁾ See Sargent, *The use of slaves by the Athenians in warfare* (Class. Phil. 22, 1927, 264 sq.), and Busolt, *Griech. Staatskunde*, 1207.

³⁴⁾ See Rostovtzeff, *C. A. H. VIII*, 636 sq.

³⁵⁾ Schultze X.

³⁶⁾ Think of Rhodes, where service in the land army was regarded as inferior to service in the navy (see footnote 34), and of our own republic, in whose fleets the Dutch sailors, in whose armies the alien elements were predominant (compare Huizinga, *Nederland's beschaving in de zeventiende eeuw* (Haarlem 1941), 55—56).

and it was Roman popular character that freely chose the service on land. Of course it is possible, though not at all easy, to analyse this popular character; we may remark, that it was predominantly rustic, conservative and aristocratic, and on account of these qualities we may conjecture, that a certain fear of political radicalism may have been a strong motive in Roman history to limit as much as possible the civic element in naval service and to reduce to a minimum the navy itself; but let us not forget that facts are only paraphrased in this way and not explained: after all popular character is only partly reducible to other things.³⁷⁾

Improvisatory methods. In the maritime sphere, as I remarked before, the minimum that circumstances absolutely claim is done reluctantly, and this means that it is only done at the hour of the highest need in an improvisatory way. A standing, carefully and continuously kept-up navy was altogether out of the question before the reign of Augustus; in republican times *ex tempore* methods were the order of the day. When there is no maritime war, the Romans do not keep any men of war in active service; only when they have to face a naval war at short notice, they are going to ascertain, how many ships are available from the last war and can still be made seaworthy after having been lying neglected in the docks for years, how many are to be got from sea-faring allies, and finally the minimal number of ships that has to be built additionally in order to match the enemy. To be sure in taking such measures they are able to display fabulous energy and speed; but nevertheless they are

³⁷⁾ I know that such a conception of popular character is regarded by many scholars as a bad make-shift, invented by sluggards in order to get rid of thinking through and puzzling out difficult problems, and I will not deny that it might be abused in this way; but the other extreme of explaining away popular character by reducing it wholly to external influences is quite as bad, if not worse. Of course popular as well as individual character is liable to a certain extent to influences from without; but the core of both is not reducible to mere external factors, which can only corroborate or extenuate native tendencies. It is very easy to explain the land-lubberism of the Romans by saying that they had at their disposal rich and abundant soil to till and therefore did not need the sea; but such an assertion is only partly true: in the course of early Roman history there were always numerous sons of poor peasants, whom Rome had to provide for and whom she did provide with land by conquering the whole of Italy in long and bloody wars; and from the second century b. C. thousands of pauperized peasants were always present at Rome, who led a life of loitering beggars. Why didn't these men go to sea and try to find an existence in over-sea-trade? It would have been possible for them as well as for others; but why didn't they even think about it? Because they were born tillers of the soil; indeed, but here we are back again at the point of departure: Roman popular character!

limping behind the events. Has the war been won, the adversary naturally has to hand over his fleet; but. . . it usually doesn't occur to the Romans to add these ships to their own navy and use them themselves on the next opportunity! ³⁸⁾ No, the delivered ships are either burnt or given away to sea-faring allies. Indeed the Romans usually behave as if they were disgusted with ships and made it a point of honour to come into touch with them in the least possible degree. This system (for notwithstanding all systemlessness it is a system after all) implies that the measure of helplessness, displayed by Rome at the beginning of a naval war, largely depended upon the question, whether a long or a short time had passed since the conclusion of the preceding war. If it had been a short time, there were still ships available, however neglected they might be; but if the interval had been long, the natural consequence was, that at the beginning of the new war (apart from the naval contingents of eventual allies) practically there did not exist a Roman navy at all! In this way we can quite naturally explain the striking fact that the Romans after Pydna, ³⁹⁾ that is to say precisely in the period of their strongest expansion, nearly for a century scarcely possessed any navy at all: from the year 201 onward they had chiefly lived on their stock of ships, built during the second Punic war, and drawn heavily upon their maritime allies; so their own stock of ships had been gradually worn off and besides after the third Macedonian war they had committed the blunder of driving their best maritime allies, the Rhodians, into the corner and seriously weakening them, because the rulers of the world were displeased with the independent behaviour of the proud little republic and wanted to humble her. We shall do well by not regarding these things too exclusively as symptoms of decay: they belonged by nature to the Roman naval system itself, which implied the ideal of. . . naval disarmament, not for Rome's enemies alone, but for the Romans themselves and their allies as well. A nice system perhaps but for the circumstance, that it reckoned without two "trifles": firstly the always threatening Mediterranean evil of piracy and secondly the fact that in the course of the second century Italy through the decline of the small Italian peasantry and the growth of large estates was deprived of its economic

³⁸⁾ Of course there were exceptions to this rule: in the year 241 for instance the captured Carthaginian ships were probably added to the Roman navy, see footnote 11 of chapter II.

³⁹⁾ Already in the third Macedonian war the decline of Roman sea-power had plainly come to light; in the third Punic war the navy played but a subordinate part.

self-sufficiency and regarding the first necessities of life became dependent on transmarine corn-trade. The combination of these two factors with the eclipse of the Roman navy might bring Italy face to face with starvation, a conjuncture which indeed made its appearance several times in the first century b. C. and forced upon the Romans the restoration of sea-power. But am I going too far, if I ask in the face of these facts: is it not a typical symptom of a non-thalattocentric mentality and of a complete absence of attachment to the sea, if a nation, which pretends to rule and keep together a world empire round the Mediterranean, plainly withdraws from that sea, as soon as it has no longer direct and manifest naval adversaries within its horizon?

But it might prove unfair to lay too much stress upon that enormous gap in the history of Roman sea-power which covers large parts of the second and first centuries b. C.; for on either side of it, remarkably enough exactly at the beginning and at the end of Roman maritime history, during the two first Punic wars and on the other side from Pompeius' action against piracy to the founding of the standing squadrons by Augustus, we meet with enormous exertions and important achievements at sea, which seem to speak quite another language. There is no doubt about it; but nevertheless these facts are in perfect accordance with the peculiar *ex tempore* system I tried to characterize in the foregoing pages. The Romans, I said, used to achieve at sea that minimum only which was absolutely claimed by circumstances; well then, this minimum may be very high, exactly because it is determined by circumstances, that is to say by the seriousness of dangers, the force of the adversary, etc. etc.: not only in the maritime sphere, but generally the best quality perhaps of the Roman realists was their masterly adaptation to circumstances. During the Punic wars Rome had to confront Carthage, a very strong maritime power, and in the first war Sicily was at stake, the possession of which was of the highest strategical and economic importance for the state which ruled the whole of Italy, whereas in the second Punic war Rome's position in Italy itself was immediately at stake: as a counter-poise against Hannibal's crushing invasion by land the Romans unconditionally had to rule the waves themselves in order to be saved from perdition. So it is not to be wondered at, that during these wars the Romans spared neither maritime exertions nor expense; circumstances forced it simply upon them. But nevertheless even here the system of the minimum and of limping behind

the facts prevails throughout. In 264 the Romans began the struggle for Sicily almost without a navy; only after some years, when at last they began to realize the constant risk of interruption of their maritime lines of communication, the difficulty of bringing and keeping the maritime towns of Sicily on their own side without a navy and the impossibility of conquering the whole of Sicily from within with the land army, they resolved to build a fleet of their own ⁴⁰⁾ and conquer the sea. This decision was carried out with the usual energy and power of accommodation, but nevertheless under the compulsion of necessity; and the system of the minimum held its own, though on account of circumstances it was naturally high. As the ingenious analyses of Tarn ⁴¹⁾ have proved, a fleet of 200 ships meant a supreme effort for Carthage (the limit must have had to do with the crews, that is with the limitation of the available *human* material). This fact was known to the Romans, perhaps through the benevolent medium of Syracuse; and as from a nautical and tactical point of view they were no match for the Carthaginians, they must necessarily outbuild the adversaries and keep up a fleet of from 20 to 40 ships in excess of 200 in order to have a chance of victory. And really in 260 the Romans had about 160 ships, the Carthaginians 130, at Ecnomus the Romans 230 against the Carthaginians about 200, at Hermaea the Romans 250, the Carthaginians 200, at the Aegates insulae the Romans about 220, the Carthaginians perhaps 170 to 200 at the outside. ⁴²⁾ During the second Punic war the Carthaginians never managed to reach the supreme limit of their maritime efforts, probably in connexion with the fact that the available human material did not suffice to support at once a great fleet and a great army; ⁴³⁾ therefore Roman naval superiority was now greater than in the preceding war. We must not forget, however, that this time not only Hannibal had to be continuously kept isolated and cut off from Carthage, but that also Philip of Macedon had to be kept at bay and — last, but not least — that the own lines of communication with Spain and Sicily had to be kept up at any price on account of their military and

⁴⁰⁾ Pol. I, 16. 20; already in 263 Valerius Messalla had declared, *ὅτι περὶ νήσου καὶ ἐν νήσῳ μαχομένους οὐκ ἔστι τῷ παντὶ νικᾶν μὴ ναυκρατοῦντας* (Ined. Vat. 4; Meyer, *Kleine Schriften* II, 377); but the first real Roman fleet-building dates from 260.

⁴¹⁾ *Fleets* 48 sq., especially 57 sq.

⁴²⁾ The critically revised (generally reduced) numbers of Tarn are accepted here.

⁴³⁾ Tarn, *Fleets*, 56 and compare the closing remarks of my second chapter.

economic importance. ⁴⁴⁾ So this time again there were strenuous maritime exertions on the Roman side and even a temporary system of more or less standing squadrons with standing commands was developed during the long war. But nevertheless the number of Roman warships never exceeded 220 except in the year 208, ⁴⁵⁾ when — it is a highly characteristic fact — the fleet was hurriedly increased up to a total effective of 280 ships on account of a rumour (which for the rest proved false) about the Carthaginians launching a great fleet, the number of course being put at 200. ⁴⁶⁾ Such numbers meant the minimum Rome *must* do to drag the war from the gates of hell, and we shall do well to remember also the queer mistakes, committed during this war by the Romans at sea, particularly their fatal decision to accomplish a rather radical naval disarmament, as soon as they could breathe somewhat more freely after two little naval victories and Hasdrubal's crushing defeat of 207, so that without the utter paralysis of the Carthaginian navy Scipio's African expedition might have ended in a catastrophe by reason of his ridiculously small naval forces. Were these achievements more than an absolutely necessary minimum? If we remember that the Ionians in 494 in the battle off Lade confronted the Persian fleet with 353 triremes (Hdt. 6, 8), that the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war had 300 galleys at their disposal (Thuc. 2, 13, 8) and little Corcyra alone 120 (Thuc. 1, 29), we must say that in comparison with these Greek naval effectives the Roman fleet-numbers of the third century, when Rome could dispose of the resources of the whole of Italy, are certainly not contemptible, but not impressive either, however much we may stress the point that the Roman quinqueremes had much larger crews than the Greek triremes and that the real difficulty was not to *build* many ships, but to *man* them. Rome always was at heart a typically continental and not a naval power and so she stuck to the *minimum* in the naval sphere.

But let us now pass to the other side of the fleetless period, that is to say

⁴⁴⁾ As Hannibal was laying waste Italy, Rome needed transmarine import of grain from Sicily and other countries in order to escape starvation, compare the second chapter *sub anno* 216 (*import of grain*), where the passages relative to this subject have been collected.

⁴⁵⁾ And consequently in the year 207, when there were perhaps some 240 ships on service; for the fleetnumbers of the second Punic war compare the detailed analyses of the second chapter and especially the closing remarks.

⁴⁶⁾ Tarn, *Fleets*, 58, Liv. 27, 22, 7 sq., compare the second chapter *sub anno* 208.

to the last fifty years of the Roman republic, to the revival of Roman sea-power, as usually it is christened not unjustly.⁴⁷⁾ Indeed it is not to be imputed to a visual error of the historian, if here he gets the impression that after a long period of maritime lethargy Roman history now is going to return to the first period of expansion outside Italy, to the age of the Punic wars: while generally the Romans show the instinctive inclination to seek the final decision of their wars in a land battle, now for the first time again we find decisive naval battles, as in the days of the first Punic war (for instance the operations against Sextus Pompeius and the battle of Actium); again the maritime operations chiefly take place in the Italian and Sicilian waters; we observe a growing notion of the importance of sea-power and in connexion with it ever growing efforts to strengthen the naval forces, which reach their summit during the struggle between Octavianus and Sextus Pompeius; this last war, which much more than the battle of Actium brought about the decision of the civil wars, again and again reminds us of the first Punic war, not only on account of the field of operations (the seas near Sicily), but as well from a tactical point of view. As I remarked, this is not to be ascribed to mere chance nor to an optical delusion. Regarding the revival of Roman sea-power there might be remarked that in this period Roman society at last begins to show more understanding for the legitimate interests of over-sea-trade, that the *equites* had a hand in the effectual measures against piracy in 67 b. C. (the beginning of the new course),⁴⁸⁾ that in this period the idea of a growing imperial unity, of which under the principate the equestrian much more than the senatorial order would be the bearer, and in connexion with this idea the conception of the sea as a uniting and not as a separating element began to come to the front, in a word that the principate cast its shadow before. To such a conception I can agree to a certain extent, that is to say on the understanding that it should not be taken in a too ideal sense: after all the Romans remained land-lubbers, they were not all of a sudden metamorphosed into sea-dogs; the phrase *mare nostrum*, which indeed appeared for the first time in this period, was used only in a local, geographical sense to distinguish the Mediterranean from the Ocean and

⁴⁷⁾ Compare the important paper of Kromayer, *Die Entwicklung der römischen Flotte vom Seeräuberkerige des Pompeius bis zur Schlacht von Actium* (Philologus 56 (N. F. X), 1897, 426 sq.).

⁴⁸⁾ See the chapter *Pompey's army in the service of capitalists* in Frank, *Roman imperialism* (New York 1921), 313 sq.

not at all to voice sentiments of proud dominion or a political program, which only some years ago was connected with it by the conceited fascistic rulers of poor modern Italy, in other words the Roman mentality always remained mainly continental, *not thalattocentric*.⁴⁹⁾ All the mentioned phenomena are finally overarched by one predominant factor, with which they might be well-nigh identified: *I mean the fact, that in this period sea-power had become for Italy a question of "to be or not to be", because by the growing of large estates and the decay of the small peasantry it had been deprived of its economic autarky and made dependent on transmarine import of grain, so that by a blockade it could be brought to starvation, unless it was able to brave such a blockade by means of a powerful navy.* This fact was known to the enemies of Italy and against such dangers the Roman state had to defend itself, whether willingly or unwillingly: think of Mithridates and the pirates and above all of Sextus Pompeius, who by his maritime blockade was able to push Italy to the verge of ruin and so compelled Octavianus to bring as it were the first Punic war on the stage again and in a life-and-death struggle for Sicily laboriously to rebuild Italian sea-power from the ground. So it is but little wonder that here we find high fleetnumbers and that finally after the founding of the principate Octavianus definitively made up his mind to establish standing squadrons in order to protect the transmarine import of grain once for all against deadly risks. We have less reason to wonder at the fact that this was achieved in the end, than at the extraordinarily tardy achievement of it. It was a long, long way, before the Romans roused themselves to make definitively away with the old, deeply rooted evil of piracy;⁵⁰⁾ and even after the year 67 they continued for a long time to limp behind the events and to cling obstinately to the old dear *ex tempore* methods and system of transferring, however fully they might be convinced of the importance of a strong navy. For we are not to forget that the important sea-power of the great Pompeius and afterwards the fleets of Brutus and Cassius and of Sextus Pompeius were founded predominantly upon the auxiliary

⁴⁹⁾ Burr, *Nostrum mare* (Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft, Heft 4), 117 sq.; the first instances of the use of this phrase are to be found in the works of Cesar and Sallust.

⁵⁰⁾ Of course the connivance of the senate at piracy had had to do with the fact that the pirates were the chief furnishers of cheap slaves for the large estates in Italy; but would such a corrupt attitude of the government have been tolerated in the long run by a sea-faring nation?

system, which means that they chiefly had been scraped together from non-Roman elements; and, as I remarked above, even the standing Italian squadrons of the empire used to recruit their personnel at first from slaves and freedmen, afterwards exclusively from free-born peregrines. It is a striking fact that even among those men, who in the crisis of the civil wars plainly realized the importance of sea-power,⁵¹⁾ the spirit was anything but "real navy": blood is thicker than water; they remained land-lubbers. The party of Pompey had against Cesar a crushing maritime predominance, but failed miserably in making use of it. Pompey did not succeed in blockading Italy decisively, he suffered Sardinia and Sicily to fall without a blow into the hands of the adversary and — last, but not least — when his supremacy on sea forced Cesar to retreat into the Greek interior, so that Pompey remained master of the situation, he allowed himself to be persuaded by his army into breaking off the communication with the very source of his power: the navy and followed Cesar into the interior, where, far from his fleet, he was to meet perdition. Is it not extremely remarkable that only a few years afterwards this sad story of land-lubberism repeated itself from A to Z during the campaign of Philippi? ⁵²⁾ — The revival of Roman sea-power was a child of Necessity, it was neither born from Roman attachment to the sea nor did it produce such an attachment in its turn. *Navigare necesse erat* in the most strictly literal sense; for that very reason Roman maritime achievements remained confined to reluctantly performed minima, whereas the innate tendency to transfer to others as much as possible always prevailed. Undoubtedly it is under economic compulsion that most nations, even real sea-faring nations, are driven in the first instance to the development of over-sea-trade and sea-power; but the question at issue is, whether in consequence of such a first compulsory step they grow together with the sea and do not restrict themselves to reluctantly performed minima, or unwillingly achieve a minimum at sea, try to make over to others as much as they can, in a word *remain* land-lubbers. The latter qualification applies to the Romans, the first *i. a.* to many a Greek sea-faring state.

One might perhaps remark that the *ex tempore* methods, which I tried to characterize in the foregoing pages, did not remain confined to Roman

⁵¹⁾ For Pompey compare Cic. *ad Att.* 10, 8, 4: *qui mare teneat, eum necesse esse rerum potiri.*

⁵²⁾ Clark 92 and 99; Dio 41, 52, 2; Plut. *Pomp.* 76, 2—3.

naval affairs, that such methods played a part with them in many domains and that they were even deeply rooted in Roman popular character. „Alle schöpferische Kraft,” says a German scholar,⁵³) whose words are too remarkable not to quote them *verbatim*, „zur Unterordnung der Wirklichkeit unter Idee oder Begriff ist dem römischen Vorstellungsablauf ursprünglich fremd und zuwider, da ja die durch die Vergangenheit ausgewiesene und gestaltete Wirklichkeit einen zu hohen Rang hat. So ist auch die römische Verfassungsbildung ein beständiges *muddle through*, ein Improvisieren für den Tag, ein Anbauen und Flickern, das nicht von der Einheit der geistigen Anschauung, sondern von der Einheit des Handelns in der täglichen Anforderung gelenkt wird und eben deshalb die Verzweiflung der modernen staats-theoretischen Deutung ist.” Indeed, this qualification is perfectly correct and it does apply not only to the formation of law and constitution, but as well to the organization of sea-power and even of the land forces. And though we may conclude that the Romans built their *imperium* with very imperfect means in every sphere, fairness commands us to acknowledge that they *succeeded* in building it and that this patch- and piece-work apparently was not so bad as it seems to be. I am even inclined to regard this peculiar disposition of the Roman mind, which it shares with the British mentality, at least in a general way as a virtue rather than as a weak point. Anyhow we do not find here, as for instance with the Spartans or the Germans, the system that kills, nor the mechanical humdrum way without possibility of transmutation nor the over-training of those who have been crammed for and riveted to a rigid system and whose morale will inevitably break down, as soon as the system turns out to be a failure; no, though habitually the Roman is badly prepared, yet for that very reason he commands an incredibly supple power of adaptation and looks reality unconstrainedly and boldly in the face. Does not this absence with the Romans of systematism, over-organization and over-training condition the imperturbable constancy of their morale, even after crushing defeats? And does not the secret of their reigning power lie partly at least in the fact, that notwithstanding their brutishness they were always willing to adapt themselves to the particular circumstances of subdued nations, that, granted all material oppression, they allowed the subdued after all to breathe more or less in their own manner? I believe

⁵³) Wieacker, *Privatrechtsgesetzgebung und politische Grundordnung im römischen Freistaat* (die Antike 16, 1940, 176 sq., especially 187).

that there is something true in such a reasoning; but.... it would be a miracle, if the Romans had not pushed this disposition to extremes in a sphere they instinctively loathed, and it was bad luck, that this sphere was the navy, which least of all could bear the absence of a permanent and strict organization. The Athenians, who luckily for themselves were no very strict organizers either, yet realized clearly that the navy required their permanent care; ⁵⁴) as for the Romans, little short of a century after they had transformed their land army into a professional one, they brought themselves at last to establish a standing navy. And even the history of these standing imperial squadrons, which lately has been treated in detail by the Frenchman Courtois, ⁵⁵) is very instructive from this point of view. For it proves, that the old Roman indifference towards naval affairs in the long run got the upper-hand again. Is it not a striking fact, asks Courtois, that Cassius Dio says nothing of the Italian squadrons and that no author mentions the reforms of Claudius? But much more proving is the fact that, as soon as the crisis of the Roman empire makes its entry (say from the reign of M. Aurelius), the standing squadrons slowly, but surely are given up to atrophy and in the long run the Romans fall back again into the improvisatory-auxiliary system of the republic, the fleet being degraded to a means of transport for the land forces. In other words the standing squadrons of the empire were nothing more than an *intermezzo*, after which the old, innate tendencies are seen to come to the surface again. Doesn't the fact, that in the sphere of naval affairs one of the best qualities of Roman popular character degenerated into a serious foible, furnish conclusive evidence, that the Romans were not attached to the sea?

In most handbooks of Roman history Duilius' famous boarding-bridge is treated as conclusive proof of Roman land-lubberism. Whether or not this short-lived machine played a real, though transitory part in Roman naval warfare, is a difficult problem to solve; ⁵⁶) but it does not affect the question which occupies us here. For it is quite certain that during the whole of their history the Romans always preferred boarding tactics (during the first six years of their naval warfare perhaps with boarding-bridges; afterwards with grappling-irons) to ramming tactics, and this

⁵⁴) Plut. *Per.* 11, 4; Thuc. 1, 142; Arist. *Ab. pol.* 46; Maccartney Shepard 24; Graefe, *Hermes* 54 (1919), 220.

⁵⁵) *Les politiques navales de l'empire romain* (Revue historique 64, 1939, 17—47, 225—259, tome 186).

⁵⁶) I tried to solve it in my last chapter, to which the reader is referred.

means that to the very last they more relied on the military strength of their eminent legionary soldiers than on the nautical skill of their rowers and sailors. The struggle between Octavianus and Sextus Pompeius again and again reminds us of the first Punic war, not only on account of the field of operations (the Sicilian waters), but also from a tactical point of view: against the better seamanship, the greater seaworthiness of the ships and in connexion with these points the predominance of the nautical manoeuvre with Pompey's peregrine squadrons Octavianus and Agrippa had to manage with inferior seamanship, heavier and clumsier ships and therefore with boarding tactics, quite in the same way as their ancestors had helped themselves against the sea-faring Carthaginians in the first Punic war. That really Roman naval warfare always decidedly favoured boarding tactics and that it remained essentially the same in the course of centuries, is also proved by the fact stated by Kromayer,⁵⁷⁾ that the number of marine troops on board the Roman galleys from the first Punic war to the last years of the republic always remained in the neighbourhood of 120 for quinqueremes and of 90 for triremes. These very high numbers — with the Greek triremes they varied from 10 to 40 — presuppose and prove boarding tactics first and last; and this means that the Romans — apart from their sea-faring allies, who naturally leaned toward the nautical manoeuvre and ramming tactics — in naval warfare always retained their landlubberish mentality.⁵⁸⁾ I know very well that even the Dutch tars of our golden age clung to boarding tactics for a long time, so that the Roman inclination towards such tactics would not prove much, if the phenomenon were isolated; but it is not isolated at all and so it does prove something in connexion with other points.

Next to boarding tactics there is another problem which must be mentioned here in conclusion, before we come to our closing remarks. We stated that Roman literature exhibited a predominantly aristocratic character and that the sailor scarcely set his sturdy seal to it: Plautus appeared to be an exception confirming the rule. And on the other side evidently the sea did not set its seal to Roman history either: the elements attached to the sea, which Roman society naturally contained and which the theatre of Plautus presupposes, did not at all determine spirit and

⁵⁷⁾ *Flotte* 481—491.

⁵⁸⁾ Compare the closing remarks of the last chapter.

direction of Roman politics and warfare.⁵⁹⁾ Yet the question remains, whether, notwithstanding the fact that those elements did not play a prominent part in Roman political life, we have to regard them as numerous and important or not. In other words, how did things stand in Roman society regarding the mercantile marine, which in all ages and with all nations always has formed the basis of naval warfare, because it furnishes the navy with nautical experience and able seamen, in a word because it shapes the maritime traditions, upon which sea-power can be built? It is not easy to gather an idea of this matter, because in default of statistics we can scarcely determine the compass of Italian commercial movement, nor easily ascertain, what part Roman and alien elements respectively had in it. But I will bring forward a few points, which in a quasi-statistical way seem to confirm the vague impression, that the Italian mercantile marine as well as the navy was chiefly based on non-Roman elements. Hatzfeld⁶⁰⁾ has devoted a detailed, chiefly epigraphical study to the origin of the Italian merchants, sailors etc., who kept up the commercial intercourse between Italy and the East, and he arrives at the conclusion that an overwhelming majority of these people came from southern Italy,⁶¹⁾ that on the contrary the Roman element was but weakly represented among them and that among these Romans the freedmen, who originally had been peregrines themselves, were numerous. So Hatzfeld rightly characterizes this commercial movement as a *mouvement italien*,

⁵⁹⁾ I know very well, that in a general way Greek literature shows an equally aristocratic spirit as Roman literature and that those aristocrats were quite averse to the maritime imperialism of the democratic city-state. But firstly their works are a (sometimes violent) reaction against this imperialism, which means against the fact, that the *ναυτικός ὄχλος* played a prominent part in the military and political life of many a Greek city-state, a fact, which they reflect and presuppose and cannot get rid of (for instance the „old oligarch“ (Ps.-Xen. *Ἀθ. πολ.*), Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle). And secondly, notwithstanding their often narrow-mindedly anti-thalassic orientation, those Greek aristocrats themselves sometimes unconsciously betray a much stronger attachment to the sea than they would like to acknowledge. Xenophon for instance, who out of dislike for maritime politics all but omits in his Greek history the establishment of the second Athenian confederacy, on the other hand is capable of painting the scene of *θάλαττα, θάλαττα* in such a way, that the emotion of the real event is echoed in his narrative. So the sea is a much more prominent factor in Greek life and in Greek literature than it is with the Romans.

⁶⁰⁾ *Les trafiquants Italiens dans l'Orient Hellénique* (Paris 1919), 238 sq.

⁶¹⁾ That a lot of these people, though not possessing the Roman citizenship, readily accepted abroad the title of honour of *Ῥωμαῖοι* is a matter of course, but does not prove that they were Romans.

non romain. At the same result arrives Pârvan,⁶²⁾ who has demonstrated that the commercial movement of Italy in republican times chiefly was carried on by *Italici* and, as far as Romans were concerned in it, by freedmen with Greek or Graeco-Syrian *cognomina* and that in the imperial age this Italian commercial movement was quite outdone by the provincials. With regard to the mercantile marine as well as to the naval forces we shall do well not to overrate the part the Romans had in „Italia sul mare”.⁶³⁾

I should have reached now the end of my Latin, were it not, that in conclusion I must in a few words point out the miracle, which from a maritime point of view Roman history presents to our astonished eyes. How in the world was it possible, that the Romans managed not only to conquer a world empire, which had the vast Mediterranean as a centre, but even to keep this empire together for centuries without real attachment to the sea, which united the parts of their empire, without possessing or at least acquiring in wide ranges of society those ineradicable maritime traditions, which form the indispensable basis of all navigation, in short without ever renouncing their native land-lubberism? And all that notwithstanding the fact, that they often had to fight real sea-faring nations! Of course it cannot be expected of me, that I should be able to clear up a miracle in a few words; I can do no more than give utterance to some unpretending ideas about this mystery, which as a matter of course are partly implied already in my previous statements. For is not the key of the secret chiefly to be found in that peculiar realism of the Romans, which I mentioned in the foregoing pages, in other words on the one side in the indomitable energy and supple liness that enabled them to adapt themselves to conditions quite strange to them while retaining their own strength (in this case their eminent soldiership), and in their imperturbable morale even after crushing adversities, on the other side (but from a psychological point of view these things are all one) in the power of accommodation peculiar to born rulers, thanks to which they were able to attach the subdued nations to themselves and thus to make nations with maritime traditions serve their own military purposes? For all their energy the Romans without natural maritime traditions would not have been able in the age of the Punic wars to create an efficient navy at short notice, if

⁶²⁾ *Die Nationalität der Kaufleute im römischen Kaiserreich* (diss. Breslau 1909), 39—43.

⁶³⁾ Frank, *Roman imperialism*, 285; Schultze 35 and 150.

the many-centuries-old nautical experience of Etruscans and Italiots had not been at their disposal for the purpose of ship-building and naval service: the type of the Roman man of war (Luigia Stella has demonstrated it in her book *Italia antica sul mare*) descended from the Etrurian warship and the humble unknown *socii navales* from Italy supplied the Roman navy with crews. And what would the Romans have been able to do at sea during the last two centuries of the republic, if the priceless squadrons of Rhodes and other sea-faring nations hadn't been at their disposal? In other words those queer methods of transference, which, as I remarked before, are a symptom of their weak attachment to the sea, on the other hand furnish conclusive proof of their common sense and rulers' gifts: they realized, that they did better leave naval matters as much as possible to sea-dogs, and they were able to do this, because they knew how to attach others to themselves instead of repelling and alienating them. ⁶⁴⁾

We remarked that the Romans not only tried by means of their boarding tactics to transform the fighting on sea as much as possible into a land battle, but that they also used to seek the final decision on land. This means that in Roman maritime history the transport plays a more or less latent, but nevertheless equally prominent part as the man of war; and for this purpose the Romans could dispose of the whole mercantile marine of Italy, not to speak about later times, when they could dispose of much more than this. Perhaps one might object, that for such enterprises they must first of all rule the waves; but this maxim does not apply to ancient maritime conditions without reserve: in connexion with the low degree of seaworthiness of the ancient warship (it was scarcely able to weather a storm or even to face foul weather) the blockading capacities of ancient warfleets were relatively small; by a heavy sea and before the wind merchant-men could easily run a blockade, and that land-lubbers are often remarkably little afraid of the sea, I remarked before. Cesar for instance, though he had practically no fleet at all and though Pompey possessed the supremacy at sea, succeeded nevertheless in transporting his troops from Italy to Greece and destroying his adversary on land; only a few years afterwards,

⁶⁴⁾ This last remark chiefly applies to the Roman policy towards the Italian allies; outside Italy the methods of the Roman conquerors and rulers were often extremely repulsive. At the close of the third century the Rhodians were quite averse to the Romans on account of their barbarous behaviour in the first Macedonian war; but the madness and cruelty of Philip's conduct drove them in spite of themselves into the arms of Rome: here the Romans had to thank their Macedonian adversary for priceless maritime aid.

during the campaign of Philippi, exactly the same thing happened again. So we shall do well not to ascribe within the compass of ancient warfare such an utterly prominent importance to sea-power, as it would acquire in later ages with greater nautical possibilities. The same seems to result from the fact, that in the long run the Romans always succeeded in prevailing over the nautical skill of their adversaries by means of their boarding tactics; apparently there couldn't be found a contrivance to elude or counteract the Roman grappling irons and to let the nautical manoeuvre have its full sway; so the Roman soldier ranked uppermost in naval warfare as well as on land: from a naval point of view the ancient warship was a relatively weak instrument with a rather limited range of possibilities. And that the Roman soldiers were stubborn peasants, who perfectly knew how to fight battles and, just as the English according to the Bonaparte of Shaw, were too "stupid" to know when they were beaten and therefore were not beaten at all, it is not necessary to point out. Ultimately in Roman naval warfare as well as everywhere the issue depended upon the grit of the people. ⁶⁵)

Holland Rose rightly points out, ⁶⁶) that after the conquest of Italy Rome possessed a strong and large land base, commanding from its central position the Mediterranean and rich in natural resources and man power. Undoubtedly this is an important factor, which from a material point of view furnishes a good explanation for the mighty power of endurance the Romans used to exhibit in warfare. But does it explain the grit of Roman popular character itself? No, it does not, nor does Holland Rose pretend such an enormity; popular character is scarcely reducible to other factors at all. We may point out, that the Romans at sea as well as on land naturally very often profited by the follies and the lack of bottom of their adversaries; but when all is said, this only means, that *they* were bull-dogs and always retained their common sense, that their adversaries on the contrary were of a much frailer make. And so we are back again at the point of departure of our closing remarks.

Let us, to wind up, return for a moment to the starting point of this chapter, Roman land-lubberism. In the foregoing pages I often mentioned popular character and on the other hand economic (or political) factors it

⁶⁵) For the limited possibilities of ancient naval warfare Adcock's excellent remarks (42 sq.) may be compared.

⁶⁶) 147 sq.

had to confront; but I all but left out of account the geographical factors, because in my humble opinion these only in a limited degree help to decide the question, whether a nation shall lead a sea-faring life or not. It is usual to explain Roman land-lubberism by the fact, that the Latin coast did not encourage navigation, because it had no islands and but a few natural harbours; in reality however we do not explain anything by such statements. Undoubtedly the formation of a coast exerts a certain educative influence upon the people who live near it; but we must not forget that an unfavourable coast may exert such an influence as well as a favourable one, provided that the people in question have briny blood. If this were not true, the Dutch would have remained land-lubbers evermore, because they live near a sea, which is notorious for its gales, and because our coast belongs to the most dangerous and treacherous on earth.

Of much greater importance are the economic factors: undoubtedly it is under economic compulsion, that most nations are driven to the development of over-sea-trade and sea-power. But nevertheless it is popular character after all that decides the question, whether they will stop at the reluctant achievement of maritime minima and always will try to transfer to others as much as they can or indeed will make a virtue of necessity and grow together with the sea. However important the economic factors may be, with the aid of economic determinism (let alone geographical determinism) the problem in question cannot be solved completely. As for popular character, we may be able to analyse and paraphrase it, but I take it for granted, that we cannot explain it in the sense of explaining it away: the core of it is not reducible to external factors.

CHAPTER II

SEA-POWER IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

The problem, what was the function and importance of sea-power in the second Punic war, how far the Romans during this war really ruled the waves and, if so, whether or not this fact decisively influenced the course and result of the war as a whole, remains as yet a *question brûlante*, which is judged in the most diverging ways and consequently cries for a thorough discussion. Clark ¹⁾ and de Saint-Denis, ²⁾ both of whom have treated this question with nautical understanding, ascribe absolute maritime supremacy to Rome and regard this as the decisive factor, which in the end secured victory to her in the war of exhaustion; whereas Köster, who is as good a judge of ancient naval affairs and maritime history, presumes, that the Romans did not fully realize the importance of a powerful navy and that therefore Roman sea-power in the second Punic war did not play the part it might have done otherwise. ³⁾ The reason for this strong divergence lies above all in the fact, that the material for the maritime history of the second Punic war never has been collected and elaborated systematically for its own sake. Clark and de Saint-Denis suppose it to be known and only pick from it the data they think to need for a discussion of the general maritime problems of this war; but though I will not deny this to be the right and even the duty of the historian in a general way and though it is not my intention to belittle the merits of their works, yet in this case they grasp the bull by the tail, because the material for the maritime history of the second Punic war has been neglected and cries for a systematical treatment, before it can be used. Beversdorff, ⁴⁾ in whose

¹⁾ *The influence of Sea-power on the history of the Roman republic*, 29 sq. (diss. Chicago 1915).

²⁾ *Une guerre maritime il y a 2000 ans* (Les études classiques 9 (1940), 117—137).

³⁾ Kromayer—Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer* (München 1928), 610 sq. In this excellent book naval affairs have been very grudgingly treated: on a total amount of 376 pages, in which Roman military affairs are discussed, 18 to wit fall to the share of the navy! This is quite insufficient and defies all proportions.

⁴⁾ *Die Streitkräfte der Karthager und Römer im zweiten punischen Kriege* (diss. Berlin 1910); I have not been able to lay hands upon the book of Luterbacher, *Die römischen Legionen und Kriegsschiffe während des 2. punischen Krieges* (Burgdorf 1895).

dissertation we might expect to find such a methodical discussion, disposes of naval affairs in a few pages. And even de Sanctis, whose *Storia dei Romani* remains a monument of that critical exactness and love for detail, which formed one of the principal titles of honour of the last generation of historians, treats the maritime problems of the second Punic war only *obiter*; even from his classical work we cannot gather an adequate idea of this war as a maritime conflict.⁵⁾

This remarkable neglect can be easily explained from a psychological point of view. Not only in the ancient world, but to the present day it always has been the gigantic struggle *on land* between Hannibal and Rome that inevitably swallowed the lion's share of every one's attention. The highly vivid and dramatic character of this struggle arrests the mental eye of the historian in such a degree, even though he may consciously try to shield himself from optical delusions, that only too readily he forgets the humble Italian sailors, who, though scarcely fighting naval battles, by their obscure blockading and convoying services made it possible for the Romans to keep on their legs on land.⁶⁾ It is no wonder that the story of these heroic, though anonymous achievements has to be scraped together from short, incidental remarks in the works of the ancient historians (especially of Livy) and that in the writings of modern scholars we meet with the same phenomenon in a still higher degree. If we will try to gather an idea of the second Punic war as a naval conflict, we must begin with laying bricks, with carefully collecting and systematically discussing the sparse little data in order to determine first of all the numbers of the naval forces, which Romans and Carthaginians had at their disposal during this war, and thus to gain a firm base for the elucidation of the maritime problems the second Punic war confronts us with.

To this introductory discourse yet one remark must be added. From the point of view of historical criticism the second Punic war is a regular hornets' nest; and though this fact chiefly concerns the war on land, because there the honest annalists had to counterpoise crushing defeats with crushing lies, yet to a certain degree it affects naval warfare as well. That in comparison with Polybius the whole tribe of Roman annalists

⁵⁾ The volume of the Sanctis' *Storia dei Romani*, which contains the history of the second Punic war, is III, 2, Torino 1917; the most detailed discussion of the naval problems of this war is to be found in the book of Rodgers, *Greek and Roman naval warfare*, which is however almost completely without scientific adstruptions.

⁶⁾ Compare the remarks of de Saint-Denis *l.l.*

are but insignificant and often unreliable scribblers, is a matter not open to discussion. But he, who like Beversdorff and Kahrstedt ⁷⁾ pushes the "polybiolatry" and on the other hand the suspiciousness towards the annalists to such extremes, that he suffers his course to be directed almost exclusively by Polybius and regards the annalistic traditions as all but worthless, gives himself up to the sin of hypercriticism. As for me, I stand by those who believe, that the annalists have handed down to us various authentic data, however much these may have been overgrown by numerous falsifications. ⁸⁾ The authenticity for instance of the informations Livy gives year by year about the division of the land forces by the senate, has been defended with strong arguments by de Sanctis and others ⁹⁾ against Kahrstedt's hypercriticism; so much the more then this applies to the information about the naval forces, which didn't come to the fore and fascinated the interest of the Roman annalists in a much lesser degree than the titanic struggle of the legions! According to the regularly returning short notices of Livy the (pro)praetor T. Otacilius Crassus for instance commanded the Sicilian squadron at Lilybaeum from 217 to his death in 211. How in the world should these short, unadorned, more or less official informations about the humble commander of a none too conspicuous guard-squadron have been falsified by the annalists? Those who, exclusively on account of the nothing-proving fact that Polybius omits the name of this commander, reject such information, deprive themselves without any valid reason of authentic material, which, however unpretending it may be, derives its value *i.a.* from the fact, that it proves the common sense of the Roman government, which during this war came to realize the advantage of standing naval commands. ¹⁰⁾ So I wish to reserve to myself the right to follow in the footsteps of de Sanctis, Tarn and other keenly critical scholars, who pick up good things where they

⁷⁾ *Geschichte der Karthager von 218—146* (Berlin 1913); I highly appreciate the sharp and lively spirit of this book, but at the same time it exhibits a certain youthful wantonness, against which the cautious as well as critical attitude of de Sanctis forms a wholesome and necessary reaction.

⁸⁾ The recent book of Klotz (*Livius und seine Vorgänger*, Teubner 1940—1941) chiefly derives its value from the fact, that it partly vindicates the authenticity of the annalistic data.

⁹⁾ III, 2, 317 sq.; compare Cantalupi, *Le legioni romane nella guerra d'Annibale* (Beloch, *Studi di storia antica* I, 3 sq.), Klotz, *Die röm. Wehrmacht im 2. punischen Kriege* (Philologus 88, 1933, 42—89), Kromayer III, 1, 477 sq.

¹⁰⁾ Compare Tarn, *Companion*, 758 and 760.

can find them, even from the weed-grown gardens of the much reviled annalists. If Kahrstedt condemns this as unmethodical (it is the anathema he has the habit of hurling at his opponents), I shall have to put up with his verdict, but I can't change my opinion: a method that tries to release a patient with a malignant abscess from his sufferings by sending him straightway to the other world instead of removing the tumour in an operative way, seems, however methodical it may be, somewhat too radical to me!

The unanimity of ancient authorities (Pol. 3, 41; Liv. 21, 17; App. 218 *Ib.* 14, 53—54) makes it quite certain, that, when in 218 the war broke out, the Romans had at their disposal a fleet of 220 quinqueremes and 20 *celoces* (these small craft I will leave out of account, because they are of secondary importance).¹¹⁾ The total number of warships Carthage possessed in 218, is not ascertainable, but at any rate it was much smaller: in Spain there were 50 quinqueremes, 2 quadriremes, 5 triremes (total number 57), of which 32 quinqueremes and 5 triremes fitted out and manned (37, Liv. 21, 22, 4 = Pol. 3, 33, 14); if we add as a second item the fact, that Carthage in 218 sent 55 ships,¹²⁾ in 217 70 ships to the Italian waters, the conclusion seems obvious, that the total number of heavy warships Carthage in 218 could launch against the Romans, remained far below 150. According to Livy (21, 17, 8; 21, 22, 4) the Romans as well as Hannibal were quite conscious of the crushing Roman naval superiority; and the *plan de campagne* of both clearly corroborates Livy's testimony. For the Romans, availing themselves of their maritime preponderance,

¹¹⁾ That this fleet existed and had not to be built for the second Punic war, follows clearly from Livy's wording (21, 17, 2—3). The last fleet-building before this, of which we know, dates from the year 242, when the Romans launched 200 new quinqueremes (Pol. 1, 59, 8), with which they fought the Carthaginians at the Aegates insulae and captured 70 of their ships (Pol. 1, 61, 6); since 241 they could therefore dispose of some 250 heavy warships. It was this fleet that in 229 (200 ships: Pol. 2, 11, 1) and in 219 (Pol. 3, 16 sq.: no shipnumbers mentioned) was brought into action against the Illyrians and in 218 of course was still extant; there is no reason, why the Romans should have built new ships between 241 and 218, and it would have been quite contrary to their methods (compare the first chapter). So the Roman fleet was rather old in 218; but this is not at all inconceivable (compare Kromayer, *Flotte*, 432 with the passages quoted in footnote 17) and in perfect accordance with the fact that during the second Punic war numerous new ships were built to replace old ones (*v.i.*).

¹²⁾ Probably however the tradition about these events is not reliable, *v.i.*

intended to begin the war immediately with a two-fronts-offensive: they sent the consul P. Scipio with an army and 60 quinqueremes via Massilia to Spain¹³) and the other consul Ti. Sempronius with an army and 160 quinqueremes to Sicily in order to launch a direct attack against Carthage herself¹⁴) (Liv. 21, 17; Pol. 3, 41; App. *Ib.* 14, 53—54). Without a strong naval superiority such an action would have been quite inconceivable, and the small number of ships given to Scipio makes it manifest, that the Romans did not expect an attack of Hannibal by sea.

And Hannibal himself? Do not his defensive measures in behalf of the African territory (Liv. 21, 21, 10 sq. = Pol. 3, 33, 7 sq.) clearly prove, that he expected a heavy attack of the Romans against it, which could not be launched without naval supremacy? And on the other hand is not the fleet, which he left in Spain, conclusive proof, that here too he expected a maritime attack of the Romans? Both facts show that his attitude was defensive on sea. But his own offensive against Italy furnishes evidence of a much more striking character. If we wish to realize clearly, what a "fleet in being" means, we must fix our eyes upon the route Hannibal chose to reach Italy: the very fact that the superior Roman fleet existed, even though it had not left the harbour, dictated to him the choice of the route by land, in spite of the tremendous drawbacks connected with it. There has been argued that, even if the Carthaginians had commanded the sea, yet Hannibal would have chosen the route by land, *i. a.* because he could hardly transport by ship his elephants and his best arm, the excellent and numerous cavalry, and because the tendencies of the house of Barcas were anything but maritime.¹⁵) The first argument does not hold water, because the Carthaginians were very well capable of transporting elephants and horses by sea, and the second really means, that the great Hannibal is

¹³) In the first chapter I pointed out, that during the first Punic war the Romans were very well informed of the Carthaginian naval effectives and, in connexion with their own nautical inferiority, always took care to outnumber their adversaries. We find back this system in 218: apparently the compass of Punic sea-power in Spain was exactly known to the Romans and so they gave 60 quinqueremes to Scipio, with which he outnumbered the total amount of Punic ships (57) only narrowly, but the real effective of 37 ships by a large margin; the lion's share (160 ships) was given to Sempronius for the principal offensive against Carthage herself.

¹⁴) It is this scheme that, after having been pushed to the background by Hannibal's invasion, finally was taken up again by the great Scipio in 205 and enforced in spite of strong opposition.

¹⁵) Compare de Sanctis III, 2, 12.

stripped of all military insight, which of course is a slap in the face of reality. Undoubtedly his preference lay with warfare on land; but this does not mean that he didn't realize the military importance of naval superiority: in later years, when the naval blockade menaced to choke him in Italy, he gave proof of possessing a clear notion of these matters and we wrong his military genius by assuming that he did not always realize them.¹⁶⁾ If Hannibal chose the route by land with its unavoidable losses of time and men, which might endanger the success of his „Blitzkrieg“, it seems quite certain that he did not choose it to amuse himself in a sportive way! On his march by land from New Carthage to northern Italy he spent five months (Pol. 3, 56, 3); going by sea would have saved him at least three of these.¹⁷⁾ As for the losses of men, I cannot go here into the numbers of the troops he took with him to Italy and of those he lost on the way; but that these losses, especially during the crossing of the Alps, were terribly high, is doubted by nobody.

No, Hannibal chose his route by land *vi coactus*, because he simply had no other choice on account of Roman naval supremacy. We may assume that he could have gathered a sufficient number of transports to transport his whole army *en bloc* to Italy¹⁸⁾; but this army would have been destroyed *en bloc* at sea by the powerful Roman navy. This risk (of course there always remained a chance of slipping through) he couldn't take; so of the two evils he chose the less deadly one, the route by land, which implied heavy sacrifices indeed, but no total destruction.¹⁹⁾ By way of check we might raise the question: what would have happened, if Carthage instead of Rome had commanded the sea in 218? The answer is:

¹⁶⁾ On the other hand it is certainly true that the Spanish policy of the *Barcini* caused a concentration of all forces upon the land army and so contributed in a high degree towards the atrophy of Carthaginian sea-power: Carthage was not rich enough in man power and popular strength to give full weight in both directions at the same time.

¹⁷⁾ From Tarraco Laelius reached Rome by sea in 34 days (Liv. 27, 7); if for Hannibal we double this space of time on account of his large army, we probably overcharge, see Clark 34, whose excellent remarks I made grateful use of.

¹⁸⁾ Compare the 700 transports Bomilcar brought to Sicily in 212, Liv. 25, 27, 4.

¹⁹⁾ More or less comparable is the fact that Alexander was compelled to conquer the whole coast (including Egypt), before he could venture to invade the interior of Asia, because he had no fleet and his enemies commanded the sea. But Hannibal did not as Alexander succeed in conquering all the naval bases of his adversaries and thus destroying their sea-power: he was able to win battles, but not to conquer and maintain maritime towns and for that very reason he failed.

Hannibal would have fallen upon the Romans with his *complete* army and several months earlier than was the case in reality; the Romans couldn't have launched, let alone sustained, the Spanish offensive by land, which now they kept up for ten years by sea and which contributed to such a high degree to the final victory of Rome; as Hannibal was laying waste Italy, they would soon have had to face starvation, because they couldn't have imported by sea the necessary victuals; only too soon Hasdrubal and Philip of Macedon would have landed their forces in Italy to join hands with Hannibal; in a word Rome would have lost the game at short notice. But let us return to our subject; that it was for the Romans a matter of the highest importance to maintain at any price in the further course of the war the maritime supremacy they possessed in 218, is obvious: we shall see, how far they succeeded in maintaining it.

ain) Of the two offensives aimed at by the Romans we shall now treat first the Spanish offensive of P. Scipio. With his 60 quinqueremes and a fleet of transports²⁰) he sailed prosperously in five days (Pol. 3, 41, 4) from Pisae to Massilia, where he received the startling news, that Hannibal already had reached the Rhône. He did not succeed in barring his way and, as Hannibal now soon could be expected in northern Italy, he decided to go back himself speedily in order to fulfil his consular duty and take the command of the forces in northern Italy against the invader, but on the other hand to send his army under command of his brother Cn. Scipio to Spain in order to take up immediately the offensive against the Carthaginian forces left there with Hasdrubal and Hanno (Pol. 3, 41. 49, 3—4. 56, 5; Liv. 21, 26, 3—5; 32, 1—5).

I cannot enter here into a discussion of his decision to send his army to Spain; undoubtedly its historical consequences were extremely important, because it prevented Hasdrubal for long years to join his brother in Italy (only in 207 he succeeded in marching to Italy, at the time when the Romans had sufficiently recovered to hold their own against this doubling of the Italian offensive) and because Carthage was forced by it to send repeatedly considerable forces to Spain, which otherwise it

²⁰) These are not mentioned, but we must presuppose them, because Scipio's army of two legions couldn't be transported by the 60 men of war: the transport often plays a latent part in Roman maritime history, compare the closing remarks of the first chapter and Kromayer, *Flotte*, 482.

might have used elsewhere.²¹⁾ But what became of the 60 quinqueremes? It is common usage to take it for granted tacitly, that they went with Cn. Scipio to Spain and that P. returned to Italy all but alone;²²⁾ in my opinion, however, the contrary can be conclusively proved. For in the spring of 217 Cn. Scipio in the battle off the Ebro²³⁾ had 35 ships against a Punic fleet of 40 (Liv. 22, 19, 4 = Pol. 3, 95, 5): that these were his total naval effective follows from the consideration, that of course he did not voluntarily confront superior Punic forces with only 35 ships, but simply because he had no more at his disposal; it follows also from the hardly incidental fact, that still in 209 Scipio the younger operated against New Carthage with a squadron of 35 ships (Pol. 10, 17, 13). Hence it seems inconceivable that in 217 Cn. should have had 25 ships in reserve; nor is there anywhere to be found the faintest hint at severe naval losses he should have incurred in 218—217 before the battle.²⁴⁾ On the other hand the events of 217 in the Italian waters prove clearly, that P. Scipio in 218 must have brought back a number of quinqueremes from Massilia to Italy. For of the 160 quinqueremes, which in 218 had been given to Ti. Sempronius, now 50 lay at Lilybaeum (Liv. 21, 51, 7), so that 110 were available. But the consul Cn. Servilius was sent via Sardinia and Sicily to Africa with 120 quinqueremes (Pol. 3, 88, 8; 3, 96, 8—14; Liv. 22, 11 and 31) and at the same time P. Scipio with 20 (Pol. 3, 97, according to Liv. 22, 22, 1—2 even 30, but in such cases Polybius of course takes precedence of all others) to Spain.²⁵⁾ So a simple calculation proves, that in 218 P. Scipio must have taken back at least 30 men of war from Massilia to Italy! The phrases *cum admodum exiguis copiis* (Livy) and *μετ' ὀλίγων* (Polybius, v. s. footnote 22) must

²¹⁾ Compare *i. a.* Scullard 41 sq.

²²⁾ At first sight the sources seem to affirm this: P. returned to Italy *cum admodum exiguis copiis* (Liv. 21, 32, 5), *μετ' ὀλίγων* (Pol. 3, 56, 5), *ἐπὶ πενήτοις* (App. 1b. 14, 55), whereas Livy (21, 39, 3) speaks of *navibus*.

²³⁾ For this battle v. i. *sub anno* 217.

²⁴⁾ When surprising the Roman crews (Pol. 3, 76, 9 sq.; Liv. 21, 61, 2), Hasdrubal had not destroyed ships, only killed men and certainly not so many, that Cn. must have left 25 ships unmanned, the presence of which in Spain, as I already remarked, is not at all presupposed in later years.

²⁵⁾ As appears from the order of events in Polybius' narrative, Scipio was sent out after Servilius, *but not after the latter's return*, so that he might have taken over 20 of his ships: Servilius' fleet returned to Italy only in the winter 217—216 (Pol. 3, 106, 7, compare Holleaux 174, 4).

refer to the fact, that the entire fleet of transports with all the land forces was sent to Spain: of the warships a considerable part returned to Italy; and if we are to ascribe some real force to Appian's words ἐπὶ περὶήρους against Livy's *navibus* (see footnote 22), it is natural to conjecture, that P. Scipio with his best and fastest ship hurried on before the others to Pisa in order to take as soon as possible the command of the forces in northern Italy, ²⁶⁾ whereas the rest of the squadron followed at a more quiet rate and via Pisa proceeded to Rome. This whole affair is a striking instance, how stingy the ancient authorities (even Polybius!) sometimes are in their communications about naval forces: the fleet of transports, which *must* have existed and in its entirety proceeded from Massilia to Spain, is passed over in silence, nor is there said a word about the dividing of the warfleet in Massilia; and in consequence of such omissions it is not easy to ascertain, how this division took place, in other words, how many warships P. Scipio sent with his brother to Spain and how many he himself took back to Italy. That we cannot settle this question by sending 35 ships to Spain with Cnaeus (his effective in the battle off the Ebro) and 25 to Italy with Publius, appears as clearly from the fact already mentioned above, that P. must have taken back at least 30 warships to Italy, as from the afore-said battle itself. From a papyrus-fragment of the pro-Carthaginian Greek historian Sosylus, ²⁷⁾ which describes this battle, we know that the Massaliots as allies of the Romans played a considerable part in it on account of their courage and their superior tactics, a part much more prominent than the narrative of Livy or Polybius ²⁸⁾ alone would allow us to presume. After reading Sosylus we must take it for granted, that the Massaliots joined in the battle with a considerable squadron, and . . . this squadron was included

²⁶⁾ Kahrstedt 385, 1.

²⁷⁾ Bilabel, *Die kleineren Historikerfragmente auf Papyrus* (Bonn 1923), 29 sq. and Jacoby, *F. G. H. II B*, 176 (Berlin 1929).

²⁸⁾ With Polybius at least a faint glimmering of it is to be found in his vague and general appreciation 3, 95, 6—7; there is every reason to prefer Sosylus on this point to the pro-Roman historians, who may have belittled the part of the allies in *maiolem Romanorum gloriam*. That also in a general way the faithfulness of Massilia was a matter of the greatest importance for the keeping up of the Spanish offensive, is a matter of course: without this base on the Gallic coast the maritime communication between Rome and Spain would have been extremely precarious, and without the colonies of Massilia in Spain the Romans would scarcely have possessed maritime bases in that country; compare Niese II, 509—510.

in Cn. Scipio's effective of 35 ships! To determine the size of this auxiliary squadron I know but one way, and not a very safe one: we stated than in 217 P. Scipio was sent with 20 warships from Rome to Spain; as far as we know, these ships did never leave Spain again; and in 209 we find with the great Scipio a squadron of 35 ships just as in 217. Isn't it obvious that in 217 those 20 ships were sent from Italy to Spain in order to relieve (and send home) the auxiliary squadron from Massilia, which had come to the rescue temporarily? Might this be true, then the effective of Cn. Scipio in the battle off the Ebro (35 ships) should have included 20 ships of Massilia and 15 Roman ships, and in 218 P. Scipio should have taken back from Massilia to Italy 45 Roman ships,²⁹⁾ a calculation which implies, that in 217 during Servilius' African expedition 15 ships were available in the Italian waters, which may have been used for the protection of the Italian coast and for conveying services. I believe, that this result is in perfect accordance with what we may expect of the excellent P. Scipio, when in 218 at Massilia he had to make up his mind under the crushing impression of Hannibal's imminent invasion of Italy. On the one side he sent all his troops with his brother to Spain, in order to prevent that Hannibal should receive reinforcements from this country by land; but on the other hand he took back to Italy as many men of war as he could, in order to gain the certainty that Hannibal could not get into communication with Carthage by sea and obtain reinforcements from his capital: for this purpose Sempronius' squadron must now be reinforced as much as possible. So Cn. Scipio got a naval minimum: 15 Roman ships and 20 borrowed from Massilia, so that now he all but matched the fitted-out Punic squadron in Spain of 32 quinqueremes and 5 triremes;³⁰⁾ the bulk of his fleet (45 quinqueremes) the consul took back to Italy. But it stands to reason that in 217, when it had become manifest that Carthage was not capable of sending more than 70 ships to the Italian waters (which

²⁹⁾ I admit that these numbers have a purely hypothetical value; but at any rate the division of Scipio's fleet must be sought thereabouts; compare de Sanctis III 2, 242, 61 and Hallward in *C. A. H.* VIII, 39, whose thoughts apparently move in the same direction, but who do not go to the bottom of the problem.

³⁰⁾ It is remarkable that the Carthaginians apparently knew this and speedily manned 10 more quinqueremes, so that in 217 they could confront Cn. Scipio's 35 ships with 40 (*Pol.* 3, 95, 2 = *Liv.* 22, 19, 2—3: both have 40 instead 42 ships); probably in consequence of their feeling of superiority and safety they were surprised by the Roman attack.... and beaten, *Liv.* 22, 19, 8.

could easily be confronted by 120 Roman men of war), at once 20 ships were sent to the Spanish waters again in order to relieve the Massaliots: ³¹) this fact too seems to prove that they had been originally intended for Spain, but sent back from Massilia to Italy. — In conclusion a few words about the place of allied squadrons in the Roman navy. In the age of the Punic wars the Romans predominantly operated with fleets of their own, though they used to *man* them with allies; auxiliary squadrons of allies were only exceptionally made use of. In the second Punic war even naval contingents of Italiot towns, though due under treaty, make their appearance only once in a case of emergency (Liv. 26, 39, 5), just as the Massaliot squadron in 218. How little the Romans intended to have recourse to the ships of their allies, appears from the fact that, when Hannibal took Tarentum, the Tarentine fleet lay idle in the harbour (Liv. 25, 11, 15 sq. = Pol. 8, 34). Besides the two cases mentioned before we can only cite two other instances: the short action of the Syracusan fleet in 218 (Liv. 21, 49, 3; 50, 7—51, 1), if it is authentic at all (*v. i.*), and the co-operation between the Roman admiral Sulpicius and king Attalus of Pergamum in the East in 208. Only in the second century b. C. in the eastern seas Roman sea-power began to gravitate more and more towards the auxiliary system: the co-operation between Sulpicius and Attalus had been the germ of this development.

icily) Let us now fix our attention upon the second Roman offensive of 218, which was to be launched by Ti. Sempronius via Sicily against Carthage herself. Here the difficulties are much greater, because in this case there is no question of omissions in the narratives of the ancient authorities that can be corrected from the material presented by themselves, but of serious contradiction between Livy and Polybius. The latter, who of course must be our base and starting point, relates, how Sempronius, after having put to sea with his 160 quinqueremes for his offensive against Libya, reached Sicily and at Lilybaeum made thorough

³¹) More than 20 were not needed, because in the battle off the Ebro the Punic fleet had been destroyed for the greater part and Roman supremacy definitely established in the Spanish waters (Pol. 3, 96, 6; 97, 1; Liv. 22, 20, 3). It is very curious, that after 217 we hear no more about assistance of Massilia to the Roman fleet in Spain: in 210 the Massaliots escorted Scipio on his passage to Spain *officii causa* with 4 triremes (Liv. 26, 19, 13) and that is all; nor do the shipnumbers after 217 imply the presence of Massaliot squadrons in the Spanish waters. Perhaps they used to convoy transports between Italy and Spain without it being mentioned.

arrangements for the attack on Africa (3, 41, 2—3), ³²⁾ how at Lilybaeum the order of the senate reached him to take his army to northern Italy in order to join hands with his colleague against Hannibal and how thereupon he sent his fleet home and ordered the army to march by land to Ariminum: he exacted an oath from his soldiers, that they would be there on a certain day; the army did not march *en bloc*, but every single soldier had to see to it, that he reached Ariminum apace, off his own bat, because in this way the transportation of the troops could be accelerated. ³³⁾ Of these events Livy gives an account that is on the one side much more detailed, on the other hand inconsistent with Polybius' narrative. As for this inconsistency, according to Livy (21, 51, 5 sq.) Sempronius made use of his fleet to transport his army by sea to Ariminum and followed himself with 10 ships, after having arranged the affairs in Sicily. We can make short work of this flat contradiction: of course Polybius must take precedence of Livy in this case, not only for methodical reasons, but also because it is to be regarded as extremely improbable, that Sempronius should have exposed his fleet and army to the autumnal storms of the Adriatic. ³⁴⁾ But it is much more difficult to judge of the authenticity of the events, which are related in detail by Livy, but suppressed by Polybius: did the latter omit here historical facts (perhaps because he regarded them as not essential) or are we to regard Livy's details as falsifications? According to Livy (21, 49—51) already before Sempronius' arrival war broke out in the Sicilian waters between Punic and Roman squadrons. A squadron of 20 Punic quinqueremes, sent out to

³²⁾ The emptiness of this short piece of information must not tempt us to complete it thoughtlessly from Livy's detailed narrative, which will be treated below: a serious offensive had to be launched against Carthage, which naturally required long and ample preparatives; think of the long time Scipio later on in this war had to spend in Sicily on the preparations for his African campaign!

³³⁾ 3, 61, 8—11, cf. 68, 12 sq., where we are told, that the soldiers had marched for 40 days at a stretch to reach Ariminum and that during this march they passed through Rome just as Sempronius himself. The distance Lilybaeum—Ariminum by land (928 m. p.) could be covered easily in 40 days by soldiers marching singly or in little groups, but not by an army marching *en bloc*, Klotz 134.

³⁴⁾ Kahrstedt 392, 3; de Sanctis 86; Hallward, C. A. H. VIII, 40, 3. At best one might admit with de Sanctis (86) and Klotz (134), that Sempronius in order to spare time went by sea himself with his staff and that in this respect Livy and Appian (*Ann.* 6, 23) are to be preferred to Polybius; but even this is neither necessary nor justifiable in my opinion.

ransack the Italian shores, was scattered about the Liparaean isles by a storm, while 3 ships drifted to the straits of Messina, where they were captured by 12 ships of Hiero, who chanced to be lying with a squadron at Messina, waiting for the arrival of the consul Sempronius. From the prisoners Hiero learned that a second squadron of 35 quinqueremes was on the way to Sicily in order to surprise Lilybaeum: this fleet probably had been driven by the same storm to the Aegates insulae. Hiero immediately warned the praetor M. Aemilius at Lilybaeum, so that he was prepared for the arrival of the Carthaginians and the attempt upon Lilybaeum failed. There followed a battle off Lilybaeum between the Punic and Roman squadrons,³⁵⁾ the Romans carrying the day and capturing 7 Carthaginian ships: the rest took to flight. Shortly after this the consul Sempronius arrived at Messina; he was informed by Hiero of the danger menacing Lilybaeum and immediately departed for that town, accompanied by the king and his fleet; on the way thither he received the news of the Roman victory. Hiero was allowed to return home with his fleet and, while the praetor remained at Lilybaeum in order to protect the shores of Sicily, the consul himself crossed with his fleet to Malta, which he took from the Carthaginians. After his return to Lilybaeum he decided to sail to the Liparaean isles, whither the first Punic squadron had been driven by the storm (*v. s.*). In the meantime, however, these ships had crossed to Italy and were now plundering the coast near Vibo. At that moment the consul received the letter from the senate which called him to northern Italy. He left behind 25 ships³⁶⁾ under the command of Sextus Pomponius for the protection of the Italian coast, increased the Sicilian squadron to 50 ships and with the rest of his fleet — this point we discussed above — he transported the army to Ariminum.

The principal objection that can be raised against the authenticity of the naval battle off Lilybaeum,³⁷⁾ is the queer way, in which it

³⁵⁾ The number of Roman ships is not mentioned, but it must have amounted to 35 at the least; phrases like *septem naves Punicae circumventae* (50, 5) even presuppose a numerical superiority on the Roman side.

³⁶⁾ The Punic squadron numbered 20 ships, of which 3 had been captured; if Livy's narrative is authentic, the Romans, according to their custom, saw to it, that numerical superiority was on their own side.

³⁷⁾ *I. a. de Sanctis* (28) and *Hallward* (*C. A. H.* VIII, 40) regard this entire episode as historical, whereas *Kahrstedt* (401) and *Beyersdorff* (50) reject the authenticity

makes its sudden appearance: we get the impression, that this episode has been inserted more or less violently into Livy's narrative, so that a striking inconsistency has been the result. For the total effective of the Roman warfleet amounted to 220 quinqueremes, of which Sempronius got 160 for the African offensive. According to Livy (21, 17, 6) and Polybius (3, 41) both Sempronius sailed *with these 160 ships* from Rome to Sicily in order to cross from there to Africa. But now it suddenly becomes apparent, that already before his arrival in Sicily a squadron of unknown size, but of 35 ships at the least, was lying at Lilybaeum, which nevertheless must have formed part of Sempronius' 160 ships, because the sum total of Roman battleships amounted to 220 and not to 255 sail. Had Sempronius sent it ahead? But this is mentioned nowhere, nor is it consistent with Livy's own narrative (21, 17, 6). So on this point Livy comes into collision not only with Polybius, but with himself as well. Besides, if really the same gale (a northeaster?) had driven back one Punic squadron to the Liparaean isles, the other to the Aegates insulae (49, 2—5), it is hardly conceivable, that Hiero, after learning this from prisoners at Messana, could have warned Aemilius in time to shield Lilybaeum from being surprised; unless the gale had continued for days, which is not mentioned. Apparently this is one of those details that are clumsily invented in order to make a falsified narrative acceptable. Finally 1700 men on board 7 captured quinqueremes (50, 5) make an incredibly low average (less than 250 men a ship: the quinquereme had 300 rowers, not to speak about sailors and marine troops!); but I will not insist on this point, because a large number may have been killed during the battle.³⁸⁾ Taking one thing with another I believe there is serious reason to regard this episode as an annalistic falsification, which can be easily explained from the desire to enrich the second Punic war with a Roman naval victory, because in contradistinction to the first Punic war it was so extremely poor in naval battles. Might this be true,

in connexion with their radical views. Compare also Niese II, 511, 4. Lammert's recent discussion of the naval battle (Wiener Studien 1940, 89—95) is not convincing.

³⁸⁾ The description of the battle is in accordance with the normal tactics of Carthaginians and Romans: with the Carthaginians the accent lay on the nautical manoeuvre and therefore they had but few marine troops; the Romans had numerous soldiers, because with them stress was laid on boarding tactics and hand-to-hand fighting (50, 1—4). But this is *cliché* and therefore very well conceivable in the narrative of a falsifier; compare *i. a.* Gsell II, 453 sq.

then the second Punic squadron of 20 ships and the leaving behind of Sextus Pomponius with 25 ships to oppose it (51, 6) should also be regarded as fiction. For the two Punic squadrons are closely connected with each other and the detaching of Pomponius' squadron has connexion with the fact, that according to Livy the bulk of Sempronius' fleet had been dispatched to Ariminum, which tradition we were forced to reject, because it was not consistent with Polybius (*v. s.*). — The narrative of the naval battle off Lilybaeum *cum annexis* cannot be inserted into Polybius' short piece of information (41, 2—3):³⁹⁾ it is not consistent with it nor can we regard it as conceivable, that Polybius would have left out those events as not essential, if he had known them. But the case of the conquest of Malta (Liv. 21, 51, 1—2) and the leaving behind of a squadron of 50 ships at Lilybaeum (51, 7) is a quite different one. The conquest of Malta was achieved by the consul with his own fleet and it is a secondary detail, which Polybius may well have suppressed, which perfectly fits in with his short exposé 3, 41, 2—3 and besides is intrinsically probable.⁴⁰⁾ And also the leaving behind of a squadron of 50 ships with the praetor Aemilius at Lilybaeum is intrinsically credible and even necessary: this vital basis must be secured at any price, as it had already been an incredible symptom of truly Roman maritime negligence, that the protection of it had been delayed such a long time; this too may have been a reason for the falsification of the battle off Lilybaeum *c. a.*, which presupposed the presence of a Roman squadron at Lilybaeum before Sempronius' arrival. Moreover, since the autumn of 218 these ships were stationed there permanently, in 218 under command of M. Aemilius and since 217 under T. Otacilius, who commanded them for years as a praetor (217: Liv. 22, 31, 6) and as a propraetor (since 216: 22, 37, 13); their number was increased from 50 to 75 in 216 (Liv. *l. l.*). We must not appeal to the silence of Polybius in order to reject this credible and essential fact. Of course Livy's phrase (21, 51, 7) *M. Aemilio*

³⁹⁾ The fragment of Coelius (H.R.F. 12: *Sempronius Lilybaeo celocem in Africam mittit visere locum, ubi exercitum exponat*) is in accordance with Polybius' exposé and not with Livy; for according to the latter Aemilius and Sempronius had to counteract the Punic squadrons, whereas according to Polybius the consul entirely devoted himself to the preparation of the African offensive. So Klotz (134) will be right in saying, that this part of Livy's narrative is derived from Valerius Antias, a not very trustworthy authority!

⁴⁰⁾ Even Kahrstedt (401) acknowledges the authenticity of the conquest of Malta.

praetori quinquaginta navium classem explevit means a perversion of reality, caused by the preceding spurious episode: there *was* no squadron of Aemilius, which in the autumn of 218 could be *increased* to 50 ships, but at that moment the consul left (50) ships with him for the first time. With this last-mentioned fact, however, we must not meddle.

We may now summarize the facts of this expedition in the following way: the consul Ti. Sempronius sailed with a fleet of 160 quinqueremes from Rome to Sicily, where he took extensive measures for an attack on Africa; *i. a.* Malta was taken from the Carthaginians. Summoned to northern Italy in the autumn of 218, he left 50 ships with the praetor at Lilybaeum, sent back the remaining 110 to Rome, where in the meantime 45 ships of P. Scipio had arrived from Massilia, and ordered his army to march by land to Ariminum. So at the end of the year 218 15 Roman warships were in Spain (+ 20 of Massilia), 155 at Rome, 50 at Lilybaeum (sum total: 220 + 20 of Massilia).

It would be natural to remark, that but little was achieved by the Romans at sea in the first year of the war, that their great offensive against Africa was nipped in the bud by Hannibal's invasion of Italy and that also P. Scipio was forced by Hannibal's surprising action to take back to Italy the greater part of his squadron bound for Spain and to invoke the assistance of the faithful Massaliots in order to run down the serious risks in the Spanish waters, resulting from this strategy; that on the other side the only positive maritime success, achieved in this year, was the conquest of Malta. It is quite true; but on the other hand we must not forget, that Roman maritime supremacy dictated to Hannibal the offensive against Italy by land, which, however surprising and crushing it might be, yet rested on a very shaky base, and that in this first year of the war the Punic fleet did not leave the harbour, a fact which proves conclusively the predominance of Roman sea-power. Naval battles often strongly influenced the course of history, "but, more often than not, the important fact is that *no* battle took place".⁴¹⁾ In this first year of the war the Roman fleet chiefly fulfilled its purpose as a fleet in being.

Yet one final remark must be added, which at the same time paves 218/217 the way for the discussion of the following year of the war. Polybius (3, 75, 4) informs us, that the Romans at the beginning of the year 217

⁴¹⁾ Clark 31 (after Corbett).

under the impression of the unexpected defeat near the Trebia *περὶ τὰς λουπὰς παρασκευὰς διαφερόντως ἐγίνοντο καὶ περὶ φυλακὴν τῶν προκειμένων τόπων, πέμποντες εἰς Σαρδόνα καὶ Σικελίαν στρατόπεδα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἰς Τάραντα προφυλακὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τόπων εἰς τοὺς εὐκαίρους· παρεσκεύασαν δὲ καὶ ναῦς ἐξήκοντα πενήρεις.* This piece of information, the authenticity of which cannot be doubted,⁴²⁾ might give rise to the belief, that such measures were taken as a reaction upon the squadrons of 20 and 35 ships, which according to Livy (21, 49 sq.) already in 218 had been sent by Carthage to the Italian and Sicilian waters, and that therefore we were wrong in denying the authenticity of these naval actions. In my opinion, however, these Roman measures are perfectly intelligible without the launching of a Punic naval offensive in 218: they prove, that the senate clearly realized the importance of naval supremacy in connexion with Hannibal's offensive by land. The Romans understood, that, as Hannibal was now threatening to overrun Italy, they must not leave a stone unturned to command the sea themselves and to prevent Hannibal from getting reinforcements from his capital.⁴³⁾ They foresaw, that in 217 Carthage would try to get into communication with Hannibal, as she did indeed; to explain this insight we need not admit a preceding unsuccessful Punic naval action in 218. Moreover it is only natural, that the Carthaginians waited till 217, before they tried to get into communication with Hannibal by sea: in 218 he remained still in the north of Italy, but in 217 he could be expected to penetrate southward into the peninsula and there to make his appearance on the coast. — But what to say of Polybius' last-quoted words, containing the assertion, that in the first months of 217 the Romans fitted out 60 quinqueremes? At that moment 155 quinqueremes were lying at Rome. To suppose with Kahrstedt (416), that in the spring of 217 60 of these were made seaworthy, is nonsense, first, because this was not worth mentioning, and secondly, because presently 140 ships would put to sea: 120 with Cn. Servilius and 20 with P. Scipio! So the 60 quinqueremes must have been *new* warships; but an increase of the sum total of Roman battle-ships from 220 to 280 is not attested by the events of the following

⁴²⁾ Compare App. *Ann.* 8, 32 and de Sanctis III, 2, 118.

⁴³⁾ Hence the sending of troops to Sicily and Sardinia and to exposed places on the Italian coast like Tarentum; moreover the loss of Sicily and Sardinia would have meant starvation, because Hannibal ransacked the country and the import of grain from the islands soon became indispensable.

years and seems to be altogether out of the question. So these new ships must have replaced old ones and such a measure was to be expected just now, because, as we remarked before (footnote 11 of this chapter), the Roman warfleet was rather old and the expeditions of 218 had afforded ample opportunity of ascertaining, what ships must be replaced immediately. Thus in the spring of 217 a partial renovation of the Roman warfleet was effected, not an increase of the total naval effective, which remained the same. Whether the old vessels were all broken up or partly laid up and held in reserve for cases of emergency, is not ascertainable. Later on in this war we shall meet with such partial renovations again.

217

We must now return first of all to the events in the Spanish waters, (*Spain*) because these opened the naval campaign of 217 and influenced the development of things in the seas near Italy.⁴⁴⁾ In the spring of 217 Hasdrubal⁴⁵⁾ with his land forces marched from New Carthage northwards along the coast, the fleet under command of Himilco⁴⁶⁾ accompanying him. The squadron numbered 40 quinqueremes, because Hasdrubal besides the 32, which had been fitted out since 218, had manned 10 more in order to outnumber the Roman fleet of 35 ships (*v. s.* footnote 30; Pol. 3, 95, 2 and Liv. 22, 19, 2 give both the round number of 30 ships instead of 32). Against this offensive Cn. Scipio limited himself to a naval action, because he felt he was no match for the enemy on land; in connexion with the character of Roman naval tactics he took on board numerous picked legionaries in order to add strength to his marine troops, sailed southwards from Tarraco with his 35 ships (15 Roman and 20 of Massilia, *v. s.*) and on the second day reached a point ten miles north of the Ebro. From here two fast-sailing ships of the Massaliots were sent ahead and reported, that army and fleet of the Carthaginians were lying encamped near the mouth of the Ebro;

⁴⁴⁾ The battle off the Ebro was fought in April or May 217 (de Sanctis III, 2, 242, 61) and this defeat compelled the government of Carthage to send 70 ships to the Italian waters, Pol. 3, 96, 8.

⁴⁵⁾ The principal authorities are Pol. 3, 95—96 and Liv. 22, 19—20.

⁴⁶⁾ Liv. 22, 19, 3; Pol. 3, 95, 2 calls the admiral Hamilcar, which is probably to be regarded as a slip, because Hamilcar is a more common name than Himilco, see Klotz 143 and compare Liv. 24, 35, 3 with Pol. 8, 1, 8.

so he decided to try a surprising attack (Liv. 22, 19, 4—5; Pol. 3, 95, 4—8). The Carthaginians, though informed by look-outs of the approach of the Roman fleet, had no opportunity to get ready quietly for the battle, because they did not expect an attack on account of their numerical superiority (Liv. 19, 8). Yet this circumstance, which Livy emphasizes (19, 7—11 he describes at length the Carthaginian panic), was not the only cause of their defeat: the safe presence of the land army on the coast weakened the morale of the Punic crews and inclined them to take to flight (Pol. 3, 96, 3), and their favourite *δέκπλους* manoeuvre was paralysed by the Massaliots, who formed a second line and gave the Punic ships that broke through the front-line a warm reception (fr. of Sosylus). When two Punic ships had been captured and four others quite disabled,⁴⁷⁾ there began a *sauve-qui-peut* to the coast. But the Romans pursued the Carthaginians and towed away from the beach 23 of their ships, thus capturing on the whole 25 vessels and destroying 4 (Pol. 3, 96, 5—6; Liv. 22, 20, 1—2). This victory changed at one blow the Roman minority in the Spanish waters into a considerable predominance,⁴⁸⁾ which they succeeded in retaining to the end of the Spanish conflict. Of course this was very important, because maritime supremacy rendered them capable of keeping up the diverting offensive in Spain even in the most difficult circumstances and of maintaining themselves in their Spanish naval bases in spite of crushing defeats on land; moreover this victory, however modest it might be, meant a welcome support to the Roman morale in the face of the serious defeats in Italy. We do not know, what became of the 25 captured ships; later on in the war they did not form part of the Roman naval effective in the Spanish waters: possibly Massilia was presented with them, a method of acknowledging the services of faithful allies which was not unusual with the Romans.

A few words may be added about the sources. Livy's narrative, though often verbally agreeing with Polybius, has not been derived from him, because it contains some details, which Polybius has not, but from Coelius,

⁴⁷⁾ Pol. 3, 96, 4; according to Livy (22, 19, 12) the four ships were sunk; Sosylus too mentions the numbers 2 and 4, if Bilabel's restorations of the fragment are correct, which is not certain, compare Jacoby, *F. G. H.* II BD, 604.

⁴⁸⁾ Liv. 22, 20, 3; Pol. 3, 96, 6; the Carthaginians saved only 11 out of 40 quinqueremes, whereas the 17 remaining ships for the greater part had not been fitted out and moreover were partly of a smaller type.

who drew upon the same sources as Polybius.⁴⁹⁾ With de Sanctis (242, 61) I believe, that the various reasons adduced by Polybius, Livy and Sossylus to explain the Punic defeat must be combined, because they are all equally above suspicion and complete each other in a satisfactory way. On the contrary the strategems, to which according to Frontinus (4, 7, 9) and Dio (Zon. 9, 1, 2) Scipio owed his victory, are certainly not authentic; at best we might conclude from the latter's narrative (and this is a welcome corroboration of Sossylus' conception), that the battle was tougher and lasted longer than the pro-Roman narratives of Polybius and Livy would allow us to presume. But there was yet another reason for Hasdrubal's defeat, which is not mentioned by the authorities and can only indirectly be deduced from a later passage of Livy (23, 26, 4). There it becomes apparent that Spanish naval officers, punished by Hasdrubal on account of their cowardly behaviour in the battle off the Ebro, kindled a revolt against him in Spain. If Hasdrubal recruited even his naval officers from Spain, *a fortiori* this was the case with the inferior naval personnel, the rowers and sailors.⁵⁰⁾ This fact throws a clear light on the decline of the Punic navy during this war. Were the *Barcini* anxious to spare the urban population of Carthage, whose support they could not dispense with, and therefore save them the trouble of naval service, which normally should have fallen to their share?⁵¹⁾ Or did the land war swallow up such quantities of man power, that the navy ran short of it? At any rate the decline of Punic sea-power must be explained from lack of man power rather than of ship-building material.

The Romans immediately exploited their newly acquired naval supremacy by ransacking with their fleet the Spanish coast as far as New Carthage; they crossed to the Pityussae and got into communication with the Balearic islands. Even if this had not been handed down by Livy (22, 20, 4 sq.), we should have to presume it⁵²⁾ and there is certainly no reason for rejecting this information, though the same passage contains manifest forgeries regarding warfare on land. Klotz (143) believes, that this *passus* (20, 3 sq.) is a doublet (from Antias) of the foregoing passage (from Coelius), because Livy did not recognize the similarity of the two versions (!); I must say this is a puzzle to me. The assertion "Die Erzählung

⁴⁹⁾ Klotz 143.

⁵⁰⁾ Gsell II, 450—451; Kahrstedt 139—140.

⁵¹⁾ Compare Gsell II, 458.

⁵²⁾ de Sanctis III, 2, 242, 62.

beginnt (20, 4) von neuem mit dem Vorrücken zur Ebro-mündung" is pure nonsense: after the battle (20, 4) the fleet sailed *on* to the town Onusa, which, as becomes manifest from 21, 22, 5 (but I am afraid Klotz does not understand ⁵³) this passage), lay south of the Ebro. It may be true, that this *passus* contains forgeries; but these do not affect the information about Roman naval action, which is certainly authentic.

(Italy) Let us now pass to the operations that took place in the summer of 217 in the seas near Italy. ⁵⁴) Under the impression of the news of the defeat in the Spanish waters the Carthaginians, κρήναντες ἀναγκάϊον εἶναι πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιβολὰς ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς θαλάττης, decided to send 70 ships.... to the Italian waters. Apparently it was their intention to damage as much as possible the Roman navy in those areas, especially the convoys to Spain, in which they really succeeded to a certain extent, and in the meantime to repair their fleet in Spain to the best of their power. That for this purpose they sent ships to Spain at the same time, we are not told, nor is it probable, taking into account the permanent Roman naval supremacy in those regions. The squadron crossed to Sardinia and from this point approached the Italian coast near Pisa; but here it was baffled in its expectation to come into contact with Hannibal (Pol. 3, 96, 8—9). ⁵⁵) It succeeded, however, in capturing near Cosa a fleet of transports, which was on the way from Ostia to Spain (Liv. 22, 11, 6). ⁵⁶) The consul Cn. Servilius was charged by the dictator Fabius with the naval command (Pol. 3, 88, 8; Liv. 22, 11, 7) and put to sea from Ostia with 120 quinqueremes in order to counteract the Punic

⁵³) Does he connect *ad Hiberum* with *praeter Onusam urbem*, this town being supposed to lie on the Ebro? Of course *ad Hiberum* must be connected with the following *ducit*.

⁵⁴) Pol. 3, 88, 8; 96, 8—14; Liv. 22, 11, 31, 1—7; Zon. 8, 26, 13.

⁵⁵) After the battle of lake Trasimene Hannibal had reached the coast of the Adriatic in Picenum and from there sent word of his victory to Carthage, which was encouraged thereby to support the Italian and the Spanish offensive with might and main (Pol. 3, 87, 4—5). But on the western coast of Italy Hannibal did not make his appearance: his army was not well adapted to the besieging of strong Italian towns, let alone the blockading and conquering of maritime towns in spite of Rome ruling the sea. It was one of the weakest points in his plan of campaign, see *i. a.* de Sanctis III, 2, 43 sq.

⁵⁶) Apparently the transports were not escorted by men of war, though there were plenty available, a carelessness, which yielded bitter, but wholesome fruit: we never hear of Roman transports bound for Spain being molested again.

squadron. But the Carthaginians yielded to superior force, sailed back to Sardinia and from there to Carthage and succeeded in escaping (Pol. 3, 96, 10—11). The consul sailed to Corsica and Sardinia, where he took hostages in order to keep the islanders from throwing in their lot with Carthage⁵⁷) (Liv. 22, 31, 1; Zon. 8, 26, 13), and thereupon crossed (via Lilybaeum: Pol. 3, 96, 12) to Africa, where according to Polybius (*l. l.*) (*Africa*) he forced the inhabitants of the island Cercina to buy off plundering with a sum of money and garrisoned Cosyra (Pantellaria), finally to return to Lilybaeum. In Livy's narrative Cosyra is not mentioned, but on the other hand before the transaction with Cercina (according to him the plundering was bought off with 10 talents of silver) he relates the ransacking of Meninx (Djerba), which is not mentioned by Polybius; moreover he informs us, that a descent was made upon the coast of Africa itself, the Roman pillagers going to work so recklessly, that 1000 men were killed and the fleet had to retreat hurriedly to Lilybaeum (22, 31, 2 sq.). It was autumn by now; so Servilius soon departed for the land army to take over the command from Fabius; but the fleet remained for a long time at Lilybaeum, where the praetor Otacilius was in command of the standing Sicilian squadron of 50 ships (Liv. 22, 31, 6—7). Only in the winter of 217—216 Servilius' ships sailed back to Rome,⁵⁸) Otacilius' squadron naturally remaining at Lilybaeum.

Polybius and Livy (who according to Klotz 140—142 is here dependent on Antias) give both details the other has not; in my opinion the extra details of Livy must be combined with Polybius, as I did in the foregoing survey, because they seem reliable and are partly indispensable (for instance the capture of the transports bound for Spain). Only the ransacking of Meninx might give rise to doubt, because this island lies rather far out of the way:⁵⁹) perhaps it has displaced the occupation of Cosyra, which is mentioned by Polybius and not by Livy. But the

⁵⁷) Naturally the Carthaginians had supporters among the inhabitants of their former dominion Sardinia, who moreover were of a turbulent character and discontented with Roman government. During this war the Romans had to guard and check them continuously.

⁵⁸) Pol. 3, 106, 7; Liv. *l. l.* is vague, cf. Holleaux 163, 4 and 174, 4.

⁵⁹) Has it been invented by Antias to serve as a counterpoise against a rather shameful accident, which befell a Roman fleet in those regions during the first Punic war (Pol. 1, 39)?

plundering of the African coast cannot be a falsification, as it ended in a shameful Roman defeat.⁶⁰⁾

The expedition of the Carthaginians to the Italian waters scarcely answered its purpose. To be sure a fleet of transports bound for Spain was intercepted, but they did neither succeed in raising a serious revolt in Sardinia nor in coming into contact with Hannibal near Pisa; and the Roman fleet having put to sea the Punic squadron had to yield immediately to superior numbers (120—70) and retreat to Carthage. On the other hand the Roman naval achievements are not impressive either. Just as in 218 the naval superiority of the Romans was very strong and they exploited it by sweeping clean the Tyrrhenian sea and ransacking the African coast with the neighbouring isles, but through their carelessness they not only lost a convoy bound for Spain, but suffered painful losses while pillaging Africa. After all the occupation of Cosyra was the only result of this expedition; it well matches the occupation of Malta in the preceding year.⁶¹⁾ On the whole the expedition was only one of those pillaging raids which again and again were launched against Africa during the war: the scheme for a real offensive against Carthage, projected in 218, had been pushed to the background by Hannibal's invasion of Italy and only in the last years of the war it would be taken up again and carried through by the great Scipio.

pain) In the summer of the same year after Servilius' departure⁶²⁾ the senate sent a new convoy to Spain with 8000 soldiers and many provisions, escorted by 20 (according to Livy 30) men of war under command of

⁶⁰⁾ The freedmen, who, according to Livy (22, 11, 8—9), were on board the ships of Servilius, served as *milites classici*, as the context proves clearly; this *special* case of *military* service of the freedmen must not be confounded with their *normal* service as *socii navales*, compare the first chapter.

⁶¹⁾ The fact, that Livy mentions one occupation and Polybius the other, supports the use of a combinative method, provided that it is critically applied. The occupation of Cosyra is another proof of Roman maritime supremacy: without it the Romans couldn't have maintained themselves in such a post. The curious fact, that neither Malta nor Cosyra are mentioned again during the war, must be imputable to the lacunary state of our knowledge regarding naval events.

⁶²⁾ The convoy sailed out after the senate had received the news of the victory off the Ebro (Pol. 3, 97, 1) and of course it could only do so after Servilius had chased the 70 Punic ships; the order of events in Polybius' and Livy's narratives tells the same tale. On the other hand Scipio departed betimes to carry through an

the proconsul P. Scipio. Henceforth P. and Cn. Scipio waged war in Spain together and from the increase of their land forces they derived the courage to cross the Ebro for the first time in this same year, the fleet co-operating with the land army (Pol. 3, 97; Liv. 22, 22, 1—4). In the winter of 217—216 another convoy with provisions reached them from Rome (Pol. 3, 106, 7).

Livy, here again dependent on Coelius (Klotz 143), forms an indispensable complement to Polybius, who does not mention the fleet of transports with 8000 soldiers and provisions, but tacitly presupposes its arrival 97, 4—5, the Scipios naturally deriving the courage to cross the Ebro from the increase of their effective *on land*.

We remarked before (p. 41) that Scipio's 20 ships had been originally intended for Spain and now, after the numerical inferiority of the Carthaginians in the Italian waters had become manifest, were again sent with him to Tarraco in order to relieve the auxiliary squadron of the Massaliots that had come to the rescue temporarily. So the Roman naval effective in Spain remained limited to 35 ships.⁶³) Of the 155 ships lying at Rome at the beginning of the year 120 had been sent out with Servilius (these ships returned to Rome in the winter of 217—216), 20 with Scipio to Spain, so that a number of 15 remained available for the protection of the Italian shores. At the end of the year 135 ships were lying at Rome again, 50 at Lilybaeum, 35 in Spain (sum total 220 ships as in 218).

In the spring of 216 a fleet of transports, sent from Syracuse by Rome's 216 faithful ally Hiero, arrived at Ostia with large quantities of grain (300.000 (Import bushels of wheat, 200.000 of barley). The envoys of Hiero, who arrived grain) with these ships, promised to supply the Romans with grain in future as well, where and so much as the senate would deem necessary; moreover they offered a golden Victoria *ominis causa* and 1000 slingers and archers (Liv. 22, 37; Zon. 8, 26, 14 and compare Pol. 3, 75, 7, Klotz 145). This piece of information clearly demonstrates the great importance of Roman maritime supremacy from an economic point of view. It was on the eve

important offensive in Spain in the same year; so his 20 ships had not been taken from Servilius' fleet, which only in the winter of 217—216 returned to Rome, see above footnotes 25 and 58.

⁶³) The captured Punic ships were not put in commission, see above p. 50.

of the battle of Cannae, in other words Hannibal had already laid waste great parts of Italy. So the Romans had to import foreign grain in order to shield Italy from starvation and it was naval supremacy that enabled them to do this: without it they would have lost the game unavoidably from lack of victuals, apart from all military factors.⁶⁴⁾ So it was no wonder that again and again during this war they imported by sea considerable quantities of grain, from Sicily, from Sardinia, even from Egypt, and it was above all for this reason, that the Carthaginians made serious efforts to wrest from them Sicily and Sardinia (as early as 217 the Punic fleet had sailed via Sardinia to Pisa and this first attempt would not be the last). In order to avoid an excessive splitting up of the data I have collected them here. *Sicily*: Liv. 22, 37 (Zon. 8, 26, 14); 23, 38, 13; 26, 32, 3; 26, 40, 15—16; 27, 5, 1—6; 27, 8, 19; *Sardinia*: 23, 32, 9; 23, 41, 6—7; 25, 20, 2—3 (that in book 25 no import of grain from Sicily is mentioned, but only from Sardinia, is not imputable to chance, in the preceding years war having raged furiously in Sicily itself; when after the fall of Syracuse peace had been restored in the island, the import of grain from Sicily to Rome also revived, compare the striking passages from books 26—27, quoted before⁶⁵⁾); *Egypt*: Pol. 9, 11a, compare Liv. 27, 4, 10.⁶⁶⁾ It stands to reason that after 207, when Hannibal must confine himself to the most southern part of Italy and hence in the rest of the peninsula the soil could undisturbedly be tilled again, this precarious situation gradually was retrieved, compare Liv. 28, 11, 8—9; 29, 1, 14.

Sicily) Hiero's envoys added to their presents the advice, *ut praetor, cui provincia Sicilia evenisset, classem in Africam traiceret, ut et hostes in terra sua bellum haberent minusque laxamenti daretur iis ad auxilia Hannibali summittenda* (Liv. 22, 37, 9). This advice of Hiero was apparently a reaction upon the Punic attempt of 217 to come into contact with Hannibal. The senate answered to it by increasing to 75 the squadron of 50 ships lying at Lilybaeum under command of the propraeor T. Otacilius and allowing him to cross to Africa, if he deemed it beneficial to the Roman state (Liv. 22, 37, 13; of the 135 ships lying at Rome there

⁶⁴⁾ de Saint-Denis, *Une guerre maritime*, 129.

⁶⁵⁾ The fact, that such a statistical phenomenon can be read from the data scattered in Livy's work, proves conclusively the authenticity of this material.

⁶⁶⁾ See Ed. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften* II, 420, 6.

remained 110 after the increase of the Sicilian squadron). The number of 75 ships is not imputable to chance: we remarked before that the Romans always took care to outnumber their maritime adversaries; as a reaction upon the fact, that in 217 70 Punic ships had made their appearance in the Italian waters, now the Sicilian squadron was raised from 50 to 75 ships, a powerful trump against those hypercritical scholars, who deem it their duty to banish poor Otacilius from History, standing squadron and all. For the number of 70 Punic ships, upon which the increase of Otacilius' effective to 75 vessels was a reaction, has been handed down by Polybius (3, 96, 8) and therefore is certainly unimpeachable.

Shortly afterwards, about the time of the battle of Cannae, Philip of (Illyria) Macedon tried to take advantage of the difficulties the Romans had to struggle with by enriching himself in Illyria at their and their allies' cost; for this purpose he had built 100 λέμβοι in the winter of 217—216.⁶⁷) The Romans, warned by their Illyrian ally Skerdilaïdas, ordered the commander-in-chief at Lilybaeum to detach 10 ships to the Illyrian waters, because as yet they had no special squadron in the Adriatic. Philip, whom the rumour of the approach of these ships had reached without their numerical strength, took to flight in a panic, though, as Polybius rightly remarks, he could perhaps have faced the 10 Roman quinqueremes with his 100 λέμβοι (Pol. 5, 109—110). Probably the Roman squadron sailed back to Lilybaeum immediately.

We may take it for granted that the fleet at Lilybaeum, 10 ships of which were detached to Illyria, was identical with Otacilius' standing squadron, which recently had been raised to a number of 75 vessels. It is an instructive spectacle to see hypercriticism worm its way through the brambles of sophistry in order to be able to maintain its anathema against Otacilius and his squadron: according to Kahrstedt (454, 2) and Holleaux (163, 4) Servilius' squadron of 120 vessels, which in 217 had operated against the Punic fleet and made a descent upon the African coast, was lying still in 216 at Lilybaeum and from this fleet the 10 ships should have been detached. It is very curious, that their desire to catch the annalists in the act of forging has compelled them in this case to forsake their idol Polybius. For, as I remarked before, Polybius positively states

⁶⁷) For the antecedents of this conflict compare *i. a.* Niese II, 465 sq.; Zippel 54 sq.; Ormerod 177 sq.

(3, 106, 7) that Servilius' squadron had returned to Rome in the winter of 217—216. So the fleet at Lilybaeum, mentioned by Polybius 5, 109—110, must have been the standing squadron of Otacilius: alas he has suppressed the name of the commander, but this omission does not give us the right to banish Otacilius and his fleet from history.

Sicily) In the same year, shortly after the battle of Cannae, the senate received a letter ⁶⁸) from Otacilius, *regnum Hieronis a classe Punica vastari; cui cum opem imploranti ferre vellet, nuntiatum sibi esse aliam classem ad Aegatis insulas stare paratam instructamque, ut, ubi se versum ad tuendam Syracusanam oram Poeni sensissent, Lilybaeum extemplo provinciamque aliam Romanam adgrederentur. itaque classe opus esse, si regem socium Siciliamque tueri vellent* (Liv. 22, 56, 6—8). Apparently the Carthaginians continued in this year their expeditions to the Italian waters: in 217 Sardinia and the Italian shores had been their aim, now came Sicily's turn. ⁶⁹) The fact that this raid all but coincided with the battle of Cannae, perhaps presupposes a certain co-operation between Hannibal and Carthage. The size of the Punic squadrons is not mentioned, but they scarcely can have numbered more than 70 ships together (the effective of 217); the dividing of them might have proved fatal, if Otacilius had had the pluck to crush first of all the squadron near the Aegates insulae by means of his superior numbers and then turn to the Syracusan shores. ⁷⁰) But on the other hand it is intelligible that the propraetor, who soon expected his successor, ⁷¹) preferred to take no risks and to invoke the assistance of an additional squadron from Rome (still 110 ships were available there (*v. s.*), which were ready to sail with Marcellus to Sicily).

That Marcellus was about to depart with the fleet for Sicily, appears from Liv. 22, 57, 1. 7—8, App. *Ann.* 27, 117 and Plut. *Marc.* 9. Under the impression, however, of the crushing defeat of Cannae the senate preferred to make use of the services of this excellent officer in Italian warfare. So Marcellus transferred the command of the fleet or rather, as

⁶⁸) Does the tradition of these facts rest upon the *acta senatus*, as 23, 21 and 23, 34, 10? Moreover, the lack of pluck, exhibited by Otacilius on this occasion, warrants their authenticity.

⁶⁹) How dangerous such pillaging raids might be for the provisioning of Roman Italy, needs no explanation.

⁷⁰) The Syracusan fleet of Hiero apparently was no match for the Punic squadron.

⁷¹) M. Claudius Marcellus (Liv. 22, 35, 6; de Sanctis III, 2, 250).

Appian *l.l.* perhaps rightly says, of part of it to his colleague, the *praetor urbanus* P. Furius Philus,⁷²⁾ and remained in Italy himself with a number of troops originally intended for the fleet.⁷³⁾ Furius crossed with his squadron to Sicily (App. *l.l.*) and, as appears afterwards from Livy's retrospective narrative (23, 21), made a raid on Africa, from which he (*Africa*) returned badly wounded to Lilybaeum.⁷⁴⁾ What became of the two Punic squadrons menacing Syracuse and Lilybaeum, we do not know; it is, however, probable that, when Furius' fleet approached Sicily, they hastily yielded to the now overwhelmingly superior numbers and retreated to Carthage.

To conclude our discussion of the maritime events of this year we (*Sicily a*) may record, that T. Otacilius informed the senate by letter that P. Furius (*Sardinia*) had returned badly wounded with the fleet from Africa to Lilybaeum (see above) and that he was in want of money and grain to pay and provide the soldiers and *socii navales*; he urged the senate to send him these necessities as soon as possible and at the same time asked for a successor for the next year.⁷⁵⁾ A complaint of the same kind about lack

⁷²⁾ Liv. and App. *l.l.*; that he was *praetor urbanus* and not *peregrinus*, as de Sanctis (250) wrongly believes, appears from Liv. 22, 35, 5; Otacilius retained his function of *propraetor*.

⁷³⁾ If we reckon 40 men for the permanent garrison of the quinquereme (drawn from the Roman proletariat, Pol. 6, 19) and 80 for the supplement consisting of legionaries (the number of marine troops of a quinquereme normally amounted to 120 men, Kromayer, *Flotte* 486), it seems probable that the *legio classica* retained by Marcellus in Italy (Liv. 22, 57, 7—8) formed the effective of legionaries, intended for the 110 ships, and that the 1500 *milites classici* he sent to Rome, were \pm one third of the permanent marine troops of the same ships. So Furius had left for himself some 2900 men or little more than 25 men a ship; if he reckoned 40 men a ship (the minimal garrison), he could hardly take more than 70 ships to Sicily and even had to supplement his military effectives from the Sicilian troops before his expedition to Africa. So some 40 ships must have stayed behind at Ostia, doomed to idleness as long as the *milites classici* were deemed necessary for the defence of Rome; though this situation will not have lasted long, as it soon became manifest that Hannibal did not think of attacking the Roman capital. These trifling facts perfectly explain, why Hannibal's invasion of Italy pressed to the background the Roman plan of campaign of 218: in Italy so many soldiers were needed, that the Romans couldn't even think of setting apart considerable military forces for a serious offensive against Carthage. Only after 207 this became possible again.

⁷⁴⁾ We do not know the details of this raid.

⁷⁵⁾ As the senate, however, began to realize the advantage of standing commands,

of money and grain ⁷⁶) arrived from A. Cornelius Mammula, the propraetor of Sardinia. The senate answered that they must not reckon upon assistance from Rome, but try to help themselves; and indeed Otacilius succeeded in getting the required support from Hiero, Cornelius from *civitates sociae* (Liv. 23, 21; Val. Max. 7, 6, 1). What became of Furius' fleet, we are not told; probably it returned to Rome with him towards the end of the year (for he managed to recover from his wounds). ⁷⁷)

The events of this year resemble those of 217. This time again a raid is made by the Punic fleet, though — a point of importance — not so far from home as in the preceding year; and again the Roman answer is a raid on Africa. Under the weight of Cannae, however, the Roman naval action is more limited than in 217: certainly, the standing squadron of Lilybaeum was raised from 50 to 75 ships, but the fleet which sailed southward from Ostia, was much smaller than in the preceding year. In the Adriatic Philip of Macedon began to stir in 216: as yet the Romans had no squadron there, but the sending of 10 quinqueremes from Lilybaeum sufficed to put Philip to flight in a panic. This farce was however the forerunner of serious difficulties. It is clear, that in 216 the Romans were able to maintain their maritime supremacy, though they couldn't prevent the plundering of the eastern shores of Sicily.

he was maintained in 215 as commander-in-chief of his squadron, whereas the praetor Claudius obtained Sicily (23, 30, 18; 23, 32, 20).

⁷⁶) Whether we must conclude from § 4 that there was a Roman squadron in Sardinia as well as at Lilybaeum (since Servilius' action of 217?), seems doubtful to me; anyhow, there will not have been more than a few ships, which, if so, should be subtracted from the 40 at Ostia. Not before 23, 40 the sending of a squadron to Sardinia is mentioned expressly.

⁷⁷) Of course Furius' expedition is to be regarded as historical: a raid, of which nothing could be told except the fact, that the commander was brought back from it badly wounded and that there was neither pay nor food for the crews, was not invented by a Roman annalist! Does not the retrospective mentioning of it à propos of Otacilius' letter to the senate prove, that the tradition of this expedition goes back to the *acta senatus*? Nevertheless the circumstance that there should have been lack of grain in corn-growing countries like Sicily and Sardinia, would remain extremely surprising, but for the fact that they were heavily drained for the sake of sustaining Italy.

Let us now for a moment turn our attention to Hannibal's position in (Italy) Italy and look at it in the light of naval affairs. The tales told by the annalists about the straits he found himself in on the eve of Cannae,⁷⁸⁾ are fables, as for instance the assertions, that his troops should hardly have had anything to live upon and that serious disturbances and a disposition to desertion should have been the consequence: the first is decisively confuted by Pol. 3, 107 (compare de Sanctis III, 2, 59, 90) and the second by the fact, emphasized by Polybius,⁷⁹⁾ that Hannibal during the entire campaign in Italy never had to face opposition, treachery and such like from the side of his soldiers. Yet, though Italy did feed his army, his position was far from rose-coloured. He received no longer Gallic reinforcements, his lines of communication with northern Italy having been interrupted, and Roman naval supremacy isolated him from Carthage as well; so in spite of and partly even by reason of his victories he must run short, if not of victuals, at least of money, military stores and above all of men: without regular supply of reinforcements normal mortality alone, quite apart from the losses in battles, must reduce his army slowly, but surely. So it is no wonder that after Cannae Hannibal showed a particular desire to possess good harbours in Italy in order to get into contact with Carthage and Macedon. Certainly, the fact of his possessing such harbours would not destroy Roman maritime supremacy, but at least he could reckon in this case with transports occasionally slipping through, on account of the slight seaworthiness and very limited radius of action of the ancient man of war: without harbours even this would be out of the question. After Cannae — it is extremely characteristic⁸⁰⁾ — Hannibal did not march against Rome,⁸¹⁾ as was expected by many people, but... against Naples. It is however equally characteristic that the attempt failed: the Romans ruling the sea and freely importing victuals into every menaced harbour, Hannibal, being shipless himself, was not capable of conquering strongly fortified maritime

⁷⁸⁾ Compare Liv. 22, 39. 40, 8—9. 43, 2—4; Zon. 8, 25, 13; 9, 1, 7; App. Ann. 12, 51; 13, 57.

⁷⁹⁾ 11, 19, 3—5; 23, 13, 2; Gsell II, 432.

⁸⁰⁾ de Saint-Denis, *Une guerre maritime*, 125.

⁸¹⁾ With his relatively small army, the best arm of which was the numerous cavalry, he couldn't think of laying siege to this mighty fortress, which, moreover, was connected with the sea the Romans governed.

towns, unless by means of treason; but the Neapolitans sided faithfully with Rome and later attempts failed just as well as the first.⁸²⁾ On the western shores of Italy Hannibal never possessed any harbour at all. After Cannae he succeeded in conquering successively a number of towns on the eastern and southern coasts of the peninsula, first perhaps Salapia (Pol. 3, 118, where de Sanctis (211, 1) reads *Σαλαπῖνοι* instead of *Ταγανῖνοι*, cf. Liv. 24, 20, 15), further Locri, Caulonia and Croton (in 215) and finally in 212 Tarentum, Metapontum, Thurii and Heraclea (cf. *i. a.* Liv. 22, 61, 10 sq.).⁸³⁾ But Brundisium and Rhegium he never took, and the one really good harbour on the southern coast he acquired (the harbour of Tarentum), was all but worthless to him, because the citadel dominating it remained in Roman hands. Only one small Carthaginian convoy reached him at Locri on the southern coast (*v. i.*):

thage) In this light we must also regard the mission of Hannibal's brother Mago after Cannae. He brought the news of the victory to Carthage,⁸⁴⁾ but at the same time he painted Hannibal's isolated situation and asked urgently for reinforcements, money and victuals. In spite of the opposition of Hanno,⁸⁵⁾ the political adversary of the *Barcini*, this request was granted by a sweeping majority and a resolution was passed to send 4000 Numidians, 40 elephants and money to Hannibal and to enlist in

⁸²⁾ Liv. 23, 1, 5 sq.; 14, 5; 15, 1—2 (216); 24, 13, 7 (214); Zon. 9, 2, 7 sq.; Klotz 153 (there is no question of doublets here).

⁸³⁾ Indeed the southern coast formed a gap or at least a very weak point in Roman maritime supremacy, as will appear afterwards.

⁸⁴⁾ During the war the contact between Hannibal and his government was never wholly interrupted: as a matter of course Rome did not command the sea so strictly, that a single ship (especially if it was a transport) could not easily pass, just as it regularly happens even now in spite of the severest blockading measures; already in 217 Hannibal had sent word of the battle of lake Trasimene to Carthage by sea, Pol. 3, 87, 5, compare Liv. 23, 10, 10 sq.

⁸⁵⁾ The personality of Hanno is undoubtedly historical; but he did not influence the attitude of Carthage towards Hannibal, because, as Livy's narrative clearly demonstrates, he was completely overruled by a sweeping pro-Hannibalic majority. If Carthage did not sufficiently support Hannibal, it is not imputable to Hanno's influence, but to the momentous fact, that Rome ruled the waves, and to a certain lack of pluck vested in the Punic popular character and worsened by paralysing feelings of inferiority, exhibited by the Carthaginians during the whole of the war: in this respect Hannibal indeed stood more or less alone. But the government honestly tried to support him, Kahrstedt 435.

Spain considerable forces in order to supplement the Spanish army and Hannibal's forces in Italy. ⁸⁶⁾

The scheme of the Carthaginian government was comprehensive indeed: the lending of assistance to Hannibal would be started from two sides. On the one hand Hasdrubal's army in Spain would be reinforced considerably in order to make it possible for him to march by land to Italy with part of his troops, to join hands with his brother and definitely knock out the Romans, who were still groggy from the defeat of Cannae: this was part of the programme for 216. On the other hand the Punic government hoped to be able to send the promised reinforcements directly by sea to Hannibal towards the year 215. ⁸⁷⁾ The plan failed, however, on account of the development of events in Spain. As early as the spring (*Spain*) of 216 Hasdrubal had received at his request 4000 foot-soldiers and 1000 troopers as reinforcements. But when he prepared for marching against the enemy and fitted out what was left to him of his fleet since 217, his Spanish naval officers deserted him and raised a revolt against him. ⁸⁸⁾ And when after some time (still in 216) he received from Carthage the order to march with his army to Italy, the rumour of it immediately caused disturbances among the Spaniards. ⁸⁹⁾ Nevertheless the government at Carthage stuck to its plan of campaign (*Italiae cura prior potiorque erat*, Liv. 23, 28, 1) and sent Himilco with considerable forces ⁹⁰⁾ to Spain in order to keep this country in check, while Hasdrubal was marching to Italy; but.... Hasdrubal was beaten decisively near the Ebro and so could not leave Spain. ⁹¹⁾ The reaction of the Carthaginian government

⁸⁶⁾ Liv. 23, 11—13, especially 12, 3 sq. and 13, 7—8; Zon. 9, 2, 6; Dio fr. 57, 14; App. *Ann.* 16, 71; Livy is here dependent on Coelius, compare the fr. of Coelius H. R. F. 26 and Klotz 151.

⁸⁷⁾ Kahrstedt 435 sq., 451.

⁸⁸⁾ Liv. 23, 26, 2 sq., see above p. 51.

⁸⁹⁾ Liv. 23, 27, 9 sq.

⁹⁰⁾ Liv. 23, 28, 2 gives no numbers, but he had a *iustus exercitus*. The strength of the fleet he brought to Spain and there hauled ashore (§ 3) we do not know either; but it cannot have been large and probably returned after some time to Carthage, as it certainly did not play a part in the Spanish waters: when taking New Carthage Scipio captured 18 ships (Pol. 10, 17, 13).

⁹¹⁾ The achievement of Hasdrubal's plan shortly after Cannae might have finished the Romans; the frustration of it by the Scipios is another proof of the importance of Roman naval supremacy, which enabled them to launch and keep up an offensive in Spain from the beginning of the war.

upon these events is characteristic. From the beginning its scheme of lending assistance to Hannibal via Spain and the route by land had taken precedence of the direct support by sea: the first was started immediately in 216, the second planned for 215. When Hasdrubal on account of his defeat was not able to march to Italy according to the original scheme, nevertheless the route via Spain and by land remained foremost with the Punic government: Mago, who in accordance with the promise should bring to Hannibal by sea 12000 foot-soldiers, 1500 horsemen, 20 elephants and 1000 talents of silver, escorted by 60 men of war, was ordered now to take these reinforcements to Spain and forces of about equal numbers were sent to Sardinia, where a change of governors and the discontentment of the population seemed to offer a chance of expelling the Romans.⁹²) Only the small reinforcements promised to Hannibal from the beginning reached him indeed in 215 via Locri (Liv. 23, 41, 10; I will come back to it below): it is the only convoy (and a small one) that ever reached him by sea, and it was only by lucky chance that it eluded the Roman navy.

It will be clear from the foregoing survey, that in those years the Carthaginian government exerted itself to the utmost of its power to support Hannibal. But it remains a striking fact that always, even after Hasdrubal's defeat, the lending of assistance via Spain and the route by land continued to take precedence of the direct route by sea. Roman naval supremacy cast its shadow on these matters. Certainly, in 216 the Carthaginians had immediately decided to send two convoys to Hannibal directly by sea, but apparently more or less reluctantly: as soon as the two-sided scheme came to exhibit a breach on the Spanish side in consequence of Hasdrubal's defeat, Spain and the route by land prevailed and the large convoy was directed thither, the small one alone being exposed to the certainly serious risk of being intercepted by the Roman navy. Was it a symptom of short-sightedness? It seems questionable; had not Hannibal himself set the example in 218?⁹³) Moreover, the plan of

⁹²) Liv. 23, 32, 5—12; Zon. 9, 3, 7 sq.; the 60 men of war certainly did not remain in Spain, as the Roman supremacy in those waters was maintained: they must have returned to Carthage; Tarn wrongly contends (*Fleets* 58) that the expedition to Sardinia was escorted by 60 men of war just as the convoy bound for Spain: Carthage certainly had not 120 warships at her disposal and the description of the Sardinian campaign does not suggest the presence of so large a squadron, *v. i.* footnote 112.

⁹³) Moreover, the maintenance of Spain in itself was of vital importance for Carthage from a financial point of view.

supporting Hannibal directly by sea was not wholly given up, but only partly delayed, in order to give it a safe basis first: after Hiero's death (Sicily) Carthage exerted herself to the utmost of her power to conquer wavering Syracuse and maintain it as a naval base on the Sicilian coast in order to bring about a reasonably safe maritime communication between Carthage and southern Italy, and for this purpose the fleet too was considerably increased. Hannibal fully agreed with this project and supported it; if it failed on account of the hesitation and pusillanimity of Carthaginian generals and admirals, the blame is not to be thrown primarily upon the government, which, though lacking natural pluck, did its level best. To tax Carthage with short-sightedness seems reasonable only with regard to Sardinia. By sending considerable forces thither instead of to (Sardinia) Hannibal just as by sending Mago with a strong army to Spain the Carthaginians naturally took the line of least resistance: Sardinia was hardly defended by the Roman navy and from Carthage the island could be reached *linea recta* in a much safer and easier way than the Italian shores with the carefully protected Sicily as an outpost. But was it justifiable to spend such considerable forces on the struggle for an outer dominion that could only be of secondary importance for the decision of the war? Did not the childishly short-sighted desire to recover as soon as possible a dear old dominion play a certain part in this game? Certainly, we may argue that every diverting offensive, wheresoever it was launched, must unavoidably throw the Romans after Cannae into serious difficulties and that they couldn't do without Sardinia on the score of the provisioning of Italy;⁹⁴) but nevertheless there remains a glaring disproportion between the unstinted exertions for the sake of this diverting offensive and the scanty support Hannibal received on the principal theatre of war. Yet the cause of this disproportion is not to be sought in the first place in the short-sightedness of the government of Carthage, but above all things in Roman maritime supremacy, which again and again forced the Carthaginians to bring their soldiers and ships into action at the wrong point.

We must now continue our narrative by discussing naval warfare in the year 215. As I remarked before, the Romans had 35 ships in Spain,

⁹⁴) It is not imputable to chance, that the discontentment of the Sardinians originated in the compulsory delivery of grain to the Romans; Liv. 23, 32, 9.

75 at Lilybaeum under command of the propraetor Otacilius and, after the return thither of Furius' squadron, 110 ship at Ostia, together 220 sail since the beginning of the war (if there were a few ships in Sardinia, they must be subtracted from the 110 at Ostia, see above footnote 76). The effectives of the Spanish and Sicilian squadrons remained unchanged in 215, but in the spring of this year the home fleet at Ostia was bled again, two new independent squadrons being separated from it. In the first place 25 ships were given to the praetor urbanus Q. Fulvius *ad suburbana litora tutanda* (Liv. 23, 32, 17), a phrase, naturally to be understood in a rather wide sense.⁹⁵) And to the praetor Valerius Laevinus in Apulia another squadron of 25 ships was given, *quibus oram maritimam inter Brundisium ac Tarentum tutari posset* (Liv. l.l.): since the battle of lake Trasimene Philip caused trouble in Illyria and thought of interfering in the affairs of Italy; in 216 he had started an action with 100 λέμβοι in the Illyrian waters, but had stolen away in a panic, when it was rumoured that the Romans had detached a squadron from Lilybaeum to the Adriatic; now, after the battle of Cannae, he was to be expected to come to a definite understanding with Hannibal and to interfere with the struggle in Italy;⁹⁶) so it is no wonder that the Romans now sought to confront this Macedonian menace with a special squadron: in the long run the fleet at Lilybaeum was not adapted to this task. We might rather wonder at the fact, that only in 215 it occurred to them to take such a measure; but in the sphere of maritime affairs they often limped behind the events, as we remarked before à propos of the stationing of a squadron at Lilybaeum in 218 (p. 46); moreover, they may have refrained from dividing their home fleet, until they knew exactly, what Carthage was able to do at sea. So since the spring of 215 the naval forces of Rome were divided in the following way: 75 ships were lying at Lilybaeum, where Otacilius retained his function of propraetor, 35 in Spain, 25 in Calabria to protect the shores between Brindisi and Tarentum, 25 in the Tyrrhenian sea for the protection of the western shores of Italy; finally 60 ships remained available at Ostia for conveying

⁹⁵) Liv. 23, 38, 2 we find these ships near Cumae in Campania, see below footnote 97.

⁹⁶) Compare the excellent book of Holleaux, 173 sq., and Engers, *Die Vorgeschichte der makedonischen Kriege Roms* (Mnemos. Tertia Series, Vol. VI, 121 sq.).

services etc., a considerable part of which was put out of commission and hauled ashore (Liv. 23, 38, 8), apart, perhaps, from a few lying in Sardinia.

Shortly after these matters had been arranged, there really came off (Maced) an agreement between Hannibal and Philip. In the spring of 215 the latter sent envoys led by Xenophanes to Italy, who reached Hannibal and concluded a treaty between Carthage and Macedon. During the return-voyage, however, the ship that transported the envoys was captured by Laevinus' squadron and the envoys with their important documents were transported to Rome on board 5 ships of Laevinus' fleet (Liv. 23, 34, 1—9). At Cumae the documents were handed over to the consul Gracchus, who dispatched them by land to the senate; the envoys continued their involuntary voyage to Rome on board the ships (23, 38, 1 sq.).⁹⁷ The senate, informed by the document found on the envoys of the agreement concluded between Hannibal and Philip,⁹⁸ which naturally contained a stipulation about the lending of assistance by Philip to Hannibal in Italy,⁹⁹ decided immediately to increase Laevinus' squadron from 25 to 50 ships.¹⁰⁰ Only just in time the Romans had stationed 25 ships in

⁹⁷ The Roman ships, which here appear to operate near Cumae under command of the consul, either belong to the squadron of 25 ships of the *praetor urbanus* Q. Fulvius *ad suburbana litora tutanda* or to the 60 available at Ostia. Their presence in these waters is to be closely connected with the fact, that Hannibal after his abortive attempts against Naples had now tried to take Cumae (23, 36, 6). That on account of his isolated situation he was very much in want of harbours, especially on the western coast, I pointed out before; his attempt upon Cumae failed as badly as the others. For the same reason Puteoli was garrisoned by the Romans in this year, Liv. 24, 7, 10.

⁹⁸ Polybius (7, 9) has the authentic text of it, which was copied by him at Rome from the original; the fact that this document was in Roman hands and that Xenophanes figures in it as the envoy, who administered the oath to Hannibal, proves conclusively that the story about the interception of the embassy must be true in substance. Of course this happened on the return-voyage and Laevinus' squadron was the agent (Liv. 23, 34; Liv. 23, 33 on the contrary is full of forgery, compare de Sanctis III, 2, 407, 22 and Holleaux 183, 2).

⁹⁹ For a discussion of the treaty as a whole, which is here out of place, the reader is referred to Holleaux 179—188; the arrangement about Philip lending assistance to Hannibal we find Pol. 7, 9, 10—11 worded in a general way, to be elaborated in detail in a special military convention (*ὡς ἐν συμφωνήσωμεν*), Holleaux 183, 3.

¹⁰⁰ Liv. 23, 38, 5 sq.; of course the 25 extra ships were taken from the 60 available

Calabria in the spring of 215: now they reaped the fruits of their supremacy in those waters by being able to intercept the embassy and thus being informed of the secret convention in time to double the Calabrian squadron against the menace of a Macedonian invasion. Chiefly for this reason (Calabria) Philip must let the year 215 pass idly: ¹⁰¹) in the face of 50 quinqueremes detached especially against him he must for the present give up the project of a landing in Italy, because he possessed only *λέμβοι* himself, a striking instance of a fleet in being. Besides, Holleaux is probably right in assuming (186), that in the special military *συμφωνία* added to the treaty the stipulation will have been laid down, that the Punic navy had to transport Philip's forces to Italy, because Macedon had no proper warfleet at all. ¹⁰²) And the conquest of Tarentum by Hannibal was also a *conditio sine qua non* for the disembarking of Macedonian forces in Italy. Tarentum however would not be taken by Hannibal before the year 212 and even then this conquest would appear to be all but worthless, because the citadel dominating the harbour remained in Roman hands. And as early as 215, old Hiero having one foot in the grave and after his death a reversal being expected at Syracuse, the Punic government (Sicily) began to concentrate at sea as well as on land upon the conquest of Syracuse. ¹⁰³) And right they were, because they were in bitter need of a good base on the Sicilian coast for the communication with southern

at Ostia: it appears that these, or at least part of them, had been temporarily put out of commission and hauled ashore (§ 8). Livy gives to Laevinus a total number of 55 ships, a mistake caused by the fact that he adds to the sum total the 5 ships that had transported the Macedonian envoys to Rome, whereas in reality these belonged to Laevinus' original squadron of 25 ships (cf. 23, 34, 9). So there were now lying 35 ships in Spain, 75 in Sicily, 50 in Calabria, 25 in the Tyrrhenian sea; 35 ships remained available, the bulk of which lay at Ostia, a few perhaps in Sardinia.

¹⁰¹) Naturally the unavoidable sending of a second embassy to Hannibal, which this time performed its task undisturbedly, caused loss of time too (Liv. 23, 39, 1-4). That the Macedonian ship captured by the Romans succeeded in escaping on the way to Rome and informed Philip of the tribulations of the first embassy (§ 1), must be true in substance, though Livy's narrative is here rather unintelligible (compared with 23, 34, 9), see Weissenborn *ad locum* and Holleaux 185, 1.

¹⁰²) Liv. 23, 33, 10 belongs to the foolish annalistic fantasies, in which this chapter abounds, see above footnote 98.

¹⁰³) Cf. Pol. 7, 3-4 and Holleaux 186, 2; whether Hiero died in the spring of 215 or of 214, is not certain, see de Sanctis III, 2, 329-334 and Tuzi (Beloch, *Studia di storia antica* (Roma 1891) I, 83-97).

Italy and the Greek waters; but after a long and heavy struggle this attempt failed, and when finally, after years, a Punic squadron made its appearance in the Greek waters, it was too small and circumstances had changed too much than that it might still have accomplished anything. But to these matters we shall come back below; for the present the Romans on account of their large stock of ships had been quite able to shield themselves from the menace of a Macedonian invasion; it stands to reason that the Calabrian squadron was maintained for years under a standing command just as the Sicilian squadron.

In the spring of 215 the Sardinian question came to a crisis likewise. (Sara The retiring governor A. Cornelius Mammula ¹⁰⁴⁾ reported to the senate, that his successor Q. Mucius was seriously ill, that everything foreboded revolt and war ¹⁰⁵⁾ and that the sending of reinforcements was highly necessary; so the senate decided to send the veteran T. Manlius Torquatus, who knew Sardinia from personal experience, with a legion to the island. About the same time (in the spring of 215) Hasdrubal Calvus in accordance with the resolution of the Punic government (Liv. 23, 32, 8 sq., *v. s.*) indeed put to sea with considerable forces ¹⁰⁶⁾ in order to cross to Sardinia, but —luckily for the Romans — he did not reach the island directly: a heavy gale drove his fleet to the Balearic islands, where he needed considerable time to repair his ships (Liv. 23, 34, 10—17). ¹⁰⁷⁾ So Torquatus got the start of his rivals: he transported his forces, safely escorted by a number of warships, ¹⁰⁸⁾ to Sardinia, united them with the

¹⁰⁴⁾ Liv. 23, 34, 10; just as 23, 21 the tradition seems to rest here upon the *acta senatus* and therefore is certainly authentic.

¹⁰⁵⁾ Apparently it was known to the Romans, that there was something on foot among the natives, that they were in contact with Carthage and expected assistance from there, cf. Liv. 23, 32, 8 sq.

¹⁰⁶⁾ According to Liv. 23, 32, 5. 12 he must have had some 12000 foot-soldiers and 1500 horsemen.

¹⁰⁷⁾ We are not told, that his transports were escorted by men of war. The 60 warships Mago had taken to Spain (23, 32, 5. 11), could hardly have returned to Carthage in the spring of 215; so Hasdrubal will have had but a small escort of men of war: such a risk he could take, because in crossing straightway from Carthage to Sardinia he did not come within the range of the Sicilian squadron.

¹⁰⁸⁾ Neither 23, 40, 2 nor 41, 7 the number of his warships is mentioned; according to Kahrstedt (452, 1) he had 20, which is fairly possible, but purely hypothetical. At any rate these ships were taken from the 35 available at Ostia, so that only 15 remained, if Kahrstedt is right.

troops already present there and increased his land army by arming his *socii navales* and hauling the ships ashore. With these forces he succeeded in defeating the insurgents, before Hasdrubal had returned from the Balears. The latter succeeded, however, in landing his army ¹⁰⁹) and joining hands with the rebels; but their united forces were crushed by the Romans, Hasdrubal and other Carthaginians of note falling into their hands. This finished the game: after pacifying Sardinia Torquatus returned with his fleet ¹¹⁰) to Rome (Liv. 23, 40—41). The Punic attempt to wrest Sardinia from the Romans had failed.

(Africa) Meanwhile Otacilius with his (probably complete) squadron had made a raid from Lilybaeum on the African coast, but set sail from there in the direction of Sardinia on account of the rumour, that Hasdrubal had crossed thither from the Balearic islands. Really he met the latter's fleet on the open sea while being on the return-voyage from Sardinia to Africa ¹¹¹) and captured 7 ships crews and all; the others were routed (Liv. 23, 41, 8—9). ¹¹²)

(Italy) Yet this Sardinian *débâcle* had its bright side for the Carthaginians: while Otacilius routed the Sardinian fleet of transports, Bomilcar in the meantime profited by the absence of the Sicilian squadron to bring a convoy intended for Hannibal with soldiers, elephants and victuals ¹¹³)

¹⁰⁹) The landlubberish tendency of the Romans to put warships out of commission as soon as they could and make use of the naval personnel in warfare on land (for instance Liv. 22, 31, 3; 26, 17, 2; 27, 17, 6; Pol. 10, 35, 4—5; Liv. 29, 3, 7; Clark 46, 88) yielded bitter fruit in this case. Torquatus could have destroyed the weakly-escorted Punic convoy with his warships on sea, but.... his ships had been put out of commission and the crews added to the land army!

¹¹⁰) In spite of Liv. 23, 41, 7 he perhaps left his legion in Sardinia, compare de Sanctis III, 2, 251, 90; but the island remained practically without ships, just as before.

¹¹¹) That Hasdrubal had sent back his fleet to Carthage *before* the decisive battle against the Romans, as Liv. 23, 40, 8 contends, seems improbable, but is a matter of slight importance for us.

¹¹²) Livy's narrative does not presuppose that the Punic fleet of transports was heavily escorted (*v. s.* footnotes 92 and 107): the panic of the Carthaginians and the light character of the fight seems to prove the contrary.

¹¹³) Livy (23, 41, 10) does not mention numbers; but undoubtedly there is question here of the 4000 Numidians and 40 elephants promised originally to Hannibal (Liv. 23, 13, 7; *v. s.* p. 62). So the convoy was but small and besides it was the only one that would reach him by sea during the war. If already in 216, before the arrival of this convoy, Hannibal is supposed by Livy (23, 18, 6) to possess elephants, this information must of course be spurious, Kahrstedt 447, 3; Gsell II, 406, 2.

safely to Locri.¹¹⁴) Bomilcar's expedition having been reported to him, the praetor Claudius,¹¹⁵) who commanded the army in Sicily, marched speedily with his forces by land to Messina and from there crossed in the direction of Locri in order to hinder the reinforcements from reaching Hannibal; but he came too late¹¹⁶) (Liv. 23, 41, 10—12). Is the Roman navy to be taxed with carelessness on this point? If so, the fault is not in the first place to be sought with Otacilius,¹¹⁷) who did his duty against

¹¹⁴) Whether Bomilcar's transports were escorted by men of war or not, we are not told; probably he was accompanied by a part of the 60 warships which had sailed with Mago to Spain and in the summer of 215 could have returned from there to Carthage. — Locri, Caulonia and Croton went over to Hannibal in 215, cf. Liv. 23, 30, 6—8; 24, 1 sq.; de Sanctis III, 2, 252; Kahrstedt 241—242, 453—454; Klotz 158—159 (in 209 Caulonia appears to be in Hannibal's hands (Liv. 27, 12, 6); the town must have gone over to him in 215 together with Locri and Croton).

¹¹⁵) Probably the convoy had been sighted from the Sicilian coast.

¹¹⁶) Apparently Claudius had no warships at his disposal, Otacilius having put to sea with his complete squadron; so he will have made use of transports from Messina. Alas we cannot build here upon Livy's short and vague account: *Locros traiecit* must mean *he crossed (with ships) to Locri*, but immediately afterwards we are told, that the Locrians shut their gates in the face of the Romans, so that we get the impression of a march by land from Rhegium.

¹¹⁷) Livy's story (24, 8—9, 6), how at the consular elections for 214 Otacilius suffered a repulse on account of his failure as an admiral, cannot be true as it stands, because he was re-elected praetor and maintained in his naval command! The violent invective Fabius should have delivered against him on this occasion, betrays the forger by its flagrant historical blunders, and it seems to be altogether out of the question, that a deserving admiral, who moreover ranked high among the Roman aristocracy (not only was he related to Fabius and Marcellus, but he was augur and pontifex at the same time, a cumulation extremely rare in Roman history), should have been treated in a way so rude as Livy represents it. If there is a hidden grain of truth in his description of the machinations à propos of the consular elections, these intrigues were rather aimed at M. Aemilius Regillus than at Otacilius; the latter, consoled by his re-appointment to the praetorship and, perhaps, by the promise of a consulship in the future (it was only death that cheated him out of it in 210, see below footnote 158), probably consented voluntarily to play into the hands of his friends Fabius and Marcellus and leave the consulship to them, whereas Fabius and his set will have been anxious, *not* to punish the deserving man for pretended failures, but on the contrary to maintain him in his naval command in Sicily, an island, with which his Samnite ancestors had already maintained relations, where during the first Punic war his father and uncle had commanded and he himself had served as a young man, and which he knew as but few other Romans. No Roman magistrate ever ruled there during a longer period than he! Compare the excellent discussion of Münzer 72—83.

the Sardinian fleet of transports and could not be present in two different places at the same time, but in the fact that the Romans had neglected to station in good time a squadron at Rhegium: for this purpose they could have disposed of 40 ships (the 15 ships available at Ostia + the 25 intended for the protection of the western shores of Italy).¹¹⁸⁾ For the rest it was but a small convoy that in this way succeeded in eluding the Roman navy, and it would remain the only one: even the most strict naval blockade can never have a hermetic character. If we bear in mind, what large convoys the Carthaginians, for fear of Roman maritime supremacy, sent to Spain and Sardinia instead of to Hannibal, this little gap in the blockade is of no moment at all.

Naval warfare in 215 is characterized by the influence, exerted by the defeat of Cannae upon the mode of division of the Roman squadrons. In 216 the central squadron at Ostia had still numbered 110 ships, in 215 it was almost completely split up into small squadrons: not only a division of 25 ships was destined for the protection of the western shores of Italy (*i. a.* on account of Hannibal's attempts after Cannae to conquer harbours on the western coast as Naples, Cumae, Puteoli), but, besides, a squadron of 25 ships (soon increased to 50) was detached to Calabria against the menace of a Macedonian invasion and finally a number of men of war (20?) was sent with Torquatus to Sardinia against the Punic diverting offensive in those areas, so that of the home fleet at Ostia ultimately some 15 ships remained.¹¹⁹⁾

The results of this far-going splitting up of the navy were in the main very good. The Calabrian squadron not only intercepted the embassy from Philip to Hannibal, so that the senate was seasonably informed of the contents of their agreement, but, moreover, by its presence alone it condemned the Macedonian king to idleness. The Sicilian squadron not only made a raid on Africa, but succeeded in surprising and routing on the open sea a Punic fleet returning from Sardinia. And finally the Punic attempt upon Sardinia failed miserably.¹²⁰⁾ Of course there were

¹¹⁸⁾ Also later on in this war the southern coast of Italy remains the step-child of the Roman navy and therefore the weak point in Roman maritime supremacy.

¹¹⁹⁾ After the termination of the Sardinian campaign Torquatus' ships returned to Ostia.

¹²⁰⁾ This fact too is to be regarded as an indirect consequence of Roman naval supremacy: in order to avoid the Sicilian squadron Hasdrubal crossed *linea recta* the

weak points as well: firstly the fact, that Torquatus put his fleet out of commission in Sardinia, whereas he might perhaps have destroyed with it the Punic fleet of transports before its landing (it is true, that he destroyed the Punic army *after* its going ashore, so that the chief purpose (the maintaining of Sardinia) was fully effected; but the fact remains that the fleet escaped, apart from the few ships captured by Otacilius); secondly the fact, that the Romans had neglected to station in good time a squadron at Rhegium, though they could dispose of at least 40 ships for this purpose, a carelessness that caused the slipping through of Bomilcar's little convoy to Locri. But we forget at once these two trifles, if we bear in mind, what big convoys the Carthaginians were forced by Roman naval supremacy to send to Spain and Sardinia instead of directly to Hannibal. In 215 the Romans commanded the sea as well as in the preceding years and in order to ward off the dangers threatening from all sides after (and in consequence of) Cannae they availed themselves of their navy in a much more intensive way than before.

In conclusion a few words about Spain. According to Livy (23, 48, (*Spain* 4 sq.) by the end of the summer of 215 a letter of the Scipios arrived in Rome containing a report of their brilliant achievements. At the same time, however, they informed the senate, that there was lack of money, clothes and grain for the land army and of almost everything for the *socii navales*; if the Romans wished to maintain themselves in Spain, these necessities must be sent from Rome, left aside the money that might perhaps be procured from Spain itself. On account of the exhausted state of the treasury the senate decided to appeal to the contractors to supply goods on credit this time, on the understanding that they would be paid off first, as soon as the treasury could afford it. Three companies declared their willingness, on condition that, as long as they had to do this work for the benefit of the state, they would be exempted from military service and that the state would repair all damages caused by the enemy or storms to the shipped goods. On these terms the army in Spain was readily supplied with the goods it wanted. But Livy's proud exclamation: *ii mores eaque caritas patriae per omnes ordines velut tenore uno pertinebat* (49, 3) is flatly contradicted by the sad things he tells

open sea to Sardinia, so that he was driven by a storm to the Balearic Isles; the delay caused by this adversity made him lose his opportunity in Sardinia.

himself shortly afterwards (25, 3, 8 sq., cf. 25, 1, 4) about the nefarious tricks, practised by those *publicani* (they invented shipwrecks and deliberately sank old hulks laden with worthless cargoes in order to be able to claim large indemnities from the treasury), and about the impudence, exhibited by them in trying to escape their well-deserved punishment. Alas Roman patriotism used to be easily compatible with the most sordid greed of gain (see Heitland I, 335). For the rest the practices of those *publicani* prove conclusively, that the transports bound for Spain were not always convoyed by men of war: that the honest contractors should have scuttled their own ships under the very eyes of the navy, is hardly imaginable! This too is indirect evidence, that Rome ruled the seas and that the risk of being captured by Punic warships had become very slight; had it been otherwise, the important consignments, for the loss of which the state itself was liable to pay, would have been regularly protected by men of war.

14—211

tial re- In 214 M. Valerius Laevinus was maintained in the command of the
ion of Calabrian squadron against Philip of Macedon, T. Otacilius Crassus as
Roman commander of the Sicilian squadron (Liv. 24, 10, 4—5).¹²¹) But first of
navy) all we must turn our attention to the important Roman ship-building
 arrangements described by Livy (24, 11) at the beginning of the year. He informs us, that the senate decided to wage the naval war this year with 150 men of war, including the Calabrian squadron of 50 ships,¹²²) and that according to this resolution.... 100 new ships were launched!

As a matter of course these 100 new ships were not added to the effective of the preceding years (220 ships), so that the sum total should have amounted now to 320 vessels! As I remarked before, the Roman fleet had been rather old in 218 and as early as the winter of 218—217 (Pol. 3, 75, 4) 60 old ships had been replaced by new ones. So we may take it for granted, that the 100 new ships of 214 were also destined to replace old ones, as Livy's words apparently imply. For if the Romans

¹²¹) The problem, whether or not Laevinus had a legion at his disposal for his fleet (24, 11, 3), I cannot discuss here; I'll come back to it à propos of the events in the Greek waters in 214, footnote 169.

¹²²) Excluding the Spanish squadron of 35 ships.

decided to operate in 214 with 150 ships not counting the Spanish squadron, their total naval effective now amounted to 185 ships against 220 in the preceding years; so according to Livy the number of old ships laid up or broken up was even considerably larger than the number of new ships destined to replace them. At first sight this result seems to be in accordance with the naval events of the following years: in Spain and Calabria the effectives remain unchanged for the present (respectively 35 and 50 ships), the 60 ships at Ostia, of which 25 had protected the western shores of Italy and 20 (?) had been temporarily detached to Sardinia, vanish in 214 without leaving a trace and in the struggle for Syracuse Polybius as well as Livy indeed do mention a Roman effective of 100 ships.¹²³) So we get the impression, that the 100 new ships of 214 went to Sicily¹²⁴) and that the 75 ships stationed at Lilybaeum as well as the 60 of Ostia (together 135 ships) were laid up or broken up, so that the total amount of Roman warships should have fallen from 220 to 185.

That reality, however, was not so simple and radical, appears from Livy's own report of the struggle for Syracuse. For he informs us (24, 36, 4 sq.), that 30 extra quinqueremes joined the Roman fleet near Syracuse, the sum total being increased in this way to 130 ships.¹²⁵) That these 30 ships were not a part of the Sicilian fleet of 100 vessels, which had been absent temporarily (compare Kahrstedt 470, 1. 4; better Gsell II, 458, 5), appears from the fact, that after the arrival of these reinforcements the Roman fleet had more than twice the strength of the Punic squadron of 55 ships: so it must have numbered 130 and not 100 ships (besides their own 55 ships the Carthaginians had a certain number of Syracusan ships at their disposal; Livy's account of the Syracusan affairs goes back directly to Polybius and therefore is highly

¹²³) Pol. 8, 1, 7; Liv. 24, 27, 5.

¹²⁴) From Liv. 23, 48, 6 we, perhaps, may conclude, that the new ships originally were intended for the war against Macedon; the Sicilian disaster, however, will have forced the Romans to concentrate all forces upon Syracuse and to leave Laevinus' squadron as it was: to check the not very seaworthy Macedon his 50 ships were indeed quite sufficient.

¹²⁵) Certainly Archimedes' defensive methods had inflicted losses upon the Roman fleet (Pol. 8, 4 sq.; Liv. 24, 34); but of the former squadron of Lilybaeum, which had numbered 75 ships, there were enough old vessels available in Sicily to keep up the effective.

trustworthy). Afterwards, it is true, Marcellus had to face Bomilcar's 130 ships off Pachynum with inferior numbers (Liv. 25, 27); but of course in this case he had left behind a squadron to cover his rear against the Punic and Syracusan ships lying in the harbour of Syracuse. So here again a total Roman effective of 130 ships must be the base of Livy's narrative: if Marcellus had been under the necessity of separating an effectual rear-squadron from a total number of 100 ships, he couldn't have thought of confronting Bomilcar's fleet of 130 vessels; and he *did* face it after all. Finally Livy's statement (26, 1), that there were 100 Roman ships in the Sicilian waters, refers to a moment, when the struggle for Syracuse had been concluded: shortly afterwards (26, 19, 11) 30 quinqueremes went to Spain; apparently after the conquest of Syracuse the Sicilian squadron was reduced to its original effective of 100 ships and the 30 available vessels were sent to the Spanish waters. In reality 105 and not 135 old ships were put out of commission in 214¹²⁶) and replaced by 100 new ones, so that the total effective now amounted to 215 against 220 before (Spain 35, Calabria 50, Sicily 130).

The difference between the years 215 and 214 from a maritime point of view lies not in the minimal reduction of the total naval effective, but in the striking contrast between the far-going splitting up of 215 and the concentration of 214. The cause of this phenomenon is obvious: in 214 and the following years the dangerous struggle for Syracuse, which was of decisive importance for the result of the war as a whole, swallowed the lion's share of the Roman navy, and it was above all the Italian coast defence that had to make way for it. Of course this system had its drawbacks (naval war in the waters of Tarentum proves it conclusively), but, nevertheless, the Romans were right in concentrating all their available power upon the most vulnerable point of their defence. And if we ask, why in those decisive years they did not keep in active service an extra number of old ships instead of reducing their total naval effective from 220 to 215 vessels, the answer is: no doubt, they had old ships enough at their disposal, but the difficulty lay in lack of naval personnel. About this matter Livy 24, 11 gives also interesting information, which at the same time invites us to raise the problem, of which elements the Sicilian squadron of 130 ships was composed.

¹²⁶) That these were not all broken up, appears *i. a.* from the fact, that in 208 30 old ships were fitted out at Ostia and put into commission again, Liv. 27, 22, 12.

In the afore-said passage (7—9) we are told, that after the launching of the 100 new ships Otacilius on account of the rumours about entanglements in Sicily was ordered to sail there *cum classe*. For lack, however, of naval personnel the wealthiest citizens were obliged to yield on behalf of the fleet a number of slaves, graduated according to their wealth, and even to pay them during a certain time. It was the first time, says Livy, that in this way a fleet was manned with *socii navales* ¹²⁷⁾ at the expense of private persons.

Notwithstanding the vague expression *cum classe* we get from this report the impression, that Otacilius took the 100 new ships, manned with the expropriated slaves, to Sicily, where, indeed, shortly afterwards 100 ships make their appearance (*v. s.*). Might this be true, then the 30 quinqueremes which, according to Livy 24, 36, 4, afterwards joined the 100 near Syracuse, should be *old* vessels, fitted out and manned at Ostia after the departure of the 100 new ships. Yet, on second thoughts, common sense revolts against such an explanation; and lack of common sense did not belong to the besetting sins of Roman character. Though Rome might be in want of naval personnel, ¹²⁸⁾ she could dispose, after

¹²⁷⁾ The term *socii navales* is one of the most vague and changing of Latin language. Originally it could only refer to the *allies* in Roman naval service, but in the long run it became so stereotyped a phrase for crew, that it was used as well of naval personnel, composed of freedmen (Liv. 36, 2, 15; 40, 18, 7; 42, 27, 3; 43, 12, 9) or slaves (Liv. 24, 11, 9; 26, 35, 10), and even of the naval personnel of foreign states (e. g. Liv. 23, 41, 9; Gsell II, 450). On the other hand the equalizations *socii navales* = *nautae* (Liv. 24, 11, 7. 9; when alluding, however, to 24, 11 in a later passage (34, 6, 13. 18), Livy speaks of *remiges*) and *socii navales* = *remiges* (26, 35, 1. 10) prove, that the term embraced oarsmen and sailors both, and sometimes it even denoted the marine troops (Liv. 26, 48, 6. 7. 12; 29, 35, 7). It stands to reason, that this chameleonic term makes it difficult to ascertain, from which elements the Romans used to recruit their naval personnel, see the first chapter 11 sq. and Kromayer, *Flotte*, 486—487.

¹²⁸⁾ On account of the hard service and the bad sanitary conditions on board the galleys the death-rate was probably high; moreover, the freedmen, who normally served in the navy, were now partly absorbed by military service (Liv. 22, 11, 8); Locri and Croton had gone over to Hannibal in 215 and several other maritime towns on the southern coast of Italy would follow their example, so that the allied territories, from which *socii navales* could be recruited, shrank more and more; finally the revolt of Syracuse caused desertion among the *socii navales* in Sicily (Liv. 24, 23, 10; 27, 2; 29, 2; 30, 6; 32, 7; 25, 25, 1), who probably for the greater part were recruited from

all, of the crews of 60 old ships at Ostia, however much their numbers might have shrunk, and in Sicily itself of the personnel of the 75 old galleys, though certainly thinned by desertion. Granted the necessity of having a fleet of 130 ships in the Sicilian waters, it would have been downright folly to man all these ships (100 new and 30 old) at Ostia at the cost of immense troubles and send them to Sicily, while 75 old ships with naval personnel were still present there! No, we must try another solution: Otacilius will have taken to Sicily 70 new ships, manned with the remains of the crews of the 60 old ships at Ostia and with those of the expropriated slaves who had already got their sea-legs.¹²⁹) Together with 30 old Sicilian vessels, manned with the remains of the Sicilian crews, these 70 ships formed the squadron of 100 ships, that, indeed, made soon its appearance in the Sicilian waters. Afterwards (Liv. 24, 36, 4 sq.) the remaining 30 new ships were sent from Ostia, the bulk of the expropriated slaves having undergone in the meantime the necessary nautical training. According to this view, in Sicily 45 out of 75 old ships were laid up, at Ostia 60 (together 105, *v. s.*) and only the 100 new vessels were sent from Ostia to Sicily; in this way the perfectly superfluous sending of 30 old ships + personnel from Ostia to Sicily was avoided. In my opinion Livy's short and vague report does not exclude such a conception; we have only to suppose, that the resolution of the senate to wage the Sicilian war with 100 (new) ships (24, 11, 5) had been superseded very shortly afterwards (at the moment of Otacilius' departure, 24, 11, 7) by the plan to increase this number to 130. But this is not unimaginable, on account of the alarming rumours from Sicily, which are mentioned in the same paragraph (7). However this may be (the explanation proposed by me remains of course largely hypothetical), in 214 and the following years the exertions of both parties centered in the struggle for Syracuse: the Roman fleetnumbers for 214 (130 out of a number of 215 ships went to Sicily!) prove it as well as the strenuous

Sikelioti (de Sanctis III, 2, 324; Clark 105; App. *Sik.* 2, 6; this desertion strikingly illustrates one of the drawbacks of the Roman system of recruiting the naval personnel not from citizens (except freedmen), but chiefly from allies; compare for a similar case in the first Punic war Cichorius 36 sq.). So the experiment of expropriating slaves for naval service must be repeated after some years.

¹²⁹) Undoubtedly there were able sea-men among them, as slaves often were used as crews on merchant-vessels.

efforts of the Carthaginians to increase their naval forces;¹³⁰⁾ and no wonder: the struggle for this important base on the eastern shore of Sicily would largely settle the question, whether or not Carthage would succeed in supporting Hannibal to a considerable extent directly by sea and in coming into contact with Philip of Macedon, who, without a proper warfleet of his own, was so bitterly in want of naval assistance.

An extensive account of the violent struggle for Syracuse with its (Syracuse) endless peripeteiai is out of place here, because it belongs to a considerable extent to the war on land and the reader may find the sad and bloody story of it in the handbooks of Roman history.¹³¹⁾ Nor is it possible for me to treat here the chronological problems, connected with these events.¹³²⁾ I must confine myself to a discussion of the points connected with naval warfare. We stated before, that in 214 the Romans increased their fleet in the Sicilian waters to 100 ships¹³³⁾ and that in 213 (Liv. 24, 36, 4) they again added 30 ships to it; at the same time they reinforced their Sicilian land army with an extra legion. But what did Carthage to counteract their efforts? It is only fair to emphasize the fact, that the Punic government exerted itself to the utmost of its power to conquer Syracuse and, if possible, the whole of Sicily; they realized the indispensability of this important base for the communication between Carthage and Hannibal in southern Italy and eventually also for the contact with Macedon, and they took action against Sicily in accordance with Hannibal's wishes and in close co-operation with him. The Carthaginians Epicydes and Hippocrates, of Syracusan extraction by their grand-father's side, who were the life and soul of the Syracusan revolt against Rome, were agents of Hannibal (Pol. 7, 2, 3 sq.; Liv. 24, 6) and in 213 it was he who by letter incited his government to send

¹³⁰⁾ I shall come back to this point presently.

¹³¹⁾ For instance in the book of Kahrstedt, who devoted some good and lively pages to the Syracusan history of these years.

¹³²⁾ Compare de Sanctis III, 2, 329—334 and Tuzi, *Ricerche cronologiche sulla seconda guerra punica in Sicilia* (Beloch, *Studi di storia antica* I, 83—97). In the main I follow de Sanctis.

¹³³⁾ That the 60 ships, with which the Romans in 213 made the renowned assault upon Syracuse that was repulsed by Archimedes, were the total naval effective of the Romans before Syracuse, is neither said by Polybius (8, 4, 1) nor by Livy (24, 34, 4): these ships formed only part of the 100 ships that were present on the Roman side in the Syracusan waters.

at last considerable forces to Sicily (Liv. 24, 35, 4). And indeed the means applied by Carthage were in accordance with the importance of the object pursued: not only a land army of 25,000 foot-soldiers, 3000 horsemen and 12 elephants was sent to Sicily under command of Himilco in the summer of 213,¹³⁴) but, moreover, in the course of the years 213—212 the Punic fleet was successively increased to a number of 150 or perhaps even of 185 ships,¹³⁵) not only with a view to the contest for Syracuse itself, but as well on account of the right belief, that in case of success this naval base would be useful only, if the Roman supremacy in those waters was suppressed at the same time. Really in 212 the Carthaginians brought into action here a greater number of men of war than the Romans.¹³⁶) First of all we must retrace the stages of this naval growth, because this may help us to answer the question, why the Carthaginians failed in spite of their predominance.

The first Punic fleet that joined in the struggle for Syracuse,¹³⁷) was Bomilcar's squadron of 55 ships, which in the summer of 213 succeeded in entering the harbour of Syracuse,¹³⁸) while about the same

¹³⁴) Liv. 24, 35, 3; of course the convoy landed on the southern coast of Sicily (at Heraclea Minoa), because the Carthaginian warfleet was too small at that moment (55 ships) to confront the 100 Roman ships in the Syracusan waters: so the vulnerable convoy could not be exposed to the risk of a voyage to the eastern coast.

¹³⁵) I remarked before, that the 60 ships that accompanied Mago to Spain (216—215) must have returned to Carthage, because the Roman supremacy in the Spanish waters was maintained: of this squadron the 55 Punic ships of 213 are probably the remains. So Carthage must have built intensively in those years.

¹³⁶) Apart from the battle off the Ebro in 217 and Scipio's African campaign, this was the only time in the history of the second Punic war the Romans had to face the Carthaginians with an inferior naval force.

¹³⁷) Before a fleet of unknown, but certainly not of considerable strength had cruised off Pachynum under command of Himilco, but it had returned to Carthage without having effected anything, Liv. 24, 27, 7; 35, 3—4, cf. Pol. 8, 1, 8, who mistakenly calls the admiral Hamilcar.

¹³⁸) The fact that, though the Romans had 100 ships, Bomilcar was able to enter the harbour of Syracuse with 55 and afterwards to leave it with 35 at a moment, when the Roman ships... couldn't put to sea on account of the rough weather (Liv. 25, 25, 11), proves, that the Carthaginians were still more than a match for the Romans from a nautical point of view. The fact, that shortly afterwards they will not be able to exploit their *numerical* superiority, becomes all the more a bewildering puzzle.

time Himilco pitched his camp near Syracuse on the Anapus, after having conquered Agrigentum from his landing base Heraclea. But a combined action of army and fleet against Marcellus' land- and naval forces was not attempted, because at the same time the Romans were reinforced via Panhormus with an extra legion and their fleet too was increased to a number of 130 vessels through the arrival of 30 new ships, which had escorted the legion.¹³⁹⁾ Himilco, who had attempted in vain to intercept the legion, abandoned the idea of making an assault upon Marcellus, who was now considerably reinforced and well entrenched; he marched away, hoping to win over other towns, succeeded in taking Margantia and wintered at Agrigentum (Liv. 24, 36, 8—10; 39, 10). Bomilcar, who with his 55 ships and probably some Syracusan vessels had to face a Roman fleet more than twice as strong as his own (130 ships), put to sea and returned to Carthage (Liv. 24, 36, 7). Apparently the Romans did not try to bar his way or to destroy him, or at least they did not succeed in doing so.¹⁴⁰⁾ The reason for the failure of this first Punic offensive must be sought, first in the fact that Carthage made her appearance rather late on the battle field,¹⁴¹⁾ secondly in the circumstance, that Himilco did not succeed in intercepting the extra legion and destroying it separately, thirdly in the ridiculously small effective of the Punic fleet.

So it is only natural, that in 212 Carthage tried above all things to

¹³⁹⁾ Liv. 24, 35—36.

¹⁴⁰⁾ The painful damages Archimedes' genius had inflicted lately upon the Roman fleet, perhaps partly explain its inactivity on this occasion: probably a number of ships needed reparation. The assault of the Roman fleet, parried by Archimedes, is the only naval event in the second Punic war, treated copiously and with delight in every handbook. So it shall be the only naval event, not treated here; from a maritime point of view it is of quite secondary importance, however interesting Archimedes' mechanical devices may be in themselves.

¹⁴¹⁾ If we bear in mind that since 215 Carthage had fixed her attention on Syracuse, it seems very strange that only in the summer of 213 considerable land forces (and a very small fleet!) were sent to Sicily. Probably the explanation must be sought in the circumstance, that after the shipping of considerable forces to Spain, Sardinia and southern Italy in 216—215 Carthage was incapable of raising immediately again a strong army for Sicily. The problem of man power was always the most ticklish problem for Carthage. But that Hannibal began to show signs of impatience (Liv. 24, 35, 4), is perfectly intelligible.

remedy this last weakness. In the spring of 212 (at the time of the conquest of the outer parts of Syracuse by Marcellus and the capitulation of the important fort Euryalus) we find Bomilcar with a squadron of 90 ships in the Syracusan harbour, his return not having been mentioned by Livy; however, he soon returned for the second time to Carthage (this time with 35 ships, 55 being left at Syracuse¹⁴²), taking advantage of a stormy night, which bound the Roman fleet to the coast. The reasons for this second retreat are probably to be sought 1° in the fact that Bomilcar this time again felt he was no match for the Roman fleet (90 + a small number of Syracusan ships against 130), 2° in the circumstance that Himilco had not yet returned with his army to the neighbourhood of Syracuse, so that there could be no question of co-operation between army and fleet.¹⁴³ However, he soon returned with 100 sail to Syracuse, so that the sum total of his ships now amounted to 155 (+ a certain number of Syracusan vessels) and so finally outnumbered the Roman fleet (Liv. 25, 25, 11—13).¹⁴⁴

¹⁴²) Probably in order to bind the Roman fleet to Syracuse; really Marcellus was forced afterwards in this way to leave behind a squadron to cover his rear, when he sailed to Pachynum to meet Bomilcar, so that he had to face him with inferior numbers. I'll come back to it presently.

¹⁴³) The fact, that only late in the summer of 212 Himilco made his appearance again in the neighbourhood of Syracuse, characterizes the lack of insight and *allure* of the Carthaginian commanders in this war (apart from Hannibal): it is the cardinal blunder, made by the Punic land army in the struggle for Syracuse. If Himilco had relieved in time fort Euryalus, as its commander hoped and Marcellus feared (Liv. 25, 25, 2—4; 26, 1), he could from there have made the latter's situation extremely precarious, in spite of his conquest of the outer parts of Syracuse. But now he appeared (too late to save Euryalus) in the late summer before Syracuse.... to perish near the unhealthy Anapus from an epidemic, army and all. See Karlstedt 483.

¹⁴⁴) This continuous travelling back and forth of the Carthaginian admiral between Carthage and Syracuse without anything being achieved (presently a fourth voyage will be added to crown the farce) has naturally given rise to doublet-tracking: Hallward for instance (68, 1) suppresses the third passage, which produced 100, Kahrstedt (479—481) the second, which produced 90 ships. We must, however, not forget 1° that Livy's account of Syracusan affairs rests upon Polybius, so that there is no specific reason to expect doublets, 2° that we must guard against meddling with this series of passages, because it is so extraordinarily characteristic for the boundless wavering and faint-heartedness of the admiral and for the fatal disposition of the Carthaginian government to produce patch- and piecework in spite of its willingness: instead of sending a strong fleet at once, a spoonful is added thrice, with the result

This time, at last, there could be some question of co-operation between land- and naval forces, because in the late summer Himilco finally appeared before Syracuse. The result was a combined attack upon the Roman positions, in which the Carthaginian fleet took part. Livy's short and vague indications make it impossible for us to gather an idea of the factors which caused this offensive to fail, though the unfavourable positions from which, on account of the loss of Euryalus, Himilco was forced to operate, certainly played a part in the game. But at any rate

that nothing is achieved at all. We must not level one of the most remarkable tragi-comedies History has brought on the stage, by beating down the number of these voyages, which rests upon Polybius of all authors; to such factors as this pettifoggery the Punic defeat is above all things to be ascribed. As during the last war the B.B.C. nicknamed Rommel "the wandering Aryan", so Bomilcar might be christened, if not "the wandering Jew", at least "the wandering Semite"; hard fighting with the risk of going down was not to his taste, locomotion was. In a word, I believe, that in the summer of 213 Bomilcar arrived at Syracuse with 55 ships, that he returned with these to Carthage and in the early spring of 212 brought 90 ships to Syracuse; that in the early summer he returned again to Carthage (this time with 35 ships, 55 being left at Syracuse); in the summer of 212 he then took 100 ships to Syracuse, the sum total of his naval effective now rising to 155 ships. Finally in the autumn there followed a last voyage to Carthage (probably with 100 ships, 55 being left again at Syracuse), from which he returned to Syracuse with 130 ships, so that at the end of 212 or the beginning of 211 185 Punic vessels operated in the Sicilian waters, compare the discussion of this problem by the very critical (even hypercritical) Holleaux, who arrives at exactly the same result (200, 2). There is but one element in this affair that might awake suspicion and indeed caused Tarn (*Fleets* 58) as well as Gsell (II, 442, 2) to shy: the fact, that according to Livy Bomilcar in the early summer of 212 left 55 ships at Syracuse, that is to say exactly the number of his total effective in 213. Is this perhaps imputable to a miscalculation of Livy (compare for instance 23, 38, where he wrongly reckons 55 instead of 50 ships), in other words, did the total effective this time also amount to 55, so that Bomilcar, taking 35 ships to Carthage, should have left 20 and not 55 at Syracuse? Might this be true, then his effective did not rise to 155, but to 120 ships in the summer of 212 and finally in 212—211 the sum total of Punic ships amounted to 150 instead of 185. The attractive element in this hypothesis is the fact, that the very high final number of 185 ships is reduced in a reasonable way; but a serious objection against it lies in the circumstance, that Bomilcar would have returned in the spring of 212 to Syracuse with exactly the same effective that had proved quite insufficient in the summer of 213. Though, taken into account the inscrutable ways of Punic government, this is not quite unimaginable, it is not probable either. As for me, I feel strongly inclined with Holleaux to maintain Livy's (= Polybius') account of these matters in its entirety.

the attack upon the Roman positions was repulsed and in the autumn Himilco's army, being under the necessity of encamping in the unhealthy region of the Anapus, perished of an epidemic (25, 26).¹⁴⁵) Probably about the same time, in order to evade contagion, Bomilcar returned to Carthage.¹⁴⁶) There he represented the situation at Syracuse as more favourable than it really was and succeeded in persuading the government to send him back to Syracuse with 130 men of war and 700 transports, probably carrying not only victuals and military stores (Liv. 25, 27, 3), but also forces for the war on land.¹⁴⁷) In the early spring of 211 (according to Tuzi late in the autumn of 212) he crossed prosperously to the southern coast of Sicily, but a heavy southeaster forced him to leave the transports (sailing-vessels!) for the present at Heraclea,¹⁴⁸) while he was prevented by it himself from rounding cape Pachynum with his warfleet. Marcellus, fearing to be blockaded, sailed out to meet and fight him with inferior numbers.¹⁴⁹) Off cape Pachynum the two squadrons were lying face to face, ready to join battle as soon as the sea should have calmed down. When the heavy southeaster at last abated, Bomilcar in spite of his numerical superiority was struck with an inexplicable panic; he sent messengers to Heraclea to order the transports back to Africa, stood out himself to the open sea and, giving the Roman fleet a wide berth, sailed... to Tarentum, which meanwhile had been conquered by Hannibal, except the citadel (Liv. 25, 27).

¹⁴⁵) Kahrstedt 479 sq.

¹⁴⁶) As afterwards he appears again with a *larger* fleet (25, 27, 3) numbering 130 vessels, he probably had left Syracuse with 100 ships, again leaving behind 55 in order to bind the Roman fleet.

¹⁴⁷) Notwithstanding Livy's silence we must assume this 1° on account of the very high number of transports, 2° because after the destruction of Himilco's army it was of course not enough to send a fleet, but a new land army had to be sent as well. If Kahrstedt (481) estimates the effective of these troops, which after all were not landed in Sicily, but returned to Carthage without having done anything, at 12—13000 men on account of the fact, that the next time (Liv. 26, 21, 14) the Carthaginians disembark 11000 men in Sicily, this is fairly possible, but purely hypothetical.

¹⁴⁸) Apparently this time the transports were intended to go on to the eastern coast, whereas in 213 the land army had been disembarked at Heraclea; at that time the warfleet had been too weak (55 ships) to escort a convoy to Syracuse, but now it outnumbered the enemy.

¹⁴⁹) I pointed out above, that he had been forced to leave part of his 130 ships

Bomilcar's behaviour on this occasion stamps him as one of the most inferior admirals Carthage ever possessed. If he had availed himself of his numerical as well as nautical superiority to destroy the Roman fleet off Pachynum, he might have thoroughly blockaded Syracuse on the sea side, he might have landed his land forces and with these, undoubtedly reinforced by Sicilian troops (Marcellus feared this, Liv. 25, 27, 9), he might have cut the Romans from the interior as well. In that case everything would have been possible still. But instead he sent the transports back to Africa without having landed one man and, not daring to accept battle himself, he withdrew from the Syracusan waters without a blow, thus sealing the fate of Syracuse. I know very well, that a Punic attempt to break through towards the Tarentine waters cannot be regarded as foolish in itself, though it was unpardonable to make such an attempt at the sacrifice of the much more important Syracuse, that is to say to make it at the very moment when Syracuse could and must be secured at any cost.¹⁵⁰) Roman maritime supremacy exhibited a dangerous vacuum on the southern coast of Italy, first because Hannibal now possessed nearly all the harbours of that coast (including the harbour of Tarentum, though it was of no use for him, because the citadel remained in Roman hands), secondly on account of the fact, that so many ships had been concentrated near Sicily: the Romans had 130 vessels in the Syracusan waters, 50 in the Greek waters; between these two areas there was nothing. If Bomilcar with his 130 ships had thoroughly blockaded the Tarentine citadel, which as by a miracle succeeded in maintaining itself against Hannibal, and had starved it into surrender, if in this way he had made the harbour useful for Hannibal, if thereupon he had destroyed Laevinus' squadron in the Greek waters and landed considerable Macedonian forces at Tarentum, perhaps the war might as

at Syracuse in order to cover his rear against the Punic squadron lying there; without this precaution he would have run the risk of being attacked in the rear during the battle.

¹⁵⁰) To turn one's energy to other things, however useful they may be in themselves, at the very moment, when one must stiffen one's back for the achievement of an important enterprise, is a symptom of weakness of character rather more than of short-sightedness. Bomilcar here exhibits this tendency quite as much as Himilco, when from the summer of 213 to the summer of 212 he abandoned Syracuse to pursue secondary conquests in the interior of Sicily.

yet have taken a favourable turn for Carthage. But Bomilcar was a born do-nothing. Even the Tarentine citadel remained in Roman hands and without having effected anything Bomilcar sailed home.¹⁵¹⁾

In the meantime the fate of Syracuse had been sealed by this wretched sluggishness: the town probably fell in the spring of 211.¹⁵²⁾ To be sure, the war in Sicily dragged on for some years; but in spite of the fact, that the Carthaginians once again landed 11,000 men on the island (a perfectly useless sacrifice of precious soldiers, it now being naturally too late; Liv. 26, 21, 14) and that Hannibal sent Muttines, one of his ablest assistants (25, 40, 5), it was rather easily wound up by the Romans, *i. e.* on the score of the puerile friction of the Punic commanders among themselves.

(Africa) These things belong to the war on land and lie outside the compass of this treatise; but an expedition of Otacilius to Africa must be discussed here. A few days before the fall of Syracuse (Liv. 25, 31, 12—15) he crossed with 80 quinqueremes from Lilybaeum to Utica, entered the harbour before sun-rise, captured 130 transports freighted with grain,¹⁵³⁾ raided the country near Utica and returned to Lilybaeum. The grain he sent immediately to Syracuse in order to meet the pressing needs of the army and of the town, conquered after so long a siege.

In my opinion there are no valid reasons to regard this piece of information as spurious (Kahrstedt 484, 1): perhaps it rests upon Polybius (de Sanctis 365, Klotz 114) and also intrinsically it seems acceptable.¹⁵⁴⁾ The 80 ships of course formed part of the 130 that had operated near Syracuse; apparently after Bomilcar's precipitate flight they had been

¹⁵¹⁾ I'll come back to it afterwards, à propos of Tarentum.

¹⁵²⁾ Whether the Punic ships left behind at Syracuse succeeded in escaping to Carthage or fell into the hands of the Romans at the time of the conquest of the town, we do not know; but if the Romans had laid hands upon these ships, the fact would probably have been mentioned.

¹⁵³⁾ It seems reasonable to suppose that these vessels formed part of Bomilcar's fleet of transports which immediately before must have returned from Heraclea to Africa; perhaps this was the principal aim of Otacilius' expedition: at that moment Carthage was probably helpless, because Bomilcar had not yet returned, so that she could dispose at best of the ships come back from Syracuse, see footnotes 152 and 155.

¹⁵⁴⁾ Only the assertion, that the expedition was accomplished in three days, must be imputed to a clerical mistake, on account of the distance between Lilybaeum and Africa, see Gsell III, 173, 1.

detached to Lilybaeum and only 50 were left before SYRACUSE: ¹⁵⁵) the fate of the town was now sealed and no other warfleet was to be expected from Carthage. Even the fact, that Otacilius never is mentioned during the struggle for Syracuse in the years 213—212 and for the first time since 214 here turns up again as commander of a squadron, is no valid reason to athetize this expedition or even to deny radically the existence of the naval commander Otacilius. The short annalistic notices in Livy's work about the annual division of Roman magistracies show, that Otacilius for the second time was elected praetor for the year 214, that in this function he commanded in 214 the fleet in the Sicilian waters (24, 9, 4; 10, 5; 11, 7) and that in the years 213—211 he retained this command as a *propraetor* (24, 44, 4; 25, 3, 6; 26, 1, 12). In the years 213—212 he will have served under the auspices of the *proconsul* Marcellus in the Syracusan waters; it stands to reason, that the so very predominant personality of Marcellus had the tendency to eclipse the names of his assistants. But now, after the fall of Syracuse, he comes naturally to the foreground again as commander of an independent naval campaign. ¹⁵⁶)

In 211 the Sicilian squadron numbered 100 ships again, as in 214 (*Sicily*, Liv. 26, 1, 12): after the fall of Syracuse 30 ships apparently had been

¹⁵⁵) The fact, that such a small squadron was regarded as sufficient, supports my supposition that the Punic ships in the Syracusan harbour had escaped to Carthage directly after Bomilcar's retreat.

¹⁵⁶) See de Sanctis III, 2, 257, 113; 278, 138; 288, 144. Polybius' assertion (8, 1), that the *propraetor* Appius Claudius commanded the fleet before Syracuse (till his departure for Rome at the end of 213) and Marcellus the land army, is just as wrong as the statement made in the same chapter, that in Spain Cn. Scipio commanded the land army and P. the fleet, and it is partly contradicted by Polybius' own account of the siege: in Livy's narrative, which goes back to Polybius, certainly Appius Claudius appears now and then as a naval commander (24, 27, 5; 33, 2; 39, 12), but during the storming of Syracuse in 213 Marcellus himself commanded the fleet and Appius the land army (Pol. 8, 3—7) and afterwards it was again Marcellus who sailed out with the fleet to meet Bomilcar off Pachynum. The truth is that, the *proconsul* Marcellus being commander-in-chief, it was within his discretion to make use of his subordinates, wherever he wanted them; why couldn't Otacilius have fulfilled a naval function during the siege under the auspices of Marcellus? Though, of course, it remains possible that in 213—212 he resided at Lilybaeum for the protection of the western shores against surprising attacks from Carthage: numerous old ships were available there, put out of commission since 214.

ordered back to Rome; ¹⁵⁷) afterwards they would be sent to Spain (26, 19). The 100 ships left in the Sicilian waters remained under the command of Otacilius, who at the end of the year died at his post. ¹⁵⁸)

If now we look back and take a general view of the whole of Sicilian affairs in the years 214—211, we cannot escape from the impression, that it was chiefly the cardinal blunders made by the Carthaginians that finally secured victory to the Romans in the contest for Syracuse. Certainly, the Punic government exerted itself to the utmost of its power for the conquest of Sicily: in 213 28,000 men were sent with Himilco to the island and in 211 again 11,000 (I leave out of account the troops carried by Bomilcar's fleet of transports, because they did not reach Sicily), while the fleet was successively raised to a number of 150 or even of 185 ships. In short, in the years 213—211 little less than 100,000 men were mobilized for Sicily alone, ¹⁵⁹) and these considerable forces would certainly have sufficed to conquer Syracuse and even the whole of Sicily, as the Carthaginians were received with open arms by a great part of the islanders. That nevertheless this unstinted attempt failed miserably, is chiefly a question of tempo. Though as early as 215 Carthage had begun her intrigues in Sicily, only in the summer of 213 considerable forces were sent to the island and even then the squadron which accompanied them numbered but 55 ships and consequently could do nothing. To be sure, this fleet was more than tripled; but instead of doing this at one swoop, one year and a half (from the late summer of 213 to the spring of 211) was spent on the gradual increase of the naval effective (the four voyages "aller et retour" of Bomilcar speak plain language in this respect!): a serious loss of tempo again. The far-going faint-heartedness and short-sightedness of the Punic commanders did the

¹⁵⁷) This was not without risk, because after Bomilcar's return from the Tarentine waters Carthage could dispose of a much larger fleet; so Otacilius could not prevent the landing of a Punic army of 11000 men on the Sicilian coast (Liv. 26, 21, 14).

¹⁵⁸) According to annalistic tradition he had suffered a second repulse at the consular elections for 210, but Livy's account of these elections (26, 22—23) forms more or less a doublet of the elections for 214 (see above footnote 117) and is certainly spurious. Probably the news of Otacilius' decease reached Rome before the elections, so that it was only death that cheated him out of the consulship; see Münzer 75—76.

¹⁵⁹) The Roman quinquereme had normally 300 rowers and 120 soldiers; even assuming, that the Punic ships had less soldiers, and basing our calculation on the minimal number of 150 ships, we count more than 50,000 men for the navy alone.

rest: a full year Himilco kept away from Syracuse in order to pursue secondary conquests in the interior of Sicily, which never could turn the scale, so that Marcellus in the meantime was able to take the outer parts of Syracuse and even to enforce the surrender of the important fort Euryalus, which Himilco might have easily relieved. And Bomilcar, who was an able seaman, witness his escaping with 35 ships from the harbour of Syracuse during a stormy night in the spring of 212, was struck with a panic off Pachynum, when he saw the smaller fleet of Marcellus closing in, and blindly threw away the last important trump Carthage had in hand to win the Syracusan game. Moreover, the co-operation between land- and naval forces was utterly defective: in the summer of 213 the fleet was much too small to do anything, in the spring of 212 the land army was not present and only late in the summer of 212 a combined attack was set up against Marcellus' positions, which failed *i. a.* on account of the fact that after the loss of Euryalus Himilco must operate from utterly unfavourable positions himself.¹⁶⁰⁾

The miserableness of all this strikes us so much the more, because, at least on sea, the Romans in the Syracusan war did not cut a brilliant figure either. Between the renowned assault with 60 ships upon the walls of Syracuse, which in 213 was repulsed by Archimedes and never repeated since, and the really powerful closing effect of the spring of 211, when in spite of his inferior numbers Marcellus bravely sailed to Cape Pachynum to meet Bomilcar, the Roman navy almost seems to die away from sight: the strong fleet is lying before Syracuse, but that's all of it. Several times it let Bomilcar undisturbedly enter and leave the harbour of Syracuse and neither in 213 nor in the spring of 212 it made an attempt to destroy his much smaller squadron, though in this way it might have averted in good time the risk of a Carthaginian naval supremacy. Now this risk only too soon became a menacing reality by the idleness of the Roman navy, and only thanks to the far-going slackness and faint-heartedness of the adversaries the Romans succeeded in overcoming it. The cardinal difference between Rome and Carthago lies after all in the fact, that to the numerous mediocre, but strenuous officers of the type of Marcellus Rome could dispose of, Carthage could only oppose the one gigantic Hannibal, who couldn't be present everywhere at the same time: the other

¹⁶⁰⁾ Compare the excellent remarks of Kahrstedt 483 sq.

Punic commanders¹⁶¹) were short-sighted and wavering, they were paralysed as it were, on the one side by the fear of severe punishment in case of a defeat suffered through foolhardiness,¹⁶²) on the other hand (especially in naval warfare) by the feelings of inferiority, laid like a crushing weight upon their morale by the memory of the first Punic war.¹⁶³) If instead of Bomilcar Carthage had had for an admiral a second Hannibal or even a plucky average officer as Marcellus was, it might have gone very hard with the Romans: especially from a naval point of view the struggle for Syracuse was a deadly dangerous crisis for them, which only the foibles of their adversaries enabled them to surmount.

(Italy and
Greece)

The simultaneous events in the Italian and Greek waters must be discussed in connexion with the Syracusan war, because they are influenced by it; nor can Italy and Greece be treated singly, because the events on those two fronts are influenced by each other as well as by the Sicilian war. Let us mention at once the chief points: Tarentum went over to Hannibal (in the winter of 213—212) not only under the influence of the Syracusan example, but also because in 214 Laevinus had left Brindisi and the Calabrian waters and stationed his squadron permanently in the Illyrian waters; on the other hand the fall of Tarentum together with the increase of the Punic naval effective forced Laevinus in 212 to conclude a treaty with the Aetolians and meddle with Greek affairs in order to involve Philip in difficulties near home and make it impossible for him to invade Italy (the fall of Tarentum had now brought co-operation between Macedon and the Punic navy within the range of possibilities).

(Illyria)

We remind, how in 216 Philip had attempted to profit by the difficulties of the Romans to sail with his *λέμβοι* to the Illyrian waters, but had taken to flight in a panic, when it was rumoured that a Roman squadron was advancing from Lilybaeum, how in 215 he had concluded a treaty

¹⁶¹) The lack of tempo, exhibited by the Punic government in the years 214—211, proves that these things were partly due to an essential trait of the popular character which the government had in common with its functionaries: it was full of willingness, but possessed as little pluck as its average commanders.

¹⁶²) Many a defeated Punic general ended his life on the cross, see Gsell II, 424; naturally this rotten method of dealing with responsible commanders resulted in undermining their morale instead of strengthening it.

¹⁶³) Other instances of this phenomenon we shall meet below.

with Hannibal, one of the terms probably being, that the Carthaginian navy should provide for the transport of the Macedonian forces to Italy, because Philip had no heavy warfleet himself, but how the presence near Calabria of Laevinus' squadron, which had just in time been raised from 25 to 50 ships, had condemned him to idleness for the rest of the year. If he had hoped for the arrival of a Punic squadron in 214, he was badly acquainted with the tempo of the Carthaginian government and met with a bitter disappointment: only in 213 the Carthaginians would make their appearance before Syracuse with a small fleet, during the whole of 212 they would continue to utilize their strongly increased naval forces in the struggle for Syracuse (and right they were!), finally in the spring of 211 Bomilcar, instead of achieving his mission to Syracuse, would make an excursion to the Tarentine waters with his 130 ships.... to return home even from there without having accomplished anything; only in 209—208 at last a modest Punic squadron would make its appearance in the Greek waters...., when it was too late! So in 214 Philip looked out in vain for a Punic fleet and consequently decided — for he was an impulsive young man — to help himself. Naturally he couldn't think of confronting the 50 quinqueremes of Laevinus with his own light craft and of launching an offensive against Italy. But he deemed it possible to repeat now with greater success the attempt against the Illyrian shores that had miserably failed in 216; if fortune favoured him, he would have at his disposal harbours situated favourably in relation to Italy, where the Carthaginian fleet, when finally arriving, would be able to reach him.¹⁶⁴) At first sight this seems a madman's scheme and the result of it seems to confirm such a view. If in 216 Philip's attempt had failed, when the Romans had no squadron in the Calabrian waters and were obliged to send a few ships from Lilybaeum to confront him, a fortiori a *débâcle* was to be expected now, while 50 quinqueremes were lying at Brindisi, which within a few hours could be on the spot to sink his pirates' boats. However, Philip apparently reckoned with the possibility, that Laevinus would *not* make his appearance, but let him have his way; and such a view of the matter was not quite unreasonable. For Laevinus' task was twofold: he was not only to guard Philip, but also to check the Greek towns on the southern coast of Italy (Thurii,

¹⁶⁴) Liv. 24, 40, 4.

Metapontum, Heraclea, above all Tarentum) and, in case of defection, to blockade them. So he found himself between two fires: if he decided for an offensive against Philip, which would naturally imply a permanent protection of the Illyrian shores against a repeating of his attacks, there would be a serious risk of Tarentum and other Greek towns on the southern coast of Italy getting lost to Rome (so it did happen indeed); if on the contrary he remained at Brindisi, the Romans would see their bases on the Illyrian coast conquered by Philip. So the question was, which of the two alternatives Laevinus was to be expected to choose, and Philip's calculation, that he would decide for Italy, could find support in the reasoning, that the menacing development of Syracusan affairs required that Laevinus' squadron should not be too far away to assist the Sicilian squadron in case of emergency.¹⁶⁵) Late in the summer of 214¹⁶⁶) (the date proves that Philip had waited and wavered a long time before he started on the risky adventure) the king of Macedon sailed with 120 λέμβοι, which probably could transport some 6000 men, to the Illyrian shores and at first met with some military successes. Without difficulty he took the seaport town Oricum, sailed up the Aous with his fleet and attempted to surprise Apollonia; this attempt having failed, he laid siege to the town.¹⁶⁷) In the meantime however envoys of Oricum and Apollonia had warned Laevinus at Brindisi and called in his assistance.¹⁶⁸) In spite of his difficult, two-sided situation, the Roman commander did not hesitate for a moment: he garrisoned Brundisium with 2000 men, took the rest of his troops on board his 50 men of war and a number of transports,¹⁶⁹) crossed the straits and easily took back Oricum, the town

¹⁶⁵) See Holleaux 188 sq.

¹⁶⁶) Liv. 24, 40; Zon. 9, 4, 2—4; Plut. *Arat.* 51; for the chronology compare Liv. 24, 40, 17; 20, 15—16; Holleaux 189, 1. If Zonaras relates the events of this expedition *sub anno* 215 in connexion with Philip's treaty with Hannibal, of course Dio is responsible for this shifting and misrepresentation of the facts, see Kahrstedt 252.

¹⁶⁷) Livy wrongly inverts the order of events, Holleaux 191, 1.

¹⁶⁸) Here again I accept Holleaux' correction of Livy's account.

¹⁶⁹) If Laevinus left at Brindisi 2000 men of the legion he had at his disposal, he took with him some 8000 men (citizens + allies, cf. Liv. 24, 40, 8), half of whom could be transported by the 50 men of war, so that the rest had to be carried by transports. If he garrisoned Oricum with 1000 men, he had, after deducting the 2000 men he sent secretly into Apollonia, some 5000 men left on his fleet, when he blockaded the mouth of the Aous. So Philip with his 5000 men (we must subtract from his

being defended only by a weak Macedonian garrison. Then he sailed to the mouth of the Aous and barred with his fleet Philip's way to the sea; he landed secretly 2000 men, who under cover of night succeeded in entering Apollonia unperceived and who thereupon made a nocturnal attack upon the royal camp.¹⁷⁰) Now Philip found himself between two fires and was outnumbered besides;¹⁷¹) consequently he couldn't accept battle, burned his boats in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy and marched with his army by land to Macedonia.

So the Macedonian king had been sorely mistaken in his calculation and consequently his attempt had failed as miserably as in 216. The worst of it was, that the Romans had been shaken up for good by his daring enterprise and refused to take any further risks with regard to Macedon: Laevinus wintered with his fleet at Oricum (Liv. 24, 40, 17;

original effective the little garrison that did not succeed in maintaining Oricum, and the losses caused by the surprising attack upon his camp) got between two fires (between the fleet of Laevinus with 5000 men at the mouth of the Aous and the Roman garrison of 2000 men in Apollonia) and, besides, he had to face this two-sided menace with inferior numbers: this explains perfectly his precipitate retreat. Hence Livy's account of Laevinus' forces is in perfect accordance with the military facts of the campaign: he who nibbles at his legion, renders Philip's sudden retreat before Apollonia perfectly inexplicable. Holleaux, who (187, 2) in imitation of Kahrstedt (461, 1) seeks to reduce Laevinus' forces, supposes, that Philip yielded to an *imaginary* numerical superiority (192); why then for heaven's sake meddle with the tradition that gives to Laevinus no imaginary, but a real superiority! — Laevinus' legion (Liv. 24, 11, 3) is probably identical with the *legio classica*, which in 216 was destined to sail with Marcellus to Sicily, but remained in Italy after Cannae (Liv. 22, 57, 7—8; cf. 23, 32, 16; 38, 9; Holleaux 187, 2; Cantalupi, *Le legioni romane nella guerra d'Annibale* (Beloch, *Studi di storia antica* I, 24—25)).

¹⁷⁰) I again accept Holleaux' corrections (191, 3 and 4) of Livy's account: that Laevinus should have remained with his fleet at Oricum, that even the ships which had transported to the Aous the 2000 men intended for Apollonia should have returned to Oricum and that only after receiving the news of the successful attack upon the royal camp Laevinus should have blockaded the mouth of the Aous, seems unimaginable indeed: apparently Laevinus' scheme was built upon a system of combined operations. The nightly attack upon the Macedonian camp may well be historical, but undoubtedly it was magnified by annalistic tradition. In the main this chapter of Livy contains a good historical nucleus, which, however, has been more or less overgrown by annalistic fantasy, see Kahrstedt 251—252, de Sanctis 412, Holleaux 190, 5, Klotz 161.

¹⁷¹) See footnote 169.

cf. Pol. 8, 1, 6) and also subsequently remained in the Illyrian and Greek waters, so that Philip had to give up every naval action with his light craft,.... unless the Carthaginians should relieve him from his isolation. ¹⁷²)

(*Tarentum*) But, though Roman naval supremacy again had brilliantly stood its ground against Philip, the reverse of the medal was, that the Italian coast defence was seriously influenced by Laevinus' permanent withdrawal from Brindisi. As I remarked before, Laevinus had had the twofold task of guarding Philip as well as the southern coast of Italy (especially *Tarentum*); besides his squadron there were no Roman naval forces in the seas near Italy apart from the Sicilian fleet, bound by the struggle for Syracuse. Now, the Calabrian squadron having been permanently removed to the Greek waters and only 2000 men having been left at Brindisi, the southern coast of Italy, which as early as 215 had proved the weak point in Roman maritime supremacy, ¹⁷³) became a regular vacuum, the Romans having scarcely a ship left between Sicily and the Greek seas. Under these circumstances the Greek towns on the Gulf of *Tarentum* (*Thurii*, *Heraclea*, *Metapontum* and *Tarentum* itself) could be expected to follow the catching example of the influential Syracuse, the entire southern coast thus falling to Hannibal: since Laevinus' departure from Brindisi the cat was away. No doubt, the afore-named towns would not revolt against Rome immediately, ¹⁷⁴) but only in the winter of 213—

¹⁷²) See Holleaux 193. Laevinus wintered 212/11 at Corcyra (Liv. 26, 24, 16); for 213/12 the same may be concluded 1° from the fact, that his command in the Greek waters was prolonged not only for the year 213 (24, 44, 5), but also for 212 (25, 3, 6), 2° from the circumstance, that during the winter of 213/12 Laevinus' squadron did nothing to save *Tarentum*, to assist the Roman garrison of the citadel or to destroy the Tarentine fleet; after having been transported from the *Mare Piccolo* by land to the open sea, this fleet, numbering some 20 ships (Liv. 26, 39, 1.6), ruled the Tarentine waters! All these things would have been unimaginable, if Laevinus had been lying with his squadron at Brindisi; no, since the autumn of 214 he remained continuously in the Greek waters and consequently the southern coast of Italy was deprived of naval protection: it is the reverse of the medal, *v.s.* and compare Holleaux 193, 2.

¹⁷³) Remember the fall of *Locri*, *Caulonia* and *Croton* and the landing of a Punic convoy at the first-mentioned town, and see above footnote 114.

¹⁷⁴) Still in 213 Livy (25, 1) mentions an abortive attempt of Hannibal to take *Tarentum*.

212 (Hannibal, no more than the Romans, could dispose of a fleet in those waters and the towns were checked by Roman garrisons: so a good chance had to be waited for, and, moreover, only the extremely brutal and tactless execution of Tarentine and Thurine hostages, who had attempted to escape from Rome, would cause the explosion of the rebellion brewing since a long time); but, nevertheless, the connexion between Laevinus' withdrawal from the Italian waters and the fall of Tarentum remains undeniable. Note for instance the fact, that Hannibal's attempt to conquer Tarentum in the late summer of 214 (shortly before Laevinus' departure) failed chiefly on account of the latter's strenuous intervening from Brindisi (Liv. 24, 20, 9 sq.), ¹⁷⁵) but that in the winter of 213—212 at the time of the fall of Tarentum Laevinus' squadron did not come into play at all and that in 212 after the conquest of Tarentum Hannibal even could think of attempting an attack (abortive for the rest) on Laevinus' old naval base Brundisium, ¹⁷⁶) where indeed only 2000 men had been left behind as a garrison. There is no reason to criticize Laevinus, because in 214 he left the Italian waters for good; the fault was not his, but it lay in his twofold task, which forced him to sacrifice one duty to the other. But no doubt we have a right to speak of a serious hiatus in Roman naval policy; that in 214 and the following years the Romans neglected to fit out a number of the available old ships for service in the waters of southern Italy, would be unpardonable but for the fact, that this negligence was probably due to lack of naval personnel. ¹⁷⁷)

A discussion of the betrayal and fall of Tarentum, which took place in the winter of 213—212, probably in the first months of 212, lies outside the compass of my treatise, as these events belong for the greater part to warfare on land; here I must limit myself to a discussion of the

¹⁷⁵) For the chronology compare Liv. 24, 20, 15, Holleaux 189, 1 and for the objects Hannibal had in view with respect to Tarentum Liv. 24, 13, 5: *ipsum ingens cupido incesserat Tarenti potiundi. urbem esse videbat cum opulentam nobilemque tum maritimam et in Macedoniam opportune versam, regemque Philippum hunc portum, si transiret in Italiam, quoniam Brundisium Romani haberent, petiturum*. Naturally he also continued in these years his vain attempts to conquer harbours on the western coast; in 214 an unsuccessful attack is mentioned upon Puteoli, which had been fortified and garrisoned just in time (Liv. 24, 12, 4; 13, 6 sq.; cf. 24, 7, 10), in 211 a second abortive attempt to take Rhegium (Liv. 26, 12, 2. 14; Pol. 9, 7, 10, cf. Liv. 24, 1 and Kahrstedt 277); on the western coast he never gained a firm footing.

¹⁷⁶) Liv. 25, 22, 14.

¹⁷⁷) V. s. p. 76 sq.

factors, important from a maritime point of view.¹⁷⁸) Of preponderating importance is the fact already mentioned before, that the Roman garrison succeeded in maintaining itself in the citadel which commanded the access to the harbour of Tarentum (now called Mare Piccolo). So Hannibal could not make use of the excellent port for an eventual disembarking of Macedonian troops (his principal object) and the Tarentine fleet,¹⁷⁹) which lay in the inner harbour, was for the present condemned to idleness, whereas the citadel could be supplied by sea with victuals and extra troops from the still loyal seaports Thurii, Heraclea and Metapontum, because the Carthaginians, no more than the Romans, had a fleet at their disposal in these waters; in this way the Roman garrison was reinforced with half the garrison of Metapontum.¹⁸⁰) In the face of these difficulties the Tarentines hoped for the arrival of a Punic fleet from the Sicilian waters to blockade the citadel and insisted on sending envoys to Sicily for this purpose, but Hannibal, realizing the impracticability of this plan, because the Punic navy must now concentrate upon Syracuse,¹⁸¹) devised

¹⁷⁸) Pol. 8, 24—34 (especially 34), Liv. 25, 7, 10—11, 20 (especially 11), App. Ann. 32—35; Kahrstedt 257—262, 472 sq., de Sanctis III, 2, 277 sq., Klotz 165 sq.; for the chronology Pol. 8, 34, 13, Liv. 25, 11, 20 and the cited modern authors. Livy is so closely related here with Polybius, that many scholars, *i.e.* Kahrstedt and de Sanctis, regard Polybius as the source of this part of his work. On account of the fact, however, that Livy differs now and then from Polybius and here and there contains a plus of tradition in comparison with him, it seems more probable (cf. Klotz *l.l.*) that his version rests upon Coelius and that the latter used the same source as Polybius. If this be true, Polybius must have copied here his source nearly verbatim, because otherwise the far-going conformity with Livy couldn't be explained; an objection, however, cannot be raised on this score against Klotz' view, as Polybius, where we are able to check him, often proves rather dependent on his sources (Klotz 167). However this may be, regarding the history of Tarentum we stand in the main on the firm ground of trustworthy tradition.

¹⁷⁹) V. s. p. 42.

¹⁸⁰) Liv. 25, 11, 10; 15, 5; App. Ann. 35, 148; for the supplying of the citadel with victuals at this stage compare Pol. 8, 34, 3 *τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους κατὰ θάλατταν ἀσφαλῶς παρεκομίζετο τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν*; from Appian's story (34, 145) about a Thurine convoy of victuals, intercepted afterwards by the Tarentine fleet, we may also conclude, that the Thurines had done the same before with more success.

¹⁸¹) Liv. 25, 11, 12 sq., a passage that is not contradicted by Pol. 8, 34, 5 sq. (Kahrstedt 474, 1); afterwards (in the spring of 211) it was indeed at the request of the Tarentines that Bomilcar's fleet came to Tarentum, Liv. 26, 20, 7, Pol. 9, 9, 11.

means himself: at his injunction the Tarentine fleet was transported by land from the inner harbour to the outer sea,¹⁸²) a measure that changed the situation thoroughly. For, no Roman squadron operating in the waters of southern Italy, the Tarentine fleet immediately commanded the sea and cut off the Roman garrison in the citadel from supplies by sea.¹⁸³) However justifiable the removal of Laevinus' squadron to the Illyrian waters might have been, it yielded bitter fruit to the Romans in southern Italy! For, though C. Servilius, probably favoured by wintry weather, succeeded in running the blockade with a number of transports and in disembarking at the citadel a quantity of grain bought in Etruria,¹⁸⁴) the blockade itself wasn't undone by it and, moreover, the other Greek maritime towns now followed the lead of Tarentum: Metapontum could no longer be checked by the halved Roman garrison and went over to Hannibal;¹⁸⁵) Thurii opened its gates to the Carthaginians, after having suffered the Roman garrison to retreat by sea to Brindisi,¹⁸⁶) and finally there was left no choice to Heraclea but to join the revolt, more from fear than from conviction.¹⁸⁷) Even after the fall of Tarentum a Roman squadron might have checked the remaining maritime towns by its presence alone and kept open the maritime lines of communication for the citadel by destroying the relatively weak Tarentine fleet. Now there remained but one large gap between the Syracusan and the Illyrian waters: the entire southern coast of Italy was in Hannibal's hands and, the Tarentine citadel being blockaded by the Tarentine fleet, its surrender could be expected to a certainty before long, so that Hannibal would be able to dispose of the priceless harbour. That the Roman garrison should

¹⁸²) Pol. 8, 34, 7 sq., Liv. 25, 11, 16 sq.; a somewhat different account is given by App. Ann. 34, 143.

¹⁸³) Pol. 8, 34, 12, App. Ann. 34, 144—145; i.e. a convoy from Thurii (see footnote 180) was intercepted and captured by night; from the passage of Polybius it clearly appears that the Tarentine fleet commanded the sea, in other words that there was no question of the presence of a Roman squadron.

¹⁸⁴) Liv. 25, 15, 4; on account of the frail structure of the men of war, which made it impossible for them to remain at sea by rough weather, transports, being nearly always strongly built sailing-vessels, could easily run a blockade by a heavy sea and before the wind, cf. App. 34, 144: the Tarentine fleet blockaded the citadel, *ὅτε μὴ χειμῶν εἴη μάλιστα*.

¹⁸⁵) Liv. 25, 15, 6, App. Ann. 35, 148.

¹⁸⁶) Liv. 25, 15, 7 sq., App. 34, 145—147.

¹⁸⁷) App. 35, 149.

succeed in maintaining itself almost for 4 years, till the reconquest of Tarentum in 209, nobody could nor did foresee in 212.¹⁸⁸⁾

For Roman naval supremacy during the second Punic war and consequently also for the war as a whole the year 212 was the year of the real crisis; we remarked this before à propos of the contest for Syracuse and here it becomes apparent again. Even after his conquest of the outer parts of Syracuse Marcellus did not at all command the situation in Sicily and his fleet of 130 vessels was bound to Syracuse, where it had to face a continually increasing Punic naval effective, which would result in a positive numerical superiority on the Punic side. From the southern coast of Italy Roman sea-power had completely vanished since Laevinus' departure for Illyria in 214;¹⁸⁹⁾ Hannibal was now in possession of all coast towns and the surrender of the Tarentine citadel, which would give him definite control of an excellent harbour for the landing of Macedonian forces, seemed to be only a question of time, the fleet of the Tarentines commanding the sea. And Illyria? Even there the Roman cause had not thriven since 214. No doubt, by shifting his squadron to the Illyrian waters Laevinus had prevented Philip from ensconcing himself in Apollonia, Oricum and other strongholds and for the present had made every naval enterprise in those areas impossible to him; but meanwhile the Macedonian king had not been idle, on the contrary he had done all he could to make possible the establishing of communications with Hannibal and Carthage in spite of Roman sea-power. He had not only made important conquests in the hinterland of Oricum and Apollonia and confined Roman influence to the coastal region, but in northern Illyria he had even succeeded in conquering Lissus and its reputedly impregnable citadel (Acrolissus), so that in spite of the presence of Laevinus' squadron¹⁹⁰⁾ he now commanded a strong base on the coast, where the Carthaginian fleet would be able to reach him for the purpose of

¹⁸⁸⁾ See the excellent discussions of Holleaux 198—201, especially 199, 1.

¹⁸⁹⁾ Rhegium in the West and Brundisium in the East were the farthest Roman bases on the coast at either end and even there no ships were lying!

¹⁹⁰⁾ It is unaccountable and at any rate a serious blunder, that Laevinus did not prevent Philip from occupying Lissus: precisely to avert such things at any cost he was lying with his squadron in the Illyrian waters and the positions of Lissus were impregnable, if well defended. Probably it was this very circumstance that made him leave the defence of this stronghold to his Illyrian allies; but a valid excuse this is certainly not.

transporting troops to Italy.¹⁹¹) All these factors together prove conclusively that in 212 the fate of Rome was trembling in the balance: the Punic fleet had but to grasp its opportunity. If it had taken advantage of its superior numbers to crush Marcellus' fleet and thus to secure Syracuse for Carthage, if thereupon it had sailed to Tarentum and starved the citadel into surrender (as in the spring of 211 it slackly and vainly attempted to do), if from there it had made for the Illyrian waters, had destroyed Laevinus' much weaker squadron, had assisted Philip in conquering Oricum and Apollonia and convoyed his Macedonian forces to Tarentum, and if finally also Carthage herself had profited by the destruction of the Roman squadron in the Sicilian waters to ship considerable forces to Tarentum,¹⁹²) Rome would probably have lost the war. It was chiefly by the blunders of their adversaries (the snail's pace of the Punic government and the incredible faint-heartedness of the admiral Bomilcar),¹⁹³) that the Romans were spared those trials; but what moves did they make themselves in order to disengage themselves from these serious positional drawbacks? The answer is: they concentrated all the power of their defence upon the wings and not upon the centre;¹⁹⁴) apparently they reasoned in the following way: if on the one side we maintain ourselves at any cost in Sicily, if on the other hand we involve Philip in difficulties near home, the vacuum between these two wings (the coast of southern Italy) will automatically be stripped of its most serious risks. Hence the chief countermove was made by Laevinus in

¹⁹¹) For Philip's Illyrian conquests in general compare Holleaux 199, Niese II, 473 sq., and especially for the conquest of Lissus Pol. 8, 13—14.

¹⁹²) That these suppositions are not mere products of an extravagant fantasy, appears not only from the situation of 212 itself, but also from the contact existing between Syracuse—Carthage on the one side, Tarentum—Philip on the other: in the spring of 212 an envoy, sent from Syracuse to Philip, was intercepted by the Roman fleet (Liv. 25, 23, 8) and we stated before, that immediately after the fall of Tarentum the Tarentines wished to call in from Sicily the assistance of the Punic fleet (25, 11, 15) and really did so afterwards (Liv. 26, 20, 7; Pol. 9, 9, 11).

¹⁹³) Compare my discussion of the Syracusan war; only in 209, much too late, a modest Punic squadron would make its appearance in the Greek waters, *v. s.* p. 91.

¹⁹⁴) To provide the Tarentine citadel with victuals they made use of a small squadron stationed at Rhegium, which was chiefly composed of the naval contingents of allies and which was destroyed in 210 by the Tarentine fleet; but the 30 ships that after the fall of Syracuse became disposable in Sicily, . . . were sent to Spain, where they were not needed and were hauled ashore! I'll come back to it below.

Greece:¹⁹⁵) the most serious dangers of the conquest of Tarentum by Hannibal and of Lissus by Philip had to be neutralized by instigating a war against the latter in Greece, thus binding him to the Balkan Peninsula and preventing him from shipping troops to Italy. As the removal of Laevinus' squadron to Illyria had caused the fall of Tarentum, so inversely the fall of Tarentum forced Laevinus in 212 to get into contact with Philip's old enemies, the Aetolians.

(Greece) The dating of the treaty concluded between Laevinus and the Aetolians has given rise to much disputing;¹⁹⁶) but a passage of Livy, which rests upon Polybius, proves anyhow, that the endeavours of Rome at coming to an understanding with the Aetolians must have begun in the early spring of 212, that is to say immediately after the fall of Tarentum.¹⁹⁷) After secret pourparlers between Laevinus and the leaders of the Aetolians the former appeared in the autumn of 212 with his fleet in the Greek waters (it was the first time a Roman squadron made its appearance there) and succeeded in bringing about an alliance with the Aetolians.¹⁹⁸) The chief terms were, that the Romans should wage the war against Philip on sea with at least 25 quinqueremes,¹⁹⁹) the Aetolians on land

¹⁹⁵) Of course, at the same time, the siege of Syracuse and generally the war in Sicily were carried on with the utmost energy.

¹⁹⁶) I follow the chronology of Niese (II, 476, 4), accepted by Kahrstedt (284), Holleaux (209, 2), Klotz (115), which refers the treaty to the autumn of 212; on the other side Clementi (*La guerra Annibalica in Oriente*: Beloch, *Studi di storia antica* I, 49 sq.), de Sanctis (III, 2, 440 sq.) and others refer it to the autumn of 211, on the authority of Liv. 26, 24. A discussion of the chronological problem is naturally out of place here.

¹⁹⁷) 25, 23, 8: *Damippus quidam Lacedaemonius, missus ab Syracusis ad Philippum regem, captus ab Romanis navibus erat. huius utique redimendi et Epicydae cura erat ingens nec abnuvit Marcellus, iam tum Aetolorum, quibus socii Lacedaemonii erant, amicitiam affectantibus Romanis.* This passage proves, that there was contact not only between Syracuse (= Carthage) and Philip (v. s. footnote 192), but as well between Marcellus and Laevinus: the former had probably acquainted the latter of the menacing increase of the Punic navy, whereas Laevinus apparently had informed Marcellus of his plans for a countermove in Greece, see Holleaux 211, 2. That only in the autumn of 211 (that is more than one year and a half later!) the treaty should have come off, seems unimaginable.

¹⁹⁸) Liv. 26, 24; for the circumstances that made the Aetolians ripe for resuming the war against Philip, the reader is referred to the excellent discussions of Holleaux (202 sq.) or to the summary, made of them by himself C. A. H. VIII, 122 sq.

¹⁹⁹) As the Aetolians had no navy at all and were heavily handicapped by this

and *immediately*; ²⁰⁰) that all conquered towns (ground, roofs and walls!) with their territories as far as Corcyra should fall to the share of the Aetolians, but the remaining booty (that is all movables, including the "live-stock") to the Romans; that the Romans should assist the Aetolians specially in conquering Acarnania; that in case of peace being made with Philip both contracting parties should stipulate, that he had to abstain from hostilities against the other contracting party; finally that Elis, Sparta, Messenia and king Attalus of Pergamum ²⁰¹) on the Aetolian side, Skerdilaidas and his son Pleuratus on the Roman side should have the right to take part in the common operations and to share the privilege of Roman friendship, if they wished to. About the disgusting character of this treaty a few words may suffice here. ²⁰²) The way, in which the Romans pledge themselves (for the benefit of the Aetolian greed of conquest and of their own pocket) to exterminate thoroughly Philip's Greek allies, who had never offended Rome, ²⁰³) is practical as well as cynical: they *must* now secure at any cost the assistance of the Aetolians and bind Philip to Greece as much as possible. They hoped to effect this purpose by starting a brutal war of annihilation against his allies,

deficiency against Philip's pirates' boats, which everywhere appeared as suddenly as they disappeared again, a fleet was indeed the best contribution the Romans could furnish to common warfare (Holleaux 208). From the minimum of 25 ships (in the following years the Romans really did operate with such a number of ships in the Greek waters) we have no right to conclude, that the other half of Laevinus' squadron had returned to Italy: the presence of those ships is not at all perceptible in the waters of southern Italy during the next years and it is natural, that they remained stationed in the waters of Corcyra, Oricum and Apollonia in order to guard Lissus, as was urgently required by the circumstances. The *minimum* of 25 ships in this term of the treaty even seems to prove, that Laevinus had more ships in reserve for a case of emergency. I believe therefore, that the strength of Laevinus' squadron was not reduced, but that its effective of 50 ships was maintained.

²⁰⁰) This *extemplo* proves better than anything else, in what hurry the Romans were (it was autumn!) to entangle Philip in Greece: their fear of a co-operation between Philip and Carthage via Tarentum formed the background of this treaty, see Holleaux 210.

²⁰¹) Attalus had westward aspirations, so that his interests conflicted with the Macedonian; really his fleet afterwards co-operated in the Greek waters with the Roman squadron, see Holleaux 202 sq. and for Messenia 211, 1, C. A. H. VIII, 127, 4.

²⁰²) See Holleaux, especially 231 sq.

²⁰³) Cf. Pol. 9, 39.

from which he *must* shield them, unless he wanted to ruin his prestige in Greece thoroughly.²⁰⁴) That in this way they would rouse against themselves the indignation and hatred of Greece and of the whole civilized world of those days, they accepted into the bargain: this does not prove, that the thought of a permanent control of Greece in the future should have been foreign to the Roman government of those days; but at that moment the interfering with Greece was above all things a diverting offensive and therefore a secondary part of the war against Carthage: the future would take care of the rest.²⁰⁵)

So the Roman-Macedonian conflict degenerated into a war of destruction, waged by Rome and Aetolia against Philip's Greek allies; and — let us give him his due — the Macedonian king did not hesitate for a moment to fulfil his task as protector of Greece against the coalition of barbarians, however unwelcome this development of the events might be to him because of his own purposes. Still in the autumn of 212 he forced the Aetolians, who had immediately mobilized against Acarnania, to retreat by swiftly marching against them (Liv. 26, 25, 16). But.... not only the Romans perfectly reached their purpose of implicating him in the affairs of Greece, but, moreover, he remained helpless at sea against Laevinus' squadron. Immediately in the autumn of 212 the latter conquered the island Zacynthus (except the citadel), took Oeniadae and Nasus from

²⁰⁴) That the Romans waged this war with the utmost brutality, but at the same time in a more or less lukewarm way, is not a self-contradictory statement: once the Greek war having been started, they were not pressed for time, on the contrary, and of course they readily suffered the Aetolians to do the dirty work.

²⁰⁵) The fact, that Rome ratified Laevinus' treaty only two years afterwards (Liv. 26, 24, 14), does not prove, that the majority of the senate was averse to meddling with Greece and eastern politics: undoubtedly Laevinus had taken counsel with his government before he acted, but probably the senate stood in fear of the rural majority of the *comitia*, which, in the dangerous year 212, they indeed might scarcely have convinced of the benefit, however indisputable it might be, of an extra front and extra complication again. What wonder that the senate put off the ratification till 210, when at least the whole of Sicily (compare Liv. 27, 5 for the account of the pacification of Sicily, given by the consul Laevinus in the senate in the autumn of 210: about that time the Aetolian treaty will have been ratified too) was firmly in the Roman grasp again! War in Greece went on in the meantime nevertheless. As a counterpoise against the exaggerated views of the excellent Holleaux concerning the utter lack of line and steadiness in Roman foreign policy we advise the reader to read the cautious remarks of Carcopino in the first chapter of his *Points de vue sur l'impérialisme romain* (Paris 1934).

the Acarnanians and, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, handed them over to the Aetolians.²⁰⁶) Thereupon he withdrew with his fleet to Corcyra in order to winter there, *Philippum satis implicatum bello finitimo ratus ne Italiam Poenosque et pacta cum Hannibale posset respicere*.²⁰⁷)

The pluck, exhibited by Laevinus immediately in the autumn of 212 and which apparently aimed only at arousing the energy of the Aetolians directly at the beginning of the war, flagged considerably in 211. Probably the sole fact of importance in this year was the conquest of Anticyra,²⁰⁸) which was forced into surrender, after having been assaulted for a few days by the Aetolians on land, by Laevinus on the sea side. In accordance with the treaty the town was handed over to the Aetolians, the unfortunate inhabitants being enslaved by the Romans, though the town had surrendered.²⁰⁹) But for the conquest of Acarnania Laevinus apparently did not stir a finger and for the rest during this year naval warfare will have confined itself to raids on the Greek coasts, which promised lucre to the Romans: they were not pressed for time, on the contrary, it was serviceable to protract the war and not to sacrifice good soldiers for the sake of the Aetolians. After having commanded permanently from the spring of 215 as (pro)praetor in the Calabrian and afterwards in the Illyrian and Greek waters, Laevinus was relieved in the late summer of 211 by the consul P. Sulpicius Galba, who in his turn again was maintained for several years in his command.²¹⁰) Laevinus himself, elected consul

²⁰⁶) Liv. 26, 24, 15; Pol. 9, 39, 2. That already these first conquests of the Romans were marked by barbarity, has not been handed down *totidem verbis*, but is very probable on account of the terms of the treaty and the Roman line of conduct afterwards (Holleaux 232, 1). Zacynthus was taken back by Philip from the Aetolians, probably in 207, Liv. 36, 31, 11, Holleaux 218 and 253, 3.

²⁰⁷) Liv. 26, 24, 16.

²⁰⁸) According to Livy (26, 26, 2; 28, 1) Anticyra in Locris, according to Pausanias (7, 7, 9; 10, 36, 6) in Phocis, see Holleaux 232, 1, C. A. H. VIII, 127, 1; Niese II, 479, 4.

²⁰⁹) Liv. 26, 26, 1—3; Paus. *l. l.*; Pol. 9, 39, 2—3.

²¹⁰) Liv. 26, 22, 1, cf. 26, 26, 4, Pol. 8, 1, 6; according to Liv. 26, 28, 2.9 his legion was taken from him in 210; but in 209 (27, 7, 15) he appears to be still in command of it. Whether this last piece of information is false or the decision of 210 was repealed afterwards, is not easily ascertainable; Cantalupi (23), who vindicates the former view, apparently forgets, that in 209 during the operations in Greece Roman forces 1000 and 4000 men strong are mentioned, numbers that cannot be regarded as forged (Liv. 27, 30, 2; 32, 2).

with Marcellus for the year 210 (Liv. 26, 22, 12—13), got the command of Sicily and the squadron of 100 ships stationed there (Liv. 26, 28, 3—29), which from 217 till his death at the end of 211 (26, 23, 2) had been under command of the (pro)praetor Otacilius. The consideration, that Laevinus had won his spurs as an admiral²¹¹) and that Marcellus seemed the right man to confront Hannibal, will have contributed more to such a distribution of the consular functions than the things related by Livy (26, 29).

Tarentum) In the meantime the Tarentine fleet had not yet succeeded in forcing the citadel into surrender: apparently it was too small to keep up a thorough blockade and so the Romans, encouraged by Servilius' success,²¹²) will have attempted again now and then in 212 to run the blockade with transports before a strong wind and will have succeeded in doing so. So the Tarentines had sent to Syracuse or Carthage for a Punic squadron,²¹³) as immediately after the fall of Tarentum they had intended already to do,²¹⁴) and it seems not improbable that, when in the early spring of 211 Bomilcar made for Syracuse with a warfleet of 130 sail and an enormous convoy of transports in order to secure the city for Carthage, he had received additional orders from his government to sail to Tarentum after achieving his task in Sicily.²¹⁵) We stated before,²¹⁶) how he neglected his primary duty in a shameful way, did not avail himself of the opportunity to destroy Marcellus' smaller fleet, but shirked battle, left Syracuse to her fate and with his 130 men of war crossed directly to the Tarentine waters. So he made his appearance before Tarentum in the spring of 211 and with his strong fleet tried to starve the citadel into surrender by means of a strict blockade.²¹⁷) But he had no more success than the Tarentines themselves: apparently the little

²¹¹) The system of standing naval commands, carried out with much understanding by the senate during this war (in contradistinction to the first Punic war!), supports this view. I call attention to the fact, that till 211 the Sicilian as well as the Greek-Illyrian squadron were under the command of a (pro)praetor, since 211 of a (pro)consul, see Tarn, *Companion*, 758 and 760.

²¹²) *V. s.* p. 97.

²¹³) Liv. 26, 20, 7; Pol. 9, 9, 11.

²¹⁴) Liv. 25, 11, 15.

²¹⁵) *V. s.* p. 85 and 99 sq.

²¹⁶) P. 85 sq., cf. Liv. 25, 27.

²¹⁷) For the following events compare Liv. 26, 20, 7—11, Pol. 9, 9, 11.

Roman garrison had been sufficiently revictualled in the course of 212 to stand now even a severe blockade for a long time; on the contrary it was the provisioning of Tarentum itself that now was endangered, because the numerous crews ²¹⁸⁾ of Bomilcar's armada naturally swallowed large quantities of food; and a storming of the citadel was out of the question. So at the end of the summer of 211 Bomilcar withdrew from the Tarentine waters, at the request of the Tarentines themselves and to their great relief; he had achieved nothing and, notwithstanding the silence of the authorities, we may take it for granted, that he returned to Carthage. For in the Greek waters, where his strong fleet would have come in handy for destroying Laevinus' squadron and thus extricating Philip from Greek entanglements, ²¹⁹⁾ we do not find Bomilcar in 211, ²²⁰⁾ and shortly after his withdrawal from Tarentum Punic forces, undoubtedly convoyed by his fleet, were landed in Sicily. ²²¹⁾ So the Tarentine citadel was maintained by the Roman garrison; ²²²⁾ but its situation remained

²¹⁸⁾ Their number must have amounted to some 50,000 men.

²¹⁹⁾ The Aetolians *alone* couldn't have sustained the war against Philip for a long time.

²²⁰⁾ Of course not: this man is seldom to be found, where he ought to be; only in 209, much too late, a Punic squadron makes its appearance in the Greek waters.

²²¹⁾ Liv. 26, 21, 14, *v.s.* footnote 157.

²²²⁾ The two passages, where this episode is related (Liv. 26, 20, 7—11 and Pol. 9, 9, 11), are in the main identical; but, as Livy gives more details, his narrative probably does not go back to Polybius, but via Coelius to Silenus, Polybius' source, cf. Kahrstedt 281 sq., Klotz 175 sq. As only in 209 Tarentum was besieged by Fabius, the words τῶν γὰρ Ῥωμαίων πολιορκούντων Τάραντα at the beginning of Pol. 9, 9, 11 must come from the excerptor, who, deceived by the situation described in this passage, wrongly supposed Tarentum to be besieged; consequently the words διὰ τὸ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἀσφαλῶς θέσθαι τὰ περὶ τὴν στρατοπεδείαν do not relate to a camp of Roman besiegers, unassailable for the Punic fleet, but to the citadel successfully defended by a Roman garrison, see Kahrstedt *l.l.* On the other hand Holleaux (240, 2) believes the fragment of Polybius to relate to the siege of Tarentum in 209, when really for the second time a Punic squadron, on its way to Greece, made its appearance in the Tarentine waters (Liv. 27, 15, 7; 30, 16): if this be true, Livy or perhaps already Coelius must have wrongly shifted this episode from 209 to 211. Against this view the following objections may be raised: after his mentioning Bomilcar's shameful retreat from Pachynum to Tarentum (25, 27, 12) we must definitely expect Livy to tell something *sub anno* 211 about the operations of the Punic admiral in the Tarentine waters: if we displace the episode, related 26, 20, 7 sq., from 211 to 209, the result is, that in Livy's narrative Bomilcar after his retreat from Pachynum

highly precarious, the Tarentine fleet naturally carrying on the blockade after Bomilcar's departure. In the spring of 211, after the fall of Syracuse, 30 Roman men of war had become disposable in Sicily,²²³) which in 210 were to go to Spain with Scipio the younger; but, as long as Bomilcar was lying at Tarentum (from the spring to the late summer of 211), this squadron could not be sent to the Tarentine waters, because it would have been crushed by the Punic armada of 130 sail. And after Bomilcar's withdrawal the senate probably deemed the season too advanced and retained the ships at Ostia in order to fit them out quietly for Spain towards the following spring: for the provisioning of the Tarentine citadel they managed with a little squadron chiefly scraped together from allied naval contingents, which in 210 appears to be stationed at Rhegium, but undoubtedly was already present there in 211.²²⁴) That the senate intended 30 ships for Spain, where they were not needed, instead of detaching them at the end of 211 or in 210 to the Tarentine waters, was a serious blunder: the auxiliary squadron at Rhegium was too weak and it would be destroyed in 210 by the Tarentine fleet, so that the position of the citadel became all but desperate. I shall come back to it presently.

(Spain) A few closing remarks must be added about the events in Spain during the years 214—211. Here too those years brought with them a very dangerous crisis, though not at all in the maritime sphere. After a slow, but steady expansion of their power south of the Ebro (*i. e.* they acquired Saguntum for a base) the Scipios both perished in 211 with a

to Tarentum vanishes without leaving a trace, armada and all; secondly Polybius says positively, that Bomilcar arrived at Tarentum *μετὰ δυνάμεως πλείστης* (that a participle like *ἀφικόμενος* has fallen out, is no valid reason to meddle with *πλείστης*, which, moreover, is protected by the difficulties of provisioning Tarentum got into through his arrival): this perfectly squares with the 130 ships commanded by Bomilcar in 211, but not with the modest squadron operating in 209—208 in the Greek waters (Liv. 27, 30, 16; 28, 7, 17—18). If Holleaux were right, which I do not believe, then the fragment of Polybius should of course belong to book 10 and not to book 9.

²²³) V. s. p. 88.

²²⁴) Liv. 26, 39; that this squadron had been formed in 211, appears 1° from the fact, that it was Marcellus who furnished some ships for it, 2° from Livy's durative report. But it cannot have effected much in 211, as Bomilcar commanded the sea near Tarentum and because Livy (*l. l.*) states, that in 210 there was *inopia vix tolerabilis* in the Tarentine citadel.

great part of their forces.²²⁵) Misplaced trust in their Spanish allies and the serious mistake of dividing their forces were among the chief causes of the catastrophe. The remains of their troops succeeded in retreating to the Ebro, a few gallant officers taking the lead, and in holding their own in northern Spain.²²⁶) For frictions of the Punic generals among themselves prevented them from exploiting their victory, from clearing the whole of Spain (also north of the Ebro) of Romans and sending considerable forces²²⁷) to Hannibal by land. There was never such a good chance of doing this as in 211 and the Roman position in Italy would have been deadly endangered by it; but again the opportunity was allowed to slip by. So the Romans got the chance of sending still in 211 C. Claudius Nero with reinforcements to Spain.²²⁸) As Livy says (26, 17, 2) that he hauled his ships ashore in Spain and incorporated the *socii navales* with the land forces (*v. s.* footnote 109), he must have had men of war;²²⁹) but they cannot have been numerous, because afterwards they do not figure among the Spanish naval effectives: Nero will have transported his not very considerable forces by means of a small fleet of transports, convoyed by a few men of war, which may have been taken from the old ships, laid up at Ostia since 214; for the 30 Sicilian vessels, available since the spring of 211, were to go to Spain in 210 with Scipio himself (Liv. 26, 19, 11). After his arrival at Tarraco Nero took over the Spanish command, but against the overwhelmingly superior numbers of the Carthaginians he too could do no more than maintain more or less the Ebro-line. So the situation in Spain remained extremely

²²⁵) For these events on land, which lie outside my subject, the reader is referred to Scullard 48 sq.

²²⁶) That even in those gloomy circumstances the Romans retained their supremacy in the Spanish waters (Pol. 10, 8, 9), is an important factor, without which they couldn't have stood their ground even north of the Ebro.

²²⁷) The Carthaginians had very strong forces in Spain, Scullard 54.

²²⁸) The numbers mentioned by Livy (26, 17, 1—2: 12000 foot-soldiers and 1100 horsemen) are far too high, because the main body, taken to Spain in 210 by Scipio himself (26, 19, 10), amounts to 11000 men only. The 10000 foot-soldiers and 1000 horsemen mentioned by Appian (*Ib.* 17, 65) are the numbers of Scipio in 210 and therefore must result from confusion. Kahrstedt (290) reckons 5000—6000 men, which is fairly possible, but purely hypothetical.

²²⁹) If we can rely upon Livy here: the surroundings of this piece of information are very suspect, remember for instance the forged numbers of Nero's forces (footnote 228).

precarious for the Romans, till in 210 Scipio came and saved it; but, anyhow, they managed to muddle through.²³⁰⁾

Let us sum up: the dangerous situation in Sicily resulting from the defection of Syracuse in connexion with the defection of Tarentum and the entire southern coast of Italy and with the steadily increasing Punic naval effective stamp the year 212 as a year of serious crisis, because a co-operation between Carthage, Hannibal and Philip came now within the range of possibilities. In comparison with 212 the year 211 shows certain signs of improvement of the Roman position, Philip being entangled in the affairs of Greece, the Tarentine citadel maintaining itself in a miraculous way, Syracuse (and Capua in Italy)²³¹⁾ being reconquered by the Romans and — last, but not least — Punic naval supremacy coming to nothing through Bomilcar's faint-heartedness. On the other hand it was the year 211 that brought with it a serious catastrophe in Spain, though here too the most dangerous consequences could be averted thanks to the shortcomings of the Punic commanders. The following years then would bring with them a steady strengthening of the Roman positions, Sicily being wholly subdued again, Tarentum recaptured, Carthage crushed in Spain and the Punic armada of 212—211 vanishing as it were into smoke.

210—209

The Romans began the year 210 with the same naval effectives they had had during the years 214—211: 100 ships in the Sicilian waters, 50 in the Illyrian and Greek waters, 35 in Spain, 30 at Ostia (ordered back from Sicily after the fall of Syracuse in the spring of 211 and intended to go with Scipio to Spain in 210), sum total 215. Moreover, there was the small auxiliary squadron at Rhegium, scraped together from allied contingents, which, however, would be destroyed in the selfsame year by the Tarentine fleet;²³²⁾ finally at Ostia as well as at Lilybaeum there were a number of old ships, laid up since 214, which in case of emergency could be put in commission again.

²³⁰⁾ Scullard 53 sq.

²³¹⁾ With this success perhaps the fact is to be connected, that from 210 onward the Sicilian and Greek squadrons, which had been commanded by (pro)praetors before, were placed under (pro)consular command (*v.s.* footnote 211): in Italy the Romans now began to breathe somewhat more freely again.

²³²⁾ Liv. 26, 39.

If we ask, what ships Carthage could dispose of to confront these Roman forces with, we find ourselves face to face with the bewildering conundrum: Riddle-me-riddle-me-riddle-me-ree, where may Bomilcar's armada be? We may take it for granted that at the beginning of 210 at least 150 men of war were available at Carthage: Bomilcar's fleet numbering 130 ships had undoubtedly returned home uninjured and, moreover, a number of Punic vessels had probably succeeded in escaping from the Syracusan harbour to Carthage in the spring of 211.²³³) This estimate is in perfect accordance with the fact, that the Carthaginians, after having lost 18 ships in 208²³⁴) and 21 in 207²³⁵) in naval battles, afterwards could still dispose of a hundred at the time of the attack upon Scipio's fleet.²³⁶) But of this important effective still considerably outnumbering the Roman naval forces in the Sicilian and Italian waters we perceive little else in the practice of war but.... rumours. In 210 the news reached Rome, that a powerful fleet was being fitted out at Carthage for the reconquest of Sicily and that it would probably cross to the island ere long,²³⁷) but.... it came not; and in 208 the rumour that Carthage would launch an attack against Italy, Sicily and Sardinia with 200 ships gave rise to a kind of panic at Rome,²³⁸) but the rumour remained a rumour. Apart from great, but vague schemes there was little achieved in the realm of naval action: in 210²³⁹) a squadron of 40 ships sailed to Sardinia to raid the island (indeed this could be done safely, because there was only a Roman army in Sardinia, but no fleet) and in 209 a squadron of 50 sail at the outside started for Tarentum, where just as little was achieved as in 211, and from there it sailed on to the Greek waters, where it arrived much too late to give a decisive new turn to the war.²⁴⁰) And that is all during these two years, whereas the Romans in 210 even ventured a raid from Sicily upon Africa with only 50 ships!²⁴¹) Indeed, we stand face to face here

²³³) *V.s.* footnote 152.

²³⁴) Liv. 27, 29, 7—8.

²³⁵) Liv. 28, 4, 5—7.

²³⁶) App. *Lib.* 24, 100.

²³⁷) Liv. 27, 5, 13.

²³⁸) Liv. 27, 22, 8.

²³⁹) Liv. 27, 6, 13—14.

²⁴⁰) Liv. 27, 15, 7; 30, 16.

²⁴¹) Liv. 27, 5, 8 sq.

with a riddle without an answer, as Bomilcar as late as 211 had operated with 130 vessels fully manned.

The solution of this puzzle²⁴²) is certainly not to be sought in lack of material (the ships were extant), but above all things in the Punic morale. We remarked before, that the memory of the first Punic war, when Carthage in spite of her nautical superiority had been defeated by the Roman land-lubbers, paralysed the Carthaginians in naval warfare and that the faint-heartedness exhibited by an admiral like Bomilcar even in the face of inferior Roman numbers must be viewed in this light.²⁴³) What wonder then, that the already weak maritime morale of the Carthaginians perfectly collapsed all at once, now that, in spite of the mighty increase of the navy and of the naval superiority resulting from it, the unstinted maritime offensive of the years 212—211 had failed in the most shameful way through the slackness of their own commanders, now that Syracuse and Sicily had thus been lost and neither Hannibal nor Tarentum nor Philip been efficiently supported? Hence the oscillation between vague great schemes and the slight, useless expeditions of reality, which is so extremely characteristic for their despondency and their wavering state of alarm; the Punic morale never surmounted the shock of 212—211. Did lack of man power play a part in the game too? Did the schemes for sending Hasdrubal by land from Spain to Italy,²⁴⁴) which now turn up again, and perhaps also internal disturbances in Africa²⁴⁵) hinder the Punic government from keeping apart a sufficient number of marine troops for a strong fleet? We do not know it, but probably this too was a factor of importance, because the necessity of obtaining sufficient man power for great land- and naval expeditions at the same time always drove Carthage into straits.²⁴⁶) Since the year 209 the serious financial troubles caused by the loss of the Spanish silver-mines added to the difficulties.²⁴⁷) However this may be,

²⁴²) We are thrown upon conjectures, as we scarcely possess any data regarding the organization of Punic naval affairs.

²⁴³) *V. s.* p. 90.

²⁴⁴) Cf. Liv. 27, 5, 11—12; 28, 1, 4; in 211 after the disaster of the Scipios the Carthaginians had suffered the extraordinarily favourable juncture for such an action to pass by unused, *v. s.* p. 107.

²⁴⁵) Diod. 26, 23, Gsell III, 182—184, Kahrstedt §13.

²⁴⁶) See the first chapter.

²⁴⁷) Compare Kahrstedt §13, de Sanctis III, 2, 505, 98.

it stands to reason, that the peculiar inertness of the Punic navy afforded to the Romans the opportunity to disengage themselves gradually from the serious positional drawbacks of 212—211: the decisive moment of the crisis was past.

Of the events of 210 the Spanish and Tarentine must be combined, (*Spain*) because there is a certain connexion between them: the Roman defeat in the Tarentine waters was a direct consequence of the sending of 30 men of war to Spain. In the summer of 210²⁴⁸) P. Cornelius Scipio the younger, who in spite of his youth had been entrusted with the important Spanish command,²⁴⁹) departed from Ostia for Spain with 10,000 foot-soldiers, 1000 horsemen and 30 quinqueremes,²⁵⁰) M. Junius Silanus having been added to him as *adiutor*. He sailed with his fleet²⁵¹) along the coast via Massilia to Emporiae, here disembarked his forces and marched by land to Tarraco, where his fleet arrived too. The ships were hauled ashore and Scipio took over the command from Claudius Nero.²⁵²) The rest of the year 210 and the winter of 210—209 he used for repairing and re-organizing the troops, for tightening his grasp upon the country north of the Ebro and for preparing the offensive of 209: the attack upon New Carthage.²⁵³) The 30 ships had become available in Sicily in the spring of 211 after the fall of Syracuse. No doubt, it would have been folly to send them in 211 to the Tarentine waters in order to confront Bomilcar's armada of 130 sail; but, that now in 210 they went with Scipio to Spain, is an inexplicable blunder: in Spain these ships were not needed; Scipio hauled them ashore, undoubtedly²⁵⁴) (though it has not

²⁴⁸) Liv. 26, 19, 10 sq.; for the chronology see Kahrstedt 502, 1, Klotz 115 sq., Scullard 304 sq.

²⁴⁹) I cannot enter into a discussion of Scipio's appointment and personality; for these topics the reader is referred to the good monographs of Schur (*Scipio Africanus*, Leipzig 1927) and of Scullard.

²⁵⁰) According to App. *Ib.* 18, 72 he had 28 warships; perhaps this is the exact number rounded off by Livy, as in 208 the number of ships in Spain amounts to 80 (Liv. 27, 22, 7: the original Spanish squadron of 35 ships + 28 of Scipio + 18 captured at New Carthage = 81, roughly 80).

²⁵¹) He must have had a fleet of transports, though, as usually, it is not mentioned: 11000 men couldn't be transported by 30 men of war.

²⁵²) *V. s.* p. 107 sq.

²⁵³) See Scullard 56 sq.

²⁵⁴) Compare Nero's proceeding in 211 (Liv. 26, 17, 2); the fact, that in 209 Scipio pressed Spaniards to serve on his fleet, which had been increased with the

been handed down) added the *socii navales* to the land forces and in 209 employed only the original Spanish squadron of 35 ships for his attack upon New Carthage. But in the meantime the weak squadron of Rhegium, which had to fulfil the task of revictualling the Tarentine citadel, was destroyed in the waters of southern Italy by the Tarentine fleet. So the important outpost at Tarentum, which succeeded in maintaining itself in a miraculous way for more than two years, was needlessly risked by sending, without any reason, a squadron to Spain that ought have been stationed at Rhegium. The only conceivable excuse is, that Scipio had to face superior numbers and needed every man for his land army; but then why not send more troops with him by means of transports (eventually the *socii navales* of the 30 men of war, if no extra legionaries were available) and keep the *ships* on service in the Italian waters, manned with slaves, if need be? ²⁵⁵) If after all the fate of the brave garrison in the Tarentine citadel was not sealed, this was not due to the insight of the Roman government.

Tarentum) The squadron at Rhegium, which had to escort transports laden with victuals from Sicily ²⁵⁶) to the Tarentine citadel and probably had been formed in 211, ²⁵⁷) numbered some 20 ships: 8 had been furnished by Marcellus, for the rest it was composed of contingents from Rhegium, Velia and Paestum, due *ex foedere*; ²⁵⁸) the strenuous D. Quinctius was in command of it. This squadron, when convoying in 210 a fleet of transports to Tarentum, engaged with the Tarentine fleet, which was of about the same strength. After a fierce struggle, which wholly turned on Roman boarding tactics and so degenerated into a kind of land battle,

captured Punic ships (35 + 18), proves conclusively, that the crews of the 30 ships had been added to the land forces and were not available for the navy, Pol. 10, 17, 11—13.

²⁵⁵) As in 214, slaves had been expropriated for the fleet in 210, Liv. 26, 35—36, cf. 24, 11 and *v. s.* p. 77 sq.

²⁵⁶) The pacification of Sicily after the fall of Syracuse had naturally brought with it a revival of agriculture in the island, see Heitland I, 350 and *v. s.* p. 56.

²⁵⁷) Liv. 26, 39, *v. s.* footnote 224; the passage of Livy rests upon Coelius, just as his previous accounts of Tarentine history, see Klotz 177 (on the other hand de Sanctis 461, 31 regards Polybius as Livy's source); Kahrstedt (500) wrongly fixes the number of Quinctius' squadron at 35 ships.

²⁵⁸) There is question here of a case of emergency, just as in 218—217 in the Spanish waters, *v. s.* p. 42.

the Tarentines gained a complete victory: Quinctius fell, the Roman squadron was partly sunk, partly captured, after running ashore, by the inhabitants of Thurii and Metapontum.²⁵⁹) The transports, which were sailing behind the war fleet, dispersed and naturally did not reach the Tarentine citadel. So the blunder of the Roman senate yielded bitter fruit: the situation of the citadel, being already extremely precarious (26, 39, 1), was made even more desperate by this disaster; more than ever the Tarentine fleet commanded the waters of southern Italy. Nevertheless, in the late summer of 210 the Romans succeeded in bringing grain from Etruria and reinforcements for the garrison into the citadel.²⁶⁰) Alas, we are not told, how. Either unescorted transports contrived to run the blockade before the wind by a rough sea, as already in 212 C. Servilius had managed to do,²⁶¹) or the Sicilian squadron of 100 sail, which now was under command of the consul Laevinus, yielded a number of warships for convoying services after the catastrophe of Quinctius' squadron.²⁶²) So the citadel stood its ground, until finally in 209 it would be relieved by Fabius.

Meanwhile the consul Laevinus — it is the most important event of (Sicily, the year 210 — had pacified Sicily definitively and cleared it of Carthaginians.²⁶³) At the senate's request he started late in the summer with 10 ships for Rome in order to report upon his military achievements; but at the same time he sent M. Valerius Messalla with half the Sicilian squadron (*i. e.* with 50 sail, Liv. 27, 5, 1. 8) from Lilybaeum to Africa,

²⁵⁹) Heitland (*l. l.*) calls attention to the noteworthy fact, that the one naval defeat of the Romans in this great war was suffered at the hands not of Carthaginians but of Greeks.

²⁶⁰) Liv. 27, 3, 9; the grain imported in 212 by C. Servilius had likewise come from Etruria, *v. s.* p. 97 and Münzer 89.

²⁶¹) Liv. 25, 15, 4; *v. s.* p. 97.

²⁶²) We may perhaps conclude this from the fact, that the 30 ships, lent in 209 by Laevinus to Fabius for the siege of Tarentum (Liv. 27, 7, 15), are qualified during the siege as *naves, quas Laevinus tutandis com meatibus habuerat* (27, 15, 5); so Laevinus after Quinctius' disaster will perhaps have yielded 30 ships to escort the transports to the Tarentine citadel, a number the Tarentine fleet was not able to face. The Romans will have taken such a step unwillingly, because it was not advisable to split up the Sicilian squadron on account of Bomilcar's armada, which was still extant, though not active, cf. Liv. 27, 5, 13 and p. 109 sq.

²⁶³) Liv. 27, 5, 1—14.

for the purpose of plundering as well as of learning the plans of the Carthaginians, because Bomilcar's armada was still extant and therefore must be reckoned with. Messalla made a nightly descent upon the coast near Utica and returned to Sicily with booty and numerous prisoners. From these he learned, that 5000 Numidians were at Carthage with Masinissa and, besides, that everywhere in Africa soldiers were being enlisted to go to Spain, in order to enable Hasdrubal to march as soon as possible to Italy with considerable forces, and that on the other hand a powerful fleet was being fitted out for a renewed attack on Sicily, which, probably, would soon be brought into action.²⁶⁴⁾ The letter, by which Messalla reported this news to Laevinus at Rome, was read to the senate and made such a deep impression that the consul was immediately ordered back to Sicily. Messalla's expedition was a daring enterprise: if really by this time 30 ships had been detached by Laevinus for conveying services to the waters of southern Italy, there were left only 10 ships in the Sicilian waters during Laevinus' and Messalla's absence; but the expedition itself with only 50 ships to Africa, where a much stronger Punic fleet was known to be present, was a fair sample of boldness too. We cannot qualify Bomilcar's armada as a fleet in being: it did not check the Romans at all by its existence and we may perhaps assume that they had some knowledge of the deep despondency prevailing at Carthage,²⁶⁵⁾ though on the other hand it is intelligible, that the reports of the prisoners caused some alarm at Rome. But it proved to be a false alarm: the whole maritime activity of Carthage limited itself in 210 to a raid with 40 ships in the late summer against Sardinia.²⁶⁶⁾

(Sardinia) There are but few things that so painfully illustrate the helplessness and discouragement of Carthage as the fact, that in spite of the existence of a very strong fleet naval action remained limited to this insignificant

²⁶⁴⁾ V.s. p. 109—111.

²⁶⁵⁾ V.s. p. 109 sq.; that the Carthaginians did not even make an attempt to destroy Messalla's squadron, is a noteworthy symptom of this despondency.

²⁶⁶⁾ The expedition of Messalla exhibits such a strong resemblance to the raid of Otacilius in the spring of 211 (Liv. 25, 31, 12—15, v.s. p. 86), that it would be natural to suppose a doublet, were it not, that a certain conformity of the numerous Roman raids upon Africa *must* be expected and that the connexion of this event (via Messalla's report to Laevinus) with the *acta senatus* is an indication of its authenticity, compare Gsell III, 173.

expedition²⁶⁷) against an island that was protected not by warships, but by land forces only and could be reached via the open sea without meeting one Roman ship on the way. That the raid yielded some booty, goes without saying, the praetor of Sardinia having no fleet at his disposal and his land army being naturally not able to be everywhere at the same time; but it was wholly void of military importance, apart from the fact that it helped to induce the Romans to protect the island at last in 208 with 50 ships from Spain: 268) up to this time they had always left it undefended at sea. 269)

In conclusion a few words about naval action of the year 210 in Greece. (Greece) Sulpicius, who in the late summer of 211 had succeeded Laevinus as admiral in the Greek waters, exhibited as little promptness as his predecessor. The most miserable instance of this tendency is the conquest of Echinus on the Sinus Maliacus by Philip in 210. 270) Sulpicius on the sea side, the Aetolians on land attempted in vain to relieve the town. That they did not prevent Philip from ensconcing himself in unassailable besieging positions round the town, is explicable after all: possibly the conquest of Aegina had detained Sulpicius. 271) But that afterwards, during the siege, he did not succeed in preventing Philip from being revictualled by sea and forcing him by means of a naval blockade to raise the siege, remains as unintelligible as the fact, that the neighbouring Phalara suffered the same fate. 272) So the first appearance of a Roman squadron in the Aegean was not very glorious indeed and the Aetolians had some reason to complain of their allies; 273) for besides Echinus and Phalara they suffered some more losses at Philip's hands in this year. The conquest, however, of Aegina by Sulpicius 274) somewhat counterpoised these

267) Liv. 27, 6, 13—14.

268) Liv. 27, 22, 7.

269) Only in 215 Torquatus temporarily brought a squadron to the island, but after his victory the ships returned with him to Ostia, *v. s. p.* 69—70; afterwards Sardinia was again protected by land forces only.

270) Pol. 9, 41 and 42, 1—4, Holleaux 239.

271) Usually the conquest of Aegina is placed after the fall of Echinus; but this is quite uncertain, Holleaux 239, 6.

272) The conquest of this town is not mentioned *suo loco*, but afterwards (Liv. 27, 30, 3) she appears to be in Philip's hands, de Sanctis III, 2, 422, Niese II, 484.

273) Holleaux, C. A. H. VIII, 127, 3.

274) Pol. 9, 42, 5—8; 11, 5, 6—8; 22, 8, 9—10, Holleaux 218 and 232.

adversities; the island was treated in the usual brutal way: Sulpicius hardly suffered the enslaved inhabitants to be ransomed and in accordance with the treaty the isle itself was handed over to the Aetolians.²⁷⁵) A second advantage lay in the fact that, besides Elis and Messenia, Sparta now joined the Roman-Aetolian coalition²⁷⁶) and that towards 209 Attalus of Pergamum was expected to make his appearance in the Greek waters with a squadron:²⁷⁷) so there could be reckoned with a revival, especially of naval action, in the following year. Be this as it may, notwithstanding the lukewarmness of warfare in 210, it had exactly the effect aimed at by the Romans: to entangle Philip in difficulties near home; whether he gained some successes and the Aetolians suffered losses, the Romans didn't care.

In the main the Roman position was somewhat improved during the year 210: to be sure, a squadron was lost in the Tarentine waters and in default of ships a raid on the Sardinian coasts could not be warded off, but the Tarentine citadel held its own, Sicily was wholly pacified, Philip was kept engaged in Greece, in Spain events were on the eve of an important offensive and — last, but not least — the powerful fleet of the Carthaginians was not brought into action during the whole year (apart from the little Sardinian expedition). The following year would bring with it a decisive turn in Spain and the Tarentine waters.

(Sicily) In 209 the Roman naval effective amounted to 215 sail as before: in Spain 65 ships (the original squadron of 35 + the 30 ships brought by Scipio in 210, but put out of commission since), in the Illyrian and Greek waters 50, near Sicily 100; of the last-mentioned vessels 30 had been temporarily detached to the Tarentine waters in order to assist Q. Fabius in his operations against Tarentum.²⁷⁸) With the remaining 70 Laevinus naturally could not undertake much: having learned in 210 from Punic prisoners that an attack of a strong fleet upon Sicily was to be expected (*v. s. p.* 114), he tried to protect the Sicilian shores as carefully as he could with his squadron, but did not venture an offensive against

²⁷⁵) The possession of the island being worthless to them because they had no fleet, they sold it for 30 talents to Attalus, who by means of this transaction acquired an excellent naval base in the Greek waters, *Pol.* 22, 8, 9—10.

²⁷⁶) Holleaux 213, 4, *C. A. H.* VIII, 127.

²⁷⁷) Holleaux 209, 1; in the autumn of 210 he was elected *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* by the Aetolians for the year 209, *Liv.* 27, 29, 10.

²⁷⁸) *Liv.* 27, 7, 12—17, especially 15, cf. 27, 8, 13; I argued above (*p.* 113, 262)

Africa.²⁷⁹) But no more than in 210 the attack of the Punic armada was realized.

No, the chief events of 209 took place in the Spanish and Tarentine waters. In Spain, this year witnessed the daring enterprise of Scipio against New Carthage, the success of which exerted such a far-going influence upon the general result of the war. Scipio realized, that he could not think of conquering the Spanish interior south of the Ebro without commanding a strong base far southwards on the coast, and consequently he chose, quite logically, for his primary aim the excellent naval base of the adversary, the consideration that he couldn't get hold of the Spanish tribes as long as the Carthaginians had control of a great number of Spanish hostages,²⁸⁰) naturally having a voice in the matter too. Seemingly this was a madman's scheme; but a chance of success was offered to him first by the circumstance, that precisely on account of her strong position New Carthage was only defended by a weak garrison, secondly by the splitting up of the Punic forces (three armies were lying far asunder in the Spanish interior, all of them at a very great distance from their coastal base) and by the disagreement between the generals foreboding lack of co-operation, thirdly by the fact, that the Roman squadron of 35 sail commanded the Spanish waters since the battle off the Ebro in 217:²⁸¹) the fleet would not only be able to partake of the assault upon the town on the sea side, but also to blockade it, if a siege might prove necessary; moreover, it guaranteed the maritime communication with the bases north of the Ebro and, if the attempt failed, it could escort the Roman army safely home by sea to its northern bases.²⁸²)

A full discussion of the expedition is out of place here, because it

that probably already in 210 after Quinctius' defeat these 30 ships had been employed for the revictualment of the Tarentine citadel.

²⁷⁹) Liv. 27, 8, 13. 17; that the senate should have ordered him to make a raid on Africa (27, 7, 16), is hardly imaginable on account of the deep impression the report of the prisoners had made especially at Rome (27, 5, 14; *v. s.* p. 114); at any rate Laevinus did not fulfil such an order.

²⁸⁰) They were kept in confinement at New Carthage.

²⁸¹) Pol. 10, 8, 9.

²⁸²) Pol. *l. l.*; that a fleet of transports accompanied the warfleet, appears from Liv. 26, 41, 1.

belongs for the greater part to warfare on land: ²⁸³) I must limit myself to the share the navy had in it. The action against New Carthage rested upon co-operation between army and navy, and apparently the plan for this combined attack had been carefully prepared and was put into practice punctually. For the warfleet of 35 ships ²⁸⁴) under command of Scipio's faithful friend C. Laelius, who alone had been let into the secret of the expedition's object, arrived (according to plan) before the town exactly at the same time as the land army, so that the assault could be started immediately from both sides. ²⁸⁵) Alas, we are ill informed of the share the fleet had in this attack. ²⁸⁶) For Polybius, who concentrates his attention upon his hero Scipio, consequently all but suppresses the naval action: he says only (10, 12, 1) that, after surrounding the town on the sea side with ships equipped with missiles of all sorts and commanded by Laelius, Scipio began the assault on land and sea about the third hour. And from Livy, who gives a more detailed account of the naval operations than Polybius, we cannot gather an adequate idea of them either (26, 43, 1; 44, 1. 10—11). No doubt, we are told, that on the day of his arrival before New Carthage Scipio inspected the preparedness of the naval forces as well as of the land army and, being rowed through the fleet, urged the captains to be watchful during the night against surprising attacks, and that on the following day the fleet, though without success, took an active part in the first assault, which was started in the morning about the third hour (cf. Pol. 10, 12, 1); but no more than Polybius does he mention the fleet in connexion with the second, decisive attack, which met with success especially through the action of the detachment that thanks to the low water was able to approach and scale the walls on the side of the lagoon. And yet we know that the fleet too must have contributed considerably to the success of the decisive attack. For the sharp contest that arose after the victory between the land- and naval forces about the question, who had scaled the walls first, the

²⁸³) For this first expedition of the great Scipio the reader is referred to the excellent chapter *New Carthage* in Scullard's book (56—99); for a discussion of the sources compare *i. a.* Klotz 178 sq.

²⁸⁴) We remarked before that the 30 ships, brought by Scipio to Spain in 210, had been hauled ashore and the crews added to the land forces, *v. s.* p. 112; that really Scipio used only the original squadron of 35 ships, appears from Pol. 10, 17, 13.

²⁸⁵) Liv. 26, 42, 5—6; Pol. 10, 11, 5.

²⁸⁶) For the following events compare Scullard 86 sq.

centurion Q. Tiberilius of the land forces or the marine Sex. Digitius, and therefore, to which of them the *corona muralis* should be awarded (Liv. 26, 48), proves conclusively that the personnel of the fleet must have penetrated into the town simultaneously with the land forces.²⁸⁷) So Scullard will be right in supposing²⁸⁸) that the commander of the town, having but scanty troops at his disposal, was forced by the fierceness of the second attack on the land side to withdraw forces from the sea side of the town, so that the soldiers of the fleet, who could achieve but little during the first assault, now got a chance of scaling the walls on the south-side of the town and entering it simultaneously with the land army.

The consequences of the conquest of New Carthage were naturally far-reaching. The Carthaginians lost their strongest base on the Spanish coast (since 209 they could only dispose of the harbour of Gades, the situation of which was infinitely more unfavourable with respect to Carthage), while the loss of the Spanish silver-mines meant little less than a disaster for a state like Carthage, which to a high degree depended upon mercenaries.²⁸⁹) Inversely Scipio had now at his disposal an excellent base on the southern coast of Spain, his fleet commanded the Spanish waters more than ever before, and the fact, that he had laid hands upon the Spanish hostages kept in confinement at New Carthage, and the very liberal course he adopted towards them, undermined the Punic position

²⁸⁷) Scullard 86, compare for the authenticity of this story Münzer 92 sq., who will be right in assuming that Digitius was a native of Paestum; but that he should have taken part in the struggle for New Carthage as a *socius navalis* in the proper sense, that is to say with a naval contingent of Paestum, seems impossible to me, first because in 210 the contingent of Paestum operated in the Tarentine waters (Liv. 26, 39) and in 209 the Roman squadron before New Carthage numbered the old 35 ships that had been stationed in Spain since 217, secondly because the term *socius navalis* here undoubtedly means *marine* (Liv. 26, 48) and the marine troops of the Roman navy were regularly recruited from citizens (proletarians, to whom before a battle legionaries used to be added) and only exceptionally from allies. So Digitius probably possessed already in 209 the Roman citizenship, which according to Münzer he should only have acquired on account of his heroic behaviour before New Carthage, and this is very well conceivable with regard to an inhabitant of a Latin colony. He will have been centurion just as his adversary Tiberilius. See Horn 84.

²⁸⁸) 83.

²⁸⁹) V.s. p. 110.

in Spain at once considerably. Time was ripe now for an offensive against the Punic land armies in the interior of Spain, which in the following years would definitively destroy Punic rule in the peninsula.

Besides large quantities of money and military stores (Liv. 26, 47) 18 Carthaginian men of war fell into Scipio's hands through the conquest of New Carthage.²⁹⁰⁾ He added them to his own naval forces and manned them with pressed inhabitants of the town, under promise of freedom at the termination of the war, provided they showed zeal.²⁹¹⁾ So his active naval forces were increased to a number of 53 ships, his total effective (including the 28 ships put out of commission) to 81.²⁹²⁾ But, after the loss of 18 ships Carthage now being almost completely without naval forces in the Spanish waters,²⁹³⁾ he soon hauled his entire fleet ashore, just as he had done in 210 with 28 ships, and incorporated the naval personnel (as far as it was fit for such a purpose) with the land forces:²⁹⁴⁾ for the coming struggle with the strong Punic armies he needed every man. Here it becomes manifest again, how needlessly the Roman government had reinforced the Spanish fleet in 210: in 209 Scipio was completely at a loss what to do with his collection of ships while in the Italian waters the Romans must bungle along with vessels borrowed from Sicily, where they scarcely could be spared! At last in 208 the senate would show that they realized this and withdraw a number of ships from Spain for the sake of naval action in the Italian waters.

From New Carthage Scipio sent Laelius on board a quinquereme to Rome with the news of the victory; after fulfilling this task he immediately

²⁹⁰⁾ Pol. 10, 17, 13; according to Livy (26, 47, 3) he captured only 8 ships, but this must be due to corruption of the text, as the 80 ships of 27, 22, 7 (208) force us to presuppose here a number of 18: 35 of the original squadron + 28 brought by Scipio in 210 + 18 captured in 209 = 81, roughly 80; compare also Pol. 10, 17, 16.

²⁹¹⁾ Pol. 10, 17, 11—13, Liv. 26, 47, 3.

²⁹²⁾ *V. s.* footnote 290.

²⁹³⁾ Roman supremacy in the Spanish waters was always maintained since the year 217, when after the battle off the Ebro the Carthaginians had only 28 ships left, partly of smaller types and unmanned (*v. s.* p. 50): the 60 ships Mago had brought to Spain in 215 (footnote 92), probably soon returned to Carthage to form part of Bomilcar's armada in the following years. Now in 209, after the loss of 18 ships, the Carthaginians had scarcely any ships left in the Spanish waters: according to Livy (26, 47, 9) they intended to build a fleet, but the materials fell into Scipio's hands!

²⁹⁴⁾ Pol. 10, 35, 4—5, Liv. 27, 17, 6.

returned to Spain.²⁹⁵) Scipio wintered at Tarraco with the main body of his army. That the news of the fall of New Carthage strengthened the Roman self-confidence as much as it weakened the already shaky Punic morale, goes without saying.

The second important event of 209, which considerably strengthened the Roman position, was the reconquest of Tarentum.²⁹⁶) Since the fall of Capua Hannibal's sphere of action had more and more crumbled off, so that the Romans now could think of reconquering the centre of his domain on the southern coast and thus driving a wedge between his positions in Apulia and Lucania-Bruttium. At the same time Rome began a diverting offensive from Rhegium, to which place Laevinus had transported from Sicily troops of wild partisans in order to ravage Bruttium: they laid even siege to Caulonia.

In the meantime a Punic fleet had again, as in 211, made its appearance before Tarentum²⁹⁷) in order to assist the Tarentines against the Roman citadel, though with as little success as before. Nevertheless, Hannibal seemed to have valid reason to regard the town as sufficiently protected by the Punic and Tarentine fleets on the sea side and the garrison in the town, and so he decided to march to Bruttium in order to take action against Laevinus' partisans and relieve Caulonia. But he met with a disappointment: the Punic fleet once again showed its talent for always sailing to such places, where it had no business, and for leaving those, where it could have been a welcome reinforcement of the Punic power. The squadron sailed away from Tarentum to the Greek waters on receiving the news, that Philip intended to march against the Aetolians.²⁹⁸) It was the old song over again: had such a scheme been carried out three years before, there would have been a reasonable chance of extricating Philip from his Greek entanglements and enabling him to invade Italy by

²⁹⁵) Pol. 10, 19, 8, Liv. 26, 51, 2; according to Livy 27, 7, 1. 4 Laelius sailed from Tarraco (after Scipio had returned there with the main body of his army) and with several ships: in the latter passage his source is probably Antias, in the former Coelius, see Klotz 179.

²⁹⁶) For the following statements compare Kahrstedt 504 sq.

²⁹⁷) This appears from Livy's incidental remark 27, 15, 7; the fleet was certainly much smaller than in 211 and, taken into account its wavering line of conduct, it probably was commanded again by Bomilcar, though his name is not mentioned.

²⁹⁸) Liv. 27, 15, 7; *v. i.* my discussion of the events in Greece.

destroying the Roman squadron in the Greek waters. But *now* it was too late: the net of enemies and wavering friends had been drawn too tight round the Macedonian king than that a still possible victory of the Punic fleet over Sulpicius' squadron could have made a great difference.²⁹⁹⁾

So Q. Fabius could safely bring the 30 men of war borrowed from Laevinus³⁰⁰⁾ into the Tarentine waters and lay siege to the town on land himself, while the Punic fleet was sailing eastwards without reason and Hannibal was operating in Bruttium and relieved Caulonia. Undoubtedly it had been Fabius' primary intention to storm the town; for he fitted out the 30 warships and a number of transports for an assault by sea. But it did not come to this: the town fell by treason and naval action limited itself to a noisy demonstration on the sea side in order to divert the attention of the Tarentines, while the Roman land forces penetrated into the town.³⁰¹⁾ The fall of Tarentum not only weakened Hannibal's position in Italy, but besides it partly stopped the gap in Roman naval supremacy on the southern coast of Italy, thus hindering the co-operation between Carthage and Macedon and the supporting of Hannibal by sea. It was certainly not in the first place conceived old Fabius that could claim the credit for it, though naturally he did claim it,³⁰²⁾ but the brave garrison, which, in spite of the blunders of Roman government, had succeeded in maintaining itself for more than 3 years in the citadel. Towards 208 the 30 ships returned to the Sicilian squadron, which thus reached its original effective of 100 sail again.³⁰³⁾

eece) In Greece the beginning of 209 is marked again by the extreme inertness of the Roman admiral Sulpicius. In the spring Philip received a cry for help from his allies the Achaeans, whose position became untenable between Sparta and the Aetolians, who were crossing to the Peloponnesus in great numbers.³⁰⁴⁾ He hastily came to the rescue, but found in his way

²⁹⁹⁾ Kahrstedt 505, v. s. p. 98 sq.

³⁰⁰⁾ Liv. 27, 15, 4—8, v. s. p. 116; the Tarentine fleet of \pm 20 ships (probably for the greater part of smaller types, Liv. 26, 39) could not face these; consequently it did not make its appearance during the siege of Tarentum.

³⁰¹⁾ Liv. 27, 15, 14.

³⁰²⁾ Liv. 27, 25.

³⁰³⁾ Liv. 27, 22, 9.

³⁰⁴⁾ For the following events cf. Liv. 27, 29, 9—33, 5, where Polybius is his source, Klotz 116.

an Aetolian army, reinforced with auxiliaries of Attalus and 1000 Roman soldiers. ³⁰⁵) He defeated it twice and forced the Aetolians, who had lost 1000 men, to retire into Lamia. Discouraged by their twofold defeat and the renewed lingering of the Roman fleet (if it had appeared in good time in the Aegean, it could have prevented much by threatening the Macedonians with a landing), ³⁰⁶) the Aetolians now inclined to make peace and for the present concluded an armistice, Rhodes, Chius, Athens and Egypt acting as mediators between Philip and Aetolia, because they saw with horror the barbarous consequences of the Roman interference in Greece. ³⁰⁷) The negotiations concerning a definitive agreement should be carried on afterwards at Aegium, but they were broken off, because in the nick of time Sulpicius arrived at Naupactus with 25 ships and Attalus at Aegina with 35. ³⁰⁸) The Aetolians took courage again and, apparently instigated by Sulpicius, ³⁰⁹) insisted upon such impossible terms, that Philip was forced to break off the negotiations.

So the Roman endeavours to involve Philip in permanent difficulties near home by means of a protracted war went near to fail through Sulpicius' tarrying; it is, however, very doubtful, whether this time the fault rested with him. For the Punic squadron, which this year reached the waters of Corcyra via Tarentum, ³¹⁰) probably forced him to remain for a longer time in the northern waters than was suitable to the juncture in Greece. ³¹¹) What happened there, alas we do not know at all: after making its appearance off Corcyra the Punic fleet disappears without

³⁰⁵) 27, 30, 2: as Sulpicius himself appeared rather late with his fleet in the Greek waters, he must have sent these troops from his winter quarters at Corcyra, Holleaux 240, 1.

³⁰⁶) Holleaux 243.

³⁰⁷) The conflict spread more and more, on the Roman-Aetolian side Attalus too being expected to partake of the war in this year, while Philip expected support from Bithynia and Carthage; moreover, public opinion revolted against the methods of Roman warfare, the private interests of the mediators naturally having a voice in the matter too. Compare *i. a.* Holleaux, *C. A. H.* VIII, 128 sq. and for a complete survey of the attempts at mediation during the whole war v. Gelder 119 sq.

³⁰⁸) Liv. 27, 30, 11, Pol. 10, 41, 1, for the shipnumbers Liv. 28, 5, 1.

³⁰⁹) The Aetolian claims were partly Roman claims, Liv. 27, 30, 13.

³¹⁰) Liv. 27, 15, 7; 30, 16, v. s. p. 122; as we remarked before, this is the only naval expedition, launched by Carthage in 209.

³¹¹) Holleaux 240, 2.

leaving a trace, to turn up again in the same region in 208. Was it defeated off Corcyra by Sulpicius' full squadron of 50 ships³¹²⁾ and did it steal away consequently? It is far from probable, because the ancient authorities would hardly have suppressed a Roman naval victory. Or did Sulpicius succeed in frightening it away without a blow, so that it either was lying idle henceforth at Lissus and wintered there or returned to Carhage, to appear again without any success on the scene in 208? Taken into account Bomilcar's strong aversion from being killed in battle and the miserably faint-hearted behaviour of the Punic squadron in 208, this seems very likely indeed. However it may be, at any rate there came a moment, when Sulpicius deemed it safe to leave the protection of Corcyra and the Illyrian coasts to 25 ships and to take action in Greece with the other half of his squadron; his late arrival at Naupactus is sufficiently explained and excused by this Punic intermezzo. To Philip on the other hand the fact that the Punic fleet, looked out for so many years, had made default, must have been a bitter disappointment, especially because the Bithynian ships did not make their appearance either, so that again he could achieve nothing at sea.

So the war went on again, but it was waged by the Romans with as little promptness as before. For the present Sulpicius remained in the Gulf of Corinth and attempted only two small expeditions. He made a descent upon the coast between Sicyon and Corinth, where his men laid waste the country-side; but from Argos Philip succeeded in surprising the pillagers with his cavalry and in driving them precipitately to the ships, which subsequently returned to Naupactus.³¹³⁾ Sulpicius' second enterprise came off somewhat less shamefully: when attempting an attack upon Elis together with the Achaeans, Philip was surprised by the presence of 4000 Romans, secretly transported by Sulpicius from Naupactus to Cyllene by means of 15 ships in order to reinforce the garrison of Elis.³¹⁴⁾ In the fierce fight that ensued Philip hardly escaped death and must take to

³¹²⁾ Probably Bomilcar's squadron too numbered \pm 50 ships: with 5 Achaean ships + the Punic fleet + an unknown, but certainly not very strong number of Bithynian ships Philip hoped to be able to fight the Romans, who at that moment could dispose of 60 sail in those waters (25 Roman + 35 Pergamene ships), Liv. 27, 30, 16, cf. 28, 7—8.

³¹³⁾ Liv. 27, 31, 1—3.

³¹⁴⁾ Kromayer, *Flotte*, 482.

flight; but the Romans couldn't prevent him from gathering rich spoils from the neighbouring country.³¹⁵) The menace, however, of a Dardanian invasion in the north forced him to depart hastily for Macedon. He left some troops for the sake of the Achaeans, who after his departure fought a prosperous fight against Aetolians and Eleans; but apparently no Romans took part in it, Sulpicius after Philip's departure having made for Aegina with his squadron in order to spend the winter in the island and having joined Attalus there.³¹⁶) What the latter had done in the meantime since his arrival with 35 ships at Aegina, we do not know; it cannot have been much.

So in 209 the achievements of the Romans in Greece had been far from brilliant again; but... they had succeeded in keeping the war going and in warding off Punic interference; and such was their chief purpose. Moreover, towards the year 208 a more effectual action could be expected: during the winter of 209—208 Sulpicius and Attalus made plans at Aegina for combined operations. Up to that time the Romans had chiefly operated on the western side of Greece; but henceforth naval warfare would gravitate towards the Aegean, because Attalus on account of his westward aspirations aimed at conquests on the eastern shores of Greece and in the islands. About the division of booty an arrangement was made between Sulpicius and Attalus which was nearly identical with the agreement concluded between Laevinus and the Aetolians in 212.³¹⁷)

Let us summarize: the year 209 brings with it considerable positional improvements for Rome in Spain as well as on the southern coast of Italy. In both cases sea-power plays a not unimportant part and on the other hand the consequences of the conquest of New Carthage and Tarentum are of great importance for Roman maritime supremacy. This year again there is no question of bringing into action the still extant Punic armada: the only Punic naval expedition, launched with a modest squadron to the Tarentine and Greek waters, has no effect at all.

In the year 208 the Roman naval effective reached its culmination point. We stated that from 214 onward the number of battle-ships amounted

³¹⁵) 27, 31, 9—32, 8.

³¹⁶) 27, 32, 9—33, 5.

³¹⁷) Holleaux 205, 1; 217, 2; C. A. H. VIII, 130; v. s. p. 101.

constantly to 215: 35 in Spain, 130 in Sicily, 50 in the Illyrian and Greek waters, 30 of the Sicilian vessels (in reality probably 28) going to Spain in 210 and in 209 again 30 being temporarily detached from Sicily to the Tarentine waters. But at any rate the sum total remained roughly 215, until in 209 Scipio captured 18 ships at New Carthage and added them to his own fleet, so that the total naval effective now was raised to roughly 230 vessels (in Spain 81, ³¹⁸) in Sicily 70, near Tarentum 30, in Greece 50: 231). But notwithstanding the fact, that the Punic armada had made default since 211, it nevertheless fulfilled its purpose as a fleet in being in this sense, that it compelled the Roman senate to increase even such a strong effective towards 208. Just as in 210 prisoners had told, that Carthage was fitting out a strong fleet for a new attack upon Sicily, ³¹⁹) so now again the rumour reached Rome, that Carthage intended to attack Italy, Sicily and Sardinia with 200 ships in 208. ³²⁰) In reply to this menace the senate, taught by its own blunders of the preceding years, decided first of all to divide the available effectives in a different way. In 210 30 ships had been sent quite needlessly to Spain, though Sardinia and the southern coast of Italy bitterly needed naval protection; now, Scipio commanding the Spanish waters so perfectly after the conquest of New Carthage, that he could put out of commission the bulk of his fleet, ³²¹) the senate at last realized, that a serious shifting of the available naval forces was necessary: so 50 of the Spanish ships were ordered to Sardinia, ³²²) with a view to the expected Punic attack as well as on account of the fact, that in 210 it had not been possible through lack of ships to prevent a humiliating plundering of the Sardinian coasts. ³²³) And secondly 50 extra ships were put in commission for the protection of the Italian shores, neglected for a long time: ³²⁴) 30 old ships, ³²⁵)

³¹⁸) The original squadron of 35 ships, the 28 brought by Scipio in 210 (App. *Ib.* 18, 72; Liv. 26, 19, 11 speaks of 30 ships as a round number), the 18 captured at New Carthage (Pol. 10, 17, 13) = 81, rounded off by Livy (27, 22, 7) to 80; Tarn's calculation (*Fleets* 58, 52) seems wrong to me.

³¹⁹) Liv. 27, 5, 13; *v. s. p.* 109 and 114.

³²⁰) Liv. 27, 22, 8; the number is not arbitrary, a fleet of 200 sail meaning always a supreme effort for Carthage, see the first chapter p. 19—20.

³²¹) Pol. 10, 35, 4—5, Liv. 27, 17, 6; *v. s. p.* 120.

³²²) Liv. 27, 22, 6—8.

³²³) Liv. 27, 6, 13—14, *v. s. p.* 115.

³²⁴) According to Livy (27, 22, 12) the additional squadron had to protect the *ora maris vicina urbi Romanae*, but in my opinion this must be regarded as an

laid up at Ostia and naturally needing repair, and 20 new vessels,³²⁶⁾ so that the total naval effective for the year 208 amounted to 281: 31 in Spain, 50 in Sardinia, 100 in Sicily (70 + the 30 ships temporarily detached to Tarentum in 209; so now in contradistinction to the preceding year Laevinus could think of a raid upon Africa again³²⁷⁾), 50 for the protection of the Italian shores and 50 in the Greek waters,³²⁸⁾ under command of Sulpicius as before. So the Romans had now 200 ships in the Italian waters (100 near Sicily, 50 near Sardinia and 50 near the Italian shores), so that they could have confronted the Punic armada with equal numbers, if it really had been brought into action; the Greek squadron stood quite apart, but in case of emergency Rome could easily summon 25 extra ships from Spain, in the Spanish waters a few ships being adequate to the need.

No more than Tarn (*Fleets* 58 and *Companion* 758) do I see reason to suspect the authenticity of these enormous maritime efforts. We have no right to derive an argument for rejecting it from the fact, that the rumour about the 200 Punic ships did not materialize and that on the contrary the year 208 did not bring a considerable quantity of sensational maritime events: it is far from improbable, that on the mere rumour of the Punic armada being mobilized (we must not forget, that she *was* extant since 211) the senate decided to start a ship-building race, and on the other hand the news of this strenuous counter-action will have compelled the Punic government to give up their big schemes. So the strongly increased Roman naval effective fulfilled in its turn the function of a fleet in being; from a maritime point of view the negative phenomenon that a battle did not take place or that an attack was not launched, is often of greater importance than heroic deeds noisily celebrated: in this case it proves that it was the Romans who commanded the sea.

After these introductory remarks the events of 208 can be dealt with in a few pages. In Spain naval warfare had all but come to an end in 209: henceforth Scipio concentrated upon the conquest of the Spanish

incorrect limitation, the southern coast being especially in need of protection.

³²⁵⁾ There were lying at Ostia 60 old ships, laid up since 214, *v. s.* p. 78.

³²⁶⁾ Consequently a total number of 180 new ships were built from 218 to 208: 60 218/217 (*Pol.* 3, 75, 4, *v. s.* p. 48 sq.), 100 in 214 (*v. s.* p. 74 sq.) and 20 in 208.

³²⁷⁾ *Liv.* 27, 22, 9, cf. 27, 8, 13, 17, *v. s.* p. 116.

³²⁸⁾ *Liv.* 27, 22, 10.

interior and the destruction of the Punic land armies, events lying outside the range of our subject. Nor was peace disturbed in the Italian waters, either because the rumour of an enormous Carthaginian offensive by sea had been false, or because the strenuous measures, taken by the senate in reply to the great Punic schemes, had forced the Carthaginian government to give them up. So we need only pay attention to the Greek front and a Roman naval expedition from Sicily to Africa.

The junction of the Roman and Pergamene squadrons at Aegina and the anticipation of their combined action in 208 stimulated the energy of Philip's numerous enemies, so that the prospects for the year 208 were rather gloomy for him and his Greek allies.³²⁹) The Aetolians had barred the Thermopylae in order to prevent Philip from joining hands with his allies, the Illyrians and Maedi were preparing an invasion of Macedon, Sparta menaced the Achaeans; not to speak about Sulpicius and Attalus themselves, who in the spring of 208 put to sea from Aegina with 60 men of war (25 Roman + 35 Pergamene ships).³³⁰) Philip did his level best to face all these threats; he sent reinforcements to the most endangered points, concentrated his army in Thessaly and remained himself at Demetrias, where a system of fire-signals should inform him of the movements of the hostile fleet. Its achievements, however, were slight. To start with, it made an unsuccessful attack on the isle of Lemnos, which Attalus coveted as a base; then the allies sailed back, laid waste Peparethus, but without taking the town, and attacked Euboea. Oreus fell by treason, but Chalcis held her own. Finally Opus in Locris was forced into surrender, where Attalus nearly met his fate: after forcing the Thermopylae, Philip suddenly appeared before the town and Attalus, who was filling his pockets with plunder, must flee head over heels to his ships and put to sea in a panic to Oreus, to which place Sulpicius had retreated already. This was to be Attalus' unheroic farewell to Greece (Holleaux *l. l.*): king Prusias of Bithynia, who was connected with Philip by marriage, had invaded his kingdom, probably at Philip's instigation; so Attalus returned to Asia, abandoning Opus and Oreus. Sulpicius

³²⁹) Compare for the following events Liv. 28, 5—8, Pol. 10, 41 sq., Holleaux, *C. A. H.* VIII, 130 sq.

³³⁰) Liv. 28, 5, 1. For this co-operation, which was the forerunner of the auxiliary system prevailing with the Romans in the second century, *v. s.* p. 42; it is characteristic, that the allied contingent was stronger than the Roman squadron.

retired to Aegina and partook no longer of the war in this year. So the "success" of the allied fleets was very poor indeed: it remained limited to the conquest and brutal maltreatment³³¹⁾ of two towns (Oreus and Opus), which at once had to be abandoned again! And the worst of it was, that through Attalus' retreat to Asia and Sulpicius' inactivity at Aegina Philip was now free to act as he liked and gained positive advantages. He took several places from the Aetolians and even was able to raid them by sea with a naturally small number of ships; thereupon he returned with his weak naval forces (from Corinth via Chalcis to Demetrias) under the very eyes of the Roman fleet!³³²⁾ Sulpicius didn't stir a finger to bar his way.

So this round ended positively to Philip's advantage and he might probably have forced a decision in his favour but for Punic faint-heartedness. For the Punic squadron was cruising again in the Greek waters³³³⁾ and even made its appearance at Aegium, where Philip had fixed a rendezvous. Attalus' hurried retreat to Asia presented to the Carthaginians a fine chance of destroying Sulpicius' 25 ships and forcing in this way the already discouraged Aetolians to ask for peace. But on receiving the news, that Attalus and the Romans had left Oreus, the Carthaginians at Aegium on the contrary were mastered by the erroneous fear, that the 60 ships of Attalus and Sulpicius were on the way to meet them and that they should be blockaded within the Corinthian Gulf; hence their hasty retreat to the Acarnanian harbours, whence they probably soon returned home: in the Greek waters we meet them no more.³³⁴⁾ On the other hand it was only reasonable, that after Attalus' departure Sulpicius was lying idle at Aegina for fear of the now crushing numerical superiority of the Punic fleet, though it remains a somewhat tragicomic note, that at this juncture the two do-nothings Bomilcar and Sulpicius were afraid. . . . of each other! At any rate the Punic squadron

³³¹⁾ Besides the passages already quoted compare for Oreus Pol. II, 5, 6—8, Holleaux 232 with the footnotes.

³³²⁾ Liv. 28, 8, 7—13, Holleaux 241—243; *inter medias prope hostium classes* (§ 11) is a slip: Attalus' fleet having retreated to Asia, the Roman ships alone were lying at Aegina.

³³³⁾ This time again it certainly did not number more than 50 ships, as it was mortally afraid of the 60 of Attalus and Sulpicius, Liv. 28, 7, 17—18, cf. 8, 7—8 and v. s. p. 124.

³³⁴⁾ Liv. 28, 7, 17—18; 8, 8.

vanished from the Greek waters without having achieved anything and it never returned there again;³³⁵) so Philip now at last decided to help himself: he ordered the construction of 100 warships, which, however, wouldn't be launched for years to come and consequently would play no part in this war.³³⁶) Then he departed for Macedon to fight the Dardanians.

icily) In the summer of 208 Laevinus undertook an expedition with 100 ships (the complete Sicilian squadron: on account of the existence of the strong Punic fleet and the rumours of the winter 209—208 it would have been inexcusable to do less) from Sicily to Africa.³³⁷) He made a descent upon the coast near Clupea and ransacked the country far and wide with impunity. However, the sudden rumour of a Punic fleet approaching forced the pillagers to return hurriedly to the ships. Off Clupea an engagement ensued with the Punic squadron, which was outnumbered, as it was 83 ships strong. The Romans carried the day, captured 18 vessels³³⁸) and returned to Lilybaeum with considerable booty.

In my opinion there is no valid reason to suspect the authenticity of this expedition. That this greatest naval battle of the second Punic war (for such it was) is dispatched by Livy in a few words, is very queer indeed, but naturally rather an argument for than against the authenticity. Moreover, there happened exactly what we should expect to happen; it is only natural, that the Carthaginians, who, even though the rumour about 200 ships had been false or exaggerated, at any rate since 211 could dispose of 150 ships at the least,³³⁹) now finally attempted to stand their ground and beat the enemy, and on the other hand it is characteristic for their weakened morale, that they did not exert themselves to the utmost of their power to obtain a chance of victory by superior numbers, but produced real Carthaginian patch-work again by facing 100 Roman ships with 83 of their own.³⁴⁰) However, there are certain

³³⁵) After the disaster of the Metaurus in 207 every attempt to reinforce Hannibal in Italy with Macedonian forces was superfluous indeed, even if it had been practicable: the good opportunity had been allowed to slip by, the old song again.

³³⁶) Liv. 28, 8, 14, Holleaux 246, 2.

³³⁷) Liv. 27, 29, 7—8.

³³⁸) The number of prizes points to the traditional Roman boarding tactics.

³³⁹) V. s. p. 109.

³⁴⁰) Even if we suppose, that at that moment 50 ships were operating in the Greek

scholars, who do not simply reject the authenticity of this naval battle, but, on account of the occurrence of a battle of the same style in 207 (Liv. 28, 4, 5—7), suppose a doublet;³⁴¹) in my opinion an equally arbitrary method. That the regularly repeated pillaging expeditions from Sicily to Africa show a certain uniformity, goes without saying; if this were a valid reason to suppose doublets, the methodical consequence would be to reject nearly all Roman raids on Africa, a consequence accepted by Kahrstedt, but hypercritical and unsound nevertheless.³⁴²) Moreover, it is quite natural, that with the strong home fleet, which since 211 was still at their disposal, the Carthaginians attempted to check the Roman raids on Africa *in two successive years* (in 208 and 207); precisely by these two defeats the already so horribly weak maritime morale of the Carthaginians was utterly destroyed, so that afterwards they did not stir a finger to prevent Scipio from crossing to Africa, though they had always some 100 ships left: without the two naval battles of 208 and 207 such a behaviour would be completely unaccountable. Finally we must discuss here the point of view of Holleaux,³⁴³) who believes the two naval battles of Livy to be annalistic forgeries, but on the other hand supposes an historical fact to be hidden behind them, to wit the destruction by the Sicilian squadron of Bomilcar's fleet, when returning from Greece in 208. In this dreadful *débauche* he seeks the explanation of the fact, that since 208 the Punic government abandoned all naval activity for years to come. Holleaux' cardinal error lies in the fact, that he regards Bomilcar's fleet of 209 and 208 as very strong and therefore as the only important squadron Carthage possessed at the time;³⁴⁴) I hope to have proved in the preceding pages, that his squadron did not number more than 50 ships, so that in the summer of

waters with Bomilcar, the Punic home fleet still numbered 100 sail at the very least; plucklessness, lack of man power and of money will have joined hands to man only 83 out of this number, v. s. p. 108 sq.

³⁴¹) For instance de Sanctis III, 2, 476, 52, Hallward, C. A. H. VIII, 92.

³⁴²) Fancy some one rejecting nine out of ten English air-raids on Germany during the last war on account of their monotonous uniformity! In such a way almost the entire air war might be explained away and of course nobody will even think of it in earnest. But with regard to the Roman raids on Africa we speak with an oracular air of doublets, which is just as foolish and untenable.

³⁴³) 244, 2.

³⁴⁴) V.s. footnote 222.

208 the Punic home fleet still numbered 100 ships at the very least, which during Bomilcar's absence could engage very well with Laevinus' fleet. Moreover, the perversion of the tremendous destruction of Bomilcar's fleet, presupposed by Holleaux, into the modest victory off Clupea described by Livy, which yielded only 18 prizes to the Romans, would be in flat defiance of the most elementary rules of annalistic forging technique, which always tends to exaggerate, never to belittle Roman victories. The naval inactivity of Carthage since 211 is perfectly explained by the moral collapse dating from 211 and naturally worsened greatly by the defeats of 208 and 207; and these defeats will certainly have contributed to the decision to stop the sending of ships to the Greek waters.³⁴⁵) But Bomilcar's squadron itself was not destroyed, because we certainly should know this, if it had happened, and because in the next years Carthage still could dispose of a hundred sail at the least.³⁴⁶) The plucklessness and failure of Carthage at sea date from 211 and not only from 208; so we must seek the explanation of these phenomena above all things in a moral breakdown and next to it in difficulties of recruitment and financial embarrassment, but not in lack of *ships*: the two defeats of 208 and 207 gave the finishing blow to the Punic morale that had been perfectly undermined already since 211. To explain these things we need not assume a crushing (but unmentioned!) defeat, which should have destroyed the entire Punic *fleet*.

The year 208 may be regarded as very favourable to Rome. In Spain the offensive begun in 209 with the conquest of New Carthage was continued successfully against the Punic land forces, Rome now fully commanding the Spanish waters. The Punic schemes for a tremendous attack in the Italian waters were nipped in the bud by the strenuous countermeasures of the Roman government, the Roman naval effective now being raised to numbers never known before; instead of waiting for a Punic attack in the home waters the complete Sicilian squadron even ventured to undertake an expedition to Africa, the Punic home fleet being beaten decisively. No doubt, in the Greek waters Sulpicius and Attalus cut a deplorable figure, so that the campaign of this year ended positively in Philip's favour; but . . . the Punic squadron operating there

³⁴⁵) Footnote 335.

³⁴⁶) *V. s.* p. 108 sq.

achieved nothing at all and returned to Carthage never to appear in those areas again (*i. e.* in consequence of the defeat off Clupea). However lukewarm the action of the Romans in Greece might be, we must not forget, that they perfectly succeeded in involving Philip in difficulties near home during the critical years since 212 and in preventing him from supporting Hannibal; *and during the second Punic war this was their only object in Greece.* In 207 not only the Punic home fleet will be defeated for the second time and thus be doomed to idleness for years to come, but on land too things will definitively take a favourable turn for Rome through Hasdrubal's disaster on the Metaurus: then the moment will be near at hand, when the offensive against Carthage herself, which had been intended to open the war in 218, can finally be taken up again.

In the year 207 naval warfare is quite thrown into the shade by warfare ²⁰⁷ on land, that is to say by Hasdrubal's defeat on the Metaurus. Of course (*Spain* these events lie outside the range of our subject, but all the more we *Italy*) have to emphasize the undeniable fact, that Roman naval supremacy here conditioned the favourable turn things took on land. We stated before, ³⁴⁷) that in 218 Hannibal did not choose the long and difficult route by land to Italy to amuse himself in a sportive way, but *vi coactus*, because he simply had no other choice on account of Roman naval supremacy. And if we ask, how it is to be explained that only in 207 the Carthaginians succeeded in sending reinforcements to Italy by the same route, the answer is: by the diverting offensive, launched by the Romans in 218 *by sea* to Spain and kept up *by sea* year by year even under the most critical circumstances. Here a clear light is thrown upon the importance of Scipio the elder's decision to send on the transports with his army to Spain, when in 218 he hurried back himself from Massilia to Italy in order to fulfil his consular duty and bar Hannibal's way: as early as 216, when in Italy the Roman position was utterly precarious, Hasdrubal attempted to break through, but he was defeated by the Scipios and forced to remain in Spain; ³⁴⁸) and though in 208 he finally succeeded in escaping

³⁴⁷) V. s. p. 36 sq.

³⁴⁸) V. s. p. 63.

from Spain, he marched off with an army halved by the defeat of Baecula, while on the other hand the Romans in Italy had by now sufficiently recovered to confront with success a two-sided attack and, moreover, the long time, required by Hasdrubal's march by land, gave them ample opportunity of preparing their defence and giving him a warm reception at his arrival in 207.³⁴⁹⁾ Suppose Carthage had commanded the sea in 208 and Hasdrubal had been able to transport his army to Italy by sea: he would have found the Romans unprepared, whereas now by means of the short and fast route by sea they not only received in good time the news of Hasdrubal's march, but extra troops from Spain to boot.³⁵⁰⁾

The history of Hasdrubal's disaster on the Metaurus will here be left out of account; we must limit ourselves to the statement, that this event forced Hannibal to act henceforth on the defensive only, as he must now give up for good his hope of receiving reinforcements from Spain as well as from Macedon, where the interference of the Punic navy in 209 and 208 had been of too small a scale and had also come too late to achieve anything. After his victory near Baecula in 208 Scipio continued in 207 his victorious offensive against the Punic land forces in the Spanish interior; in 206 this offensive would lead to the conquest of the whole of Spain.

icily) Just as in 208 the proconsul Laevinus undertook a pillaging expedition from Sicily to Africa in 207.³⁵¹⁾ The territory of Carthage and Utica was ransacked. On the way home the Roman fleet, which certainly numbered 100 sail (the complete Sicilian effective), met a Punic squadron

³⁴⁹⁾ That in ancient times as well as nowadays Scipio was criticized in a somewhat easy way, because after Baecula he suffered Hasdrubal to escape from Spain, goes without saying (compare f.i. Fabius' speech Liv. 28, 42, 14—15); Kahrstedt (519 and 524) and Scullard (114 sq.) rightly emphasize the unfairness of such a criticism. For the rest I remind that in 211 after the catastrophe of the Scipios a second invasion of Italy had only been spared to Rome by the remarkable weakness of character of the quarrelling Punic generals in Spain. At that moment such an invasion could certainly not have been prevented and it would have made the Roman position in Italy extremely precarious; but in 207 it was in reality too late again.

³⁵⁰⁾ Liv. 27, 38, 11—12; Zon. 9, 8, 7, cf. Clark 40, who rightly regards this piece of information as authentic. This fast shifting by sea of military forces in comparison with Hasdrubal's slow march by land throws a clear light upon the importance naval supremacy had for Rome.

³⁵¹⁾ Liv. 28, 4, 5—7.

of 70 ships, 4 of which were sunk and 17 captured, the rest being dispersed. The Roman squadron returned to Lilybaeum laden with booty. That this second naval defeat in succession (I pointed out before, ³⁵²) that there is no reason to regard the battle of 207 as a doublet of the fight of 208) must have stripped the Carthaginians of the last particle of self-confidence they had left, is manifest; though after the loss of some 40 ships in the two naval battles of 208 and 207 they certainly had more than 100 left, ³⁵³) they abandoned after 207 every naval action for years to come and thus made possible the great offensive of Scipio against Africa, which, with a bit of promptness at sea, they might perhaps have prevented. Not without reason Livy after his account of the naval battle of 207 (28, 4, 7) affirms, that through this victory the sea had become safe; for this defeat had brought about the total destruction of the Punic maritime morale: a large number of ships was still extant, but they were no longer used! So it goes without saying, that in the Italian waters peace was not disturbed in 207; ³⁵⁴) since 208 Sardinia too had become unassailable through the stationing of 50 ships in that area.

We might perhaps expect ³⁵⁵) that, Attalus having withdrawn from (Greece in 208 in order to protect his own kingdom against Prusias of Bithynia, Sulpicius should have doubled his activity in the Greek waters; but exactly the reverse of it happened: according to Livy's positive testimony (29, 12, 1) Greek affairs were wholly neglected by the Romans in 207 and 206. It may be, that in the spring of 207 Sulpicius conquered the Achaean Dymae, the inhabitants being enslaved according to custom; but if so, it was at any rate his last "exploit". ³⁵⁶) To be sure, he was

³⁵²) V. s. p. 130 sq.

³⁵³) The fact, that the Carthaginians in 207 just as in 208 faced the Roman fleet with inferior numbers, though they had more ships at their disposal, is one of those numerous puzzles the Punic admiralty again and again confronts us with: those people behaved as if they *sought* defeat! Lack of natural pluck, of money and of man power are the three factors, in which the solution of these problems is always to be sought.

³⁵⁴) Of the newly formed squadron of 50 ships for the protection of the Italian coast we hear nothing: it will have been laid up again at Ostia, because it was not needed, or at least have slumbered there.

³⁵⁵) Compare for the following statements C. A. H. VIII, 132 sq.

³⁵⁶) Liv. 32, 22, 10, Paus. 7, 17, 5; the fall of Dymae cannot be dated with certainty; so it may have taken place at an earlier date (see f. i. Niese II, 483, 6),

still maintained in his command for two full years (207—206);³⁵⁷ but his activity will have been limited to the protection of the Illyrian shores: with Greece he interfered no longer. What forces he could dispose of to fulfil this humble task, has not been handed down; but without any doubt the senate in 207 called back a considerable part of his original effective, the sending of 35 ships and 11,000 men with Sempronius in 205 (Liv. 29, 12, 2) clearly serving the purpose of supplementing very weak forces: if at that moment Sulpicius had been lying in Illyria with his original squadron of 50 ships, such a measure would have been quite superfluous. So Sulpicius in 207 and 206 will have guarded the Illyrian shores with a small squadron; the rest of his forces was called back to Italy: whether these ships were laid up or again stationed at Brindisi, we do not know.

Thus the war — to quote Holleaux' sharp characterization — underwent a third transformation: from Roman-Macedonian, then Roman-Hellenic, it became merely Macedonian-Hellenic, the Romans now quitting the job. So a discussion of this closing stage of the war in Greece is out of place here and we may limit ourselves to the statement, that Philip now played a winning game: after the Roman retreat he could resume his dear old piratical tactics against the Aetolians, Zacynthus *i. a.* being reconquered in this way; but, moreover, the revival of the Achaeans, who, led by the strenuous Philopoemen, beat Sparta decisively, allowed him to concentrate upon Aetolia himself; consequently the Aetolians, deserted by Rome and suffering heavy losses, were forced in 206 to accept peace on unfavourable and humiliating terms.³⁵⁸ We may, however, well ask here, what induced the Roman government to violate the treaty with Aetolia in such a flagrant way. If we remember, that in 212 the object of this treaty had been to involve Philip in difficulties near home and to prevent him in

but at any rate the summer of 209 remains *terminus post quem*, the town still siding with Philip at the time, Liv. 27, 31, 9 sq., Holleaux 232, 1.

³⁵⁷) This clearly results from Liv. 29, 12, 2 and App. *Mac.* 3; these testimonies have more weight than the fact, that à propos of the dividing of Roman forces for 207 and 206 Livy does not mention the Greek command (27, 36, 10 sq.; 28, 10, 8 sq.). On the other hand the important transport of troops, mentioned by Appian *l. l.*, must be regarded as an annalistic falsification, intended to obscure Roman faithlessness towards Aetolia: its effective proves it to be identical with Sempronius' mission in 205, shifted from its place (Liv. 29, 12, 2), see Holleaux 245, 2 and 255, 2.

³⁵⁸) See C. A. H. VIII, 132 sq.

this way from interfering with Italy, we may take it for granted, that in 207 the senate deemed this object to have been attained and therefore immediately deserted their Greek allies in the most cynical way. The senate will have had valid reasons to suppose, that after 208 the Carthaginians would stop their attempts at intervention in the Greek waters, as they did indeed: it could be deduced from the fact, that in 208 Philip had ordered the construction of 100 warships of his own,³⁵⁹⁾ which proved that henceforth he despaired of naval assistance from Carthage; it could be deduced as well from the weak effective sent by Carthage to the Greek waters in 209 and 208 and from the utterly nervous and ineffective line of conduct of this squadron, finally from the serious defeat of the Punic home fleet in 208, which was followed by a second in 207; perhaps the senate had even positive information on this point.³⁶⁰⁾ Moreover, the reconquest of Tarentum in 209 had made intervention in Italy all but impossible to Philip. So the Romans had a right indeed to regard the object of their intervention in Greece as realized. Whether the menace of Hasdrubal's invasion was a factor that also urged the Romans to call back a great part of Sulpicius' forces, because they believed every man to be needed in Italy, seems questionable to me: for such a purpose it was not necessary to order back from Greece the small effective of Sulpicius; moreover, if this had been the senate's motive, we should not be able to account for the fact, that in 206, after Hasdrubal's catastrophe, the senate persisted in their attitude of non-intervention in Greece.³⁶¹⁾ But, though the practical need of man power hardly played a part in this game, a certain psychological factor will undoubtedly have had a voice in the matter. In Italy too (not only in Carthage) there were serious symptoms of war-weariness, in spite or rather in consequence of the energy that was produced. Already in the critical year 212 the senate had postponed the ratification of the Aetolian treaty for two years, because they feared opposition from the side of public opinion, *i. e.* of

³⁵⁹⁾ Again the senate will have had reasons to suppose, that this fleet would not soon be launched, a supposition, which indeed was afterwards corroborated by the events, *v. s.* p. 130; and *if* it would put to sea nevertheless, Rome had a sufficient number of ships to reinforce Sulpicius' squadron in good time.

³⁶⁰⁾ In this connexion it is worthy of note, that after its victory of 207 the Sicilian squadron was reduced from 100 to 30 sail, Liv. 28, 10, 16.

³⁶¹⁾ Holleaux 248.

the rural majority in the *comitia*, against an extra offensive: ³⁶²) though in the main this majority was docile enough, the senate had naturally to spare its sensibilities. The year 207 brought with it a serious crisis again and, though the decisive offensive against Carthage would only be launched in 205, nevertheless the final heat of the struggle with Carthage came into sight in 206; and there were signs enough of discontentment and weariness with citizens and allies: in Etruria and Umbria defection was threatening, ³⁶³) 12 Latin colonies were in open recusancy, ³⁶⁴) and among the maritime colonies too a spirit of opposition displayed itself.³⁶⁵) What wonder then, that the senate spared the sensibilities of public opinion that naturally asked for concentration upon the main struggle with Carthage herself? So they wound up the Greek diverting offensive, because it had fulfilled its direct task, even though perhaps realizing themselves the benefit of continuing the operations in Greece with a view to the future establishing of Roman hegemony in the East. ³⁶⁶) Finally the landlubberish tendency always present with the Romans, to withdraw from the sea as soon as circumstances allowed it, will have played a certain part too. ³⁶⁷)

The year 207 brought relief to Rome in many respects. In Spain the end of the war was drawing near thanks to Scipio; in Italy the disaster of Hasdrubal definitively imposed upon Hannibal a defensive strategy, though he succeeded in maintaining himself undefeated in Bruttium; the Punic home fleet suffered a second serious defeat dooming the Punic navy

³⁶²) V. s. footnote 205.

³⁶³) Liv. 27, 24, 1; 28, 10, 4.

³⁶⁴) Liv. 27, 9; 29, 15.

³⁶⁵) Liv. 27, 38.

³⁶⁶) That the thought of a future Roman hegemony in the East should have been foreign to the senate, as is asserted by Holleaux, does not result in my opinion from its line of conduct in 207. The senate had to spare the rural instincts of Roman popular character and besides rightly regarded the intervention in Greece above all things as a secondary part of the struggle with Carthage. In 207 the senate probably realized perfectly, that the stopping of the Greek offensive and the cynical disloyalty to the allies in Greece would prove detrimental to the Roman influence in that country; but such a loss could be easily repaired in the future, when Rome would breathe freely again: now first of all Carthage *must* be disposed of. See Carcopino 58 sq., whose cautious remarks form a wholesome counterpoise against Holleaux' exaggerated views about the utter lack of line and perspective in Roman foreign policy.

³⁶⁷) Compare the first chapter.

to idleness for years to come and finally the Greek offensive could be wound up, though in a sorely inglorious way.

About the dividing of naval forces for the year 206 we have but 206 slight information; we only learn from Livy (28, 10, 16) that the proconsul (*Sicily*, Laevinus, who since 210 had continuously commanded the Sicilian *Spain*) squadron, was ordered now to leave 30 ships in the Sicilian waters under command of the praetor C. Servilius and to take the remaining 70 to Rome. In the light of the events of the preceding years this measure is perfectly clear. After the two serious defeats the Carthaginian fleet had suffered in 208 and 207 the senate did not reckon any longer with the possibility of a Punic naval offensive,³⁶⁸) regarded the sea as safe (Liv. 28, 4, 5—7) and consequently reduced immediately and radically the Sicilian squadron; moreover, the danger now being past, the ships remaining on service were given to a praetor again, as had been usual till Otacilius' death in 211. But, though we can understand this measure, it nevertheless is highly characteristic of Roman landlubberism: if circumstances require it, the Romans are ready enough to spare neither trouble nor expense in order to launch very strong naval forces and, if need be, to do so at short notice (the enormous effective of 280 sail in 208 had proved it conclusively); but, as soon as circumstances seem to allow it in any way, they are in a hurry to withdraw from the sea again: in 207 they had called back to Italy the greater part of the Greek squadron, now the Sicilian squadron was reduced in the same radical way. So in 206 only a small part of the enormous naval forces of 208 was in commission: 50 ships in Sardinia, 30 in Sicily and an unknown, but certainly not large number of ships in the Illyrian waters. But the 30 ships in Spain can scarcely have been in active service, the Carthaginians now having only a few vessels left in that area; and the squadron of 50 ships, newly formed in 208 for the protection of the Italian shores, does not make its appearance either, for the simple reason that, in consequence of the two serious defeats of the Punic home fleet, peace was not disturbed for the present in the Italian waters: it will probably have slumbered at Ostia just as the 70 ships brought by Laevinus from Sicily, while the greater part of Sulpicius' squadron presumably passed

³⁶⁸) V. s. p. 134 sq. and 137.

through a similar sleeping cure at Brindisi. Of course these ships remained available, so that in case of emergency the Romans could still dispose of an effective of 280 sail. But apart from the difficulty how to keep fit the crews out of service, there is reason to ask, whether their landlubbers' mentality did not play them false in this case, in other words, whether such an extensive naval demobilization was not executed too soon. In my opinion this was certainly the case: the fact that presently Mago will be able to land his forces in Liguria undisturbedly and to unsettle northern Italy for a considerable time (why doesn't the special squadron for the protection of the Italian shores stir a finger to bar his way?) and that Hannibal will succeed in crossing from southern Italy to Africa with a considerable part of his forces, seems to prove that the Romans had unduly precipitated the laying up of the entire Italian coastal squadron and of a great part of the Sicilian. That they did not think of preventing Hannibal from leaving Italy, is natural enough; but they might have attempted to intercept and destroy his fleet of transports on sea by means of the Sicilian squadron, as he had to pass by Sicily. Blood is thicker than water: the Romans remained landlubbers after all, in spite of the respectable energy, displayed by them at sea in cases of emergency. Of course the war-weariness we noticed already in the preceding year, had a strong voice in the matter too: we might speak of symptoms of reaction, especially now, after the heavy strain of 207. However, the evil consequences of this premature demobilization would not be perceptible at once: the year 206 itself was very poor indeed in maritime events. In the Sicilian, Sardinian and Italian waters peace was not disturbed; in Greece the war between Philip and Aetolia, abandoned by Rome in 207, resulted in a peace detrimental to the Aetolians; only in Spain the last agonies of Punic resistance brought with them a bit of naval activity too. Remarkably enough it was from here that peace in the Italian waters would be disturbed once again.

It lies beyond the compass of this treatise to describe, how after the departure of Hasdrubal Barca for Italy Scipio finished the conquest of Spain in 207—206; nor can I discuss here the chronological problems connected with these events: they belong entirely to warfare on land.³⁶⁹⁾

³⁶⁹⁾ See Scullard's fifth chapter *Iliipa and the last steps in Spain* and for the chronological problems *Appendix 3*: the cardinal question is, whether the battle of Iliipa belongs to 207 or to 206; but the naval events we have to discuss here belong certainly to the year 206.

I must limit myself to the statement, that soon after the battle of Ilipa the strong insular position of Gades was the only one the Carthaginians succeeded in maintaining; of the two Punic generals left in Spain Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, withdrew from here to Africa, ³⁷⁰) while Mago remained at Gades and here organized the last resistance by collecting auxiliaries from the neighbouring parts of Africa and Spain and by gathering ships. ³⁷¹) However, his position at Gades was far from safe: the prosperity of this commercial town largely depended upon the Spanish hinterland, the rich products of which she used to export; this hinterland now having been conquered by the Romans, Gades, if remaining in Punic hands, would run the risk of being cut off from her natural feeding-ground

³⁷⁰) Liv. 28, 16, 8. 13; 28, 17, 13.

³⁷¹) Liv. 28, 23, 7. In order to form an adequate idea of the following events it is necessary to discuss here the question, how many warships the Carthaginians could dispose of at Gades. They cannot have been numerous, because after the fall of New Carthage in 209, when 18 men of war fell into Scipio's hands, the latter commanded the Spanish waters so perfectly that he could lay up almost his entire fleet (*v. s. p.* 120). According to Livy (28, 17, 13) Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, takes 7 triremes from Gades to Africa and in the miniature naval battle off Gibraltar 8 triremes and 1 quinquereme figure on the Punic side (28, 30), 3 of which are disposed of by Laelius, the rest withdrawing to Africa. After the departure of these 16 ships Mago will scarcely have had any warships left at Gades (Kahrstedt 536; the phrase *navibus in Oceano collectis* (Liv. 28, 23, 7) naturally refers to the requisitioning of transports; the 60 warships mentioned by Appian (*Ib.* 31, 126) are certainly spurious), though it is possible, that he received some ships from Carthage without it having been mentioned: consequently during his attack upon New Carthage and his expedition to the Balearic Isles (*v. i.*) his fleet must have been chiefly composed of transports. It is worthy of note, that in 206 at least 15 Punic triremes are present in the Spanish waters, whereas in 218—217 the Carthaginians had but 5 ships of this type in Spain, and that on the Roman side too 7 triremes with 1 quinquereme make their appearance in the battle off Gibraltar, though the Romans probably never sent other ships to Spain than quinqueremes. These Roman triremes must therefore have come from the 18 prizes captured in 209 at New Carthage; but then the question remains to be answered, how the strong increase of the number of Punic triremes since 217 (from 5 to 22 at the least) is to be explained. In 217 after the battle off the Ebro the Punic fleet in Spain was composed of 28 vessels (21 quinqueremes, 2 quadriremes, 5 triremes, *v. s. p.* 50); to these was added temporarily the fleet of 60 ships, brought by Mago to Spain in 215 and apparently composed partly of triremes (*v. s. p.* 64). When this last squadron sailed back to Carthage to form part of Bomilcar's armada (*v. s. p.* 80, 135), an exchange will have taken place: the ships of smaller type will chiefly have been left in Spain, the heavy battle-ships being brought back to Carthage in order to fight or rather not to fight the Romans before Syracuse.

and falling a prey to a rapid decline. So it is no wonder, that the Gaditans soon began to stir, that they inclined to desert the Punic cause and tried to get into contact with Scipio: deserters joined him at New Carthage, who held out to him the betrayal of the town. So Marcius was sent with light-armed troops by land, Laelius with 7 triremes and 1 quinquereme by sea, in order to launch combined land- and naval operations against Gades, as Laelius and Scipio himself had done before against New Carthage. Perhaps Scipio himself intended to follow with more troops, if need be; but a serious disease checked him.³⁷²) So, while he was lying ill and rumours about the critical state of his health caused dangerous disturbances among the Roman troops and the Spanish tribes, Marcius and Laelius made a vain attempt to conquer Gades.³⁷³) Marcius succeeded in putting a stop to the Punic recruitments from the Spanish country-side, but the endeavour to play Gades herself into Roman hands by treason from within failed: Mago was informed betimes of the treacherous scheme, the conspirators were arrested and under Adherbal's care were sent to Carthage on board a quinquereme, escorted by 8 triremes. In the Straits of Gibraltar an engagement ensued between these ships and Laelius' small squadron, which on its way to Gades had reached meanwhile the harbour of Carteia. In this battle, in which the strength of the current prevailed over nautical tactics, the Romans got the upper-hand in spite of their inferior numbers: two Punic triremes were sunk and a third disabled; the rest succeeded in escaping to Africa, including probably the quinquereme, though this does not clearly follow from Livy's account (28, 30, 12). Laelius returned to Carteia, where he learned that the endeavour at betraying Gades had failed; he and Marcius decided not to waste time in besieging the strong town, but to return to New Carthage. So the scheme for a combined attack came to nothing, perhaps in connexion with the ridiculously weak naval effective, perhaps on account of the disturbances in northern Spain, which were more dangerous than Gades and therefore naturally took precedence of it.

³⁷²) Liv. 28, 23, 6—8, Scullard 147 and 150 sq. It is noteworthy, that only such a weak squadron was sent with Laelius from New Carthage: apparently the main body of the Roman fleet in Spain was lying at Tarraco (just as afterwards at the time of Mago's attack upon New Carthage), only a few, chiefly light ships being stationed at New Carthage; a serious and quite unnecessary blunder that soon would enable Mago to unsettle northern Italy for years to come.

³⁷³) For the following events Liv. 28, 30—31, 4, Scullard 150 sq.

However, a few months later the fate of this last Punic stronghold in Spain was sealed nevertheless. Mago had pinned his hope upon the mutiny of the Roman troops and the Spanish revolt, caused by Scipio's illness. When Scipio, however, had succeeded in quelling these disturbances, he despaired of the Punic prospects in Spain and prepared to leave the country.³⁷⁴) At that moment the order reached him from Carthage to sail to Italy and join hands with Hannibal after recruiting Kelts and Ligurians. For this purpose money was sent to him, which he augmented by pillaging Gades, thus alienating the last sympathies of her inhabitants for the Punic cause. Thereupon he made first of all an attempt to surprise New Carthage and reconquer it; but the garrison was on its guard, so that Mago's troops were surprised by a sally instead of the town being surprised by him. Not without pains he succeeded in escaping with his ships after losing 800 men.

On returning to Gades, Mago found that the town was no longer willing to open her gates to him. So he sailed to the Pityussae, where he was received with benevolence and *i. a.* supplied with men for his fleet.³⁷⁵) Hence he made for the Balearic Isles, but the inhabitants of Majorca repulsed him with a rain of sling-stones; in Minorca however, the capital of which (Mahon) still bears his name, he succeeded in gaining a sufficiently firm footing to winter there. In the meantime Gades had surrendered to the Romans; the whole of Spain was now in their hands. In the late autumn of 206 Scipio returned with 10 ships from Tarraco to Rome in order to stand for the consulship for 205.³⁷⁶)

These last Spanish events give rise to some critical remarks. Mago's scheme for reconquering New Carthage was not at all absurd as such, but according to Punic custom it came too late: this attack should have taken place, while Scipio was being occupied by the Spanish disturbances and the mutiny of his own troops, but not behindhand. On the other hand these events betray a certain lack of real nautical sense on the Roman side, which is also revealed, though in a somewhat different manner, by the partial naval demobilization of the year 206 (*v. s.*). I will leave out of the question the fact, that Scipio sent Laelius to Gades with a far

³⁷⁴) Liv. 28, 31, 3—4; 28, 36—37, Scullard 158 sq.

³⁷⁵) It seems possible to me, that here or afterwards at Minorca he received from Carthage a number of warships for his expedition to northern Italy, *v. i.*

³⁷⁶) Liv. 28, 38, 1, Pol. 11, 33, 8; the large fleet of Appian (*ib.* 38, 154) was of course a fleet of transports.

too weak squadron, though this too seems to prove that far too few ships were lying at New Carthage and far too many at Tarraco. But the fact that Mago could venture an attack on New Carthage with a fleet of transports, convoyed by a few men of war,³⁷⁷) without a Roman squadron being present to face him, was little short of a maritime scandal. After all there were still 30 ships in Spain (since 208, when 50 out of a number of 81 had been shifted to Sardinia), which could easily have destroyed Mago's entire fleet: in this way his landing near Genoa in 205, which seriously complicated the situation in Italy, could have been prevented. But the Roman squadron was peacefully slumbering at Tarraco, while Mago sailed undisturbedly from New Carthage to Pityusa and from there to Minorca for the purpose of hibernation, just as in 205 at the time of his landing in Liguria (which Rome could foresee) the Italian coastal squadron would be conspicuous. . . . by its absence! The Romans remained land-lubbers after all: this rule holds good with regard to the great Scipio as well as to the average Romans.

- 205 The year 205 brings the consulship of the great Scipio and, in connexion with it, the prospect of the renewal of the offensive against Carthage herself, which had been intended to open the war in 218, but had been pushed into the background by Hannibal's invasion of Italy. That in the bosom of the Roman government there was disagreement with respect to the desirability of such an offensive, cannot reasonably be doubted in my opinion, however suspect many a detail of Livy's narrative may be.³⁷⁸) The politicians of chiefly Italic orientation like old Fabius and his set, who aimed above all things at releasing Italy from Hannibal's grasp as quickly as they could, opposed the statesmen of pronouncedly imperialistic tendencies like Scipio, who, after wresting Spain from the enemy, now wanted to attack him in his own country, in order to force upon Hannibal the evacuation of Italy and at the same time to stab at the heart of Carthage herself. Undoubtedly Scipio felt able to defeat Hannibal in Italy and he did not shrink from such a task; but he realized that such a victory would bring the war irrevocably to an end, because the Roman people could by no means be induced to launch a new offensive against Africa, *after* Italy had been liberated from Hannibal. Scipio's

³⁷⁷) V. s. footnote 371.

³⁷⁸) See *i. a.* Scullard 160 sq. (*The interlude*).

designs went far beyond the liberation of Italy: once for all he wished to secure for Rome the supremacy in the entire western basin of the Mediterranean by beating Carthage decisively in Africa and thus eliminating her for good as a serious adversary. Scipio won the game, because the people sided with him, so that finally the senate, though reluctantly, had to yield: to one consul Sicily was assigned with the 30 warships present there since 206 and with the authorization to cross to Africa, if he deemed it beneficial to the Roman state, to the other the command against Hannibal in Bruttium; and as Scipio's colleague was *pontifex maximus* and therefore was not allowed to leave Italy, this decision of the senate meant in a somewhat disguised form compliance with Scipio's desire.³⁷⁹⁾

Scipio's preparations before his departure for Sicily, which are described (*Scipio* by Livy in detail in a more or less famous chapter,³⁸⁰⁾ give rise to *naval* serious difficulties. That he was not allowed to levy troops, but thrown *tive*) upon the enlisting of volunteers, is conceivable in connexion with the exhaustion and war-weariness prevalent in Italy: in the face of these circumstances the senate will have shrunk from official compulsion with regard to such a distant campaign and credited Scipio's popularity with sufficient attractive power to gain his end privately by the enlistment of volunteers.³⁸¹⁾ That on the other hand besides the 30 men of war present in the Sicilian waters only 30 from Italy were given to Scipio, may be true likewise, however odd it seems to be: no more than the senate's state of mind, Scipio's mentality was "real navy", as he repeatedly exhibited in Spain as well as afterwards during the African campaign; moreover, after the two defeats suffered by the Punic home fleet in 208 and 207 Rome regarded the sea as safe, which was really more or less the case in connexion with the destruction of the Punic morale at sea;³⁸²⁾ it is characteristic, that after all Scipio did not even make full use of his

³⁷⁹⁾ Liv. 28, 45, 8.

³⁸⁰⁾ 28, 45, 13 sq., cf. Zon. 9, 11, 6—7, Plut. *Fab.* 25, App. *Lib.* 7, 28.

³⁸¹⁾ Whether we must explain this prohibition from a tendency with the senate to thwart Scipio's enterprise, seems questionable to me: whatever vices we may feel inclined to ascribe to the Roman council of state, at any rate it had common sense and was not mad! See Scullard 168.

³⁸²⁾ Nevertheless, Carthage had still 100 ships at the least at her disposal; so after all Rome was playing a rather bold game by limiting Scipio's naval effective so strongly, v. s. p. 134 sq.

modest naval effective of 60 sail, but only took 40 with him to Africa! But, that the 30 ships sent with Scipio from Italy should have been newly built by means of the voluntary contributions of enthusiastic Etruscan allies, is downright indigestible stuff, which must be regarded as a ludicrous annalistic forgery, because it is perfectly incompatible with the surrounding facts and, if authentic, would stamp the senate as an assembly of madmen, which it was by no means: those men could eventually be stingy, narrow-minded or unfair, but they were not crazy. The 280 warships Rome could dispose of in 208, were in the main still extant and — what is much more important — they were perfectly available for the African campaign. In 207 the greater part of the Greek squadron had been called back to Italy and in 205 the rest would return home too from the Illyrian waters, after Rome had made peace with Philip; 70 ships of the strong Sicilian squadron were lying at Ostia since 206, probably together with the 50 of the Italian coastal squadron; finally the 30 ships in Spain were no longer needed in the Spanish waters after the fall of Gades and consequently could be made use of elsewhere: only the squadrons of 30 and 50 sail which were on service respectively in the Sicilian and the Sardinian waters, could be regarded as still needed in those areas. Taking one thing with another, we may conclude that in the course of 205 the Romans had or got at their disposal in Italy some 200 men of war: these ships were partly old³⁸³) and had been laid up for the greater part, so that undoubtedly a number of them needed repair, *but anyhow they were extant*. And now fancy Livy to make us believe, that Scipio, in order to spare the empty treasury, should have built quite needlessly 30 new ships by means of the voluntary contributions of Etruscan allies, by which measure the already so badly weakened bearing-power of Italy would have been undermined still more! Why not rather repair 30 of the 200 available Roman ships by means of the contributions of the allies? Or was the senate not even willing to yield only one of the 200 Roman ships to Scipio, because those worthy politicians wanted to thwart his enterprise at any cost? At first sight Livy's account of these preparations impresses us by its vividness, but on second thoughts the sphere of it appears to be the sphere of a madhouse. And as for the

³⁸³) But the greater part, 180 ships out of a number of 280, had been built during the war, *v. s.* footnote 326.

"voluntary" contributions of the "enthousiastic" Etruscan allies, we get into a blind alley as well. For it was exactly Etruria that in 207 had shown a tendency to join Hasdrubal (Liv. 27, 24, 1; 28, 10, 4), and after Mago's landing in northern Italy the same symptoms would come to the surface again (Liv. 29, 36, 10—12; 30, 26, 12); consequently it would be nothing short of marvellous, if this very Etruria between two outbursts of flagrant disloyalty would have manifested in such a touching way its devotion to the Roman cause! So Weissenborn (ad 28, 45, 14; compare Heitland I, 319) will undoubtedly be right in supposing, that there is no question here of voluntary, but of compulsory contributions, of penalties *in natura*, a supposition strongly corroborated by the fact that the bell-wether Arretium apparently was taxed in a specially heavy manner. However, this implies, that such penalties had been imposed upon the towns of Etruria *ex senatusconsulto* (cf. Liv. 28, 10, 4; 29, 36, 10—12) and that consequently the senate duly assisted Scipio in fitting out the 30 ships nor attempted to thwart his enterprise in this respect. So the authentic nucleus, hidden behind the annalistic nonsense of Liv. 28, 45, 13 sq.,³⁸⁴) finally comes to this, that no new ships were built, but that Scipio received from the senate 30 of the 200 available Roman ships besides his Sicilian squadron and that the reparation and fitting out of these vessels was paid by the Etruscan allies in the form of supplies *in natura* by way of penalty, this too by order of the senate. The most serious objection against Livy's narrative and the most conclusive proof, that it has been made up with false colours, lies in the fact — to wind up my bill of indictment with this closing remark —, that in his story there is so horribly much ado about nothing: in reading the detailed description of the large supplies furnished by the enthousiastic Etruscans we get the impression, that an armada is going to the born; but the poor result is . . . , that 30 ships, 30 to wit, are launched,³⁸⁵) that Scipio presently crosses to Africa with 40 sail out of a total of 60 and that

³⁸⁴) Tarn, *Companion*, 758 arrives at a similar result; in connexion with his hypercritical point of view Kahrstedt (539—540) naturally rejects the entire passage, whereas Scullard (168) accepts the greater part of it and de Sanctis (III, 2, 513) swallows it as it stands.

³⁸⁵) Appian's assertion (*Lib.* 7, 28), that Scipio, besides his 30 Sicilian men of war, fitted out 10 in Italy, is probably to be regarded as a calculation, resting upon the number 40 of his real effective during the African campaign; this last number haunts Livy's narrative too (28, 45, 17). The explanation of Kahrstedt (327) seems wrong to me.

after a little while the Etruscans commit treason again! *Parturiunt montes...*

cily) With his 30 "new" warships and 7000 volunteers Scipio crossed to Sicily³⁸⁶) and here continued to devote himself energetically to the preparations for the African offensive; meanwhile he sent Laelius with the 30 Sicilian men of war to raid the African coast.³⁸⁷)

taly) In the meantime Mago had crossed from Minorca, where he had wintered,³⁸⁸) to Italy with 30 warships and a fleet of transports carrying 12,000 foot-soldiers and 2000 horsemen, and he took Genoa by surprise: Livy states positively that the coast was not protected at all. He sent 20 warships back to Carthage, where they were needed in connexion with the approaching offensive of Scipio; for the remaining 10 he chose Savo for a base and got into contact with the Ligurian tribe of the Ingauni, enlisting Gallic troops at the same time.³⁸⁹) The Romans, who had not stirred a finger to prevent Mago's landing, naturally took measures on land to guard his movements in northern Italy and eventually bar his way to the south. To Mago's expedition we shall come back presently; here it may suffice to point to the deplorable figure the Roman navy made on this occasion. That in the autumn of 206 the Spanish squadron had neither prevented Mago's attack on New Carthage nor his crossing from there to the Pityussae and the Balearic Isles, notwithstanding the

³⁸⁶) Liv. 28, 46, 1; the number of soldiers, which is too large to be transported by 30 men of war, presupposes, as usually, the presence of a not-mentioned fleet of transports.

³⁸⁷) Liv. 29, 1, 14; 28, 45, 8; that Scipio should have hauled ashore at Panhormus the 30 ships brought from Italy, because they had been built in a hurry (according to Liv. 28, 45, 21 in 45 days) of unseasoned timber, seems to be spurious: this piece of information belongs in the sphere of the annalistic forgeries of 28, 45, 13 sq., v. s.

³⁸⁸) V. s. p. 143.

³⁸⁹) Liv. 28, 46, 7 sq. The number of troops, brought by Mago from the Balearic Isles, is rejected by Kahrstedt (538—539) as being much too high, but may probably be regarded as reliable on account of Mago's enlistments in Spain and Africa (Liv. 28, 23, 7), in the Pityussae (28, 37, 4) and Minorca (28, 46, 7), see *i. a.* de Sanctis III, 2, 510—511. On the other hand it is unimaginable, that he should have brought the 30 men of war from Gades (v. s. footnote 371); so we must assume, that at least for the greater part they were sent to him from Carthage, either in the autumn of 206 to Pityusa or Minorca, or in the spring of 205 to the latter island: this supposition is in perfect accordance with the fact, that 20 of them returned immediately to Carthage.

fact that he certainly had only a few men of war at his disposal, had already been too bad; ³⁹⁰⁾ but, anyhow, at that moment an element of surprise had had a finger in the pie. In the spring of 205 the Romans in Italy could know that Mago was on the way, but nevertheless didn't stir a finger to intercept him on sea or prevent him from landing at Genoa, though numerous warships were available for such a purpose. ³⁹¹⁾ Where did the squadron of 50 sail, specially formed in 208 for the protection of the Italian shores, hang out on this occasion? It was only conspicuous by its absence and undoubtedly slumbered at Ostia. The fact that since 206 the Romans had demobilized a great part of their considerable naval forces, yielded bitter fruit now; in the last instance these things were imputable to the war-weariness that visited Italy as well as Carthage, and to the land-lubbers' instinct that drove the Romans to withdraw from the sea in a hurry, as soon as they could. ³⁹²⁾ The ridiculously slight naval forces given to Scipio must also be viewed in this light.

Let us now turn back to Sicily. With his 30 ships Laelius reached (*Sicily*) Hippo Regius, where he disembarked his troops and pillaged the countryside. ³⁹³⁾ His operations caused a panic at Carthage, because it was rumoured that the invasion had begun and that Scipio himself had landed near Hippo. Consequently preparations were made for sustaining a siege: troops were enlisted, the town itself was brought into a state of defence and ships were fitted out to send them to Hippo against the Roman fleet. This last fact furnishes a typical instance, how stupidly the Carthaginians used to come limping behind the events: since 207 they had done nothing at sea and now not even the ships were ready, though they knew Scipio's invasion to be close at hand! So the fleet came naturally too late to achieve anything against Laelius (29, 4, 9; 5, 1).

However, they soon learned the comforting truth, that there was only question of a pillaging raid of Laelius with modest means and not yet of the invasion itself; but, shaken up by the alarming incident, they decided to make a last attempt to prevent Scipio's impending attack by means of a diverting offensive: 25 warships, 6000 foot-soldiers, 800

³⁹⁰⁾ V. s. p. 143 sq.

³⁹¹⁾ V. s. p. 139 sq. and 146.

³⁹²⁾ V. s. p. 140.

³⁹³⁾ Liv. 29, 3, 6—5, 1.

horsemen, 7 elephants and money for enlisting troops were sent to Mago, in order to enable him to march to southern Italy and join hands with Hannibal, as he had been ordered already in the autumn of 206 at Gades; ³⁹⁴) moreover, the Carthaginians sent 100 transports with soldiers, grain and money ³⁹⁵) to Hannibal himself and by means of a promise of 200 talents of silver tried to persuade Philip into an invasion of Italy or Sicily. ³⁹⁶)

Meanwhile Laelius had a conference with the Numidian Masinissa, who already in Spain had got into contact with Scipio: he complained of Scipio's offensive being tardy in coming off, warned against the wavering attitude of the Numidian king Syphax and urged the Romans to make haste; at the same time he advised Laelius to withdraw immediately to Sicily, because the Punic fleet was on its way to Hippo and the weak Roman squadron was no match for it. ³⁹⁷) So Laelius sailed back to Sicily, laden with booty, but unmolested by the Punic fleet, which naturally appeared on the scene too late; after his return he reported his experiences to Scipio. ³⁹⁸)

³⁹⁴) Liv. 29, 4, 6, cf. 28, 36, 2; App. *Lib.* 9, 34, Zon. 9, 11, 10. Of course the troops were carried by transports: the 25 men of war acted only as escort and probably returned at once to Carthage, where they were badly needed.

³⁹⁵) App. *Ann.* 54, 226, Liv. 28, 46, 14, Zon. *l.l.* The convoy, which was not escorted by men of war, was the first since 215 (!) that was sent directly by sea to Hannibal, and moreover... the attempt failed (*v.i.*)! But, if it had met with success, it would naturally have come too late in 205.

³⁹⁶) Liv. 29, 4, 4; Zon. *l.l.* If this piece of information is authentic, it offers a striking instance of the pluckless *esprit d'escalier* of the Punic government: from 212—208 they had suffered all chances of bringing Philip with his forces to Italy to slip by; now in 205, when it was irrevocably too late,... they promised money in order to attain an object, for which they had neglected to spend energy!

³⁹⁷) Liv. 29, 4, 2, 9; the effective of the Punic fleet is not mentioned, but, even after the departure of the 25 warships sent to Mago, there remained 75 at the least, *v. s. p.* 109.

³⁹⁸) In my opinion there are no valid reasons to reject the authenticity of Laelius' expedition. The fact, that this time the Romans made a descent far westwards, probably springs from the desire to impress Numidia; that at Carthage the great invasion was rumoured to have begun and that these rumours caused a panic, is quite natural and certainly trustworthy. Compare the judicious remarks of Scullard (169, 1), de Sanctis (III, 2, 513, 110), Klotz (*Appians Darstellung des 2. Punischen Krieges*, 85, 1) and Gsell (III, 206—207) against Zielinski, *Die letzten Jahre des zweiten punischen Krieges*, 6 sq. (Leipzig 1880), who localizes Laelius' descent in the neighbourhood of the Emporia and not near Hippo Regius.

At about the same time the considerable convoy sent to Mago reached (*Italy*) him prosperously on the Riviera:³⁹⁹⁾ this time again there was no trace of an Italian coastal squadron that might have intercepted the convoy. So considerable military forces had been gradually concentrated in Liguria under Mago's command; but the Roman armies were ready to bar his way to the south.

On the other hand the fleet of transports intended for Hannibal fared very ill.⁴⁰⁰⁾ The 100 transports, which carried soldiers, grain and money and were not escorted by men of war, were driven by a storm to the Sardinian waters,⁴⁰¹⁾ where the praetor Cn. Octavius⁴⁰²⁾ easily succeeded with his warfleet in sinking 20 ships and capturing 60, so that only 20 escaped to Carthage;⁴⁰³⁾ so not even one ship reached Hannibal.⁴⁰⁴⁾

From the Italian theatre of war we must finally report the reconquest of Locri: after having been in Hannibal's hands for 10 years, the town was now taken back by the Romans.⁴⁰⁵⁾ Naturally we must limit ourselves to a discussion of the part, taken in the operations by Scipio himself and his fleet. From Rhegium a Roman corps had succeeded in occupying one citadel of Locri by way of treason, so that the town, being tired of the Punic régime, went over to the Roman side; but the other citadel remained in Punic hands and, as Hannibal was advancing, the situation of the Roman garrison threatened to become extremely precarious. So Scipio decided to intervene with his fleet from Messina.

³⁹⁹⁾ Liv. 29, 5, 2, sq. and the passages quoted in footnote 394. The 25 men of war will have returned to Carthage immediately, so that Mago retained 10 warships and numerous transports, *v. s. p.* 148.

⁴⁰⁰⁾ See the passages quoted in footnote 395.

⁴⁰¹⁾ App. *Ann.* 54, 226. At first sight it seems to be impossible, that ships on their way to Bruttium should have been driven by a gale to the Sardinian waters: shortly after their departure from Carthage they must have met with a heavy southeaster.

⁴⁰²⁾ Liv. 28, 46, 14, cf. 28, 38, 13.

⁴⁰³⁾ App. *l. l.*; Livy mentions only the loss of 80 ships. In the Sardinian waters 50 Roman warships had been stationed in 208, Liv. 27, 22, 7, *v. s. p.* 126.

⁴⁰⁴⁾ The tradition of Coelius, handed down by Livy and Appian and reproduced in my text, is undoubtedly to be preferred to the version of Antias, who asserts (see Liv. 28, 46, 14), that the ships oppressed near Sardinia carried booty and prisoners of Mago from the Riviera to Carthage, see *i. a.* de Sanctis III, 2, 512, 108, Hallward, *C. A. H.* VIII, 98, Klotz 107.

⁴⁰⁵⁾ Liv. 29, 6 sq.

though in this way he exceeded his competencies by interfering with the province of his colleague. He appeared in good time to throw troops into the town and succeeded by means of a sally in inflicting such losses upon Hannibal (who was preparing for an assault), that he gave up his attempt to reconquer the town. Thereupon the second citadel was also evacuated by the Carthaginians.⁴⁰⁶) For two reasons this affair has some importance, first because Hannibal again lost a basis on the southern coast of Italy, secondly because it was the first time that he and Scipio directly faced each other, however slight the engagement might be: the fact, that Hannibal got the worst of it, naturally tended to strengthen the morale of Scipio's troops on the eve of the invasion of Africa.⁴⁰⁷) The serious complications, caused by the Roman occupation of Locri, complications which, as far as we can judge, remain a dirty blot on Scipio's escutcheon and nearly had cost him his command, cannot be discussed here.⁴⁰⁸)

don) The year 205 brought with it the termination of the conflict between Rome and Macedon, which was now dragging on already for two years.⁴⁰⁹) The peace, which the Aetolians, shamefully deserted by Rome, had been forced to conclude with Philip in 206, had at last shaken up the Roman government: now that the Macedonian king had freed his hands in Greece, the senate began to fear for the Illyrian shores and decided to protect them. In order to reinforce the very weak squadron Sulpicius in 207—206 had had at his disposal for the protection of the Illyrian coast, his successor (the proconsul P. Sempronius) was sent to Dyrrhachium in the spring of 205 with 35 men of war, 10,000 foot-soldiers and 1000 horsemen;⁴¹⁰) the troops were naturally transported by means of a not-mentioned fleet of transports. While Sempronius was operating in Illyria, his legate Laetorius sailed with 15 ships and part of the troops to Aetolia, in order to make an endeavour at persuading the Aetolians to re-open the war against Philip; but his mission failed completely, the Aetolians naturally not feeling inclined to bleed again for the sake of an ally that had deserted them already once in such a shameless way.

Apparently the senate had foreseen such a refusal and given orders to

⁴⁰⁶) Liv. 29, 7.

⁴⁰⁷) Scullard 169—171.

⁴⁰⁸) For this affair the reader is referred to Scullard 171—173.

⁴⁰⁹) V. s. p. 135 sq.

⁴¹⁰) Liv. 29, 12.

Sempronius, that in this case he should shift his ground and try to come to an arrangement with Philip. So Sempronius did not accept battle before Apollonia and, the magistrates of the Epirotes acting as mediators, peace was soon made at Phoenice, Philip too being tired of the long war and, moreover, the Romans appearing to be ready to make concessions: *i. a.* they yielded to him the important Atintania. On the Roman side the peace included Pleuratus and Attalus, on the Macedonian side Philip's Greek allies and Prusias; Attalus retained Aegina. The agreement was ratified unanimously by the Roman people; after bringing about the treaty of peace Sempronius had returned to Rome to become one of the consuls for 204. From the Greek and Illyrian waters the Romans could now entirely withdraw their military forces.⁴¹¹)

If we ask, why the Romans in 205 wanted to put an end to the conflict with Macedonia, the answer must be: *not* because they couldn't have set apart the relatively slight forces for carrying on this contest, but *undoubtedly* because war-weariness had made itself sadly felt in Italy during those last years and because in view of the approaching final offensive against Africa public opinion demanded concentration of all fighting power upon the struggle with Carthage and liquidation of all other fronts. Hence the unanimity of the *comitia* in ratifying the treaty of peace, which is expressly stated by Livy.⁴¹²) On the other hand we have no right to conclude from the peace of Phoenice, that the senate took no interest at all in Greek-Macedonian affairs and that every

⁴¹¹) Compare Holleaux 258—305 and C. A. H. VIII, 132—137. From Livy (29, 12) we get the impression, that Sempronius only came just too late to prevent the conclusion of peace between Philip and Aetolia and that the principal object of his expedition was to lend assistance to the Aetolians. Of course this is a perversion of the facts for the purpose of concealing more or less the Roman disloyalty towards Aetolia (for a fair sample of this kind of forgery see App. *Mac.* 3, *v. s.* footnote 357): while sending Sempronius in the spring of 205, the Romans perfectly knew, that Aetolia had made peace in 206, and the chief object of Sempronius' expedition was the protection of the Illyrian shores, though at the same time he was to make an attempt at drawing Aetolia back into the war again; in case this attempt should fail (and the senate had common sense enough to expect such a failure), he apparently had been ordered to shift his ground and.... follow the example of Aetolia by making peace with Philip in his turn.

⁴¹²) 29, 12, 16: *iusseruntque omnes tribus, quia verso in Africam bello omnibus aliis in praesentia levare bellis volebant.*

thought of interfering with the eastern affairs in the future was foreign to them; on the contrary: if in 205 they wanted to free their hands for the final round against Carthage and for that reason were ready to make concessions in the East, this line of conduct implied a certain mental reservation, that is to say the intention to recover afterwards what was lost now. An intention put into practice immediately after the struggle with Carthage had been brought to an end.

In a word, the year 205 brought with it a strongly marked concentration of Roman fighting power upon the struggle with Carthage. In Italy Hannibal in the south, Mago in the north had to be kept in check; besides, Scipio was ready towards 204 to launch from Sicily the final offensive against Africa. But everywhere else Rome's hands were now free. And this was a sound and necessary precaution indeed, because war-weariness had become by now a factor of importance: especially in the maritime sphere it betrayed itself in the slight naval forces given to Scipio and in the fact, that Mago could peacefully land at Genoa and that the reinforcements sent to him from Carthage were not intercepted by the Roman navy; only a convoy intended for Hannibal himself was destroyed by the Sardinian squadron. The fact was that a great part of the numerous available ships had been put out of commission. It was a godsend to Rome, that the Carthaginians had sooner still and more completely shot the bolts of their energy.

204 Scipio saw his imperium prorogated for 204, so that as proconsul he
Sardinia) could in this year put into practice the scheme for the invasion of Africa.⁴¹³) Cn. Octavius, who in 205 had commanded as praetor in Sardinia and with the squadron of 50 sail stationed in that area had destroyed the convoy intended for Hannibal,⁴¹⁴) was ordered to make over Sardinia with the troops there present to the new praetor Ti. Claudius and to protect the seacoast himself as proprætor with 40 men of war,

⁴¹³) Liv. 29, 13, 3; the consuls of 204 remained both in Italy in order to face the twofold menace of Hannibal and Mago, 29, 13, 1; and even if this had not been the case, the judgment of the senate would probably have been too sound to replace Scipio by another commander, while he was on the point of crossing to Africa.

⁴¹⁴) V. s. p. 151.

*quibus finibus senatus censuisset.*⁴¹⁵) This last statement is not quite clear. Were the 40 ships taken from the Sardinian squadron, so that 10 remained at Claudius' disposal, or was the Sardinian squadron left intact and did Octavius' 40 sail come from the great number of ships available in Italy? The former supposition has more probability, as Octavius was ordered *Sardiniam legionemque Ti. Claudio tradere*: a fleet is not mentioned in this connexion by Livy and, though it is fairly possible that he neglected to mention 10 ships made over to Claudius,⁴¹⁶) it is scarcely imaginable that he should have suppressed 50! Moreover, Octavius escorted a Sardinian convoy to Africa in this year, which would probably not have happened, if the Sardinian praetor himself had had 50 warships at his disposal (Liv. 29, 36, 1—3). Secondly we are in the dark about the limits of Octavius' command, to be determined afterwards by the senate. Did he remain in the Sardinian waters with his squadron? No doubt, it is only natural to suppose that the senate, shaken up by the fact, that in 205 Mago had undisturbedly landed at Genoa and that moreover a convoy had reached him from Carthage, should now at last have taken measures for the protection of the Italian shores and that Octavius' squadron should have been intended for such a purpose. And yet this was probably not the case: first of all the convoy escorted by Octavius from Sardinia to Africa in 204 (Liv. *l. l.*) proves anyhow, that there was still a certain tie binding Octavius' squadron to Sardinia, and, moreover, in the account of the dividing of commands and forces for 203 Octavius figures with 40 ships as the defender of the *Sardinian* shores,⁴¹⁷) which naturally is to be regarded as the continuation of the state of things in 204. So the upshot of the matter is only just this, that the command of land- and naval forces in Sardinia, which before had been in one hand, was divided between two commanders in 204 and that the naval effective on active service, which was so very slight already, was even decreased with 10 ships, a striking instance, how much the exhaustion and the aversion from naval exertions had grown in Italy during the last years. Only in 203 a part of the numerous warships laid up in Italy would at last be put in commission again and (for the first time since 208) a special

⁴¹⁵) Liv. 29, 13, 5.

⁴¹⁶) Moreover, it seems far from improbable, that these 10 ships did not even remain in Sardinia, but were put out of commission, cf. Liv. 30, 2, 4.

⁴¹⁷) Liv. 30, 2, 4.

squadron would be formed once more for the Italian coast defence.⁴¹⁸⁾
 (Sicily- Towards the spring of 204 Scipio had finished his preparations for the
 Africa) great expedition to Africa; but shortly before his departure he met with
 a serious disappointment. Already from Spain he had got into contact
 with the Numidian prince Syphax (just as with Masinissa) and had
 even paid him a personal visit at his African residence. However, in
 contradistinction to his enemy Masinissa, Syphax was a man of wavering
 character and, moreover, a marriage contracted with the daughter of
 Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, drove him back into the arms of Carthage.
 He now sent an embassy to Sicily in order to inform Scipio, that in case
 of an invasion he would take part in the war on the side of the
 Carthaginians. The news meant a hard blow to Scipio, not only on
 account of the shifting of power, caused by Syphax' change of front
 on the eve of his departure (Syphax being the most powerful Numidian
 prince, his joining Carthage sadly upset Scipio's calculations, whereas
 Masinissa, who stuck to Rome, had been driven from his kingdom and
 consequently was no very powerful ally), but also on account of the
 discouragement of his troops he had to fear in case the news should
 spread. So he had recourse to "pious fraud" and informed his soldiers,
 that Syphax as well as Masinissa urged him to make haste and that
 consequently it was not advisable to delay the expedition any longer.⁴¹⁹⁾
 In this way he succeeded in preventing his army from getting wind of
 Syphax' defection while being still in Sicily; once in Africa he would
 see about it and manage it all right.

The point of departure was naturally Lilybaeum. Here a fleet of 400
 merchant vessels, requisitioned far and wide, had been assembled⁴²⁰⁾
 for the transport of his considerable forces;⁴²¹⁾ this convoy was to be
 escorted by two squadrons of 20 men of war, the right one under the
 auspices of Scipio himself and his brother Lucius, the left under command
 of Laelius and Cato;⁴²²⁾ by night the men of war were to carry one
 light, the transports two, the flagship three;⁴²³⁾ victuals and water for

⁴¹⁸⁾ Liv. 30, 2, 5.

⁴¹⁹⁾ Liv. 29, 23—24, Zon. 9, 12, 2, Scullard 174 sq., Gsell III, 184—198, 207—208.

⁴²⁰⁾ Liv. 29, 24, 9; 26, 3.

⁴²¹⁾ Perhaps more than 30,000 men, see *i. a.* Scullard 318 sq.

⁴²²⁾ Liv. 29, 25, 10; 26, 3; App. *Lib.* 13, 50 speaks of 52 warships, a statement which
 is however contradicted by his own account 7, 28 (40 ships), *v. s.* footnote 385.

⁴²³⁾ 29, 25, 11.

45 days were put on board the ships.⁴²⁴) So now there was question indeed of a huge offensive, in contradistinction to the numerous transitory raids, launched during this war from Lilybaeum to Africa and rightly contrasted by Livy with Scipio's expedition;⁴²⁵) but the weak point is clearly perceptible: the slight number of warships escorting the enormous convoy. We stated before ⁴²⁶) that 60 men of war had been given to Scipio, 30 from Italy and 30 Sicilian vessels, and that the meanness of this effective (for mean it was, considering the large number of available ships) does not give evidence indeed of a "real navy" mentality with Scipio and the senate. But now we perceive with astonishment that after all Scipio takes only 40 of those miserable 60 ships to Africa, 20 being left in the Sicilian waters! An undeniable blunder; for by doing so he needlessly accepted serious risks on sea: the Punic home fleet was much stronger (it numbered probably some 100 ships) and consequently it could have intercepted and destroyed the entire convoy during the crossing to Africa or, if it failed to achieve this, it could afterwards have cut off Scipio's lines of communication with Sicily, . . . if it had been ready for action. Apparently Scipio had based his plans upon its *not* being ready, as in a general way the Romans since 207 always counted upon Punic maritime inertness; and I admit that his line of conduct was justified by the result. But, nevertheless, it remains a piece of wanton land-lubbers' work; it was only the lethargic apathy of the sea-dogs facing him that saved him and conditioned his success.

At first a strong northeaster favoured the crossing to Africa, but subsequently a thick fog, attended with a calm, retarded the progress twice. At last, however, the Romans landed undisturbedly near the *Promunturium Pulchrum* (identical with the *Promunturium Apollinis*), probably in the neighbourhood of the modern Porto Farina.⁴²⁷) That it was for the present Scipio's principal object to conquer Utica and make use of this

⁴²⁴) 29, 25, 6. 9.

⁴²⁵) Liv. 29, 26, 1, cf. 29, 28, 5—6.

⁴²⁶) V. s. p. 145.

⁴²⁷) Liv. 29, 27, cf. Zon. 9, 12, 3. For the problems concerning the passage to Africa the reader is referred to Gsell III, 209—214 and Scullard 184—188. In my opinion Scullard is right in asserting that the landing in the neighbourhood of Utica took place according to plan and that Scipio was not forced by fogs and headwinds to give up an original scheme for landing near the so-called Emporia in the neighbourhood of the Little Syrtis (the latter view is defended *i.a.* by Klotz, *Appians Darstellung des*

town as a base against Carthage herself, appears from the following events; but the results he obtained in 204 fell miserably short of the expectations. No doubt, according to custom Carthage was not ready, though she expected the invasion since 205: ⁴²⁸) for the present Hasdrubal had only some 13,000 men at his disposal and he was not at Carthage, but had marched inland, probably in order to join Syphax who had not yet arrived with his army; ⁴²⁹) consequently Carthage was in a state of panic and for the present had to manage with troops of horse formed in a hurry and easily beaten twice by Scipio; ⁴³⁰) finally Scipio succeeded in gathering considerable booty which was immediately transported to Sicily; ⁴³¹) but... the conquest of Utica, Scipio's chief object, failed

2. *Punischen Kriege*, 88). Scipio having put on board food and water for 45 days, he couldn't be forced by the temporary occurrence of unfavourable weather to give up without a blow his plan for landing near the Emporia, if he really entertained such a design. It is, however, far from probable that he should have entertained it: Scipio aimed at a direct offensive against Carthage herself; the Emporia were too far distant from Carthage to serve as a basis for such an enterprise, not to speak about the fact that the remoteness of the Emporia from Sicily would have seriously endangered his lines of communication. If there is a hidden grain of truth in Livy's statement 29, 25, 12, we must suppose with Zielinski and Scullard (185) that Scipio announced his intention of landing near the Emporia on purpose to mislead the Carthaginians, hoping that they would be informed of it and that their attention would be diverted from his real aim, the neighbourhood of Utica: considering Scipio's weak naval forces such a view seems not unreasonable. The fact that Scipio, when the *Promunturium Mercuri* (Cape Bon) was sighted, gave orders *dare vela et alium infra navibus accessum petere* (29, 27, 9), is not incompatible with his intention to land in the neighbourhood of Utica, on the understanding that we do not translate *infra* with *further south*, as Scullard and Klotz quite arbitrarily do, but with *further landwards*, that is to say in the Gulf of Carthage, an indication perfectly squaring with the neighbourhood of Utica. Such an interpretation of the word *infra* is in complete accordance with the part of Livy's account immediately following Scipio's order (*vento eodem ferebantur*): from a point five miles north of Cape Bon ships sailing before the northeaster really must reach the neighbourhood of Utica.

⁴²⁸) The fact that in 205 reinforcements had been sent to Mago and Hannibal, yielded bitter fruit now: either this ought to have been done much earlier or not at all, and certainly not in 205, when it was too late and the invasion of Africa close at hand, *v. s.* p. 150.

⁴²⁹) App. *Lib.* 9, 35, Liv. 29, 34, 2, Scullard 319 sq.

⁴³⁰) Liv. 29, 28 sq.; for the two cavalry engagements, which naturally have given rise to unjustified doublet-tracking, Scullard (189—194) may be compared.

⁴³¹) Liv. 29, 29, 3; 29, 35, 1. 5; Dio fr. 57, 69.

miserably.⁴³²⁾ The Romans laid siege to the town, land- and naval forces operating on two sides and an ample use being made of siege-engines, partly brought from Sicily by Scipio, partly sent to him afterwards by sea, partly manufactured on the spot; but Utica offered a stubborn resistance and, moreover, Hasdrubal had by this time collected considerable forces and Syphax had joined him with another strong army: they encamped near Utica and threatened Scipio. So the Roman general had left no other choice but to raise the siege for the present after trying in vain every possible means to take the town for 40 days:⁴³³⁾ winter was close at hand and he had to look out for suitable winter quarters, where he wouldn't be separated from his fleet, as before Utica. For this purpose he chose a spot, a few kilometers to the east of Utica, where he could unite his land- and naval forces. Here a headland projected S.W.—N.E. into the sea,⁴³⁴⁾ on the neck of which Scipio pitched his camp, from which the spot would derive its name (*Castra Cornelia*); on the north-side (to the east of Utica, west of the headland) the ships were hauled ashore, in the middle the legions were encamped, on the southside the cavalry.⁴³⁵⁾

In such a situation Scipio had to pass the winter and modern historiography is unanimous in judging his position to have been extremely precarious.⁴³⁶⁾ He was now confined to a rocky peninsula, where he was almost beleaguered by the armies of Hasdrubal and Syphax, who had pitched their camps in the neighbourhood and could probably dispose of superior numbers. He had gathered victuals by plundering the neighbouring country, but not in sufficient quantities to do without fresh supplies from Sicily, Sardinia and Italy; and now he was cut off from the African hinterland by the presence of the Punic armies, whereas his transmarine communications might be interrupted by the wintry weather alone, not to speak about Punic naval actions, which always remained possible.⁴³⁷⁾ It was a godsend to him that apparently neither at Rome nor on the Punic side his awkward position was completely realized.

⁴³²⁾ For the following events cf. Liv. 29, 28, 11; 34, 3; 35, 6 sq.

⁴³³⁾ Liv. 29, 35, 12 (the statements of Liv. 30, 3, 3, Pol. 14, 1, 2 are inaccurate), see Scullard 196, 1, Gsell III, 221, 7.

⁴³⁴⁾ By its deposits the Medjerda has altered the coast-line since Roman times.

⁴³⁵⁾ Liv. 29, 35, 13—14, Caes. B. C. 2, 24, Gsell III, 219—220, Scullard 196—197 and the first plan on p. 193; for a different view Kromayer III, 2, 583 sq. (Veith).

⁴³⁶⁾ De Sanctis III, 2, 524, Hallward C. A. H. VIII, 100, Gsell III, 221, Scullard 197.

⁴³⁷⁾ Pol. 14, 1, 2; Liv. 30, 3, 4.

Probably Scipio's consignments of booty and his undoubtedly somewhat exaggerated reports of the victories gained over the Punic cavalry had impressed on the senate a more favourable idea of the state of affairs than it really was; otherwise his adversaries in the Roman capital would certainly have profited by the situation to replace him by another commander, which — luckily for the Roman cause — did not happen.⁴³⁸) And the Carthaginians? Instead of pressing Scipio as hard as they could and immediately bringing the fleet into action against him, they were mad enough to enter during the winter into peace negotiations, which gave him an opportunity of wresting himself from the dangerous grasp of his adversaries and inflicting a heavy blow upon them. The important point on which all turns is here just as always the puzzling inactivity of the Punic navy. Of Bomilcar's armada of the years 212—211 Carthage had still some 100 sail left and already in 205 these ships had been fitted out during Laelius' raid, though of course too late to destroy his 30 vessels.⁴³⁹) So we might expect that the Punic navy should have been ready in 204 to give Scipio a warm reception: it might have intercepted and destroyed his enormous convoy which was only escorted by 40 men of war, and, *if* such an enterprise failed, it might at least have interrupted his communications with Sicily, Sardinia and Italy after his landing. But nothing of the kind: Scipio landed undisturbedly near Utica and during the year 204 convoys repeatedly reached him from Sicily and Sardinia, which carried grain, clothes and other necessities and took back the booty gathered by Scipio.⁴⁴⁰) It is possible that those convoys were escorted by men of war: regarding the Sardinian convoys it is practically certain, as they were led by Cn. Octavius, who, as we remarked before, had 40 warships at his disposal;⁴⁴¹) of the Sicilian we do not know it at all, but at any rate since Scipio's departure there were 20 men of war available for such purposes in the Sicilian waters.⁴⁴²) Be this as it may, an escort of 20 or even 40 men of war was certainly no match for the much stronger Punic fleet; so this transmarine import of necessities might have easily been stopped, the more so because the transports must now

⁴³⁸) Liv. 30, 1, 10.

⁴³⁹) V. s. p. 149 sq.

⁴⁴⁰) Dio fr. 57, 69; Liv. 29, 29, 3; 35, 1. 5. 8; 36, 1—3, cf. 30, 3, 2 (Spain).

⁴⁴¹) Liv. 29, 13, 5, v. s. p. 154 sq.

⁴⁴²) Scipio's own 40 ships were certainly not employed for convoying services: they remained in Africa, cf. *i. a.* Liv. 29, 35, 5. 7. 14.

land at a fixed point that was known at Carthage (Scipio's camp), which naturally had not been the case at the time of his own landing. We may seek the explanation for this complete failure of the Punic navy in lack of personnel, which always hampered Punic naval activity more than lack of material; Appian's communication (*Lib.* 9, 35) that Hasdrubal bought 5000 slaves to serve in the navy as oarsmen, indeed points in this direction. However, this is no real explanation at all. For in 203 the Punic fleet *was* mobilized: naturally this happened much too late again, just after Scipio had got back his liberty of action by destroying a great part of the Punic land forces and could now try again to feed the war from the country itself,⁴⁴³) but it happened anyhow; now then, the crews Carthage succeeded in manning the fleet with in 203 in spite of very difficult circumstances, could certainly have been furnished in 204 as well. So after all we always run against that fatal tendency to exert oneself to the utmost of one's power only when it is too late, against that remarkable paralysis of the Punic morale which manifested itself again and again during the whole of this war, especially on sea, and which after the short, fruitless revival of 212 degenerated into a complete moral collapse. The oppressing memory of the first Punic war, the accurate notion that, if all came to all, Rome was always able to launch more ships than Carthage herself, the Roman armada of 208 potentially still present, which, though demobilized for the greater part, continued to fulfil the task of a fleet in being, and other factors of the same nature certainly worsened this phenomenon; but they did not *cause* it, because after all it was rooted in popular character and cannot be wholly reduced to external factors: the lack of devotion and self-denial of the populace, the lazy tendency to say with a shrug of the shoulders: "it's no use", to let things take their course and to display at last (and of course too late) an unreasoning, feverish energy that could have been displayed at the right moment as well, the wavering faint-heartedness of government and military commanders are the symptoms of it. If the Romans had had to face a sea-faring nation like the English, possessing the same bulldog-qualities in naval affairs which they possessed themselves on land, they would have lost this war or at least Scipio's great offensive that rested upon such an extremely weak maritime base would have ended in a catastrophe in its very first year.

⁴⁴³) See for instance Pol. 14, 6, 7.

But, though his line of conduct displays a certain youthful wantonness and a typical landlubbers' mentality, it is only fair to point out that the result proves how accurately he had estimated his adversaries.

The year 203 brings at last a modest increase of the Roman naval effective: it was raised to 160 sail, 40 being on service with Scipio in Africa, 40 near Sicily, 40 in the Sardinian waters, 40 protecting the Italian coasts.⁴⁴⁴) Scipio's African squadron was not reinforced. In Sicily 20 ships had been left at the time of Scipio's departure in 204, 40 out of a number of 60 going with him to Africa; but Livy's account of the Sicilian arrangements of 203 is not consistent with this fact: he asserts that in order to raise the Sicilian squadron to 40 sail 13 extra ships were sent from Italy to Sicily, while the old vessels in Sicily were repaired.⁴⁴⁵) This statement presupposes that since Scipio's departure there had been 27 ships in the Sicilian waters instead of 20. Whether this is to be regarded as a simple mistake or we have to presume that besides the 20 ships left by Scipio 7 of the 45 old ships laid up at Lilybaeum since 214⁴⁴⁶) had been put in commission again, I can't make out; the only thing we know for a certainty is that really in 203 the Sicilian squadron was raised to 40 ships, this number being corroborated by Livy himself in a later passage.⁴⁴⁷) In the Sardinian waters nothing was altered: here the propraetor Cn. Octavius retained the command of his 40 sail *ad tuendam Sardiniae oram*.⁴⁴⁸) Finally a squadron of 40 ships was formed for the Italian coast defence,⁴⁴⁹) a revival of the coastal squadron numbering 50 ships that had been established in 208, but had scarcely seen service; naturally these ships came from the large number of vessels laid up in Italy since 206, just as the ships sent to Sicily. So

⁴⁴⁴) Liv. 30, 2, 1—7.

⁴⁴⁵) Liv. 30, 2, 1—2; the *tredecim novae naves* were of course not newly built, but new for Sicily: they formed part of the numerous ships put out of commission in Italy since 206.

⁴⁴⁶) V. s. p. 78.

⁴⁴⁷) 30, 27, 9.

⁴⁴⁸) Liv. 30, 2, 4; that Octavius should have been *praetor prioris anni*, is a slip: he had commanded as praetor in Sardinia in 205, as propraetor in 204, Liv. 28, 38, 11. 13; 28, 46, 14; 29, 13, 5; 29, 36, 1.

⁴⁴⁹) Liv. 30, 2, 5.

the total effective was increased from 100 in 204 (40 in Sardinia, 20 in Sicily, 40 in Africa) to 160,⁴⁵⁰) the Sicilian squadron being raised from 20 to 40 sail and an Italian coastal squadron of 40 sail being newly established: a very modest exertion, considering that not one new ship had to be built and that even after this increase of the real effective still 120 ships laid up since 206 were available in case of need, the Roman fleet having numbered as much as 280 sail in 208. Concerning the new Italian coastal squadron we may well say: better late than never! If we bear in mind that in 205 Mago had quietly landed in Liguria and that an only modestly escorted convoy had reached him there from Carthage, because the Roman government had shelved the coastal squadron of 208 long ago, we are completely at a loss how to explain such a miserable limping behind the facts and ask ourselves in vain, why such a measure for protecting the Italian coasts was only taken in 203 and not already in 205 or 204. The solution of this riddle is probably to be sought in the fact, that Scipio had informed the senate that during the winter of 204—203 the Punic fleet was at last being fitted out towards the next spring,⁴⁵¹) and that this news shook up the senate, because on account of it they now feared a diverting offensive against Sicily or Italy in order to force Scipio to withdraw from Africa (as is really suggested by Livy)⁴⁵²) or at least renewed attempts to provide Mago and Hannibal with reinforcements; hence the founding of an Italian coastal squadron and the redoubling of the Sicilian. That, however, in reply to this news the senate did not first of all begin with reinforcing Scipio's weak squadron in Africa, is nothing short of marvellous: even a child could foresee that the mobilization of the Punic fleet would be directed first of all against

⁴⁵⁰) Liv. 30, 2, 7. Whether a number of the 30 ships that had been stationed in the Spanish waters from 208 to 206 and 10 of which had been brought by Scipio to Rome in the autumn of 206 (*v. s. p.* 143), remained on service in Spain, I do not know. From Livy's total of 160 sail for 203 we might feel inclined to conclude that they were all put out of commission (though this is no conclusive proof, as Livy in calculating the total effective for 214 (24, 11) leaves completely out of account the Spanish squadron of 35 sail, which undoubtedly was present there at that moment, *v. s. p.* 75); on the other hand it is natural to suppose, that the convoys which reached Scipio from Spain (Liv. 30, 3, 2) were escorted by Spanish warships. However, taken into account Roman maritime indolence, it is far from impossible that these convoys were sent to Africa unescorted, *v. s. p.* 160. *Non liquet.*

⁴⁵¹) Pol. 14, 1, 2; 2, 1; 6, 7; 10, 9; Liv. 30, 3, 4.

⁴⁵²) 30, 2, 1; 2, 5.

this, as the course of events really did prove afterwards, and that the success of Scipio's campaign would be seriously endangered by it. But the Romans didn't think of reinforcing Scipio's poor squadron of 40 sail, though 120 ships were available for such a purpose: ⁴⁵³) only after it had escaped from destruction with the skin of its teeth, they would come limping behind this fact again by sending extra ships to Africa... when they were needed there no longer! For these queer symptoms, which we stated again and again in discussing naval warfare of the preceding years, there is but one reasonable explanation to be found. Rome was spent with fatigue and this exhaustion naturally revealed itself in its most serious form in the sphere that in spite of all achievements remained foreign and offensive to the Roman land-lubber: the sphere of naval warfare.

(Africa) In the early spring of 203 Scipio succeeded in wresting himself from the awkward position he found himself in at *Castra Cornelia*: taking advantage of the peace negotiations opened during the winter, he surprised by night and set on fire the neighbouring camps of Hasdrubal and Syphax, and destroyed the bulk of their forces; a little later he defeated them again in the African interior on the so-called *Campi Magni*, where, supposedly out of Scipio's reach, they were occupied with recruiting troops; thereupon Scipio himself marching back to the coast, Laelius and Masinissa definitively broke Syphax' resistance, taking him prisoner himself, so that henceforth Carthage must all but do without Numidian support. It stands to reason, that these events cannot be discussed here in detail, because they belong entirely to warfare on land; ⁴⁵⁴) we must limit ourselves to the statement that the tarrying and bungling of the Carthaginians at sea now yielded bitter fruit to them. Not only had they suffered Scipio in 204 to land quietly and not stirred a finger during the whole year to intercept the convoys sent to him, but they had also spent the whole winter of 204—203 in fitting out the fleet ⁴⁵⁵) instead of profiting by Scipio's awkward position at *Castra Cornelia* to press

⁴⁵³) Even the measures that *were* taken (in Italy and Sicily) were insufficient: presently Hannibal will be able to evacuate Italy undisturbedly.

⁴⁵⁴) See Gsell III, 222 sq. and 236 sq., Scullard 198 sq., 216 sq., Kromayer III, 2, 586 sq. (Veith).

⁴⁵⁵) Pol. 14, 1, 2; 6, 7; 10, 9; Liv. 30, 3, 4. Once for all I call attention to the fact, that Livy's account of the African campaign has been derived directly from Polybius, see for instance Zielinski 83 sq.

him as hard as they could on land and sea: so again the right moment had been allowed to slip by and the adversary had been afforded an opportunity of disentangling himself in time on land. And when at last in the spring of 203 a naval operation was launched against the Roman squadron before Utica,⁴⁵⁶) the right moment was missed again. If this attack had been made while Scipio with a great part of his land forces was far away on the Campi Magni,⁴⁵⁷) the Roman fleet would probably have been completely destroyed without a blow, as it numbered only 40 sail and, moreover, had been wholly adapted to the war on land (the siege of Utica).⁴⁵⁸) But now the Punic fleet put to sea just at the moment, when Scipio on his way back from the Campi Magni reached the coast again at Tunes, so that he perceived the movement of the Carthaginian fleet and managed to reach Utica by land in time to take measures for the protection of the Roman squadron.⁴⁵⁹) We must certainly not seek the explanation of this miserable series of retardations in difficulties of recruitment, caused by the fact that since the surprising attack upon Hasdrubal's and Syphax' encampments Carthage had been cut off from the interior: during the year 204 and the whole winter of 204—203, while Scipio was being blockaded in Castra Cornelia, Carthage had had ample opportunity of recruiting at discretion; nor are we to suppose that the Carthaginians had to build new ships and that the execution of this building project caused a considerable loss of time: at least a hundred ships of Bomilcar's armada were still available, which needed at the most some repairs.⁴⁶⁰) Besides, some more lost chances would be added still

⁴⁵⁶) In the early spring Scipio had laid siege to Utica again, Pol. 14, 2, 1—4, Liv. 30, 4, 10—12; Pol. 14, 7, 1, Liv. 30, 8, 1.

⁴⁵⁷) De Sanctis III, 2, 533.

⁴⁵⁸) According to the land-lubbers' system followed before in Spain Scipio had already in 204 employed the naval personnel for warfare on land against Utica (Liv. 29, 35, 7); in 203 too the fleet had been wholly adapted to the siege and made unfit for a naval battle by burdening it with siege-engines, Pol. 14, 2, 1—4; 10, 9; Liv. 30, 4, 10—12; 10, 3.

⁴⁵⁹) Liv. 30, 9, 10 sq., Pol. 14, 10, 2 sq.

⁴⁶⁰) The number of 100 ships, given by Appian (*Lib.* 24, 100, a chapter that is worthless for the rest, as it transforms the painful defeat of the Roman fleet into a victory), is to be regarded as authentic, *v. i.* footnote 462. I call attention to the fact, that Polybius and Livy nowhere mention newly built ships, but only speak of the Punic fleet being fitted out, which is misunderstood by Holleaux 244, 2: the only

to the already considerable number: when Scipio perceived the Punic fleet from Tunes, it was already on its way to Utica;⁴⁶¹) the distance by sea between Carthage and Utica amounts to some 40 kilometers, the distance by land between Tunes and Utica to some 30; consequently, if the Punic fleet had made haste, it would have found the Roman squadron in complete disorder, because Scipio's extensive measures to protect it required considerable time, and might have crushed it, the Carthaginians being superior in numbers as well as in nautical skill.⁴⁶²) But on the contrary — the usual symptoms of paralysis display themselves here and they are expressly mentioned by Livy this time⁴⁶³) — the Punic fleet crept forward at a snail's pace, did not appear before Utica on that day and spent the night in the harbour of Rusucmon, near Porto Farina, so that Scipio got ample opportunity to complete his protecting measures. If we bear in mind that nevertheless it threw the Romans into serious difficulties on the next day and inflicted considerable losses upon them, we need not ask, what would have become of the Roman fleet, if the Carthaginians had engaged at once.⁴⁶⁴)

Scipio's measures to protect his warfleet are so extraordinarily characteristic for his truly Roman land-lubbers' mentality, that it is worth while to describe here those measures in a few words as well as the seafight that followed them. We remarked before, that the Roman squadron was not only far too weak (40 sail!) to face the Punic fleet in a pitched battle, but that, moreover, Scipio had made it completely unseaworthy by adapting it to the siege of Utica (by burdening the ships with siege-engines etc.).⁴⁶⁵) From this state of things he now drew the only logical and possible, but nevertheless somewhat ridiculous conclusion: that his fleet of transports must protect his helpless warfleet! The men of war remained near shore, but a large number of transports were

passage where *ship-building* is mentioned in this connexion, is App. *Lib.* 17, 69, which is however outweighed by the testimony of Polybius (14, 1, 2; 10, 9; Liv. 30, 3, 4); if there is a hidden grain of truth in it, it is this, that a number of ships was repaired.

⁴⁶¹) Liv. 30, 10, 1, Pol. 14, 10, 6—7.

⁴⁶²) Liv. 30, 10, 8.21, see Gsell III, 234, 2. According to App. *Lib.* 24, 100 sq. the number of Punic ships amounted to 100, v. s. p. 108 sq.; for their nautical superiority cf. Liv. 30, 10, 3.9.

⁴⁶³) 30, 10, 9: *perculsi terrestribus cladibus atque inde ne mari quidem, ubi ipsi plus poterant, satis fidentes e.q. s.*

⁴⁶⁴) Liv. 30, 10, 8.21.

⁴⁶⁵) V. s. footnote 458.

drawn up three or four deep before them on the sea side, as a kind of wall against the hostile fleet.⁴⁶⁶) These transports were securely lashed together, the intervals left for the light craft to make sorties against the Punic fleet being covered with planks, so that one line of transports formed as it were one large deck, upon which the Roman soldiers could move freely and easily (masts and yards had of course been taken down and employed in fastening the transports to each other). A number of 1000 picked soldiers were intended for the defence of this wall of ships and large supplies of missiles were piled up on the decks, for use against the enemy. The Punic fleet, which, as we remarked above, had remained inactive on the first day and spent the night in the port of Rusucmon, drew up into battle array next morning and awaited the Roman fleet in open water; but, as it naturally did not put out against them, they at last made an attack upon the transports, which, as Livy rightly remarks (30, 10, 12), scarcely had anything in common with a naval battle.⁴⁶⁷) The light craft intended to use the intervals between the transports for sallying out against the hostile fleet, proved a failure, because they were easily sunk by the Punic men of war and, moreover, hindered the Roman soldiers on board the transports from throwing missiles for fear of hitting their own men. On the other hand the heavy transports were of course higher than the nimble Punic men of war, so that, as long as the contest remained limited to the throwing of missiles, the Carthaginians were in an unfavourable position. However, this changed, when they began to operate with so-called *harpagones* (grapnels on iron poles,⁴⁶⁸) which in their turn were fastened with chains to the ship):⁴⁶⁹) after getting hold of the transports by means of these, they ordered the rowers to back water and in this way they succeeded in breaking up the first line of transports and finally returned with some 60 prizes (all of them transports)

⁴⁶⁶) Pol. 14, 10, 9 sq., Liv. 30, 10, 4 sq.

⁴⁶⁷) Polybius' account of the battle is not extant; but Liv. 30, 10, 7 sq. has directly been derived from it, see *i.a.* Zielinski 101.

⁴⁶⁸) The poles cannot have been made of wood, because Livy (30, 10, 17) says positively, that they couldn't be chopped off.

⁴⁶⁹) Besides these *harpagones* (grapnels on a pole with chain), for which may be compared (besides Liv. 30, 10, 16) Caes. B. C. 1, 57, 2, Plin. N. H. 7, 209, so called *ferreae manus* (grapnels with chain) were often made use of, cf. Liv. 24, 34, 10; 26, 39, 12; 36, 44, 8, Caes. and Plin. l. l.; that, however, the terms *harpago* and *ferrea manus* were often interchanged, appears from passages like Curt. 4, 2, 12, Zon. 9, 12, 10 (the latter in comparison with Liv. 30, 10, 16). See the fourth chapter.

to Carthage, a modest success, but proving anyhow, how easily the Carthaginians might have destroyed the entire Roman fleet, if they had attacked it in good time the day before.⁴⁷⁰⁾

About the strange inactivity of the Punic navy at the time of Scipio's crossing to Africa, about its failing to take action afterwards against the convoys sent to him⁴⁷¹⁾ and finally about the far-going slackness of its action against the Roman fleet before Utica I have said my say before. This failure is the more curious, because Carthage found in Scipio such a weak opponent in the naval sphere: he had not only brought far too small a squadron to Africa and adapted it wholly to warfare on land, but, moreover, he had marched in the spring of 203 to the Campi Magni without having taken sufficient measures for the protection of his fleet before Utica.⁴⁷²⁾ It was by the merest chance that he saw from Tunes the Punic fleet leave Carthage for its expedition to Utica, and only thanks to its slackness he succeeded in reaching Utica by land in good time to take as yet the neglected protecting measures. And how distressingly defective and landlubberish those measures were in themselves, will have become sufficiently clear, I suppose, from the preceding pages. Scipio scarcely owed the preservation of his fleet to his own insight and energy, but almost wholly to an inscrutable providence and to the unaccountable lameness of his adversaries, though it is only fair to acknowledge that the latter had partly been caused by his own strenuous action on land and... that he had reckoned with it.

Scipio remained for some time before Utica, which, however, for the present he no more succeeded in conquering than the vainly stormed Hippo Diarrhytus (Bizerte);⁴⁷³⁾ his two coastal bases remained Castra

⁴⁷⁰⁾ For this episode are to be compared besides the good tradition of Polybius (14, 9—10; Liv. 30, 9—10) the short account of Zon. 9, 12, 9—10 and App. *Lib.* 24, 100, where the Roman defeat is transformed into a victory; 30, 127 is a doublet of 24, 100 sq., see *i. a.* Zielinski 61, de Sanctis III, 2, 534, Scullard 215, 2. For Scipio's tactics Graefe, Hermes 57, 447 sq.

⁴⁷¹⁾ According to Livy the fleet had originally been mobilized for the purpose of intercepting those convoys (30, 3, 4; 9, 6); but nothing came of it.

⁴⁷²⁾ Laelius for instance, who had won his spurs as an admiral, accompanied Scipio to the Campi Magni instead of being left behind as commander of the fleet, and he returned even later than Scipio, as he and Masinissa had first to break Syphax' resistance.

⁴⁷³⁾ App. *Lib.* 30, 128; see for the following events Scullard 215 sq., Gsell III, 235 sq.

Cornelia and Tunes, where we shall find him henceforth alternately.⁴⁷⁴) The Carthaginians on the other hand, who after their defeat on the Campi Magni (April 203)⁴⁷⁵) had already decided to recall Hannibal,⁴⁷⁶) because they despaired of the situation, were now somewhat encouraged again by the modest success of their fleet (May 203); but... their joy had but a short life, the news soon (June 203) reaching Carthage of the final defeat of Syphax, who had been beaten and taken prisoner by Laelius and Masinissa.⁴⁷⁷) To be sure, Scipio had not succeeded in taking Utica; but he possessed two fortified bases on the coast and commanded the open field, so that he could cut off Carthage from her hinterland and deprive her of supplies at discretion. Hannibal (and Mago too) had been called back, but had naturally not yet returned. This awkward situation was now worsened still by Syphax' fall, which implied that Carthage henceforth could scarcely count on military assistance from Numidia and was thrown upon the fleet and the garrison of the town. That in such distressing circumstances the Carthaginians felt inclined to open negotiations for peace, is only natural; and such a disposition revealed itself not only among the landed aristocracy, who had always opposed the *Barcini* and now saw their estates ravaged by Scipio, but also among the war party, which, though not sincerely aiming at peace, welcomed negotiations as a means of keeping matters going till Hannibal's return.⁴⁷⁸) As for Scipio, he was not averse to peace either: after his failure before Utica he naturally could not even think of an assault upon the much stronger Carthage, nor could the powerful city be forced into surrender by means of a siege, as long as the Punic fleet was considerably stronger than his own; moreover, during this siege he must be prepared for Hannibal's return and for a final round with this giant, which, in spite of his self-confidence, he naturally wanted to avoid if he could. So he proposed the following terms to the Punic envoys who had come to Tunes to ask him for peace: the surrender of all prisoners and deserters, the evacuation of Italy and Gaul and of all islands lying between Italy and

⁴⁷⁴) The Punic peace embassy met him at Tunes (Liv. 30, 16), but afterwards, at the time of the violation of the truce by Carthage, we find him at *Castra Cornelia* (Pol 15, 2).

⁴⁷⁵) For the chronology of this year see Scullard 326 sq.

⁴⁷⁶) Pol. 14, 9, 6 sq.; 10, 1; Liv. 30, 9, 3 sq.

⁴⁷⁷) V. s. p. 164.

⁴⁷⁸) See the remarks of Scullard 219 sq., which I made grateful use of.

Africa, the renouncing of Spain, the surrender of the whole warfleet, except 20 (according to Appian 30) ships, an indemnity of 5000 talents; finally, Carthage should support the Roman troops in Africa till the treaty was definitely made, by furnishing double pay for the soldiers and large quantities of barley and wheat. These terms prove that Scipio did not aim at destroying Carthage, but at limiting her to Africa and securing for Rome the supremacy in the western basin of the Mediterranean. Carthage having accepted these conditions, she concluded an armistice with Scipio and sent an embassy to Rome in order to obtain official ratification.⁴⁷⁹) At the time of the departure of this embassy for Rome (probably late in the summer of 203) Hannibal and Mago had not yet evacuated Italy; for this evacuation was one of the terms to be ratified at Rome. But shortly afterwards (probably in the autumn of 203) Mago's forces as well as Hannibal with a considerable part of his army returned to Africa. This fact in connexion with the dragging on of the peace negotiations at Rome caused the hostilities to be opened again; and as, besides, it throws light upon the limitations of Roman maritime supremacy, it deserves an ample discussion here.

(Italy) That Hannibal needed half a year for the evacuation of Italy, follows not only from the chronology of the year 203 (he was called back after the battle of the Campi Magni, that is to say in the spring, and he returned to Africa after the departure of the Punic embassy for Rome, which means in the autumn, see Scullard 327), but also from practical considerations: he transported the main body of his army from Italy to Africa⁴⁸⁰) and needed a fleet of transports for this purpose, which he could not create from the void. So the account of Livy,⁴⁸¹) who makes him put to sea immediately after the arrival of the embassy sent to recall him and asserts that he had prepared a fleet of transports beforehand, because he foresaw his recall, must yield to the far more probable version of Appian,⁴⁸²) who informs us that Hannibal after receiving the order to return home had transports built in Italy, which naturally required a considerable time, and that Carthage sent the admiral Hasdrubal to him

⁴⁷⁹) Liv. 30, 16; Pol. 15, 1, 6—8; 7, 8; 8, 7; App. *Lib.* 32, 135; Scullard 221, 1.

⁴⁸⁰) Liv. 30, 20, 6; we know this for a certainty, because those troops formed the élite of Hannibal's army in the battle of Zama.

⁴⁸¹) 30, 19, 12; 20.

⁴⁸²) *Lib.* 31, 129; *Ann.* 58, 243.

with ships: this last event must be dated after the seafight near Utica, which probably took place at the end of May,⁴⁸³⁾ because before that victory the home fleet could hardly be divided.⁴⁸⁴⁾ In short, I believe that Hannibal evacuated Italy in the autumn of 203; he crossed undisturbedly to Africa and landed far from Carthage and from Scipio's positions at Leptis Minor (Liv. 30, 25, 11), whence he marched to the neighbouring Hadrumetum. There he passed the winter with his forces, waiting for the truce to be broken and preparing for the final round (Pol. 15, 5, 3; Liv. 30, 29, 1; App. Lib. 33, 139). About the same time Mago's troops returned to Africa.⁴⁸⁵⁾ In the Po valley he had fought a battle against Roman forces and had been badly wounded himself; on returning to his Ligurian basis Savo he found there the Carthaginian embassy that delivered to him the message of recall.⁴⁸⁶⁾ A sufficient number of transports will have been available at Savo, his troops having been originally transported to Liguria by sea.⁴⁸⁷⁾ So he could put to sea without much delay; on the voyage he died of his wound and some of his ships, having strayed from the main body of transports, were captured by the Sardinian squadron of the Romans, but the bulk of the convoy landed safely in Africa: we know this for a certainty, because Mago's troops afterwards took part in the battle of Zama.⁴⁸⁸⁾

Now the point at issue is: why did the Romans not even make an attempt to destroy those convoys on sea before they reached Africa? It

⁴⁸³⁾ Scullard 326.

⁴⁸⁴⁾ Probably 40 warships at the outside were taken by Hasdrubal to Italy, because the Punic fleet numbered some 100 sail and naturally even after the fight of Utica Punic superiority in the African waters had to be maintained at any cost against Scipio's squadron; however, it seems possible that Hasdrubal took also a number of transports to Italy, with a view to Hannibal's evacuation.

⁴⁸⁵⁾ Liv. 30, 19.

⁴⁸⁶⁾ That the message of recall was already sent to Mago in the spring of 203, just as it had been sent to Hannibal, has not been handed down; according to Livy (30, 19) Mago's departure followed immediately after the arrival of the Punic envoys. But it seems not impossible to me, that Livy compressed the events chronologically, just as in the case of Hannibal's departure, in other words that the envoys had not arrived at the Ligurian coast *paucis ante diebus*, but long before, and had awaited there Mago's return from the Po valley. Be this as it may, the *departure* of Hannibal and Mago must have taken place at about the same time (autumn 203).

⁴⁸⁷⁾ For escorting services he could dispose of 10 warships, *v. s.* p. 151, 399.

⁴⁸⁸⁾ Pol. 15, 11, 1; Liv. 30, 33, 5; App. Lib. 40, 169.

would indeed have been worth while to make such an attempt, because the senate could easily foresee that Hannibal's return home would give rise to a reopening of the hostilities, with a fair chance (considering Hannibal's strategic genius) of Scipio being destroyed, army and all. No doubt, even in this case Rome would have won the war, but it would have been possible for Carthage to make more favourable terms; for instance she could have been forced no longer to surrender her fleet nor to pay an indemnity nor to limit her power in Africa, not to speak about the loss of prestige involved. Was it sensible to take such risks? Oughtn't Hannibal to have been prevented at any price from reaching Africa after the evacuation of Italy? ⁴⁸⁹) And such an enterprise lay certainly within the range of possibilities: Rome possessed the naval resources for it. If the Sardinian squadron of 40 ships, which was scarcely needed any longer in the Sardinian waters, had been stationed at Genoa, which had been evacuated by Mago and was now in Roman hands again, ⁴⁹⁰) it could have watched Mago's retreat from Savo within striking-distance and the odds would have been of ten to one that Mago's transports escorted by 10 men of war at the outside would have been intercepted and destroyed by it at sea. The same holds good with regard to Hannibal: apart from the numerous ships laid up in Italy the Italian and Sicilian squadrons numbering 80 sail together were immediately available. If these had been stationed at Locri, it would have been extremely difficult for Hannibal to evade the Roman fleet cruising there; for only a small part of the southern coast of Italy was in his hands, so that he could scarcely conceal his starting point, and, if intercepted and forced to engage, he would have been overwhelmingly outnumbered (no more than 40 men of war against 80). Certainly nobody will contradict Kahrstedt's assertion (556) that it is difficult to intercept ships on the open sea: even during the late war this still appeared to be true, in spite of the sway of the airforce. But even one brief glance at a map of the Mediterranean may suffice to state, that in Hannibal's case there was no question of crossing the open sea, but almost of hugging the coast: ⁴⁹¹) if the Roman squadrons had been

⁴⁸⁹) That the senate should have wanted to prevent Hannibal from leaving Italy (Liv. 30, 21, 1), seems to be out of the question; but the Romans might have attacked him at sea after the evacuation.

⁴⁹⁰) Liv. 30, 1, 10.

⁴⁹¹) Sailing from the southern coast of Italy in the direction of Hadrumetum we find our way barred by Point Pachynum and, moreover, must pass by Malta.

at their post, Hannibal would have had to make a very long detour through the open to evade them; and this would have been extremely precarious in the autumn threatening with storms. *Were* the Roman squadrons at their post and did Hannibal really venture on such a daring enterprise? I fear not. That the Roman government entertained certain thoughts in this direction, appears afterwards from the fact, that in 202 suddenly (and much too late) ships were sent to Africa (for the purpose of reinforcing Scipio's squadron) which were no longer needed in the Italian waters after Hannibal's and Mago's departure and which consequently in 203 had still been reserved for an action against those Punic generals. However, there is no trace of an indication left in the ancient sources, that even an attempt should have been made to put those thoughts into practice. Why not? It is difficult to give the answer. That Hannibal and Mago should have crossed to Africa under protection of the armistice, is of course out of the question: the armistice was valid only for the African theatre of war.⁴⁹²⁾ On the other hand the following solution of the problem deserves at least to be considered: according to Dio 57, 74 (and this tradition seems to be trustworthy, because it is in accordance with Roman custom) the senate refused to enter into negotiations with the Punic peace embassy as long as there were Punic armies in Italy. So we might perhaps feel inclined to suppose that, this condition being fulfilled immediately,⁴⁹³⁾ the Roman government suffered Hannibal and Mago to withdraw undisturbedly for fairness' sake, because by departing they obeyed the senate's demand, the fulfilling of which must pave the way for negotiations. However, letting alone the circumstance that in a general way considerations of fairness and good sport were quite foreign to the Roman state of mind, such a view must unavoidably wreck on the prosaic fact that the Romans did capture some of Mago's transports, which had strayed from the main body (Liv. 30, 19, 5, *v. s.*). No, this remarkable inactivity of the Roman navy at such a decisive moment can only be regarded as a symptom of the exhaustion Rome gave repeatedly proof of during the last years of the second Punic war and which revealed itself especially in the sphere of naval warfare.

⁴⁹²⁾ Kahrstedt 556.

⁴⁹³⁾ Late in the summer the Punic embassy departed for Rome, in the autumn Hannibal and Mago evacuated Italy.

203/202 (Africa) It stands to reason that Hannibal's return caused the war party at Carthage to pluck up its courage again: from the beginning they had only accepted the negotiations for peace and the armistice in order to keep things going and, moreover, the fact that the negotiations at Rome dragged on till the spring of 202 for reasons not clearly palpable to us,⁴⁹⁴) afforded them the opportunity of restoring their influence; a serious blunder of the Roman government. To make matters worse the revictualling of the city crowded with fugitives was insufficient during the winter,⁴⁹⁵) so that the populace was all but reduced to starvation. So the slightest incident might prove sufficient to make war break out again and such an occasion offered early in the spring of 202. At that time two convoys with victuals intended for Scipio crossed to Africa. One of them, numbering 100 transports and escorted by 20 men of war, had been sent by the praetor Lentulus from Sardinia and reached its destination safely. But the other convoy, numbering 200 transports with 30 men of war and crossing from Sicily under command of Cn. Octavius, was surprised under the African coast by a westerly gale.⁴⁹⁶) The men of war being rowing-boats, Octavius succeeded in weathering the storm with them and in reaching safely, head to wind, the Promunturium Apollinis; but the transports, being sailing-vessels, were driven back and embayed on the lee shore: part of them were carried to the island of Aegimurus, others to the Aquae Calidae, on the west of the peninsula of Cape Bon opposite the city itself. All this could be seen from Carthage. The masses suffering privations forced the hand of the government, in the bosom of

⁴⁹⁴) See for the strife of rival parties in the Roman senate of those days Scullard 221 sq.; a discussion of these things is out of place here.

⁴⁹⁵) The principal causes of this phenomenon are to be found in the fact, that Scipio had laid waste the country during the war, and in the obligation the Punic government was under to furnish large quantities of grain for the Roman army during the armistice.

⁴⁹⁶) The incident took place before the beginning of the proper navigation season: during the winter westerly and northwesterly winds, which often are violent, prevail in those waters, see Kromayer III, 2, 508—509 (Veith). Octavius' 30 men of war formed part of the Sardinian squadron commanded by him: apparently 10 ships had been left in the Sardinian waters. To Lentulus had probably been given 20 ships of the Italian squadron, which since Hannibal's and Mago's departure were needed no longer in the Italian waters. For the same reason Octavius remained in Africa with his ships, the first reinforcement Scipio's squadron received. *V.i.*

which, moreover, the war party was gaining the upper hand again since Hannibal's return: the admiral Hasdrubal was sent with 50 men of war to capture the Roman transports.⁴⁹⁷) Of course this deed meant a flagrant violation of the truce; but nevertheless Scipio wanted to make a final attempt at preventing the war from flaring up again, especially because news had just reached him from Rome that the peace had been ratified.⁴⁹⁸) So he sent an embassy to Carthage to inform them of the ratification of the treaty at Rome and to demand redress. However, the envoys were not only dismissed without a satisfactory reply, but, to make matters worse, the Roman quinquereme, which carried them back to Castra Cornelia, was suddenly attacked on the way by some warships of Hasdrubal, who at that moment was lying with his fleet near Utica: the envoys scarcely escaped from death. By this treacherous act peace had been broken irrevocably and a final decisive round between Scipio and Hannibal had become unavoidable.⁴⁹⁹)

This decisive round was fought on land and therefore lies outside the subject of this treatise; it may be sufficient to state, that in the battle of Zama Scipio at last succeeded, though not without great pains, in triumphing over Hannibal, chiefly by reason of his superiority in horse,⁵⁰⁰) and that this victory, gained probably in October 202,⁵⁰¹) decided the war definitely in favour of Rome.

⁴⁹⁷) Liv. 30, 24, 5 sq. (= Pol.); Pol. 15, 1, 1; Diod. 27, 11; App. *Lib.* 34, 143.

⁴⁹⁸) Pol. 15, 1, 3—4.

⁴⁹⁹) Pol. 15, 1—2; Liv. 30, 25, 1—10; Diod. 27, 12; App. *Lib.* 34, 144—146; Dio 57, 75. A papyrus-fragment containing some mutilated passages from the work of a Greek historian of the second century b. C. concerning the peace-negotiations of 203/202 has recently come to light and has been commented upon by Wilhelm Hoffmann (*Hermes* 76 (1941), p. 270—282). The anonymus is silent upon the capture of the Roman transports and the treacherous assault made upon the Roman envoys, and, what is more, his version of the story seems to leave no room for these Carthaginian transgressions. Hoffmann tries to prove that this newly-discovered account of the events of 203/202 is preferable to Polybius, and perhaps he is right. But I do not feel so sure about it as to adopt this version of the story unreservedly instead of Polybius' account.

⁵⁰⁰) Thanks to Syphax' fall and the restoration of Masinissa's power Scipio instead of Carthage had now at his disposal the bulk of the excellent Numidian cavalry.

⁵⁰¹) The date of the battle of Zama is not certain, but the arguments for dating it in October 202 are strong, see Scullard 327 sq., Carcopino 62, 2. The fact that in

So it goes without saying that my discussion of the second Punic war as a naval contest is almost at an end; but... we have to face the striking fact that precisely in the year 202 the Roman naval effective was increased rather considerably! The year 203 with its 160 ships (40 Africa, 40 Sicily, 40 Sardinia, 40 Italy) had already substantially surpassed the preceding years, but in 202 200 men of war at the least were in commission and 120 of them in the African waters, where up to this time Scipio had managed with only 40 in far more dangerous circumstances! Such a remarkable phenomenon deserves a detailed discussion and a serious attempt at explanation.

The 30 warships brought by Octavius to Africa in the early spring of 202 remained there with their commander, under the auspices of Scipio.⁵⁰²) Consequently, Octavius' Sardinian squadron having numbered 40 sail, there remained now 10 in the Sardinian waters,⁵⁰³) after Mago's and Hannibal's withdrawal a quite sufficient number; for the same reason the Sicilian squadron was now reduced from 40 to 20 sail: half its effective was ordered back to Rome.⁵⁰⁴) So Scipio could dispose of 70 men of war at the moment of the reopening of the war, but in spite of this considerable reinforcement he was still outnumbered by the Punic fleet numbering 100 sail at the least. Consequently the tradition handed down by Livy that in March 202 the senate decided to send the consul Ti. Claudius Nero with 50 ships to Africa,⁵⁰⁵) is in perfect accordance with expectation; for by means of such a measure the African squadron would — better late than never! — be increased to a number of 120 sail and

the autumn of 202 an Aetolian embassy, sent to invoke Roman protection against Macedonian aggression and to ask for a renewal of the old alliance, was rudely rejected by the senate, must undoubtedly be viewed in the light of the nervous suspense Rome was in on the eve of the decisive battle in Africa: at that moment the Romans couldn't give attention to the East, however conducive this might have been to the ends of Roman politics, cf. *App. Mac.* 4, 2; *Liv.* 31, 1, 9; 31, 29, 4; *Holleaux* 293 sq., *Carcopino* 62. On the other hand the assertion that in the battle of Zama Philip should have supported Carthage with troops (*Liv.* 30, 26, 1—4; 30, 33, 5; 30, 42, 6; 31, 1, 10; 31, 11, 9; *Dio fr.* 57, 76 (*Boissvain* 273)), is to be regarded as a flagrant annalistic forgery, intended to justify the Roman aggression against Philip after bringing the second Punic war to an end, see *de Sanctis* III, 2, 439, 100.

⁵⁰²) *Liv.* 30, 24, 6; 27, 9; 41, 6—7, *v. s. p.* 174.

⁵⁰³) *Liv.* 30, 41, 8, cf. 24, 6.

⁵⁰⁴) *Liv.* 30, 27, 8—9.

⁵⁰⁵) *Liv.* 30, 27, 1 sq.

thus naval supremacy in the African waters would finally pass into Roman hands. De Sanctis⁵⁰⁶) has objected that, according to Livy, the senate should have taken this measure before the reopening of the war, in other words at the time when the treaty of 203 was ratified at Rome: wasn't it a folly to reinforce the African squadron in such a sweeping way just at the moment that the war seemed to be at an end? But the senate, which was certainly not void of military and political understanding, will have seriously reckoned (in connexion with Hannibal's presence in Africa) with a reopening of the hostilities, they may, moreover, have intended the sending of Claudius' squadron as a military demonstration for the very purpose of preventing the war from breaking out again and — last, but not least — they will have been driven by the desire to appease in some way the ambition of the disappointed consul.

For the consuls had demanded that the African command should be given to one of them by lot.⁵⁰⁷) Such a claim was in perfect accordance with Roman constitutional tradition: the consuls were the regular commanders of the Roman army and after the evacuation of Italy by Hannibal at least one of them was available for the African command, so that the proconsul Scipio was no longer needed.⁵⁰⁸) Partly in connexion with such conceptions the opposition against Scipio in the bosom of Roman oligarchy had grown considerably.⁵⁰⁹) Nevertheless Scipio's champion Q. Metellus succeeded in inducing the senate to leave the decision to the *comitia*; and naturally the Roman people voted unanimously for maintaining their idol Scipio in the African command,⁵¹⁰) a decision which, though not consistent with constitutional formalism, was quite right from the point of view of fairness and military efficiency. Thereupon the senate allowed the consuls — probably by way of a sop to those troublesome animals — to ballot for the naval command in the African waters, with the order to take thither 50 extra quinqueremes; but as a

⁵⁰⁶) III, 2, 545, 157.

⁵⁰⁷) Liv. *l. l.*

⁵⁰⁸) Already after Hannibal's departure in the autumn of 203 the consul Cn. Servilius Caepio had crossed from Italy to Sicily, for the purpose of sailing from there to Africa and taking the place of Scipio. In order to check his arbitrary and high-handed action the senate had been forced to have recourse to the appointing of a dictator, who by virtue of his *maius imperium* recalled the consul to Italy, Liv. 30, 24, 1—3.

⁵⁰⁹) Münzer 143 sq., Schur 62 sq., Scullard 223 sq.

⁵¹⁰) Liv. 30, 27, 2—3; 40, 9—10.

matter of course Scipio retained the complete command on land according to the vote of the *comitia*.⁵¹¹) The lot fell upon the consul Ti. Claudius Nero, but, more or less rightly from his consular point of view, he regarded this arrangement as an unfair slight put upon him and, addicted to restiveness and sulkiness like most genuine Claudii, he shirked his duty: he was intentionally slow about the preparations for his expedition and, when the news of the violation of the truce reached Rome and the senate ordered him to sail with his squadron as soon as he could via Sicily to Africa, he was not ready.⁵¹²) Putting to sea at last,⁵¹³) he made light of the explicit order of the senate to start for Africa via Sicily, on the contrary sailed northwards along the Tuscan coast, crossed via Elba and Corsica (!) to Sardinia and, having been twice overtaken by a storm on this voyage, he finally put into port at Cagliari with his sorely battered fleet. Here winter overtook him while repairing his ships; and, his imperium expiring on service and naturally not being prolonged after such a display of refractoriness, he brought back his fleet to Rome as a private person in the spring of 201. So these 50 ships never reached Africa.⁵¹⁴)

On the other hand P. Lentulus arrived in October 202 at Castra Cornelia with a convoy of 100 transports and 50 warships; here Scipio found him, when after his victory of Zama he returned to the coast. So in spite of Ti. Claudius' failure Scipio's naval effective was increased (though at the eleventh hour or rather at ten minutes past twelve!) to a total number of 120 men of war (the original squadron of 40 sail, Octavius' 30, Lentulus' 50 ships); and, as now finally naval superiority had passed

⁵¹¹) That in spite of the vote of the assembly the consuls should have balloted for the *provincia Africa* and that Ti. Claudius should have been appointed Scipio's fellow-commander (*parique imperio cum P. Scipione esset*, Liv. 30, 27, 4—5), is naturally inconceivable: the decision of the sovereign people excluded such an arrangement. But the complications of 201, which according to Livy himself formed a repetition of the entanglements of 202 (30, 40, 9 sq.; 41, 6 sq.), enable us to correct these inaccuracies from Livy's own narrative: it was only naval command (*imperium maritimum*) the consuls balloted for, see Weissenborn ad Liv. 30, 27, 4.

⁵¹²) Liv. 30, 38, 6—7.

⁵¹³) Liv. 30, 39, 1—3, somewhat differently Zon. 9, 14, 1.

⁵¹⁴) I regret that, when some years ago (Mnem. Tertia Series II, 1935, 245 sq.) I tried to characterize the ancestors of the emperor Tiberius, I overlooked this cross-grained man. The fact that his contrariness squares perfectly with the Claudian state of mind as it was sketched by me on that occasion, proves in my opinion the authenticity of these secondary, but very lively events.

into his hands, he planned a twofold demonstration against the city itself, by land and by sea.⁵¹⁵) He himself took the command of the fleet (he used to leave it to others, but at that moment warfare centered on the navy, because the weakened morale of the city, which had already been defeated on land, had now to be broken completely by the menacing prospect of a thorough, two-sided blockade) and sailed with all his ships in the direction of Carthage, while Octavius, who normally used to be in command of the fleet (Liv. 30, 24, 6; 27, 9; 41, 6—7), was ordered to march there by land with the legions. On the way a Punic ship with a peace embassy came alongside; he ordered the envoys to come to him at Tunes, where he intended to go ere long. After carrying on his naval demonstration as far as the immediate neighbourhood of Carthage, he turned back to Castra Cornelia, where Octavius joined him with the legions. It is very easy to say afterwards that this show was quite superfluous; it probably helped somehow to bring home to the Carthaginians that a siege of the city offered no reasonable prospects of efficient resistance, because Scipio now commanded the sea as well as the hinterland. Be this as it may, the negotiations were opened shortly afterwards at Tunes.⁵¹⁶)

It will be clear from the preceding account, that in 202 200 Roman men of war were on active service (120 in Africa, 10 in Sardinia, 20 in Sicily, finally the 50 ships of Claudius) against 160 in 203 (40 in Sardinia, 40 in Sicily, 40 in Italy, 40 in Africa). We stated before, that 30 of the 40 Sardinian ships sailed with Octavius to Africa and remained there, and that half the Sicilian squadron (20 ships) were ordered back to Rome. But of what ships the squadrons of Claudius and Lentulus were composed,

⁵¹⁵) Liv. 30, 36 1 sq., App. *Lib.* 49, 212. De Sanctis (555, 173) and Scullard (249, 3) believe Lentulus to have had only 20 warships, because his former convoy too had been escorted by 20 men of war (Liv. 30, 24, 5, *v. s.* p. 174 sq.), and they suppose that Livy arrived at a number of 50 by inadvertently adding Octavius' 30 sail to the 20 of Lentulus; according to them Scipio ultimately could dispose of 90 and not of 120 men of war. I do not agree with them: after learning in the autumn of 202, that Claudius' 50 ships couldn't reach Africa, the senate probably on purpose sent an equal number of warships with Lentulus in order to raise the African squadron to the originally intended effective of 120 sail and thus to secure Scipio naval supremacy in the African waters; according to Scullard and de Sanctis he did not possess superior numbers at the time of his demonstration.

⁵¹⁶) The defeat of Vermina, son of Syphax, cannot be discussed here, because it belongs to warfare on land.

both of which numbered 50 sail, we do not know. Probably first of all the 40 vessels of the Italian squadron and the 20 that had become available in the Sicilian waters, were employed for this purpose; the remaining 40 must have been laid-up ships: that a large number of these were available, goes without saying, as since 208 the potential naval effective still amounted to 280 sail. Unquestionably there lies an element of ridicule in the fact that in the preceding years the senate had suffered Scipio to muddle through with 40 sail in the most dangerous circumstances, but now suddenly at the very last moment began to reinforce this squadron most strenuously by way of afterthought. However, we ought to realize that this ridiculousness lies in the lethargy of the preceding years and not in the energy of 202. It is rather easy for us to know in 1944 A.D. that Scipio won the battle of Zama; but in the course of the year 202 b. C. the Roman senate must seriously reckon with the eventuality of Scipio being crushed by the formidable Hannibal. In such a case it would be of the greatest importance for Rome to command the African waters, not only in order to give a chance of escape to the remainders of the defeated army, but also to prevent Carthage from transferring the war once more to territories outside Africa. And really the battle of Zama proved a touch-and-go business of the first water: Scipio did win in the end, but only after a deadly struggle. But why did the senate delay these measures of naval reinforcements for such a long time, though plenty of ships were available? The answer remains always the same: war-weariness prevented them from doing it in good time. In the preceding years there had been besides the African front the double defensive in Italy against Hannibal and Mago; in those circumstances the general exhaustion had hindered Rome from disengaging energy for reinforcing the navy in the African waters. But after the evacuation of Italy by Hannibal and Mago all forces could be concentrated upon Africa: not only squadrons on active service in the Italian waters could now be shifted from there to Africa, but also energy could be disengaged for raising the naval effective considerably. Hence the maritime revival in 202.

201 The peace negotiations between Carthage and Scipio took place during the winter of 202—201, and considering the violation of the armistice it stands to reason that the terms now propounded by the latter were

more severe than they had been in 203: *i. a.* ⁵¹⁷) the number of warships Carthage was allowed to retain was halved by reducing it to 10 triremes, the indemnity on the contrary doubled by raising it to 10,000 talents and — worst of all — Carthage's military rights were seriously limited and the powerful city was reduced to the condition of an ally dependent on Rome. But Carthage had no choice left; so she accepted Scipio's terms, urgently advised to do so by Hannibal; in the spring of 201 the treaty was ratified at Rome. It lies out of my way to discuss the internal political difficulties Rome had to struggle with during the winter of 202—201. But the complications brought about by the ratification of the treaty in the spring of 201 are connected with maritime history and therefore must be treated here; *mutatis mutandis* they offer a repetition of the painful scenes, of which the consul Ti. Claudius Nero had been the miserable protagonist in 202. The consul of 201 Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, being able no longer to take away from Scipio the glory of finishing the war, wanted to rob him at any cost of the honour of settling the peace: he refused to grant the Punic peace embassy an audience in the senate and to submit to treatment the peace arrangements until he should be granted the command in Africa. ⁵¹⁸) However, this consular *veto* was counteracted by the *veto* of two tribunes, who intervened in favour of Scipio and appealed to the fact that in 202 the popular assembly had given the African command to Scipio by unanimous vote. In order to escape from this impasse the senate projected the following compromise, which, however, practically meant a complete defeat for the consul: he should get the command of a fleet of 50 sail and depart for Sicily; if peace couldn't be established with Carthage, he should cross to Africa and there command the naval forces, Scipio retaining the command on land; if, on the other hand, an agreement with Carthage should be arrived at, the assembly should decide, whether the consul or Scipio should give the peace to Carthage and bring home the triumphant army: if the people decided in favour of Scipio, the consul was not allowed to cross from Sicily to Africa; the consul should choose his 50 ships from the 20 lying near Sicily, the 30 of Octavius and the 50 brought by P. Lentulus to Africa in the autumn of 202: the remaining 50 should be brought back to Rome by Octavius, if Scipio could do without him; the

⁵¹⁷) For the terms of the peace Liv. 30, 37; Pol. 15, 18; App. *Lib.* 54, 234; 59, 258—259; Dio fr. 57, 82 and the detailed discussion by Scullard 252 sq.

⁵¹⁸) Liv. 30, 40, 5 sq.; 41, 6 sq.; see Schur 66 sq.

original squadron of 40 sail should remain at Scipio's disposal.⁵¹⁹⁾ It is manifest, that this compromise meant in reality a complete *échec* for the consul: on the most hopeful view he might have shared the naval command with Scipio; but it would not even come to this, because at the moment of this resolution of the senate it was practically certain that the negotiations would yield a happy result and that the assembly would charge Scipio and not the consul with accomplishing the closing arrangements. So it is no wonder that Lentulus made once more a desperate attempt at preventing the senate from passing a resolution in favour of peace.⁵²⁰⁾ But thereupon the same tribunes brought the matter before the people, putting the question to them, whether they wanted peace and, if so, who should give the peace to Carthage and bring the army home from Africa; that the former question was answered in the affirmative and the latter in favour of Scipio, goes without saying. So the only thing the consul accomplished was a useless voyage to Sicily, where he received the fleet from Octavius,⁵²¹⁾ while Scipio returned home with the army in triumph. Before his departure from Africa the surrendered Punic warfleet had been burnt by him at sea;⁵²²⁾ the communication that the sum total of these ships amounted to 500, may be regarded as trustworthy, on the understanding that even the smallest types were included in this number, as, moreover, is stated explicitly by Livy: the number of battle-ships will scarcely have surpassed 100, but at any rate it here becomes manifest once more that the Punic helplessness on sea was not rooted in lack of ships, but in lack of men, money — and morale.⁵²³⁾

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⁵¹⁹⁾ Consequently the senate intended to reduce the naval effective from 200 to 100 sail: only the 40 ships of Scipio, the 50 of the consul and the 10 Sardinian vessels (Liv. 30, 41, 8) should remain on active service; Octavius was to bring back 50 ships to Rome, where meanwhile the 50 of Ti. Claudius had returned from Cagliari, *v. s. p.* 178.

⁵²⁰⁾ Liv. 30, 43, 1 sq.

⁵²¹⁾ Liv. 30, 44, 13.

⁵²²⁾ Liv. 30, 43, 11—12; Zon. 9, 14, 12. Only exceptionally the Romans added captured ships to their own fleet; in general they used to destroy them or to give them away to sea-faring allies, *v. s. p.* 17.

⁵²³⁾ See de Saint-Denis, *Une guerre maritime*, 135, 2.

(Closing remarks)

After drawing up in the preceding pages a detailed inventory of naval warfare during the second Punic war, we must now try to summarize the results of our investigation. That the maritime exertions of Rome during this war were considerable, appears from the fleetnumbers we tried to ascertain year by year and which may be summed up here in conclusion: ⁵²⁴) from 218 to 215 220 (+ 20 ships of Massilia in the Spanish waters in 218—217); from 214 to 209 215 (+ in 211—210 an auxiliary squadron of some 20 ships in the Tarentine waters, for the greater part of smaller types; in 209 the Roman fleet itself was increased with 18 prizes, captured at New Carthage); in 208 \pm 280; in 207 \pm 240 (the greater part of the Greek squadron (perhaps 40 ships) was laid up; but we must reckon with the possibility, that also the Italian coastal squadron of 208 was put out of commission as early as 207); in 206 \pm 120; in 205 \pm 155, after the peace of Phoenice 110; in 204 100; in 203 160; in 202 200; in 201 100; in 218—217 60 new sheps were built, in 214 100, in 208 20, together 180. But what was the part played by those naval forces? Did they give to Rome naval supremacy? Did naval warfare decisively influence the course and result of the war? Did the Romans employ their fleets in a efficient way or did their landlubberish state of mind reveal itself irresistibly, in spite of the efforts and sacrifices they sustained for the sake of the navy, in spite of the fact that they realized the importance of naval warfare? Perhaps the preceding detailed investigations may well enable us to answer these questions in a more or less satisfactory way.

The first question may be settled easily: in the main naval supremacy was indeed on the Roman side, except in the following cases: in 217 the Carthaginians had a few ships more in the Spanish waters than the Romans, but were nevertheless surprised and beaten off the Ebro; in 212—211 they outnumbered the Romans in the Sicilian waters, but did

⁵²⁴) Only the total effectives are here summed up again; for a detailed discussion of the subdivisions the reader is referred to the preceding investigation itself.

not exploit this superiority: off Pachynum Bomilcar refused battle and in doing so threw away a fair chance of defeating the Romans; finally during the African campaign Scipio's 40 men of war were sadly outnumbered by the Punic home fleet.⁵²⁵) But with regard to this last fact we must bear in mind that the Roman naval effective in those years still amounted *potentially* to 280 sail (since 208), so that in spite of the radical naval demobilization carried out since 206 the Romans in case of emergency might easily have sent at short notice a strong fleet to the African waters, as happened indeed, though at the eleventh hour, in 202; in other words, the so very weak African squadron was covered in the rear by a very strong fleet in being, which undoubtedly contributed to paralysing the Punic home fleet. If further we take into account the inferior Spanish naval personnel of the Carthaginians in the battle off the Ebro and the lack of morale exhibited by them at sea during the struggle for Syracuse and the African campaign, factors the Romans were perhaps better acquainted with than we are able to surmise and with which they probably reckoned,⁵²⁶) we do not push matters too far by ascribing naval supremacy to the Romans during the second Punic war, though the year 212 remains a year of serious crisis in connexion with Bomilcar's armada and the vacuum on the southern coast of Italy. We may well ask here, why at that juncture the Romans continued to bungle along with a total effective of 215 sail, why they did not raise it already in 212 to a number of 280 ships instead of putting off such a measure till 208, when the situation had become far less precarious. The answer is that lack of personnel probably prevented them from doing it. For in the years 212 and 211 no less than 25 legions were under arms⁵²⁷) (the maximum of the whole war) and, especially in connexion with the precarious position in Campania and Sicily, these were urgently needed too. Consequently the ± 5000 legionaries as well as the ± 2500 proletarians Rome would have wanted to garrison 65 extra ships,⁵²⁸) should have

⁵²⁵) The miniature naval battle off Gibraltar in 206 was won by the Romans, though their adversaries had one ship more; but this engagement had scarcely any importance at all.

⁵²⁶) Again and again we get the impression that during the African campaign Scipio reckoned with and even confidently counted upon Punic naval inertness.

⁵²⁷) See for instance the list of the legions in C. A. H. VIII, 104.

⁵²⁸) If we reckon 120 men for the total amount of marine troops of a quinquereme and 40 for its permanent garrison drawn from the Roman proletariat and stiffened

been enlisted afresh, which would have been undesirable or even impossible on account of the enormous number of legions mobilized already.⁵²⁹⁾ Besides, Rome ran also short of naval personnel in connexion with the fact that the freedmen normally serving in the navy were now partly absorbed by military service, with the defection of Greek towns on the southern coast of Italy and with the desertion of numerous Sicilian *socii navales* who joined the Syracusan revolt.⁵³⁰⁾ On the other hand in 208 only 21 legions were afield and the situation on land was far less critical than in 212, so that extra soldiers could be easily enlisted for the fleet or temporarily borrowed for this purpose from the legions already in existence.⁵³¹⁾ And as for the naval personnel, Rome could now perhaps dispose again of more numerous freedmen for the navy, because several legions had been demobilized, and could quietly recruit *socii navales* from Sicily, the island now being firmly in the Roman grasp again; moreover, in 210 for the second time a great number of slaves had been expropriated for naval service (Liv. 26, 35), while since the conquest of New Carthage in 209 Scipio employed pressed Spaniards as rowers in the Spanish waters. I believe therefore that, if Rome neglected to reinforce the navy in 212, this was not imputable to carelessness, but to hard necessity. Be this as it may, on surveying the war as a whole we must arrive at the conclusion that the Romans and not their adversaries commanded the sea.

The question, whether or not this maritime supremacy decisively contributed to the Roman victory, must undoubtedly be answered in the affirmative. Let us sum up the principal items: Roman naval supremacy dictated to Hannibal in 218 and to Hasdrubal in 208 the long and difficult march *by land* to Italy, whereas the Romans received by sea from Spain the news of Hasdrubal's march in time to give him a warm reception and troops into the bargain to reinforce the army in Italy; it effected that Hannibal in spite of all his victories was so thoroughly blockaded in Italy, that only once (in 215) a modest convoy reached him by sea; it enabled the Romans to launch by sea an offensive in

before a battle with picked legionaries, some 80 legionaries were needed for one ship, see Kromayer, *Flotte*, 485 sq.

⁵²⁹⁾ See footnote 73.

⁵³⁰⁾ See footnote 128.

⁵³¹⁾ Temporarily, because the increase of the fleet in 208 was a reaction upon the rumour of a powerful Punic armada, which was to be expected in the Italian waters, ... but did not come!

Spain in 218 and to keep it up by sea year by year, so that till the end of 208 Hasdrubal was prevented from joining Hannibal in Italy and Carthage was forced to send again and again considerable forces to Spain, which otherwise she might have employed elsewhere; it enabled the Romans to bar Philip's way to Italy and to bind him to Greece; and — last, but not least — it enabled them during the most critical years of the war (from 217 to 207), when Hannibal was ravaging Italy and the soil couldn't be tilled regularly, to import grain by sea from Sicily and Sardinia and thus to guard the civil population as well as the armies from starvation. No doubt, the decisive battle was fought on land and in a general way too the maritime factors I mentioned are completely outshone by the tremendous battles on land. But for all that they are real and important enough, as we may realize most clearly by turning the tables for a moment. For what would have been the end, if Carthage instead of Rome had commanded the sea? In other words, if Rome had not been able to launch an offensive in Spain and consequently Hasdrubal had made his appearance in Italy at the time of the battle of Cannae instead of in 207, when it was too late, if at the same time Philip had landed considerable forces in Italy and Carthage had found ample opportunity of providing Hannibal directly by sea with all he wanted, and if — again last, but not least — she had profited by her naval supremacy to wrest Sicily and Sardinia from the Romans and starve Italy by doing so? There is but one answer: Rome wouldn't have had the slightest chance of winning the war, on the contrary she would have lost it within half the time. This means that in reality naval supremacy decisively contributed to the Roman victory, though in a somewhat latent way; the maxim that he wins who has the sea is certainly applicable to this war.⁵³²⁾

And yet, for all that, we get the impression that even in this war, in which sea-power played such a decisive part, the Romans did not renounce their landlubberish nature. Only after 207 (since the battle on the Metaurus) the symptoms of it reveal themselves plainly, but even during the first 10 years of the war they were never wholly absent. A peculiar lack of tempo, a certain tendency to "sail" behind the events

⁵³²⁾ See besides Clark and de Saint-Denis (*Une guerre maritime*), Maccartney Shepard, *Sea-power in ancient history* (London 1925), 170 sq., whose remarks rest upon Mahan, *Influence of sea-power upon history*.

are present during the whole war: only in the autumn of 218 a (permanent) squadron is stationed at Lilybaeum, only in 215 the same is done for Calabria; only since 208 50 ships were operating in the Sardinian waters, notwithstanding the fact that as early as 215 a dangerous revolt of the Sardinians and a Punic invasion had seriously threatened Roman rule over the island (at that juncture a modest number of ships (20?) had been sent temporarily to Sardinia) and that in 210 the Sardinian shores had been plundered with impunity by a Punic squadron; the Italian coastal squadron established in 208 slumbered from its birth and only in 203 (after Mago had landed undisturbedly at Genoa in 205 and a convoy from Carthage had reached him on the Riviera) it was restored to life again; and the far too weak African squadron of Scipio was reinforced in 202 by way of afterthought, after it had scarcely escaped destruction in 203 before Utica. In the same way the tendency to incorporate if possible the *socii navales* with the land forces and lay up the ships reveals itself during the whole war: in Sardinia in 215 (v. s. p. 70), in Spain in the years 211, 210 and 209 (p. 107, 112, 120), in Africa during the siege of Utica in 204—203 (footnote 458); the three last cases are all imputable to the great Scipio, who in spite of his imperialistic tendencies showed little or nothing of a thalassic orientation. During the first 10 years of the war we have to mention moreover the needless throwing away in 217 of a convoy bound for Spain (p. 52), the none too active line of conduct of the navy during the struggle for Syracuse (p. 89 sq.), its slack behaviour in the Illyrian and Greek waters (remember the loss of Lissus by Laevinus (p. 98) and the inert as well as brutal conduct of Sulpicius) and above all things the fact that the southern coast of Italy was left unprotected for years. Already in 215 the senate had neglected to station a squadron at Rhegium, so that a convoy from Carthage could reach Hannibal via Locri; but especially since 214 the southern coast of Italy was completely denuded of naval protection, in consequence of the concentration of Roman forces upon Syracuse and the withdrawal of Laevinus' squadron from Brindisi to Illyria and Greece. That in 210 30 ships, which in the spring of 211 had become available in the Sicilian waters, were sent with Scipio to Spain, where they were not needed at all and consequently were not employed, instead of being utilized for the protection of the southern coast of Italy and the revictualling of the Tarentine citadel, is an inexplicable blunder; that in spite of this bungling the citadel of Tarentum succeeded in maintaining

itself, was certainly not due to a sound maritime policy on the part of Roman government. — But all these facts are trifles in comparison with the atrophy of Roman sea-power during the last years of the war (since Hasdrubal's catastrophe in 207); the mere fleetnumbers of the years 206—204 clearly point out that, as soon as the Romans could breathe somewhat more freely again, that is to say as soon as they realized (on account of Hasdrubal's disaster) that Hannibal had lost his last chance of winning the war, they began to demobilize their naval forces on a large scale! It is the same phenomenon on a small scale and in a less serious form as the second and first centuries would show on a vast scale, when for nearly a century Rome governed her dominions round the Mediterranean almost without a navy; and this demobilization might have had serious consequences. The case of the Spanish squadron, which in 206, when Mago tried to surprise New Carthage and sailed from there to the Balearic Isles, was not at its post at New Carthage, but was slumbering at Tarraco, may be regarded as more or less isolated, though it was bad enough in itself. But the fact that in 205 Mago could land at Genoa and that a convoy from Carthage could reach him by sea, is immediately connected with the circumstance that the Italian coastal squadron of 208 had been laid up and would only be resuscitated in 203, when it was too late. And also the ridiculously small naval effective given to Scipio for his African campaign was a miserable consequence of the partial naval demobilization; the farce of Utica, where in 203 Scipio was forced to protect his helpless warfleet against a much stronger Punic squadron by means of lines of transports, proves, in what *débâcle* the African expedition might have ended, if the Punic navy had delivered a vigorous blow in good time (for instance during the crossing from Sicily to Africa). Only in 202 at the eleventh hour Scipio's squadron was finally raised from 40 to 120 sail! If we add to this bill of indictment the fact, that in 203 Hannibal's as well as Mago's forces could escape from Italy to Africa, we gather a rather distressing notion of Roman naval warfare after 207, which at any rate does not invite us to propose a toast in honour of the good old Roman naval policy. No doubt, we may excuse and counterpoise these foibles with the remark that in those closing years of the war Rome no less than Carthage suffered severely from war-weariness and that as a matter of course this exhaustion made itself felt most strongly in a sphere that remained foreign to the Roman state of mind: the sphere of naval warfare, we may point out that in spite of a far-going

demobilization Rome since 208 continued to have at her disposal a potential effective of 280 sail, so that in case of need the real effective could immediately be reinforced at discretion, as happened indeed in 203 and 202, and finally we may suppose with some reason that the Romans were well acquainted with the extremely weak maritime morale of Carthage and more or less counted upon it, at first sight a rather risky speculation which, however, was perfectly justified by the result; but all these considerations cannot explain away the fact that, at least in this last period of the war, they owed their successes rather to the utter paralysis of their adversaries than to their own promptness: we cannot escape from the uncomfortable impression that, just as we always do in Roman history, we meet here with the typical doings of land-lubbers, who no doubt were ready in case of emergency to exert themselves considerably for the sake of naval warfare, but who restricted themselves nevertheless to reluctantly performed minima and consequently withdrew from the sea as much and as soon as they could.

Certain scholars reject the numbers of land- and naval forces handed down by Livy, because they regard them as untenable from a demographic point of view.⁵³³) So we must consider here the question, what percentage of the total population of Roman Italy was swallowed by army and navy during the second Punic war. For this purpose I choose the years 212 and 208, because they furnish maxima, the former for the land forces (25 legions — 215 warships), the latter for the navy (280 men of war — 21 legions). The nominal effective of a legion including the contingent of allies pertaining to it amounted to some 10,000 men;⁵³⁴) but undoubtedly the real effective was considerably lower during the second Punic war, probably some 8000 men on an average.⁵³⁵) Consequently we obtain 200,000 men for the year 212 and 168,000 for 208. If we reckon 300 men for the rowers of a quinquereme⁵³⁶) and 40

(The Roman naval effectives and demography)

⁵³³) See for instance Kahrstedt 440 sq., Ed. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften* II, 415—423.

⁵³⁴) Ed. Meyer, *l. l.*, 417, 3.

⁵³⁵) Beloch, *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt* (Leipzig 1886), 383, de Sanctis III, 2, 324.

⁵³⁶) Here too the real effective was lower perhaps, but I will neglect this in order to give a fair chance to hypercriticism; moreover, I call attention to the fact that I based my calculation on the *quinquereme* as the normal type of man of war, though

for its permanent garrison drawn from the Roman proletariat,⁵³⁷) we get for the year 212 (215 ships) a total amount of 73,100 men, for 208 (280 ships) of 95,200. Consequently for army and navy together roughly 273,000 men were mobilized in 212, 263,000 in 208, which, as I remarked before, were the years of maximal numbers (together with 211 and 207).⁵³⁸) Is it possible from the point of view of demography, that such numbers of soldiers and crews were produced by the population of Roman Italy? The data concerning the Italian forces in 225 which Polybius (2, 24) has handed down to us from Fabius Pictor, furnish 273,000 men⁵³⁹) of Roman citizen troops (*iuniores* and *seniores*) and upwards of 400,000 allies (according to the low calculation of Beloch 367), the latter *iuniores* only. If we estimate the *seniores* at half the number of *iuniores*, the sum total of allies able to bear arms amounted in 225 to more than 600,000 men and the total military forces of Roman Italy to some 873,000 men, so that we may reckon a round number of 900,000 for 218 on account of the increase of population. In order to derive from this number the total amount of the free population we must multiply by 4 and not by 3, because the 900,000 men do not include all adult men, but only those able to bear arms, which means excluding those older than 60 years;⁵⁴⁰) in this way we obtain for 218 a free population of Roman Italy of roughly 3.5 millions or, including the slaves, whose number is hardly determinable, but must have been considerable (we *must* include them, because not only from an economic point of view they played a highly important part during the war, but also in case of emergency were employed in army and navy), a total population of 4—4.5 millions at the least. Of course for the years 212—207 we must reckon with a

it is certain that a not determinable, but probably small part of the Roman fleet consisted of *triremes* with far less numerous crews. Consequently the numbers given in the text are rather high and must probably be decreased with several thousands. Compare my closing remarks about the types of Roman warships.

⁵³⁷) The remaining 80 marines were furnished by the legions and therefore must be left out of account here in order to avoid double counting.

⁵³⁸) Perhaps the year 211 surpassed 212 by a few thousands in connexion with the small auxiliary squadron, which possibly was already on service at that moment in the Tarentine waters; similarly the numbers of 207 (240 ships + 23 legions) perhaps slightly surpassed those of 208.

⁵³⁹) This amount agrees with the numbers of the census of 234 (270713): in those years of relative quiet there was naturally an increase of population.

⁵⁴⁰) Thus rightly Schulz (Mnemos. Tertia Series V, 169) against Beloch 313.

considerably smaller quantity of human material, first on account of the heavy losses suffered in the great battles, especially in the battle of Cannae (though these losses are usually rather overestimated), secondly in connexion with the defection of part of the allies: the census of 204 furnished a number of only 214,000 citizens liable to military service and with the allies the decrease of numbers must have been proportionate to this downward movement, or rather worse on account of defections on their part. So we may not be wide of the mark, if we subtract one third from the 3.5 millions of free population in 218 in order to obtain the numbers for 212 and the next years: by doing so we get 2.4 millions of free population⁵⁴¹) or, including the slaves, 3 millions at the least. The upshot of all this is that even the highest numbers of mobilization (in the years 212—211) amount to less than 10 % of the total population. It is a high percentage, but not inconceivable: in ancient Greece the strain put upon the popular resources of man power was sometimes even more tremendous⁵⁴²) and during the great war of 1914—1918 Germany for instance mobilized more than 10 % of its total population,⁵⁴³) to let alone the late war. What was practicable even for modern states in spite of their extremely complicated economic mechanism, was a fortiori possible to the primitive commonwealth of third century Rome. No doubt, Germany was only capable of carrying through such a far-going military mobilization of its own population by exploiting the working-power of large numbers of prisoners of war, not to speak about the brutal slave-hunting practice of the latewar; but in Roman Italy too masses of prisoners (think for instance of Tarentum and the slave-hunting in the Greek waters) increased the number of slaves, which *mutatis mutandis* comes to the same thing as the German practice. So the strain put upon the resources of man power in Italy was very heavy indeed, as appears plainly from several emergency-measures taken for the sake of recruitment (severe punishing of those who evaded military service, enlisting of boys

⁵⁴¹) See de Sanctis III, 2, 324; perhaps this number is a trifle too high, but on the other hand part of the population of Sicily must be added to it, as the Sikeliots served in the Roman navy as *socii navales*.

⁵⁴²) See Barbagallo, *Le déclin d'une civilisation* (Paris 1927), 177.

⁵⁴³) De Sanctis III, 2, 324, Barbagallo l. l., Ed. Meyer II, 423. In 1914 France had mobilized as much as 9.5 % of its total population (3.6 millions), Germany 5 % (3.8 millions); but consequently in the next years Germany could raise its effectives in a much higher degree than France.

under the age liable to service and even of slaves and criminals for legionary service);⁵⁴⁴) but this does not mean that such a strain is inconceivable or untenable from a demographic point of view:⁵⁴⁵) there is no valid reason to reject the numbers of legions and ships handed down by Livy on account of the high mobilization-numbers they presuppose; but undoubtedly these numbers furnish a striking explanation of the war-weariness we again and again had to state on the Roman side during the last years of the war.

(*The maritime failure of Carthage*) Why, on the other hand, the much more seaworthy Carthage cut such a miserable figure at sea against Rome, is less easy to account for demographically, because in spite of the abundance of information about the second Punic war we know next to nothing about Carthage from within. We perceive the atrophy of the Punic navy and even in periods of temporary revival as for instance during the Syracusan adventure we observe a peculiar paralysis, a lack of tempo and a series of spoilt chances, but we may at best guess the causes of these phenomena. That in the period between the first and the second Punic wars the Punic navy was smothered as it were between the continental policy of the Barcids in Spain on the one side and the agrarian interests of the aristocracy on the other,⁵⁴⁶) is plausible enough. But then why not build a lot of new ships immediately in 218 and try to outdo the Romans at sea as well as on land, which was indispensable for a vigorous supporting of Hannibal's offensive? Why couldn't they bring themselves to make such an attempt before 212 and why did Bomilcar's armada vanish after 211 almost without leaving a trace? Why didn't they try already in 204 to destroy Scipio's weakly escorted convoy during the crossing to Africa, though they could dispose of a hundred warships at the very least, and why was this fleet only brought into action in 203 before Utica? Lots of such questions may be asked, but to answer them is another question. It is usual to say that Carthage's fate was decided by the fact that she couldn't dispose of

⁵⁴⁴) See the passages quoted by Ed. Meyer II, 420.

⁵⁴⁵) Even Beloch (*Studi di storia antica* I, 46), a hypercritical scholar and at the same time one of the best judges of the demographic problems of Ancient History, must acknowledge this.

⁵⁴⁶) Kahrstedt 139.

sufficient man power to give full weight on land and sea at the same time; ⁵⁴⁷) but, though this may be true, it can only be valid in a relative and not in an absolute demographic sense. Beloch estimates the population of Punic Africa at 3—4 millions ⁵⁴⁸) and even Kahrstedt, ⁵⁴⁹) whose estimates are always low, reckons more than 4 millions for the population of the Punic empire in Africa and Spain together, a number scarcely lower than we arrived at for the population of Roman Italy. So the lack of human material was certainly not rooted in demographic factors as such, but in the lack of devotion and self-denial of the urban population, which only in the hour of highest need was willing to perform the naval service that normally should have fallen to their share, ⁵⁵⁰) and in a certain lack of binding and absorbing power, in consequence of which Carthage couldn't exploit the population of her empire for the purpose of recruitment in such an intensive way as Rome was able to do in Italy; consequently she was to a great extent thrown upon mercenaries ⁵⁵¹) and therefore dependent on the "sinews of war" in a degree that cannot be regarded as sound: in conditions of that kind the loss of the Spanish silver-mines must have been little short of a calamity. If, moreover, we take into account the demoralizing memory of the first Punic war and the peculiar sclerosis of Carthaginian civilization in this period, that seems to be proved by the archaeological data ⁵⁵²) and with which the atrophy of the navy might be correlated, we get a vague, chiefly conjectural, but probably more or less accurate notion of the factors from which the failure of Punic sea-power possibly resulted and which after all were rooted in popular character. ⁵⁵³) However this may be, that the maritime failure of Carthage decisively contributed to Roman victory, is not open to discussion at all.

⁵⁴⁷) See the first chapter.

⁵⁴⁸) 470, cf. de Sanctis III, 1, 40 and 85 sq.

⁵⁴⁹) 133.

⁵⁵⁰) Hence the fact that the Punic fleet was only manned in 203 and not at the right moment in 204; that the urban populace had to perform naval service, has not been handed down, but is highly probable, see Meltzer, *Geschichte der Karthager* (Berlin 1896) II, 135—136, Gsell II, 450 and v. s. p. 51.

⁵⁵¹) See i. a. Gsell II, 449—451, 458.

⁵⁵²) Kahrstedt 69.

⁵⁵³) Compare the remarks of Holland Rose 146 sq.; his supposition that lack of timber and therefore of ships should have been one of the factors to which the weakness of Carthage's maritime policy was due (150), seems not probable to me, v. s. p. 182.

In conclusion a few words about the organization of the Roman navy during the second Punic war and about the types of its ships. In the first chapter we remarked that in republican times the Romans stuck to improvisatory methods in the maritime sphere, that only under the principate standing squadrons were established by them and that up to that time they used to launch fleets according to the need of the moment. So they began the war in 218 with the 220 quinqueremes that had been lying in the dockyards since 241 and in the mean time had only been employed for the short Illyrian expeditions. But the character of the war, which in contradistinction to the first Punic war developed on several fronts at the same time, forced them to establish "temporarily permanent" squadrons with standing commands. During the first Punic war the naval command had been vested in the yearly changing consuls, whose power embraced not only Italy, but the seas as well. In 218 the Romans still adhered to this custom: both consuls put to sea with a squadron, one of them in the direction of Spain, the other to Sicily (Africa). But Hannibal's presence in Italy prescribed a different course: both consuls saw their command limited to the war against Hannibal in Italy and on several fronts standing commands were established, independent of the consuls. So we find in the Spanish waters from 218 to the end of the war in Spain a permanent squadron under standing command of the Scipios, similarly in the Sicilian waters a standing squadron commanded by the (pro)praetor Otacilius from 217 to 211⁵⁵⁴) and subsequently by the (pro)consul Laevinus, while a standing squadron in the Calabrian and subsequently in the Illyrian and Greek waters was from 215 to 211 under command of the (pro)praetor Laevinus and from 210 onward of the (pro)consul Sulpicius. So after 211, when the worst pressure in Italy was over, the fleets were again commanded by consuls and proconsuls instead of by (pro)praetors, but this did not upset the system of permanent

⁵⁵⁴) When during the struggle for Syracuse the consul Marcellus was sent to Sicily, the naval praetor Otacilius of course was (temporarily) subordinate to him, the consul having *imperium maius*; but he was no *mandatary* of the consul and did not derive his own *imperium* from him; no doubt, the praetorian *imperium* was subordinate to that of the consul, but nevertheless it was like-natured and the praetor had a right to it of his own. As long as the consul was not on the spot, the command of the praetor was perfectly independent, not only in fact, but also by right. See Leifer 201 sq., especially 204, 2.

squadrons and standing commands, as appears plainly from the fact that the proprætor Laevinus after having been elected consul was transferred from Greece to Sicily, no doubt, but, nevertheless, was maintained in a maritime function. That the (pro)consul as well as the (pro)prætor could delegate his naval command to a *præfectus*, appears from the fact that Laelius commanded in this way as a mandatary of Scipio Africanus, P. Valerius Flaccus in 215 (Liv. 23, 34, 4; 38, 7sq.) and Messalla in 210 as *præfecti* of Laevinus. — This system meant an enormous improvement in comparison with the yearly changing consular commands of the first Punic war, but.... it was not maintained after 201: it had been forced upon the Romans by the long and dangerous war that had to be waged on numerous fronts at the same time; the danger being over, the spoilt pet of Roman oligarchy, the yearly change of commands, ranked uppermost again, especially since the Syrian war, and the navy itself was given to atrophy, slowly but surely. ⁵⁵⁵)

The fleets Rome operated with during the second Punic war consisted (The of Roman ships, just as during the first struggle with Carthage; in a few *navas* exceptional cases only we find auxiliary squadrons of allies besides them: *perso* in 218—217 a squadron of Massilia in the Spanish waters, in 210 one of Italiots in the Tarentine waters (both in cases of emergency), while finally the co-operation of Sulpicius with a Pergamene squadron in the Greek waters (208) may be mentioned, which was to be the germ of the mighty development of the auxiliary system in the Greek waters after 200. ⁵⁵⁶) But, though during the second Punic war the Romans only exceptionally made use of the naval contingents of allies and though consequently the *fleets* themselves were predominantly Roman, the *crews* on the other hand, at least as far as the naval personnel was concerned, were recruited almost exclusively from *peregrini*. Among Roman citizens it was the freedmen alone (born foreigners) that, probably of old, ⁵⁵⁷) were liable to nautical service (as sailors and oarsmen), and during this

⁵⁵⁵) Compare the excellent remarks of Tarn, *Companion*, 758 and 760, from which I borrowed gratefully.

⁵⁵⁶) V. s. p. 42.

⁵⁵⁷) That the passages proving naval service of freedmen (see the first chapter, footnote 28) all relate to the period after 200, must be due to the whims of historical tradition: there is no valid reason to suppose that they shouldn't have been employed for it from long ago, even though the ancient authorities are silent about it.

war even to a limited degree, part of them now being absorbed by military service (Liv. 22, 11, 8—9); besides them at best the citizens of the maritime colonies served in the navy, though these too were called out in 207 for *military* service in spite of their resistance.⁵⁵⁸) But apart from these two categories apparently no Roman citizen ever handled an oar: the lion's share of the naval personnel was furnished by the *socii navales* in the proper sense of the word, that is to say by allies in Italy and Sicily, who were liable to naval service; that a considerable part of them were Sikelioti, appears from the desertion of numerous *socii navales* in Sicily during the Syracusan revolt and under the influence of it.⁵⁵⁹) Finally slaves and prisoners of war were made use of: in 214 and 210 slaves of private persons were expropriated for the sake of naval service and in 209 Scipio after the conquest of New Carthage pressed Spaniards for the same purpose.⁵⁶⁰) On the other hand the marine troops used to be recruited from Roman citizens: the permanent garrison of \pm 40 men a quinquereme was drawn from the Roman proletariat (Pol. 6, 19), the 80 extra men were picked from the legions.⁵⁶¹)

This system of recruitment for naval service was probably the same that had prevailed during the first Punic war, in contradistinction to the system of commands, which underwent important changes. Also from the first Punic war we possess only one scrap of information concerning the origin of the *socii navales* and — remarkably enough! — again in connexion with a revolt:⁵⁶²) we hear of a dangerous conspiracy set on

⁵⁵⁸) The condition of this category is not very clear: in 207 they were called out for service on land (Liv. 27, 38, 3—5), in 191 for the naval service (Liv. 36, 3, 4—6). In both cases they protested while appealing to their exemption from service, but in both cases the protest was rejected. However, we get the impression that in the former case their protest was better founded than in the latter (their *vacatio* from military service was not denied by the senate in 207, but only suspended on account of the menace of Hasdrubal, Liv. 27, 38, 5, on the contrary in 191 the *vacatio* from naval service was denied as such, 36, 3, 5). See Clark 7, Tarn, *Companion*, 761.

⁵⁵⁹) V. s. footnote 128; this is the only piece of information we possess from the second Punic war about the origin of Rome's *socii navales*, cf. Cic. in C. Verrem II, V, 125.

⁵⁶⁰) Liv. 24, 11; 26, 35; Pol. 10, 17, 11—13; Liv. 26, 47, 3.

⁵⁶¹) Kromayer, *Flotte*, 485 sq., Tarn, *Companion*, 761.

⁵⁶²) Zon. 8, 11, 8, Oros. 4, 7, 12 in connexion with some fragments from Naevius' *Bellum Punicum*, compare the excellent discussion of this problem by Cichorius, *Römische Studien*, 36 sq.

foot at Rome in 259 by a great number of Samnites, who had been called up for naval service, together with groups of slaves and prisoners of war. The communication is highly important for two reasons: first of all it proves that the allies who served in the Roman navy were not exclusively recruited from maritime towns, but also from the interior; ⁵⁶³) secondly,

⁵⁶³) See Göhler, *Rom und Italien* (Breslau 1939), 34, and Horn 82 sq., who rightly contest the current view that the recruitment of *socii navales* should have been limited to Greek maritime towns; I call attention to the fact that in Sicily too not only the maritime towns were bound to provide the Romans with ships and crews, but also the inland towns, cf. Cic. in Verr. II, V, 86 with the commentary of Richter-Eberhard. We know next to nothing about the cities, tribes and regions in Italy from which the *socii navales* (in the proper sense of the word) used to be recruited; thanks to Cicero (in Verr. II, V, 42 sq.) we know more in this respect about Sicily: the Sicilian cities (in the interior as well as on the coast) were bound to furnish either ships and crews (for instance Messina one biremis) or *socii navales* alone without ships, to serve on board the properly Roman men of war (for instance Tauromenium, cf. Cic. l. l. 49—51 with the commentary of Richter-Eberhard). *Per analogiam* we may surmise that in Italy too first of all the allied cities on the coast, but also some inland tribes were bound *ex foedere* to provide the Roman navy either with manned ships or with crews for the Roman ships themselves or perhaps in some cases with both. But, apart from the isolated case of the naval contingents of Velia, Paestum and Regium in the Tarentine waters in 210, the Romans used to waive their claim to the *ships* of the Italian and Sicilian allies during the second Punic war and limited themselves to exacting *socii navales*, the ships being in the main provided by Rome herself. Or are we to suppose that the Roman fleet in the battle off Lilybaeum in 218 was composed not of Roman, but of Sicilian vessels and thus try to save the authenticity of that episode (v. s. p. 44 sq.)? I think not: the numerical strength of this squadron as presupposed by Livy's narrative (35 sail at the very least) is far too great to admit of its auxiliary origin; and it seems scarcely due to chance that Cicero (in Verr. II, 5, 125) speaks of *nautae* from the Sicilian cities employed in the second Punic war (by the great Scipio) against Carthage, but not of *ships* provided by them. These data are in perfect accordance with the naval system followed by the Romans during the great Punic wars; much more remarkable and surprising is the fact that in the period from 201 to 167, when the Roman naval policy centered on the auxiliary system and when accordingly the naval contingents of the Italian allies used to be called out by the Romans (for instance in the Syrian and the third Macedonian war), they nevertheless continued to abstain from mobilizing the *ships* of the Sicilian allies: in the third Macedonian war they employed Sicilian *socii navales*, but no Sicilian vessels (the 12 ships ordered from Sicily in 172 were probably no Sicilian, but Roman vessels; the Sicilian *socii navales* employed by Rome during this war did not belong to these ships, but they were only enlisted in 169 and transported to Greece in order to serve on board the Roman men of war present there, Liv. 42, 27 and 43, 12, 9 and compare my remarks upon the fleetnumbers and the naval personnel in the chapter

though we are not told *totidem verbis* that the slaves and prisoners with whom the Samnites conspired were intended for naval service like them, the context points clearly in this direction. So it is at least very probable that already during the first Punic war slaves and prisoners were employed for naval service, so that the cases of 214, 210 and 209 were not at all without precedent.⁵⁶⁴) The supposition that freedmen too served in the Roman navy of old and not only after 200, was expressed already before.⁵⁶⁵)

types of ships) As for the types of ships employed by the Romans in the second Punic war, the most current was undoubtedly the quinquereme, but this does not mean that the Roman fleets were *exclusively* composed of quinqueremes: that the 220 battle-ships Rome could dispose of in 218 were *all* quinqueremes has been handed down to us positively (Pol. 3, 41; Liv. 21, 17; App. *lb.* 14, 53—54) and the same holds good with regard to the 60 men of war newly built in 218—217 (Pol. 3, 75, 4); but of the type of the new ships of 214 (Liv. 24, 11) and 208 (27, 22, 12) we know nothing, while among the 18 Punic ships captured at New Carthage in 209, which were added to the Spanish squadron of Scipio, there must at any rate have been a number of triremes (*v. s.* footnote 371). Moreover, we are able to prove conclusively that the new ships of 214 and 208

on the third Macedonian war). So we find no Sicilian naval contingents in the Roman navy before the "fleetless" epoch (Cic. in Verr. II, V, 42—125 *passim*), though the Sicilian cities were bound of old to furnish ships as well as crews; a fact which, though astonishing and unaccountable, seems to be indisputable nevertheless.

⁵⁶⁴) Livy's words (24, 11, 9) *tum primum est factum ut classis Romana sociis navibus privata impensa paratis compleretur* do not mean that in 214 for the first time slaves were employed for naval service, but that this happened for the first time at the expense of their owners.

⁵⁶⁵) Isn't the attempt of Appius Claudius Censor in 310 at increasing the political influence of the urban population by enrolling them in all tribes alike (Diod. 20, 36; Liv. 9, 46, 11) to be connected *i. a.* with the fact that the proletarians served in the navy as *militēs classici*, the freedmen, who formed an important element of the urban population (see for instance Liv. *Per.* 20), as oarsmen and sailors? Never and nowhere the correlation between military service and citizenship was more close than in Ancient Greece and Rome; and I call attention to the striking circumstance that about the same time the function of the *duoviri navales* was created (Liv. 9, 30, 4), a fact proving that sea-power was one of the problems on which public interest centered in those years.

must also have embraced a number of triremes:⁵⁶⁶ the 20 ships brought by C. Claudius Cento to Athens in 200 were all triremes (Liv. 31, 14, 3; 22, 5) and these vessels came from the squadron that in 201 had been commanded by the consul Cn. Cornelius Lentulus in the Sicilian waters and in its turn partly derived its origin from the African fleet (Liv. 31, 14, 2, cf. 30, 41, 6 sq.; 44, 13 and *v. s. p.* 181). And though it is possible that part of these triremes had come from Spain to Sardinia in 208, from there with Octavius to Africa in 202 and finally via Sicily (Cornelius Lentulus in 201) to the Greek waters (in 200), we never arrive in this way at a number of 20 (footnote 371). So we may take it for granted that some of the new ships of 214 and 208 were triremes; how many, it is impossible to guess, but we shall do well not to over-estimate their number. For this reason I based my calculation of the numbers of Roman naval personnel on the quinquereme alone, leaving out of account the existence of a not determinable, but probably small number of triremes. The bulk of the Roman fleet was certainly composed of quinqueremes and to check demographically the tenability of my numbers I *must* operate with maximal numbers, that is to say that they ought rather to be too high than too low. Yet, on account of the undeniable existence of a number of Roman triremes the reader will do well to decrease the numbers of naval personnel arrived at on p. 189 sq. with a few thousands, because the triremes had far less numerous crews than the quinqueremes; in this way the apparent demographic tenability of my numbers is still corroborated.

⁵⁶⁶) See also Liv. 26, 39, 4.

CHAPTER III

ROMAN NAVAL WARFARE FROM 201 TO 167 b. C.

The period of the Punic wars (264—201) may be regarded as the acme of Roman maritime history, to which only the closing period of the naval revival in the first century b. C. can be compared, when Octavianus and Agrippa were forced by the deadly menace of Sextus Pompeius to create at last a *Roman* navy again. For in contradistinction to all other periods these two are marked by the phenomenon that the Romans operated almost exclusively with *Roman* ships (though even these were predominantly manned with *peregrini*) and only exceptionally had recourse to the naval contingents of allies.¹⁾ Why? The answer is near at hand: in both cases they had to struggle for Sicily and Italy, in other words, their naked existence was at stake;²⁾ so it is no wonder that in such circumstances they took shipbuilding into their own hands and in this one respect at least (*not* with regard to the crews) suppressed temporarily the innate tendency to transfer to others what they could in the sphere of naval affairs.³⁾ Consequently it is only natural that after 201, when, by defeating Carthage, they had got rid of the danger menacing Italy and Sicily, they immediately began to take it easy again in naval affairs and returned to the auxiliary system they had already made use of before 264, that is to say that besides their own Roman squadrons they employed to a great extent the naval contingents of sea-faring allies. The objection might be raised that the auxiliary system after 201 was the direct continuation of the practice of the second Punic war, as the co-operation of Roman with Pergamene and Rhodian squadrons since 201 developed in a quite natural way from the co-operation of Sulpicius with Attalus of Pergamum in the Greek waters during the first Macedonian war; in other words that there can be no question here of a return to the methods followed before 264. Formally this is quite true; but we must not forget that what had been a by-front of secondary importance during the second Punic war became the principal theatre of war after

¹⁾ For the exceptions during the second Punic war *v. s. p.* 42 and 195.

²⁾ Moreover, in both periods the allies Rome could dispose of would scarcely have been able to furnish the strong fleets that were needed.

³⁾ See the first chapter.

201, warfare now centering wholly on the Greek waters: the auxiliary system employed there, which during the second Punic war had only formed a slight part of naval warfare as a whole, consequently became fundamental now. If, moreover, we bear in mind that also in the western waters naval contingents of (Italian) allies were made use of to a greater extent since 201 than before (for instance in 195 in Spain, Liv. 34, 8, 4) and that on the other hand the so-called duumviral squadrons, poor Roman flotilla's, which between 311 and 264 had been put in commission at intervals for the sake of the Italian coast defence, but had completely vanished during the great wars, appeared on the scene again between 189 and 172,⁴) we shall have to admit — in spite of the fact that it is easy to draw lines from the second Punic war to the next period — that a certain element of regression plays a part in this game too. And regression usually implies decline. No doubt, there was every reason for taking naval affairs somewhat more easy after 201, the danger threatening Italy and Sicily now being over, nor must the auxiliary system as such necessarily imply an element of decay: the Romans would have been fools, if they had *not* accepted the support of the excellent Rhodian navy, thrown to them quite unexpectedly in consequence of the suicidal policy of Philip of Macedon. But all the same the consciousness of possessing excellent naval allies on the now principal theatre of war might easily prove pernicious especially to the Romans, in connexion with their innate tendency to extemporize in the sphere of naval affairs and let matters take their way. In republican times they kept no standing fleets; it was always their habit to begin a new war with the ships lying in the docks since the preceding and to supplement only at the eleventh hour this stock of old ships by building new ones. And it is only natural that the consciousness of possessing allies like Pergamum and Rhodes reduced to a minimum their already weak tendency to build new ships of their own and keep their navy up to the mark. In 201 they could nominally dispose of 280 battle-ships (since 208), 180 of which had been built during the second Punic war, and as a matter of course they lived on this stock of extant ships in the next period and didn't show the least desire to build new ones. Naturally this didn't make itself felt for a long time (the available stock of ships *was* indeed large enough for the present and,

⁴) This is scarcely imputable to chance or to the lacunary state of our historical knowledge, see Tarn, *Companion*, 755.

moreover, they had good naval allies), but in the war against Perseus the atrophy of Roman sea-power came to the surface in a frightful way. So this period is marked by a slow decline; it forms the transition between the most prosperous naval period (the Punic wars) and the fleetless period which roughly covered a century (167—67).⁵⁾

I

Naval war in the eastern waters.

A: the second Macedonian war. Introduction. It lies out of my way to treat here the antecedents of the second Macedonian war (which followed immediately the second Punic war), its fundamental and incidental causes, the character of Roman imperialism⁶⁾ etc., nor can I enter therefore into a detailed discussion of the complications caused in and round the Aegean by Philip's brutal behaviour after the settling of his conflict with Rome in 205 and his agreement with Antiochus about the dividing of the Egyptian dominions. Undoubtedly these events belong partly to maritime history, but to the maritime history of the Hellenistic states, not of Rome. So I can only pick from them here what is of direct importance for us to get an accurate notion of the second Macedonian war from a maritime point of view. *The fact that Philip entered into this war with such desperately inferior naval numbers*

⁵⁾ Roughly, because during the first decades after 167 now and then a modest Roman squadron still made its appearance, for instance in the third Punic war.

⁶⁾ I will, however, not omit warning in a few words against the modern fashion of denying all imperialistic tendencies to the Roman senate of those times: they should have begun this war, driven by a misplaced desire of self-defence, that is to say on account of the erroneous belief that Philip and Antiochus menaced Italy. Of course the correctness of such a view can be "proved conclusively": the senate (and naturally pro-Roman historiography following its lead) was skilled in the art of representing Rome as menaced innocence, always acting in a state of legitimate self-defence; they *must* even do so, if they wanted to sweep along the peasants of the *comitia*, the state of mind of those peasants in the main being indeed not imperialistic. In this way we can prove conclusively that in September 1939 Germany began the war, because it was menaced by Poland, or that a few months later Russia acted in a state of legitimate self-defence, when it attacked Finland. Is there any human soul in the world (outside the common herd in the countries concerned) who pays such a swindle in other coin than derision or contempt? But in the set of the modern historians of Antiquity it is the fashion to believe that poor old honest and artless Rome conquered the world.... in spite of herself, because she had to defend herself!

that during the whole war his fleet could not leave the harbour, is of eminent importance for the history of naval warfare from 200 to 197. This fact decided the war before it had begun and for this reason it deserves to be elucidated from its antecedents.

The 100 men of war Philip had ordered to be built at Cassandrea in 208, when it began to dawn upon him that he could no longer expect any naval support from his Punic allies, ⁷⁾ were never finished. In 205, the year of the peace of Phoenice, he could certainly not yet dispose of a warfleet deserving that name; ⁸⁾ but in the next years he at least partly realized the schemes of 208, in connexion with his thoughts of expansion in the Aegean and in the direction of the Hellespont. Partly in order to fill his empty treasury and thus enable himself to build ships, partly to start action, he sent out Dicaearchus in 204 with 20 ships to support the Cretans in their war against Rhodes and to capture merchant-vessels and extort money from the islanders at the same time. ⁹⁾ Dicaearchus returned laden with booty and thus Philip got hold of the means wherewith to build new ships: in the battle off Chios in 201 he had at his disposal 53 heavy men of war (chiefly quadriremes and quinqueremes, but also a small number of still heavier battle-ships) besides a very great number of light craft (*i. a.* 150 λέμβοι and πρίστεις). ¹⁰⁾ But, as we know for a certainty that for this battle he had temporarily reinforced his fleet with an (unknown) number of ships from the Egyptian squadron lying at Samos, ¹¹⁾ we may (with Holleaux) estimate his own battle-fleet at some 40 heavy ships, which were seconded during the battle by a very large number of light craft. ¹²⁾

It goes without saying that this fleet was no match at all for the Romans, who, if need be, could dispose of hundreds of battle-ships: even by the united squadrons of Rhodes and Pergamum alone it was already outnumbered in the battle off Chios in 201, though reinforced with

⁷⁾ Liv. 28, 8, 14, *v. s.* p. 130.

⁸⁾ Holleaux 246, 2; 285, 5; 287, 2.

⁹⁾ Pol. 18, 54, 8 sq.; Diod. 27, 3; 28, 1, see *i. a.* Ormerod 148.

¹⁰⁾ Pol. 16, 2, 9; for the πρίστεις, a light type of warship, see Ormerod 167, 2, Torr, *Ancient ships* (Cambridge 1895), 115 and 121.

¹¹⁾ Pol. I. I., de Sanctis IV, 1, 8, 22, Holleaux, *C. A. H.* VIII, 145, 2.

¹²⁾ This co-operation was an invention of Philip, which he put into practice for the first time in the battle of Chios; it exerted some influence upon the history of naval tactics, see Tarn, *Companion*, 762.

Egyptian ships.¹³) Yet, if Philip had sufficiently realized that the Romans would never be able to regard the peace of Phoenice, concluded hurriedly in 205, as a definitive settlement, but that after finishing the struggle with Carthage they would certainly want to punish him for the line of conduct followed by him during the second Punic war, he might perhaps — by concentrating in the years 205—201 upon the increasing of his fleet and the acquiring of naval allies (the Rhodians for instance) by means of a moderate, compliant policy — have succeeded in gathering a navy with which he could at least have tried to confront Rome. However, of such a notion we perceive nothing: in those years Philip behaved as if he had definitely settled accounts with the Romans and didn't fear the rod they had in pickle for him. Did he expect that Rome would still need many years to floor Carthage definitely and that he would be able to consolidate his conquests in and round the Aegean into a powerful empire with a considerable navy before the Romans could stir a finger against him? If so, he was sorely mistaken. Did the fact that in the autumn of 202 an Aetolian embassy, sent to invoke Roman protection against Macedonian aggression and to ask for a renewal of the old alliance, was rudely rejected by the senate, convince him that Rome now washed her hands of Greece? If so, this too was a miserable miscalculation: at that moment (on the eve of the decisive battle in Africa) Rome was in a nervous suspense and naturally couldn't pay attention to the East;¹⁴) but Hannibal's defeat would immediately change the matter. However this may be, instead of securing the sympathy and support of the Greek world against an eventual Roman revenge, Philip on the contrary did all he could in the years 204—201 to rouse the anger of the whole Greek world against himself, especially of Pergamum and Rhodes, both of them maritime powers. With regard to Pergamum this was only natural: Philip and Attalus had opposed each other for a long time, during the first Macedonian war the latter had supported Rome against Macedon and now he felt himself directly menaced by Philip's conquests in the Aegean and Asia Minor. But with Rhodes matters stood quite differently: she entertained friendly relations with Macedon, while on the other hand her relations with Pergamum and

¹³) 65 heavy ships against 53; but the numerous light craft of Philip caused the battle to remain more or less undecided, at least prevented it from ending in a crushing Macedonian defeat, Pol. 16, 2, 1. 10; 4, 2. 8.

¹⁴) See the second chapter, footnote 501.

Rome were rather strained: the Pergamene aspirations for expansion in the Aegean didn't square with the interests of sea-faring Rhodes, whereas Rome had roused the righteous anger and horror of the highly civilized republic by her brutal behaviour in the first Macedonian war; so the Rhodians had repeatedly mediated between Aetolia and Macedon in order to keep Pergamum and barbarous Rome from Greece, consequently in favour of Macedon.¹⁵⁾ That under these circumstances Philip managed to force the natural adversaries¹⁶⁾ Rhodes and Pergamum into a common war against Macedon and thereupon to drive them both into the arms of barbarous Rome, may seem to be unimaginable; but it happened nevertheless. He succeeded in accomplishing this clever piece of work by systematically acting the fire-brand in the Aegean against the friendly Rhodes, by capturing merchantmen himself and inciting others to acts of piracy too, by conquering islands and towns near the Dardanelles and — last, but not least — by the brutal maltreatment of Greek places as Cius and Thasos.¹⁷⁾ In this way the most sacred feelings of the civilized republic were hurt as badly as her commercial interests and so she was forced to join hands with Philip's enemies against barbarous Macedon. Is Cary wrong in calling the methods of this madcap suicidal? They were so especially from a maritime point of view. For now, even before Rome joined the war, he lost in 201 in the battle off Chios nearly half¹⁸⁾ his fleet, which had already been none too strong before, against the united squadrons of Rhodes and Pergamum, so that during the winter of 201—200 he was blockaded in Caria by his opponents and could only narrowly escape home in the spring; but, moreover, in the second Macedonian war itself he would have to face not only the Romans, but, standing shoulder to shoulder with them, Attalus and his own former friends the Rhodians, priceless squadrons and all. What wonder that the senate gratefully utilized the extraordinarily favourable juncture to crack its nut with Philip and treated the request for help from Pergamum and

¹⁵⁾ V. s. p. 123, Holleaux 35 sq., v. Gelder 119 sq.

¹⁶⁾ See for the antagonism between Pergamum and Rhodes, which continued during their co-operation, the good paper of Starr (*Classical Philology* 1938, 63—68).

¹⁷⁾ I cannot enter into a discussion of these facts, because they do not belong to Roman naval history. See *i. a.* Niese II, 571 sq., de Sanctis IV, 1, 1 sq., C. A. H. VIII, 138 sq., Cary, *A history of the Greek world from 323 to 146 b. C.* (London 1932), 186 sq., v. Gelder 121 sq., Petzold 31 sq.

¹⁸⁾ 26 battle-ships, 72 λέμβοι, Pol. 16, 7, 1—2.

Rhodes, which reached them in the autumn of 201,¹⁹⁾ in quite a different way than they had treated the Aetolian embassy that had invoked their assistance exactly a year before? It was as it were a present, made to them by Philip himself; and, moreover, they had freed their hands by this time.

From these remarks about the antecedents of the conflict it will, I hope, have become clear, how horribly inferior in naval numbers Philip was from the very beginning of this contest. During the whole war the Macedonian fleet did not leave the harbour,²⁰⁾ the Roman, Rhodian and Pergamene squadrons perfectly commanding the sea and freely doing what they liked. Now we might perhaps feel inclined to pass to the order of the day with the remark that during the whole war no naval battle took place, that consequently this war is to be regarded as wholly void of importance from a maritime point of view and that indeed the decisive battle was fought on land (at Cynoscephalae in 197). But such a way of viewing the matter is substantially wrong, though specious on the surface; to this war as well as to the preceding the maxim is applicable that in maritime history the fact that no battle took place often means more than a brilliant victory. Without the fact that the Macedonian fleet had been wholly shunted from the very beginning of the conflict and that its opponents commanded the sea completely, the Roman victory, though gained on land, would not even have been possible. With a demonstration of this truth I will close these introductory remarks.²¹⁾

In the barren, rocky Balkan Peninsula, where, to make matters worse, the adversary diligently saw to it that the victuals were not thick on the ground, Roman warfare on land was wholly dependent on its transmarine lines of communication; at the first glance this appears from the fact that during the whole of the war the Romans waged the contest

¹⁹⁾ Liv. 31, 2, 1; App. *Mac.* 4, 2; Pol. 16, 24, 3; Petzold 67.

²⁰⁾ It appeared on the scene for the last time during the siege of Abydos in the year 200 before the Roman fleet was brought into action (Pol. 16, 30; Liv. 31, 16—17); since that moment it was lying idle in the harbour of Demetrias (Liv. 31, 33, 1—2; 46, 8). For the rest there are only to be mentioned privateering raids from Chalcis before the arrival of the first Roman squadron in the autumn of 200 (Liv. 31, 22, 6—7) and activity of *lembi* at Corinth, which in 198 during the siege succeeded in bringing troops into the fortress (Liv. 32, 23, 11) and in 197 plundered the coast of Achaia (33, 14, 8). And that is all!

²¹⁾ Compare the excellent discussion of this problem by Clark 49 sq.

on land *from the west*, in order to limit the length of their lines of navigation as much as they could. During the first serious campaign (in 199) Sulpicius, who had his head-quarters between Apollonia and Dyrrhachium,²²⁾ penetrated through the Illyrian highlands into Upper Macedonia. However, in spite of his successes he was compelled to fall back upon his bases on the western coast, because in view of the length and difficulty of his communications by land he feared to get into straits by lack of victuals and other necessities;²³⁾ in other words the Romans were to a high degree dependent on their western coastal bases. Partly in order to avoid these difficulties,²⁴⁾ T. Flamininus, the consul of 198, chose another route, more southwards through Epirus to Thessaly. He succeeded in penetrating into Thessaly, but here he experienced in a similar way the precariousness of the communications by land. Already in Epirus he had ordered the route of the fleets of transports to be shifted more southward (to Ambracia); from here the victuals had to be transported by land to Gomphi in Thessaly, by a difficult, though not very long way.²⁵⁾ So Flamininus too was completely thrown upon his transmarine communications for the revictualling of his army;²⁶⁾ he couldn't even manage to pass the winter of 198—197 far from the sea in the ravaged Thessalian country, but chose Anticyra in Phocis on the Corinthian Gulf for his winter quarters, because there the fleets of transports could reach him easily.²⁷⁾ Consequently in the next years his head-quarters continued to be in Phocis; from here he marched again to Thessaly in 197 in order to fight the decisive battle. The important convoys which provided the Roman armies in Greece with all necessities are several times mentioned expressly by Livy, for instance 31, 19 (grain from Carthage and Masinissa), 32, 27, 2 (grain sent by Masinissa, victuals and clothes from Sicily and Sardinia), see also 32, 14, 7; 15, 5; 18, 3.

Now fancy that the Romans should not have had absolute naval

²²⁾ Liv. 31, 27.

²³⁾ Dio fr. 58, 4, Liv. 32, 9, 10, Plut. *Flam.* 4, see de Sanctis IV, 1, 55, Kromayer II, 31 sq.

²⁴⁾ Liv. and Plut. *l. l.*, de Sanctis IV, 1, 59, Kromayer II, 33 sq.

²⁵⁾ Liv. 32, 14, 7; 15, 5—7, Kromayer II, 55—56.

²⁶⁾ To be sure, his lack of victuals resulted also from his compliant mode of treating the Epirotes, who recently had been gained over to the Roman side and whose country was carefully spared for this reason (Liv. 32, 15, 5, Plut. *Flam.* 5); but also this moderateness was only made possible by the fact that Rome commanded the sea

²⁷⁾ Liv. 32, 18.

supremacy, but that the Macedonian fleet had been strong enough to dispute the possession of it and to cut off their transmarine communications in the west. In this case Rome would simply not have been able to wage the war on land in Greece; her armies would have been between two fires (between the Macedonian fleet in the west and the Macedonian army in the east) and would have met with starvation in the barren country.

But now (and this is another factor of consequence) the dubious privilege of finding oneself between two fires fell to the share of Macedon. For during the whole war the Romans operated systematically from two sides: in the autumn of 200, in 199 and 198 there was action by land from the west, while the fleet operated on the eastern side, in the Aegean; in 197 on the other hand the Roman land army took action in the east (in Thessaly), while the fleet subdued Acarnania on the western shores of Greece. In between Philip found himself with his land army; his fleet — we remarked it before — had been eliminated from the beginning. The allied fleets could land everywhere on the Greek coasts and attack wherever they thought fit; this forced Philip to garrison numerous vital points, not without serious detriment to the main body of his army, which was none too numerous in itself. But even this did not suffice to check the adversaries, because their naval forces proved capable of taking garrisoned and fortified places by storm or siege; so Philip himself must be present with his army everywhere at the same time, in order to prevent serious calamities, an impossible task which — let us give him his due — he bravely tried to fulfil, but as a matter of course he not always managed to cope with. In the autumn of 200 the important Chalcis was surprised and sacked by a Roman squadron before Philip who was at Demetrias could be on the spot to save it.²⁸⁾ In 199 the equally important Oreus in Euboea was conquered by the allied fleets, while Philip had to face Sulpicius in Upper Macedonia and while his fleet, blockaded by the Rhodians, was lying helpless in the harbour of the neighbouring Demetrias.²⁹⁾ Also in a general way the events of 199, the first year of the war (in 200 there had been only some preliminary operations in the autumn), are well fitted for the purpose of illustrating the awkwardness of Philip's position. He didn't know where the main attack would be

²⁸⁾ Liv. 31, 24, 1.

²⁹⁾ Liv. 21, 46, 6 sq.

launched by the Romans: he must reckon with the possibility of an invasion by land from the west, which, moreover, could be attempted by several roads, but, considering the method followed by Scipio against Carthage, he must also take into account the eventuality of a landing on the eastern side, Macedon's most vulnerable point;³⁰⁾ so he remained with the main body of his army in the central part of his empire, ready to meet all eventualities.³¹⁾ But when after all the main attack was launched from the west, Sulpicius stood already in Upper Macedonia before Philip could be on the spot to bar his way. No doubt, the Macedonian king hurried thither with his army and bravely did what he could, nor was the consul able to exploit his successes, the precariousness of his communications and of his means of revictualling (*v. s.*) forcing him to return to his Illyrian bases; but meanwhile the allied fleets could do in the Aegean what they liked and *i. a.* conquered Oreus: in consequence of this painful loss Philip was pretty nearly cut off from the central and southern parts of Greece, the Aetolians commanding the Thermopylae and Oreus the access to the Euripus.³²⁾

This naturally leads up to the discussion of a third important point: the positional drawback resulting from the lack of a strong navy made it impossible to Philip to protect his allies in Greece against the Romans. That his natural enemies, perceiving the awkwardness of his situation, immediately threw in their lot with his adversaries, goes without saying; but also neutrals and allies were automatically driven by it into the arms of Rome. The conquest of Oreus by the allied squadrons in 199 for instance, or rather the simple fact of their appearance before the town, was one of the factors that caused the Aetolians, who had been neutral up to that moment,³³⁾ to side henceforth with the Romans.³⁴⁾ And the same event brought home in a painful way to the Achaeans, Philip's allies in the Peloponnesus, that in case of need they could not longer count upon his assistance. When a year later the allied squadrons put into port

³⁰⁾ Really the allied fleets made an attempt in this year to conquer the important basis Cassandrea in Chalcidice; but it failed, Liv. 31, 45, 14 sq.

³¹⁾ See Kromayer II, 11 sq., who is naturally the principal authority for warfare on land during this war.

³²⁾ See de Sanctis IV, 1, 50 and 57.

³³⁾ They had not yet forgotten the Roman behaviour in the first Macedonian war and the humiliating treatment they had met with at Rome in the autumn of 202.

³⁴⁾ Liv. 31, 40, 9—10; 46, 1 sq.

at Cenchreae,³⁵) the Achaeans yielded willy-nilly and joined the Romans. Why? Let us introduce one of their leaders to speak for himself: *Philippi praeter legatum videmus nihil; Romana classis ad Cenchreas stat urbium Euboeae spolia prae se ferens and paene insula est Peloponnesus, angustis Isthmi faucibus continenti adhaerens, nulli apertior neque opportunior quam navali bello and finally mare in potestate habent; terras quascumque adeunt extemplo dicionis suae faciunt.*³⁶) This is plain language needing no explanation. And as in 198 Philip was not able to bind the Achaeans to himself and protect them against Rome, so he couldn't shield his most faithful allies, the Acarnanians, from being subdued by the Roman fleet in 197, while he was occupied himself by the decisive campaign of Cynoscephalae.³⁷)

To speak in this connexion of Philip's positional drawbacks is to express oneself in a far too mild way: the war resembles a game of chess, in which one of the players has to do without his queen from the very beginning; that means a game lost from the first move. To be sure, a land battle was to decide the war: the Roman legionaries had to prove on firm ground at Cynoscephalae that they were the superiors of the formidable Macedonian phalanx, and they did prove it; but without Roman naval supremacy it would not even have come to this final measuring of strength.

The fleetnumbers. The numerical strength of the Roman fleet which operated in the Greek waters during the second Macedonian war has not been handed down to us. According to de Sanctis (IV, 1, 37—38, 69) it amounted to 50 sail, but in my humble opinion there are valid reasons to regard this estimate as too low. Our starting point must be the speech, delivered by Aristaenus in 198 in the Achaean assembly, in which he ascribes a total effective of *centum tectae naves et quinquaginta leviores apertae et triginta Issaei lembi* to the allied fleets lying at Cenchreae.³⁸) We may leave out of account the 50 *leviores apertae*, which probably had been furnished by allies (Pergamum, Rhodes, perhaps also Athens, Byzantium, Crete and the Cyclades), and the 30 *lembi* coming from Issa and consequently non-Roman too; but what about the 100 armoured

³⁵) Liv. 32, 19, 3; 21, 7.

³⁶) Liv. 32, 21, 7. 26. 32; I have only quoted a few passages from this speech, but the whole of it is full of similar utterances.

³⁷) Liv. 33, 16—17.

³⁸) Liv. 32, 21, 27.

vessels? We know for a certainty that 24 Pergamene and 20 Rhodian ships were among them,³⁹⁾ so that there remain 56 sail for the Roman squadron. No doubt, there is reason to reduce this amount somewhat, because the numbers come from the speech of an orator pleading for submission to Rome and therefore inclined to exaggerate the Roman forces and round off the numbers of these forces in an upward direction; but at any rate we may roughly estimate the Roman squadron at Cenchreae at 50 sail and by this way de Sanctis too will have arrived at his number of 50 ships for the total Roman naval effective in the second Macedonian war. But then he forgot one thing: that the Romans naturally did not send their *whole* fleet from their naval head-quarters at Corcyra to the Aegean, but must have left a squadron in the waters west of Greece for conveying and patrolling services. If we remember that Roman warfare was wholly dependent on transmarine import, that already in the summer of 198, that is to say before the events at Cenchreae, the convoys with victuals made no longer for Illyria, but for Ambracia,⁴⁰⁾ and from the autumn of 198 (the time of the action of Cenchreae) for Anticyra on the Corinthian Gulf, where T. Flamininus had established his head-quarters,⁴¹⁾ that the Acarnanians were Philip's most zealous allies and that the afore-said convoys, if sailing to Ambracia, had to pass the northern coast, if bound for Anticyra, the western coast of Acarnania, we must regard it as manifest that at any rate on the west-side of Greece a Roman squadron must be present in order to shield the transports from pirates and privateers. Naturally this squadron had Corcyra, the naval head-quarters, for its base; how many ships it numbered, we do not know at all, because it is never mentioned. If we estimate it at 25 sail (it can scarcely have been much smaller), the total effective of the Roman fleet in the Greek waters amounted to \pm 75 ships in 198. And as we never hear of reinforcements,⁴²⁾ we may take it for granted that this effective dated from the beginning of the war.⁴³⁾

³⁹⁾ Liv. 32, 16, 6.

⁴⁰⁾ Liv. 32, 14, 7; 15, 5—7, v. s. p. 207.

⁴¹⁾ Liv. 32, 18, v. s. l. l.

⁴²⁾ The 2 quinqueremes with which L. Quinctius crossed to Corcyra in the spring of 198 (Liv. 32, 16, 2) will have returned to Brindisi.

⁴³⁾ Of course the number of 75 ships is only hypothetical; but anyhow I hope to have demonstrated that the total amount of Roman ships on service in the Greek waters must have been higher than 50 and therefore is probably to be sought in the neighbourhood of 75.

Armed with this result, we now must try to understand the naval arrangements of the years 201—200. According to Livy (31, 3, 1—6) M. Valerius Laevinus (the well-known commander of the second Punic war, who had won his spurs as an admiral in the Greek waters) was sent in the autumn of 201 as *legatus pro praetore* to the Illyrian waters with 38 ships of the squadron that was on the way back from Sicily with Cn. Octavius.⁴⁴) A year later, in the autumn of 200, the consul P. Sulpicius (during the second Punic war he had also succeeded Laevinus as commander in the Greek waters) followed with an unknown number of ships he had chosen from the squadron of Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, the consul of 201 (Liv. 31, 14, 1—2). As according to Livy (30, 41, 6—8) Lentulus' squadron (just as Octavius' squadron) numbered 50 sail, we may suppose that Sulpicius chose some 37 ships from this number, so that the squadron in the Greek waters was raised from 38 to ± 75 sail. I know very well, that Laevinus' expedition to Illyria in the autumn of 201 is usually classed by historical criticism among the fables of the annalists (I'll come back to it afterwards in my systematic discussion of the events), but I state here beforehand that the fleetnumbers furnish a strong argument in favour of its authenticity. For, if we reject Laevinus' expedition, we must suppose Sulpicius to have brought in 200 the total number of 75 ships to Corcyra; a simple calculation proves that he cannot have.... chosen 75 ships from a number of 50! In order to escape from this impasse we might suppose that the 40 ships of Scipio⁴⁵) and the 50 of Octavius⁴⁶) are tacitly included in Lentulus' squadron. But it is not advisable to twist the meaning of one historical datum in order to make possible the rejection of another: in such a case hypercriticism has almost certainly a finger in the pie.

For the rest we may cut matters short. In the autumn of 200 Sulpicius

⁴⁴) Cf. Liv. 30, 41, 6—8; 44, 13 and *v. s. p.* 181. As according to the first-quoted passage of Livy Octavius' squadron amounted to 50 ships, apparently 12 out of this number were not sufficiently seaworthy and therefore were not taken over by Laevinus from Octavius.

⁴⁵) *V. s. l.l.*; perhaps one might feel inclined to suppose that 30, 44, 13 (*Cn. Octavium classem in Siciliam ductam Cn. Cornelio consuli tradere iussit*) these 40 ships are included in the *classis*; but this is not necessary and, moreover, inconsistent with 30, 41, 7.

⁴⁶) If Laevinus' expedition might be spurious, these too would have been available in 200.

sent the legate C. Claudius Cento with 20 triremes ⁴⁷⁾ to Athens, so that ± 55 ships wintered at Corcyra. ⁴⁸⁾ After his surprising attack upon Chalcis Cento passed the winter with his squadron at the Piraeus. ⁴⁹⁾ In 199 L. Apustius sailed with an unknown number of ships from Corcyra to the Aegean; ⁵⁰⁾ probably he had some 30 sail, so that, including those of Cento, 50 Roman ships operated in the Aegean, while 25 remained in the western waters. Of these 50 30 passed the winter of 199—198 at the Piraeus, Apustius returning with 20 sail to Corcyra to winter there ⁵¹⁾ (consequently 45 Roman ships were at Corcyra during the winter of 199—198). In 198 the new naval commander L. Quinctius again operated with ± 50 ships in the Aegean (*v. s.*); consequently he had brought some 20 from Corcyra, as 30 were already present at the Piraeus. Apparently the whole Roman fleet passed the winter of 198—197 at Corcyra ⁵²⁾ and in 197 it remained in the western waters, where L. Quinctius conquered Leucas with an unknown, but probably considerable number of ships. ⁵³⁾ Finally in 195 40 Roman men of war took part in the war against Nabis. ⁵⁴⁾ For details I refer the reader to the systematic survey of the events; among the mentioned numbers there are some x's, but presuming the permanent presence of some 25 Roman ships in the western waters for patrolling and convoying services and estimating the total effective of the Roman fleet at 75 sail, we anyhow obtain a reasonable base for a rough, but probable estimate of the other unknown numbers too.

In conclusion a few words about the naval contingents of the allies. As far as we know, no naval contingents of allies from Italy took part in the war in the East; so much the more on the other hand the auxiliary squadrons of Pergamum and Rhodes contributed to the success. ⁵⁵⁾ In the important operations in the Aegean of 199 Pergamum took part with

⁴⁷⁾ *V. s. p.* 199.

⁴⁸⁾ Liv. 31, 14, 3; 22, 5.

⁴⁹⁾ Liv. 31, 25, 1—2; 26, 5.7.

⁵⁰⁾ Liv. 31, 44 sq.

⁵¹⁾ Liv. 31, 47, 2; 32, 16, 5.

⁵²⁾ Liv. 32, 23, 13.

⁵³⁾ Liv. 33, 17.

⁵⁴⁾ Liv. 34, 26, 11.

⁵⁵⁾ These contingents were not due *ex formula*: only after 167 Rhodes became an ally of Rome in the strict, formal sense (Pol. 30, 5, 6, Holleaux 30—46, Carcopino 49) and Attalus was at best *amicus*, not *socius populi Romani*; cf. Heuss 31 sq.

x, Rhodes with 20 *naves tectae*; ⁵⁶⁾ in 198 they respectively furnished 24 and 20 ships. ⁵⁷⁾ It is therefore reasonable to suppose that also in 199 the Pergamene squadron amounted to 24 sail. So in these two years the proportion of Roman to allied battle-ships in the Aegean was 50—44; if, moreover, we take into account that at least in 198 some 50 *leviores apertae* took part in the operations, which undoubtedly were furnished by Greek allies, ⁵⁸⁾ we may safely conclude that, as far as the operations in the Aegean were concerned, the naval contingents of the allies roughly equalled the Roman naval forces. There is perhaps a correlation between this fact and the phenomenon that apparently the winter-service (which, for the rest, was not very troublesome) used to be performed by turns: towards the winter of 199—198 the Rhodian and Pergamene squadrons sailed home, whereas 30 Roman ships kept watch at the Piraeus; ⁵⁹⁾ on the other hand the whole Roman fleet passed the winter of 198—197 at Corcyra, Attalus now remaining with his squadron at Aegina to watch the enemy. ⁶⁰⁾ Finally we meet with the same proportions in 195 in the war against Nabis: 40 Roman ships took part in the operations, while Rhodes furnished 18, Pergamum 10 *naves tectae* + 30 *lembi* and other light craft; ⁶¹⁾ that is again nearly half-and-half. Only the expedition against Chalcis in the autumn of 200 was executed predominantly, that against Leucas in 197 exclusively by Roman squadrons; ⁶²⁾ and in a general way too naval action on the west-side of Greece, of which the expedition against Leucas formed part, fell wholly to the share of the Roman navy. If finally we take into account the fact that besides the Pergamene, Rhodian and other Greek contingents the Romans could dispose of 20 *lembi* in 199, of 30 in 198, which the Dalmatian isle of Issa had furnished, ⁶³⁾ we arrive at the conclusion that they took upon themselves

⁵⁶⁾ Liv. 31, 46, 6.

⁵⁷⁾ Liv. 32, 16, 6.

⁵⁸⁾ Liv. 32, 21, 27, v. s. p. 210.

⁵⁹⁾ Liv. 31, 47, 2.

⁶⁰⁾ Liv. 32, 23, 13; 39, 2.

⁶¹⁾ Liv. 34, 26, 11.

⁶²⁾ Liv. 31, 22, 8; 33, 17.

⁶³⁾ Liv. 31, 45, 10; 32, 21, 27; for the position of the Issaeans as subjects of Rome Holleaux 106, 3 and 108, 3, for the naval contingents they furnished Zippel 92. — These *lembi* form the Roman reply to the fact that in 201 in the battle off Chios Philip for the first time had put into practice (with some success) a co-operation between heavy battle-ships and light craft (v. s. p. 203, 12). As we remarked before,

some 60 % of naval warfare in the second Macedonian war and no more than that. The marked difference between this and the second Punic war, when the auxiliary system had been strictly limited to a few secondary cases, ⁶⁴) is illustrated in a striking way by the fleetnumbers calculated here.

The naval personnel. That the personnel of the Rhodian, Pergamene, Issaeian auxiliary squadrons was composed of Rhodians, Pergamenes and Issaeans, stands to reason and does not interest us here; so I will confine my remarks to the crews of the properly Roman squadrons. It is highly remarkable that (just as for the first and second Punic wars) ⁶⁵) we possess only one piece of information on this point and — again just as before — à propos of a case of revolt or desertion. ⁶⁶) Livy ascribes the failure of the allied assault on Corinth in 198 i. a. to the following circumstance: ⁶⁷) *transfugarum Italicorum magna multitudo erat, pars ex Hannibalis exercitu metu poenae a Romanis Philippum secuta, pars navales socii relictis nuper classibus ad spem honoratoris militiae transgressi; hos desperata salus, si Romani vicissent, ad rabiem magis quam audaciam accendebat.* I have written out the passage *verbatim*, because it is interesting in many respects. In the first place the hard and none too honorable position the *socii navales* occupied in Roman military organization becomes pitifully apparent from it; the fact that under Roman conditions the passing from the naval to the land forces, even at the cost of insurrection or desertion, was regarded as an important promotion, is rarely expressed as plainly as here; as long as there were Romans, this always remained the same, even during the principate, in spite of the standing imperial fleets. Secondly we may safely suppose that the Italici, at least as far as they were *socii navales*, were for the greater part Italiots, that is to say citizens of Greek maritime towns in

there was no naval battle in the second Macedonian war, so that the *lembi* were only employed for the purpose of plundering (Liv. 31, 45, 10); but these light open boats would be maintained henceforth as part of the Roman naval forces. Also Pergamum appears (for the first time) to possess *lembi* in the war against Nabis (Liv. 34, 26, 11). In such respects the reactions of ancient rival states upon each other's measures of armament and ship-building were quite the same as in modern times.

⁶⁴) V. s. p. 200 sq.

⁶⁵) V. s. p. 196 sq.

⁶⁶) Roman historiography takes no interest in the *socii navales* and usually does not speak about them, except à propos of particular incidents.

⁶⁷) Liv. 32, 23, 9.

Southern Italy: of course they went over to compatriots (*i. e.* to Greeks), just as the Sikeliots had done during the Syracusan revolt in 214 and the next years. Finally it is evident that the fleets from which these people had run away must have been the 20 ships of Cento and the 30 of Apustius that had respectively passed the winters of 200—199 and 199—198 at the Piraeus: ⁶⁸⁾ from there Corinth could be reached most easily, but scarcely from Corcyra. Probably those deserters were relatively numerous: the number of new *socii navales* Quinctius received from the senate in the spring of 197 (of course partly to replace the runaways), amounted to 3000. ⁶⁹⁾

The naval command. We stated before (p. 194 sq.) that during the second Punic war the Romans were forced by circumstances to limit temporarily the consular command to warfare against Hannibal in Italy and to establish standing naval commands, partly given to (pro)praetors (in the Sicilian and Greek waters) and independent of the consuls. No doubt, after 211, when the worst pressure in Italy was over, they returned to the (pro)consular naval commands, but this did not upset the system of permanent squadrons and standing commands and the (pro)consul commanded personally his squadron, though he could and sometimes did delegate it to a *praefectus*. This last procedure became a standing rule during the second Macedonian war, which, though the new state of things was rooted in the preceding, meant nevertheless a serious change: the command of the consul again embraced land and sea both, he was commander of the land army and admiral at the same time; but, as he couldn't be present everywhere at the same time, he systematically delegated the naval command to a deputy, by order of the senate. ⁷⁰⁾ In the autumn of 201 *senatus decrevit ut P. Aelius consul quem videretur ei cum imperio mitteret, qui classe accepta, quam ex Sicilia Cn. Octavius reduceret, in Macedoniam traiceret. M. Valerius Laevinus propraetor missus circa Vibonem duodequadraginta navibus ab Cn. Octavio acceptis in Macedoniam transmisit.* ⁷¹⁾ In this case the consul couldn't leave Italy himself, his colleague being in Sicily, and therefore by order of the senate delegated the naval command to Laevinus as his deputy *cum imperio*;

⁶⁸⁾ V. s. p. 213.

⁶⁹⁾ Liv. 32, 28, 10.

⁷⁰⁾ See Tarn, *Companion*, 760.

⁷¹⁾ Liv. 31, 3, 2—3.

so the latter occupied the position of a *legatus pro praetore*.⁷²⁾ In the next years this system was continued, the only difference being that now the consul crossed himself to the Balkan Peninsula and there co-operated as commander of the land forces with his naval mandatary. That L. Apustius commanded the fleet as *legatus pro praetore* of the consul P. Sulpicius, appears first of all from the fact that Zonaras calls him *στρατηγός* ⁷³⁾ (Livy briefly calls him *legatus*, 31, 44, 1), secondly from the circumstance that it was he who in the winter of 200—199 replaced the consul during his illness as commander of the land forces (in this period the legate Cento temporarily occupied Apustius' naval command).⁷⁴⁾ Of C. Livius, Apustius' successor, we know nothing, because, just as the consul P. Villius, he commanded only from the autumn of 199 to the spring of 198 and was relieved before he could start operations;⁷⁵⁾ but admittedly his relation to the consul Villius was the same as the relation between Apustius and Sulpicius. For with his successor the system appears to be the same as with Apustius: in 198 and the next years L. Quinctius Flamininus was in possession of the naval command as *legatus pro praetore* of his brother Titus, the (pro)consul. On account of the afore-mentioned inscription, in which L. Flamininus is called *τραπεζεύς* (= *propraetor*), and of the fact that in the preceding year (199) he had been *praetor urbanus*,⁷⁶⁾ Dittenberger⁷⁷⁾ supposes that the senate had prolonged his praetorian command of 199 for the following years; which means that according to Dittenberger Lucius should have had an independent (not a delegated) naval command as *propraetor* (not as *legatus pro praetore*) side by side with his brother, who commanded the land forces as consul. The same might be inferred from the way in

⁷²⁾ From a legal point of view Manlius Torquatus' expedition to Sardinia in 215 (Liv. 23, 34, 14) and the expedition to Sicily in 192 (35, 23, 6) are exactly parallel.

⁷³⁾ 9, 15, 2; *στρατηγός*, the Greek version of the Latin *praetor*, is sometimes used by Greek historians and in inscriptions (for instance Dtb.³ 591, 5) in the sense of *ἀντιστρατηγός* (= *propraetor*). That only for the year 196 Apustius was elected *praetor* (Liv. 33, 24, 2), is no valid counter-argument.

⁷⁴⁾ Zon. 9, 15, 2—3; Liv. 31, 14, 3; 22, 5 sq.; 27; 44, 1.

⁷⁵⁾ Liv. 32, 3, 2; 6, 4; 9, 6 sq.; 16, 1 sq.; for the chronology de Sanctis IV, 1, 383 sq., Weissenborn ad 32, 16, 3. The praenomen Caius is not in the mss. (32, 16, 3), but has been added with great probability by H. J. Müller: C. Livius Salinator is meant, who in the Syrian war again commanded the fleet in 191 as praetor.

⁷⁶⁾ Liv. 32, 1, 2.

⁷⁷⁾ 591, 5.

which Livy mentions his appointment;⁷⁸) but nevertheless it cannot be true, because the same Livy calls him not only *praefectus* (which does not prove much), but also *legatus* of his brother, the consul.⁷⁹) Consequently T. Flamininus must have appointed him by order of the senate, just as Laevinus had been appointed by the consul of 201;⁸⁰) by means of this appointment the naval command was delegated to him by the consul, who legally remained himself the admiral: Lucius was not *propraetor*, but *legatus pro praetore* of the consul. This is also proved by the fact that in the spring of 197 the new *socii navales* together with the new land forces were given by the senate to Titus and not to the naval commander Lucius.⁸¹) I suppose that Livy's wording (32, 16, 2) has shortened the procedure, so that we get the wrong impression that the senate had appointed him directly instead of indirectly (*i. e.* by ordering the consul to appoint him).⁸²)

Undoubtedly this method of appointing naval commanders was perfectly adapted to the special circumstances of the second Macedonian war: a continuous co-operation between land- and naval forces was demanded by them and therefore the supreme command must necessarily remain in one hand, the consul's; on the other hand the operations themselves seem to prove that in practice the naval commander was sufficiently independent to prevent operations from being paralysed. Moreover, the co-operation of senate and consul in appointing the naval commander guaranteed a better selection of able men equal to this rather special task than the regular elections could effect, the results of which used to be determined by aristocratic family-intrigues and by the whims of popular favour; the *legati* who during this war commanded the navy were certainly equal to their task, as is proved by the events themselves. Another question is, whether the system allowed the creation of such standing commands as had been customary during the second Punic war.

⁷⁸) 32, 16, 2 *L. Quinctius frater consulis, cui classis cura maritimaeque orae imperium mandatum ab senatu erat*, cf. *Plut. Flam.* 3.

⁷⁹) 33, 17, 2; 34, 50, 11; 35, 10, 8.

⁸⁰) The fact that this legal procedure is sharply and plainly described à propos of Laevinus' command, but only vaguely hinted at à propos of Quinctius' appointment, so that the latter, which nobody thinks of suspecting, must be elucidated by means of the former, which is rejected almost unanimously, is, besides the fleetnumbers (*v. s.*), another argument for the authenticity of Laevinus' expedition. I'll come back to it.

⁸¹) *Liv.* 32, 28, 10.

⁸²) See Weissenborn ad 32, 16, 2; Tarn, *Companion*, 760.

This depended upon the term of office of the consul himself, because as a matter of course the *legatus pro praetore* who commanded the fleet was closely connected with the consul who had appointed him. Together with his principal, the consul P. Sulpicius, L. Apustius was maintained in his function from the autumn of 200 to the autumn of 199 and in the same way C. Livius together with the consul P. Villius from the autumn of 199 to the spring of 198. But when the *imperium* of Titus Flamininus, the consul of 198, was prolonged by the senate, as a matter of course his brother and naval mandатарy was maintained too:⁸³⁾ both retained their functions for five years continuously (198—194). That only so late in this war standing commands (on land as well as in the maritime sphere) were established again, though they had amply proved their efficiency during the second Punic war, is not imputable to the mode of appointing the naval commanders, but to the strong natural tendency of Roman aristocracy towards a yearly change of commands. Of course the system of appointment as such would not have prevented Rome from prolonging the terms of office of her commanders from the very beginning of the war; but in the Roman community of deadly jealous aristocrats the resistance against such a procedure was too strong and it was much stronger in this period than during the second Punic war, when the existence of numerous fronts simply forced upon them a system of regular and long *prorogationes*: in the period now under discussion the jealous character of Roman oligarchy finds its most marked expression, partly as a reaction upon the powerful prolonged commands of the preceding war; the quinquennial command of the two Flaminini remained an isolated exception⁸⁴⁾ and even this met with resistance (Liv. 32, 28; 33, 25, 4 sq.; 34, 43, 3 sq.).

Survey of the events: 201. The second Macedonian war was declared and opened in the year 200; but already in the autumn of 201, shortly after the arrival of the Rhodian and Pergamene envoys,⁸⁵⁾ it was anticipated on the Roman side with the sending of M. Valerius Laevinus with 38 ships to the Illyrian waters.⁸⁶⁾ The object of this expedition will have

⁸³⁾ Liv. 32, 28, 9—11.

⁸⁴⁾ De Sanctis IV, 1, 505—506.

⁸⁵⁾ Liv. 31, 2, 1, v. s. p. 205.

⁸⁶⁾ Liv. 31, 3, 1—3, v. s. p. 212.

been to possess a trustworthy observer in the Balkan area (during the first Macedonian war Laevinus had been naval commander in those waters for a long time and he was thoroughly acquainted with Greek-Macedonian conditions) and to protect for the present the Roman bases on the Illyrian coast by means of a strong squadron against all eventualities. Laevinus' expedition belongs to the small number of events during the second Macedonian war that have aroused the suspicion of historical criticism. For in the main Livy derived his description of the war directly from Polybius; but Laevinus' mission is told by him in the introductory chapters of book 31, which rest upon the annalistic tradition and really contain several more or less serious forgeries. Consequently the surroundings of Laevinus' expedition are rather suspect; the mission of M. Aurelius for instance, ⁸⁷⁾ which is connected with his own, is certainly spurious. ⁸⁸⁾ But there is more. We may call attention to the fact that the annalist Valerius Antias, who is probably Livy's authority in this part of his work, ⁸⁹⁾ had the morbid habit of pushing namesakes from the *gens Valeria* into the foreground, alas often in a way inconsistent with historical probity. And moreover — last, but not least — Laevinus' mission vanishes without leaving a trace. If it is authentic, we must presume that he remained in the Illyrian waters till the autumn of 200, when the consul P. Sulpicius arrived there with army and fleet, and that thereupon he returned to Rome, leaving behind his ships, which were added to Sulpicius' squadron; but... on that occasion ⁹⁰⁾ Livy does not even hint at Laevinus or his ships! Shortly afterwards he mentions (without any comment) the solemnities occasioned by his decease, ⁹¹⁾ and that is all.

And yet these objections are not at all conclusive in my opinion. To begin with the last-mentioned argument: communications about naval affairs which end as it were in smoke, which are made to be forgotten a moment afterwards, are often enough to be found in Roman historiography, without there being any valid reason to reject them. One instance from the immediate surroundings: the expedition of Cento with

⁸⁷⁾ Liv. 31, 3, 4—6; 5, 5—7; cf. 30, 42, 5—6.

⁸⁸⁾ De Sanctis IV, 1, 21, 55; 38, 69; Holleaux, *C. A. H.* VIII, 156, 1, and recently Perzold 77 sq.

⁸⁹⁾ See *i. a.* Klotz, *Heft* 1.

⁹⁰⁾ Liv. 31, 14, 1 sq.

⁹¹⁾ Liv. 31, 50, 4.

20 sail from Corcyra to the Piraeus and from there to Chalcis is told by Livy in detail (from Polybius);⁹²⁾ his ships must have passed the winter of 200—199 at the Piraeus and have been united with Apustius' squadron in the spring of 199. But neither the hibernation nor the uniting of the two squadrons is mentioned at all and at the moment of Apustius' appearance on the scene the legate Cento is not even hinted at.⁹³⁾ All these things are tacitly presupposed and it occurs to nobody to regard this silence as a reason for suspicion; naturally not, for Livy's account of these events rests upon Polybius! As for the untrustworthiness of the annalists, undoubtedly they do confront us with forgeries of all sorts, but nevertheless they have handed down to us authentic facts as well; often, as for instance in this case, authentic and spurious materials have been contaminated by them: in such a case it is our task to disengage the authentic nucleus from its spurious surroundings, but not to reject the good with the bad. We remarked before⁹⁴⁾ that the fleetnumbers as well as the legal procedure of Laevinus' appointment furnish arguments for the authenticity of his mission; but, moreover, this mission is highly probable in itself: if it had not been handed down, we ought almost to postulate it! More than anybody else Laevinus was the right man for such a task on account of his antecedents; but moreover: at the moment that Laevinus was sent out, in the autumn of 201, the senate was already resolved to go to war against Philip. This appears clearly from the fact that P. Sulpicius was elected consul for the year 200:⁹⁵⁾ just as Laevinus he had become personally acquainted with Greek-Macedonian conditions during the first Macedonian war and in that period he had co-operated already as admiral with Attalus of Pergamum; consequently his being elected consul for 200 meant that the Romans intended to entrust him again with the command in the war against Macedon, . . . as it happened in reality. Now then, wasn't it a matter of course that the senate, when once they had decided to go to war against Macedon in 200, immediately saw to it that the Illyrian beachheads, without which a war against Macedon couldn't even be started, were shielded from eventual surprises by the sending of a strong squadron? On the other hand it stands to reason that we scarcely hear any more of Laevinus after his departure

⁹²⁾ 31, 14, 3; 22, 5 sq.

⁹³⁾ 31, 44 sq.

⁹⁴⁾ *V. s.* p. 212 and 218, 80.

⁹⁵⁾ Liv. 31, 4, 4.

for Illyria: at the moment of his departure Philip was in Asia Minor with his army and fleet, where during the winter of 201—200 he was blockaded by the Rhodian and Pergamene squadrons; ⁹⁶⁾ he spent also a great part of the year 200 with conquests on the Thracian coast and the Hellespont, ⁹⁷⁾ his fleet again co-operating with his land army; so Laevinus' task will have been limited to patrolling services along the Illyrian shores and the sending of reports to the senate. ⁹⁸⁾ It seems highly questionable, whether in the autumn of 201 the senate was thoroughly acquainted with Philip's plans; but even the most complete knowledge of them didn't make superfluous such a precautionary measure with regard to the Illyrian beachheads: the senate acted wisely in making here assurance doubly sure. One objection remains to be discussed: would Philip really have started his expedition to the Thracian coast and the Hellespont in the year 200, if he had known that Laevinus' squadron was cruising along the Illyrian shores, and isn't the fact that he *did* start it a valid reason to banish the squadron from history? But in the first place Philip was a born dare-devil. Secondly there were serious reasons that forced upon him the expedition to the Thracian coast and the Hellespont: 1°, in case of a war with the Romans in which these would command the sea, he must at least secure the communications by land with his recent conquests in Asia Minor; 2°, again with a view to the possibility of a war with Rome, he must protect Macedon against an invasion on the eastern side, its most vulnerable point, in other words he must occupy the Thracian coast. ⁹⁹⁾ Moreover, the fact that in the spring of 200 the rural majority of the *comitia* had rejected the declaration of war, because they naturally didn't want to start on a new adventure immediately after the long Punic war, will have eased his mind, for the present at least, and will have made him believe Laevinus' mission to be only a demonstration or a precautionary measure, which it was indeed; when a few months afterwards (in the summer of 200) the Roman assembly, forced by the false propagandism and the pressure of government and impressed by the incident between Athens and Macedon, changed

⁹⁶⁾ V. s. p. 205.

⁹⁷⁾ V. i.

⁹⁸⁾ The report communicated by Livy (31, 3, 4—6; 5, 5—7) doesn't make the impression of being genuine and is, moreover, connected with M. Aurelius, see Niese II, 590, 2; but after all a grain of historical truth may be hidden in it.

⁹⁹⁾ Liv. 31, 15, 11, Pol. 16, 29, 1, C. A. H. VIII, 163.

its mind and decided to go to war, ¹⁰⁰) Philip in the meantime had gone to the East, where the Roman declaration of war reached him at Abydus. So the upshot of this long-winded discussion is that there is no reason to reject the authenticity of Laevinus' mission; for the rest the importance of this little problem lies more in the sphere of methodology than of history itself, because his task was only of a modest, more or less latent character.

Only late in the summer of the year 200 the war itself was opened ²⁰⁰ on the Roman side (*i. a.* in connexion with the procrastination of the declaration of war): at that time the consul P. Sulpicius crossed to Illyria with land and naval forces. Consequently warfare of this year belongs for the greater part rather to the war of Pergamum and Rhodes against Philip than to the second Macedonian war resulting from this; nevertheless we cannot leave these events out of account. In the spring of 200 Philip had succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the Rhodian and Pergamene squadrons blockading him in Caria ¹⁰¹) and in returning to Macedon. ¹⁰²) The allied fleets followed closely after him; Attalus sailed with his squadron to Aegina, the important basis acquired by him from the Aetolians during the first Macedonian war, ¹⁰³) the Rhodians on the other hand probably making directly for the Piraeus, ¹⁰⁴) where Attalus too made soon his appearance. For immediately after Philip's return (in the spring of 200) an incident of slight importance had occasioned a

¹⁰⁰) From Livy (31, 6—8) we get the impression that the two meetings of the assembly followed each other closely; but I agree with de Sanctis (IV, 1, 32, 65), that some months (from the spring to the summer of 200) must have passed between them, cf. Petzold 42.

¹⁰¹) V. s. p. 205.

¹⁰²) See for the following events Pol. 16, 25—35; Liv. 31, 14, 4—18.

¹⁰³) See chapter II, footnote 275.

¹⁰⁴) According to Livy (31, 14, 11) they sailed with Attalus to Aegina and made from there for the Piraeus, but this seems to be improbable: the relations between Rhodes and Pergamum were rather strained, in spite of the co-operation (*v. l.*), afterwards the Rhodian squadron sailed home directly from the Piraeus (Pol. 16, 26, 10 in contradistinction to Liv. 31, 15, 8) and we may suppose that they took the Athenian ships they had recaptured from the Macedonians (Pol. 16, 26, 9; Liv. 31, 15, 5; for the rest we do not know anything about those ships) directly to the Piraeus. See Starr Class. Phil. 1938, 64, 1.

conflict between Athens and Macedon, resulting in a plundering raid on Athenian territory.¹⁰⁵) Presumably matters might have been easily arranged; but Attalus and the Rhodians, cautiously seconded by Roman envoys,¹⁰⁶) succeeded in driving Athens to join the allied powers and declare war upon Macedon. Thereupon Attalus returned to Aegina, where he remained for some time, because he entertained hopes of bringing the Aetolians to join the alliance against Macedon, hopes naturally¹⁰⁷) proving vain. The Rhodian fleet sailed home via Keos, accompanied by some *naves apertae* of the Athenians¹⁰⁸); on their way the Rhodians succeeded in bringing into alliance with themselves the Cyclades, except Andros, Paros and Kythnos which were held by Macedonian garrisons.¹⁰⁹) From two inscriptions dating from this period¹¹⁰) we know that the islanders immediately joined the Rhodian fleet with their ships, that they engaged to furnish vessels in future too and that this fleet guarded the islands and protected the safety of navigation under command of a Rhodian *ἀρχων*. In a word, the league of islanders which formerly had policed the seas under Egyptian control, revived now under control of Rhodes.¹¹¹) Moreover, already since 201 Rhodes had succeeded in winding up the Cretan war¹¹²) which had chiefly arisen from Philip's intrigues:¹¹³) the treaty with Hierapytna which dates from those years was one of the results.¹¹⁴) In short, since 200 the Rhodians policed the seas with vigour

¹⁰⁵) That also a naval engagement had taken place, appears from the Athenian ships which had been captured by Macedon and recaptured by the Rhodians; but we do not know details, see footnote 104 and Petzold 39, 45 and 40, 49.

¹⁰⁶) For the Roman assembly had rejected the declaration of war and it was exactly the conflict between Athens and Macedon that would considerably contribute to the repealing of this decision; so the Roman envoys remained cautiously in the background, de Sanctis IV, 1, 32, 65.

¹⁰⁷) V. s. footnote 33.

¹⁰⁸) Dtb.³ 582, 5.

¹⁰⁹) Liv. 31, 15, 8; Pol. 16, 26, 10.

¹¹⁰) Dtb.³ 582 and 583.

¹¹¹) See i. a. Ormerod 133 sq. and 148 sq.

¹¹²) Antiochus who, in spite of the agreement with Philip concerning the dividing of the Egyptian dominions, must regard the Macedonian king as a potential adversary, had acted as mediator, Holleaux, *Klio* 1913, 137 sq., v. d. Mijnsbrugge, *The Cretan Koinon* (New York 1931), 66 sq. and the inscriptions discussed by him (D. I. 5167, 5177).

¹¹³) Pol. 13, 4 and v. s. p. 203, 9 and 205.

¹¹⁴) Dtb.³ 581; that Rhodes had already come to an agreement with the important Cnossus before, appears from this inscription (XV).

and success, protecting navigation and fighting piracy,¹¹⁵⁾ for the prospering of which during the preceding years Philip was largely responsible; their principal contribution to human civilization lay in this sphere and the Romans willingly left to their sea-faring allies a task which they had the tendency to shirk themselves as much as they could. If there was yet some privateering, it was exercised in more or less legalized forms, *i.e.* it formed part of the regular warfare against Macedon.¹¹⁶⁾ In this light we must view Pausanias' communication about Cretan support to Athens against Macedon:¹¹⁷⁾ Philip had lost for a good deal the support of the Cretans, who, partly at least, now sided with Rhodes and her allies.¹¹⁸⁾ And the great number of light, open ships we meet afterwards, for instance in 198,¹¹⁹⁾ among the allied squadrons, probably came not only from Rhodes and Pergamum, but also from Athens, Crete and the Cyclades.¹²⁰⁾

But, however important and memorable the fact might be that in 200 the Rhodians succeeded in rallying the islanders round themselves, it is manifest on the other hand that this achievement must be mighty unwelcome to Attalus left behind at Aegina; for he entertained strong thalassocratic aspirations himself.¹²¹⁾ Still in the same year this would give rise to friction between the queer couple of allies and bring to the surface their latent animosity.

Meanwhile Philip had marched to the east, his fleet accompanying him and co-operating with the army; he conquered Maronea, Aenus and other places on the Thracian coast, thereupon he took Elaeus, Alopeconnesus, Callipolis and Madytus in the Chersonese and finally prepared for an attack upon Abydus on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont.¹²²⁾ For on the one hand it was his object to protect Macedon

¹¹⁵⁾ That Rhodes' chief object in concluding treaties with Cretan towns was to suppress the piracy endemic there, appears plainly from the inscription of Hierapytna (X), see Ziebarth 28.

¹¹⁶⁾ Dtb.³ 582, 6; of course there were always exceptions: Nabis of Sparta practised piracy systematically till 195 and up to that year he had connexions with some towns in Crete, Liv. 34, 32, 18—19; 35, 9.

¹¹⁷⁾ 1, 36, 5—6.

¹¹⁸⁾ v. d. Mijsbrugge, *l.l.*

¹¹⁹⁾ V. s. p. 210.

¹²⁰⁾ And perhaps from Byzantium, see Dtb.³ 580 and Pol. 16, 2, 10.

¹²¹⁾ V. s. p. 204 sq.

¹²²⁾ Liv. 31, 16.

against an invasion on the east-side (its most vulnerable point) by occupying the Thracian coast, on the other to secure at least the communication by land with his Asiatic conquests, because his adversaries commanded the sea; ¹²³) so the possession of the beachhead Abydus was highly important for him. Now it is a very remarkable fact — Polybius is apparently scandalized by it ¹²⁴) — that Rhodes and Pergamum scarcely stirred a finger to save the brave town which had shut its gates and now was defending itself to the utmost of its power against the assaulter, notwithstanding the circumstance that for them too great interests were at stake in this desperate struggle: think for instance of the command of the straits! The total assistance Abydus received from without consisted of 300 Pergamene soldiers, 1 Rhodian quadrireme and 1 trireme from Cyzicus! ¹²⁵) But the Rhodian fleet which, after sailing home from the Piraeus, had set sail for the North on receiving the news of Philip's conquests, was lying idle near Tenedos and even after Attalus from Aegina had joined the Rhodians with his squadron, this line of conduct was not changed; ¹²⁶) so Abydus perished with almost her whole population after a brave and protracted resistance. ¹²⁷)

There is only one reasonable explanation for this puzzling phenomenon and it has been given by Starr. ¹²⁸) We remarked before that Attalus and Rhodes were a queer sort of allies, *bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble*: ¹²⁹) their interests were naturally opposed and willy-nilly they had been driven into each other's arms by the brutal behaviour of Philip; but below the surface the antithesis continued to exist. Isn't it natural that in consequence of Rhodes' successful attempt at rallying the islanders it came to the surface again? Attalus was irritated by the Rhodian thalassocracy and appeared only late at Tenedos; ¹³⁰) the Rhodians on the other hand may have been afraid that, if Abydus was relieved, Attalus should try to appropriate the town; so probably a lot of precious time was frittered away at Tenedos with angry and suspicious words and in

¹²³) V. s. p. 222, Pol. 16, 29, Liv. 31, 15, 11.

¹²⁴) 16, 28, Liv. 31, 15, 10—16, 8.

¹²⁵) Liv. 31, 16, 7, Pol. 16, 30, 7; 31, 3.

¹²⁶) Liv. 31, 16, 6—8; Pol. 16, 34, 1.

¹²⁷) For the siege Pol. 16, 30—34, Liv. 31, 17—18.

¹²⁸) 67 sq.

¹²⁹) V. s. p. 204 sq.

¹³⁰) Liv. 31, 16, 6—8.

the meantime Abydus perished through lack of co-operation between the allies. Correlative with these phenomena is the fact that after the fall of Abydus Achaean envoys came to Rhodes in order to mediate peace between the Rhodians and Philip; ¹³¹⁾ no doubt, Roman envoys, present in the island, opposed the conclusion of a separate peace and indeed succeeded in retaining for Rome the assistance of the Rhodians against Macedon, but the fact in itself that the Achaeans could think of making such an attempt at mediation with some hope of success, proves that Rhodes was but a very cool ally. In the autumn of 200 she supported the Roman squadron of Cento with no more than 3 quadriremes ¹³²⁾ and only in 199, after an urgent summons from Roman head-quarters, ¹³³⁾ she began to co-operate strenuously with the Romans in the Macedonian war; since that moment we perceive no more signs of reserve, at least for the present.

In the summer of 200 ¹³⁴⁾ the Roman assembly, under the impression of the Athenian-Macedonian conflict and urged by the government, repealed its former negative decision and sanctioned the declaration of war: Rome's prestige was now at stake, Philip having simply disregarded her demand that he should abstain from war against Athens or any other Greek state; the Roman ultimatum, made unacceptable on purpose, reached Philip at Abydus. After garrisoning the town he returned to Macedon towards the autumn; on the way the news reached him that the consul P. Sulpicius had crossed with land- and naval forces to Illyria and that the army had chosen Apollonia for its head- and winter-quarters, the navy Corcyra. ¹³⁵⁾ We shall now have to fix our attention on those parts, because this year of the war wound up in the autumn with the first military achievements of the Romans.

In the late summer of 200 ¹³⁶⁾ P. Sulpicius had crossed from Brindisi to Illyria with 2 legions and \pm 37 men of war he had picked from the squadron of Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, the consul of 201; we tried to demonstrate above that Laevinus' squadron of 38 ships which since the autumn of 201 had been on service in the Illyrian waters was now added

¹³¹⁾ Pol. 16, 35.

¹³²⁾ Liv. 31, 22, 8.

¹³³⁾ Liv. 31, 28, 4.

¹³⁴⁾ V. s. p. 222.

¹³⁵⁾ Liv. 31, 18, 9; 22, 4 sq.

¹³⁶⁾ Liv. 31, 22, 4, de Sanctis IV, 1, 383—384.

to Sulpicius' fleet and that Laevinus returned home.¹³⁷⁾ Consequently the naval forces Rome was going to operate with in the second Macedonian war amounted to some 75 sail and, as it was already late in the year, this fleet went into winter-quarters at Corcyra, while the consul with the land army pitched his camp somewhat north of Apollonia on the Apsus.¹³⁸⁾ Yet, at the urgent request of Athenian envoys, a part of the fleet, 20 triremes, were immediately sent to Attica under command of the legate C. Claudius Cento, in order to protect the Athenian territory against eventual surprises.¹³⁹⁾ Cento was not the regular naval commander: during this expedition he acted as substitute for the *legatus pro praetore* L. Apustius who was the normal naval deputy of the consul, but who by virtue of his function of second-in-command had now to replace Sulpicius during his illness as commander of the land forces.¹⁴⁰⁾

The arrival of the Roman squadron at the Piraeus¹⁴¹⁾ put immediately a stop to the raids by land from Corinth and the pirates' raids from Chalcis which had scourged Attica before.¹⁴²⁾ But Cento didn't limit his action to the protection of the Athenian territory for the purpose of which he had been sent; he decided to make an attempt at surprising the important Chalcis, one of Philip's principal strongholds in Greece. Sailing by night from Sunium he succeeded in reaching Chalcis before daybreak¹⁴³⁾ and penetrating unperceived into the town. Livy's account which implies the complete conquest of Chalcis and the destruction of the garrison is perhaps somewhat coloured, though it rests upon

¹³⁷⁾ Liv. 31, 14, 1—2, v. s. p. 212 and 219 sq.

¹³⁸⁾ Liv. 31, 18, 9; 22, 4 sq.; 27, 1.

¹³⁹⁾ Liv. 31, 14, 3; 22, 5 sq., Zon. 9, 15, 3; consequently there remained 55 ships at Corcyra. For the triremes v. s. p. 198; the 1000 soldiers sent with Cento (50 men a ship) will have been the legionaries who used to be added to the permanent garrisons of 30—40 men a ship; in this way we arrive at a total amount of 80—90 men a ship, which was indeed the normal garrison of a trireme, see Kromayer, *Flotte*, 489.

¹⁴⁰⁾ Zon. 9, 15, 2—3; App. *Mac.* 4, 3; Liv. 31, 27, 1. 8, v. s. p. 217; consequently in 199, after Sulpicius' recovery, Apustius acted as naval commander again, Liv. 31, 44, 1.

¹⁴¹⁾ See for the following events Liv. 31, 22, 5—23; Zon. 9, 15, 3.

¹⁴²⁾ Corinth, Chalcis and Demetriás were the 3 chief strongholds, by means of which Philip commanded Greece; piracy belonged to the normal Macedonian practices, see Diod. 28, 1; Pol. 18, 54, 7—10.

¹⁴³⁾ His fleet had been reinforced with 3 Rhodian quadriremes and 3 open Athenian ships, v. s. p. 227.

Polybius; ¹⁴⁴) at any rate Cento made no attempt at occupying the town permanently: he couldn't dispose of a sufficient number of soldiers to garrison Chalcis strongly and to protect Athens at the same time; so he evacuated the town and sailed back to the Piraeus. From a Roman point of view this course of things was regrettable; as Livy rightly remarks, the occupation of this vital point immediately at the beginning of the war would have been of the highest importance: in losing Chalcis Philip would have lost the Euripus which formed almost his only good way of communication with southern Greece, the neutral and soon hostile Aetolians commanding the Thermopylae. ¹⁴⁵) But the conquest of Oreus in the next year made up for this adversity.

There is certainly reason to ask here: where was the Macedonian fleet? At any rate it must still have comprised upwards of 20 battle-ships and a great number of *lembi* ¹⁴⁶) and on this occasion it got its only chance during the whole war of fighting a numerically weaker enemy; ¹⁴⁷) why didn't it avail itself of this chance? For at this juncture it appeared no more on the scene than later on in the war; its co-operation with the land army in the siege of Abydus remained its last military achievement. The answer to this question — as far as I know it has never been noticed — must be sought in Attalus' squadron. It is highly remarkable that Livy does not even hint at it in connexion with Cento's expedition and only tells us afterwards ¹⁴⁸) that Attalus passed the winter of 200—199 at Aegina. That he was already present there during Cento's expedition to Chalcis, is highly probable on account of the fact that immediately

¹⁴⁴) De Sanctis IV, 1, 47, 85.

¹⁴⁵) De Sanctis IV, 1, 47; Liv. 31, 23, 11—12: *ut terra Thermopylarum angustiae Graeciam, ita mari fretum Euripi claudit.*

¹⁴⁶) V. s. p. 203 and 205; where the Macedonian fleet was lying, we do not know, but probably it was already at that moment, partly at least (Liv. 31, 33, 1), at Demetrias, where also afterwards it would be lying idle during the whole of the war: Philip's expedition via Chalcis to Attica, which closely followed the Roman surprising attack upon Chalcis, was started from Demetrias and he needed ships for it, v. i.

¹⁴⁷) Cento had only three (Rhodian) quadriremes, 20 Roman triremes and 3 light Athenian ships, whereas the Macedonian battle-fleet consisted chiefly of quadriremes and quinqueremes (p. 203), was nearly as numerous and, moreover, was seconded by a great number of light craft; consequently it was in reality stronger than Cento's naval forces.

¹⁴⁸) 31, 28, 3.

after Attalus sent soldiers from Aegina to Athens; ¹⁴⁹⁾ after the fall of Abydus, when the Rhodians sailed home, ¹⁵⁰⁾ he will have returned with his fleet from Tenedos to Aegina. It was this squadron that by its very presence in the Athenian waters doomed the Macedonian fleet to idleness during Cento's action; a fair instance of a fleet in being. ¹⁵¹⁾

We may make short work of Philip's revenging expedition against Athens, because it belongs to warfare on land; nevertheless we perceive even here the influence of Roman maritime supremacy upon the course of events, also on land. On receiving the news of the surprising attack on Chalcis Philip, who was at Demetrias, hurried to Chalcis with his army, ¹⁵²⁾ but the bird was flown, Cento having sailed back to Athens before his arrival. Thereupon he marched through Boeotia to Attica, hoping to take Athens by surprise. But this attempt failed, and when on the next day forces sent by Attalus from Aegina ¹⁵³⁾ and Romans from the Piraeus, where in the meantime Cento had returned with his fleet, had entered the town, he gave up his plans against Athens and tried to surprise Eleusis; but here too he met with a disappointment, *i. a.* because the Roman fleet came to the rescue from the Piraeus in time. A second attack, made shortly afterwards upon Eleusis, miscarried as badly as the former, the Roman fleet sailing again from the Piraeus to Eleusis and throwing a garrison into the town. And when immediately upon this Philip turned against the Piraeus, the Roman fleet was back in good time to take part in the defence of this place as well. ¹⁵⁴⁾ So the rapid displacements of Roman (and Pergamene) troops by sea effected that Philip could do

¹⁴⁹⁾ Liv. 31, 25, 1.

¹⁵⁰⁾ They sent only 3 quadriremes to support Cento, *v. s.*

¹⁵¹⁾ Of course we must also take into account the surprising character of Cento's expedition and perhaps reckon with serious damages, incurred by the Macedonian fleet during the siege of Abydus, cf. Pol. 16, 30, 4, Liv. 31, 17, 1.

¹⁵²⁾ Liv. 31, 24, Zon. 9, 15, 3—4; Livy apparently assumes that Philip marched all the way from Demetrias to Chalcis by land, but this was impossible, the Thermopylae being in the hands of the Aetolians; he must have transported his troops by sea from Demetrias to Oreus or perhaps to some place in Locris or Boeotia and from there have marched by land. His fleet was probably lying at Demetrias, partly at least, *v. s.* footnote 146.

¹⁵³⁾ Liv. 31, 25, 1; already before there was a Pergamene garrison at Athens (31, 24, 10), probably since the spring of 200, when Attalus visited the town from Aegina (*v. s.* p. 223); so this was the second force, sent by Attalus.

¹⁵⁴⁾ Liv. 31, 25, 2; 26, 5—7; Zon. 9, 15, 3.

nothing against the Attic maritime towns by land; by the fact that the Romans commanded the sea warfare on land was decisively influenced on this occasion.¹⁵⁵⁾ Only the Attic country-side was ransacked for some time in the most brutal way by the Macedonian troops. At last Philip returned via Boeotia to Macedon without having effected his purpose.¹⁵⁶⁾ He had interrupted the campaign in Attica to attend the Achaean assembly at Argos.¹⁵⁷⁾ The Achaeans were anything but well disposed towards the Romans in connexion with their savage behaviour in Greece during the first Macedonian war; but on the other hand they declined to be drawn into the war by Philip and thus to be made the helpless target of brutal Roman warfare, without Philip being able to support them effectually from the north. So they kept aloof, and they had rightly judged the situation: it had been for the first and the last time during this war that Philip appeared from the north in the Peloponnesus with an army; the conquest of Oreus by the allied squadrons in the next year would make this henceforth impossible. So Roman maritime supremacy had here a strong voice in the matter again; we shall come back to it afterwards.¹⁵⁸⁾

Cento wintered with his squadron at the Piraeus; though Livy is silent on this point, it is undeniable. When the Roman fleet arrived from Brindisi at Corcyra, it was already autumn;¹⁵⁹⁾ thereupon Cento sailed from Brindisi to the Piraeus, subsequently from there to Chalcis and back, to spend finally considerable time in defending Athens, Eleusis and the Piraeus against Philip's assaults. So winter must have been fast approaching, when at last the Macedonian king retired. Now then, it is quite impossible that at this time of the year Cento should have ventured to round treacherous Malea with his light men of war in order to return to Corcyra; even Roman land-lubbers cannot be credited with such rashness. So the Roman squadron passed the winter at the Piraeus, just as Attalus at Aegina; when in the next spring Apustius appeared in the Aegean, it must have been added to his fleet, again without this fact being mentioned by Livy.¹⁶⁰⁾

¹⁵⁵⁾ See Clark 53.

¹⁵⁶⁾ Liv. 31, 26, 13; 28, 4; Zon. 9, 15, 4.

¹⁵⁷⁾ Liv. 31, 25, 2 sq.

¹⁵⁸⁾ V. s. p. 209 sq.

¹⁵⁹⁾ V. s. p. 227.

¹⁶⁰⁾ 31, 44 sq., v. s. p. 220.

The first operations of the Roman land forces from the West synchronize with Cento's maritime achievements. The naval commander L. Apustius who during the illness of the consul P. Sulpicius temporarily commanded the land army in his place,¹⁶¹⁾ marched inland from the head-quarters on the Apsus and plundered the confines of Illyria and Macedonia (autumn 200).¹⁶²⁾ He met only with slight resistance from local forces, Philip himself being kept engaged in Greece by the simultaneous operations of the Roman fleet; his principal exploit was the conquest and destruction of the important fortress Antipatrea. So the system of two-sided warfare of the next years (in 199 and 198 with the land army from the West, with the naval forces on the eastern side, in 197 inversely) was put into practice already on a small scale in the autumn of 200; and immediately the weak spot of Philip's system of defence revealed itself plainly: I mean the fact that he had practically no fleet and couldn't be everywhere at the same time himself.¹⁶³⁾

- 199 The plan of campaign for 199, projected by Sulpicius during the winter of 200—199, aimed at a combined attack upon Macedon,¹⁶⁴⁾ as we already pointed out before. Sulpicius himself was to invade Macedonia from the west, the Illyrians and Dardanians, who were his allies, from the north, while the Athamanians were to enter Thessaly and try to draw the Aetolians into the war. Attalus who passed the winter at Aegina was ordered to wait for the arrival of the Roman fleet in the spring and then to combine with it in naval action against Philip; to the Rhodians, who had showed a certain reserve in the preceding year and had sent only 3 quadriremes to support Cento,¹⁶⁵⁾ an urgent summons was directed to take a vigorous part in the naval operations of next season. It seems probable that the plan to master Cassandrea in Chalcidice and to menace simultaneously Macedon's eastern flank from this good naval base formed already part of the naval operations as originally planned at Sulpicius' head-quarters during the winter.¹⁶⁶⁾ Philip on the

¹⁶¹⁾ V. s. p. 228.

¹⁶²⁾ Liv. 31, 27; Zon. 9, 15, 3—4; Kromayer II, 10.

¹⁶³⁾ V. s. p. 208 sq.

¹⁶⁴⁾ Liv. 31, 28, 1—4 and Holleaux, C. A. H. VIII, 167 sq.

¹⁶⁵⁾ V. s. p. 227.

¹⁶⁶⁾ Holleaux, *l. l.*, 167.

other hand tried to make the best of his awkward position. He sent forces under the nominal command of his youthful son Perseus to the north in order to bar the way of the Dardanians by holding the passes there; ¹⁶⁷) against the expected maritime action of the allied squadrons he concentrated his own naval forces under command of Heraclides at Demetrias, ¹⁶⁸) where part at least of his fleet had already been present in 200, ¹⁶⁹) and ordered the islands Sciathus and Peparethus to be laid waste, in order to prevent their being utilized as bases by the hostile navy; ¹⁷⁰) he himself remained with the main body of his army in the central part of his empire, ready to meet all eventualities. ¹⁷¹) For he didn't know, where the main attack would be launched by the Romans: he must take into account an invasion by land from the west as well as the possibility of a landing on the eastern side, Macedon's most vulnerable point. But when after all the main attack was launched from the west, Sulpicius stood already in Upper Macedonia before Philip could be on the spot to bar his way. No doubt, the Macedonian king hurried there with his army and bravely did what he could, nor was the consul able to exploit his successes, the precariousness of his communications and of his means of revictualling forcing him to fall back upon his Illyrian bases; ¹⁷²) but Philip had been compelled by his lack of reserves to recall Perseus with his forces, so that the Illyrians and Dardanians could now enter Macedonia,

¹⁶⁷) Liv. 31, 28, 5; 33, 3.

¹⁶⁸) Liv. 31, 33, 1—2. The words *Philippus impigre terra marique parabat bellum* do not square with the facts. That from the very beginning he did not dream of a real naval action with his weak fleet, appears from the devastation of Sciathus and Peparethus: he didn't feel capable of defending these islands which commanded the access to Demetrias too! So he will not have thought of anything more than protection of the coasts (hence perhaps the expression *Heraclidam navibus maritumaeque orae praefecit*) and even for this purpose Heraclides' forces did not suffice, compare the situation during the storming of Oreus, when the Macedonian fleet was blockaded within the harbour of Demetrias by 20 Rhodian battle-ships (Liv. 31, 46, 7 sq., especially 8: *Heraclides, praefectus regius, classem ibi tenebat, magis per occasionem, si quam negligentia hostium dedisset, quam aperta vi quicquam ausurus!*). In a word, the Macedonian fleet didn't take any part in the operations of this war; it was and remained eliminated by the naval supremacy of Rome and her allies.

¹⁶⁹) V. s. footnote 146.

¹⁷⁰) Liv. 31, 28, 6; 45, 12, cf. Dth.³ 587.

¹⁷¹) V. s. p. 209; for warfare on land in 199 Liv. 31, 33—43; Zon. 9, 15, 5—6; Dio fr. 58, 1—4.

¹⁷²) V. s. p. 207.

while the Aetolians, impressed by the invasion of Macedon and the unopposed allied naval action, now made common cause with the Romans and penetrated into Thessaly, together with the Athamanians. To be sure, Philip with the promptitude peculiar to him was soon on the spot and succeeded in defeating the Aetolians, moreover one of his generals inflicted severe losses upon the Dardaniens during their retreat and the combined attack had proved a partial failure, neither Cassandrea having been conquered by the fleet nor the invasion of Macedon having put an end to the war, as Sulpicius had hoped; but nevertheless the year 199 meant a lost round for Philip. The loss of prestige caused by the Roman invasion of Macedon and the unopposed operations of the allied squadrons (they had even conquered the important Oreus and it was now once for all clear to all Greeks that Philip was quite helpless at sea) had immediately brought the warlike Aetolians into the war on the Roman side¹⁷³) and the conquest of Oreus, which commanded the access to the Euripus, Philip's only good way of communication with Greece, brought definitely home to the Achaeans the fact that Philip would not be able to support them; a year later they would follow the lead of the Aetolians, in spite of themselves.¹⁷⁴) So it is obvious already beforehand that the naval operations of 199 strongly influenced the course of events; they coincided with the operations on land and must be discussed here in conclusion.¹⁷⁵)

L. Apustius who after the consul's recovery now commanded the fleet again,¹⁷⁶) put to sea from Corcyra in the spring of 199, probably with 30 ships,¹⁷⁷) rounded Malea and joined Attalus (who had sailed from Aegina to meet him) off Cape Scyllaeum east of Hermione. The strength of Attalus' squadron is not mentioned; it probably numbered 24 sail, just as in the next year.¹⁷⁸) The united squadrons sailed to the Piraeus, where Apustius' Roman fleet was raised to 50 sail by the addition of Cento's 20 ships, which had wintered at the Piraeus.¹⁷⁹) From there the operations were started. Probably Apustius and Attalus had the intention to wrest

¹⁷³) Liv. 31, 40, 9—10; 46, 1—5.

¹⁷⁴) V. s. p. 209 sq.

¹⁷⁵) For the following events Liv. 31, 44—47, 3; Zon. 9, 15, 6 = Dio fr. 58, 4.

¹⁷⁶) V. s. p. 217 and 228.

¹⁷⁷) V. s. p. 213; consequently some 25 ships remained in the western waters for convoying and patrolling services.

¹⁷⁸) V. s. p. 214.

¹⁷⁹) V. s. p. 231.

first from Philip the three bases he still possessed in the Cyclades-area ¹⁸⁰) (Andros, Kythnos and Paros), though this plan was only partly carried out. They made for Andros first. Town and citadel were scarcely able to resist the assault undertaken with a considerable apparatus; ¹⁸¹) after a few days the citizens and the Macedonian garrison capitulated on condition that they should be allowed to withdraw to the Boeotian Delium. The system of dividing the booty that had obtained during the first Macedonian war between the Romans on the one hand, the Aetolians and Attalus on the other, ¹⁸²) was now put into practice again: the island was handed over to Attalus, the movables fell to the share of the Romans. Thus Attalus acquired a second naval basis in the Greek waters besides Aegina; ¹⁸³) at his urgent request many citizens and Macedonians remained at Andros or, if already transported, came back to it. ¹⁸⁴) After the conquest of Andros the Rhodian Agesimbrotus made his appearance with 20 battle-ships, ¹⁸⁵) so that the united squadrons of the allies now numbered 94 sail. That the Rhodians will not have cheered the fact that Andros had been given to Attalus, while normally it ought to have belonged to the league of islanders recently revived under Rhodian control, is natural and therefore probable, though it is not mentioned; all the more they will have regretted that they had come too late to co-operate in

¹⁸⁰) Liv. 31, 15, 8, *v. s.* p. 224.

¹⁸¹) Just as afterwards, when Oreus was stormed (Liv. 31, 46, 10); that all the siege-engines should have been carried by the men of war, seems to be impossible: as often in Roman maritime history, we must presuppose here the presence of an unmentioned fleet of transports. That in this war the Romans sent regularly fleets of transports round Malea to the Aegean, appears afterwards à propos of the war against Nabis in 195 (Liv. 34, 32, 18—19); during the Macedonian war itself only one is mentioned (in 198: Liv. 32, 16, 4), the others are passed over in silence, as often. On the other hand it is fairly possible and almost certain that part of the apparatus was carried by the men of war: the Romans commanded the sea and had not even to reckon with the possibility of a naval battle.

¹⁸²) *V. s.* p. 101 and 125; the same system prevails afterwards at Oreus (31, 46, 16). After the war Andros remained in Pergamene hands, but Oreus was left free with the other Greek cities, *v. i.* It is natural that Sulpicius, who had co-operated with Attalus on this basis during the preceding war, now continued the system.

¹⁸³) Was it meant by the Romans as a compensation and a counterpoise to the fact that in the preceding year Rhodes had rallied round herself the other Cyclades, to the disappointment of Attalus? *V. s.* p. 224 sq.

¹⁸⁴) Liv. 31, 45, 1—8.

¹⁸⁵) Liv. 31, 46, 6.

the conquest, as in that case they might perhaps have laid claim to the island themselves. — Now it was Kythnos' turn; but, several days having been spent in vain assaults, the allies gave up the attempt,¹⁸⁶⁾ nor did they sail on to Paros, the third Macedonian base.¹⁸⁷⁾ Probably the fear of loosing too much time in connexion with the operations planned against Chalcidice will have been the principal reason for it.

So they sailed northwards again; off Prasiae (on the eastern coast of Attica) 20 *lembi* from Issa¹⁸⁸⁾ joined the Roman fleet. These light craft were immediately employed according to their natural "vocation", that is to say for the purpose of plundering the environs of Carystus in Euboea. Near Geraestus the main body waited for the return of the pirates' boats and thereupon they crossed the open sea east of Euboea to Ikos (passing by Skyros), where apparently no resistance was offered, and from there to Skiathos, recently laid waste by Philip in order to prevent the enemy from using it as a base.¹⁸⁹⁾

This became the starting point for the important expedition against Chalcidice, which formed part of the combined attack upon Macedon. However, the attempt failed for the greater part: the chief object, the conquest of the naval base Cassandrea on the neck of the peninsula Pallene (the site of ancient Potidaea), which might have become the point of departure for an invasion of Macedonia on the east-side, was not realized. After a heavy gale that dispersed the fleet, the allies succeeded — it is true — in gathering the scattered ships again; but, when after landing the troops they began to assault the town, they were repulsed with bloody losses by the strong Macedonian garrison and gave up further attempts at conquering it. Had they lost perhaps part of the besieging apparatus during the storm, so that they couldn't think of a siege? It seems far from improbable.¹⁹⁰⁾ On the other hand they succeeded in

¹⁸⁶⁾ 31, 45, 9.

¹⁸⁷⁾ That this had belonged to the original scheme, is highly probable, though Livy is silent about it; it seems to follow from the route Piraeus—Andros—Kythnos, which otherwise would have been strange.

¹⁸⁸⁾ V. s. p. 214.

¹⁸⁹⁾ 31, 45, 10—13 and v. s. p. 233; the interjacent Peparethos, which had been laid waste likewise by Philip, is not mentioned.

¹⁹⁰⁾ The *armamenta* lost during the storm (31, 45, 14) were of course in the first place ships' riggings; but siege-engines carried by the ships may very well be included. On the other hand during the siege of Oreus there were sufficient besieging materials again (31, 46, 10).

taking and plundering the far less important Acanthus on the eastern side of Chalcidice, after rounding the promontory of Torone.¹⁹¹⁾ Thereupon they sailed back to Euboea via Skiathos.¹⁹²⁾

Here the most momentous result of the whole naval campaign was obtained: the conquest of the important Oreus commanding the access to the Euripus. Already in 208 during the first Macedonian war the town had been conquered by Sulpicius and Attalus and according to the agreement concerning the division of booty¹⁹³⁾ it had been handed over to the Pergamene king; but he had soon been forced to evacuate it again.¹⁹⁴⁾ Now the town was defended by a strong garrison determined to prevent a second capitulation, so that the siege which was undertaken with a considerable apparatus took up much time. In order to be protected against surprises from the side of the Macedonian fleet which was lying close by at Demetrias, the 20 Rhodian ships were ordered to blockade it, while Attalus and Apustius attacked Oreus on different sides. The fact that 20 ships were deemed sufficient to guard the Macedonian fleet proves that the latter cannot have been much stronger,¹⁹⁵⁾ though we must not forget that the Rhodian navy of those times was the best in the world and that in case of need the Roman and Pergamene squadrons which were lying before Oreus were close at hand. But these were not forced to take action, their very presence — they acted as a fleet in being — preventing Heraclides from attacking the Rhodians and in short from every attempt at saving Oreus: he quietly remained within the harbour of Demetrias, while the besieged town perished after a long and brave resistance. Just as in 208 it fell to the share of Attalus, all movables including the "live-stock" to the Romans.¹⁹⁶⁾ During the siege Apustius had taken by surprise Larisa Cremaste (except the citadel)¹⁹⁷⁾ in Phthiotis beyond the straits and in the same way Attalus had surprised Pteleon.¹⁹⁸⁾

We must here ask the question, what was done to maintain Oreus

¹⁹¹⁾ In this whole passage Livy's topography is far from clear; apparently they approached Acanthus via the *sinus Singiticus* and did not round Mount Athos.

¹⁹²⁾ Liv. 31, 45, 14—16.

¹⁹³⁾ V. s. p. 235, 182.

¹⁹⁴⁾ V. s. p. 128.

¹⁹⁵⁾ Indeed it numbered probably little more than 20 battle-ships, v. s. p. 229.

¹⁹⁶⁾ Cf. Paus. 7, 7, 9.

¹⁹⁷⁾ Consequently it soon got lost again, Pol. 18, 3, 12; 8, 9, de Sanctis IV, 1, 57, 111.

¹⁹⁸⁾ Liv. 31, 46, 6—16.

and to utilize its commanding position on the straits. As will be discussed afterwards, Pergamum was not allowed to retain the town like Andros: when later, after the coarse Sulpicius had gone back to Rome, the philhellenic policy of "freedom and autonomy", especially cherished by Flamininus, was pushed into the foreground more than before, the fate of Oreus was modified by it; when in 196 the pace was concluded, the town was declared free by the senate (Flamininus and the ten commissioners who assisted him had disagreed on this point, Liv. 33, 34, 10 = Pol. 18, 47, 10—11) and, when in 194 Greece was evacuated by Flamininus, it was a Roman garrison that left the town (34, 51, 1). So we must assume that in 199 after the fall of the town it was yielded to Attalus and that from that moment onward it was held by a *Pergamene* garrison and *Pergamene* ships;¹⁹⁹) but in 196, when the town was liberated, these will have been replaced by a temporary *Roman* garrison which remained there till the day of definitive liberation in 194. After everything I have already said about it I can spare the reader here a long-winded expatiation on the importance of the fall of Oreus. Suffice it for me to say that besides the Roman invasion of Macedon it was the landing of the allied squadrons on the northern coast of Euboea that determined the Aetolians to give up their initially sulky and temporizing attitude and make common cause with Rome;²⁰⁰) but the fall of Oreus influenced the line of conduct of the Achaeans as well. For the town commanded the only good way of communication Philip had with southern Greece (from Demetrias through the straits); so after its passing into the hands of Philip's enemies his Peloponnesian allies could be pretty sure that he would not be able to support them. No doubt, during the winter of 199—198 he still made a desperate attempt to prevent the Achaeans from following the lead of the Aetolians by means of important concessions in the Peloponnesus;²⁰¹) but in 198 the unavoidable would happen nevertheless, again under the pressure of Roman naval operations. So in spite of its partial failure the naval campaign of 199 strongly influenced the course of the events.

¹⁹⁹) This is — remarkably enough — not mentioned by Livy, but is undeniable, because otherwise the commanding position of the town on the straits couldn't have been exploited by the allies: Philip's way from Demetrias to the straits (his principal way of communication with southern Greece) had to be barred, but to effect this there *must* be ships and troops at Oreus.

²⁰⁰) Liv. 31, 40, 9—10; 46, 1—5, v. s. p. 234.

²⁰¹) Liv. 32, 5.

In September, before the autumnal equinox, the allied squadrons sailed back to the Piraeus. Twenty Roman ships (under command of Cento) had passed the preceding winter at the Piraeus, Attalus' squadron at Aegina; now Apustius left behind 30 ships at the Piraeus,²⁰²) while Attalus and the Rhodians sailed home for the winter. With the remaining 20 ships Apustius himself sailed round Malea to Corcyra; this happened probably in the last days of September,²⁰³) which means that it was rather late in the season for such a dangerous enterprise; but the squadron came off with a whole skin.²⁰⁴) At Corcyra Apustius found C. Livius, the naval deputy of the consul P. Villius, who had come to relieve Sulpicius in the autumn of 199;²⁰⁵) consequently his naval command was at an end.²⁰⁶) This time 30 Roman ships wintered at the Piraeus, 45 at Corcyra.

Philip realized that, if he would regain his lost prestige, he must modify 198 his strategy and not shut himself in his kingdom, but fight the Romans on his western frontier and deny them access to Greece. On the sound assumption that, in order to join the Aetolians, they would try this time to penetrate through Epirus into Thessaly, he ensconced himself in the mountains of northern Epirus near Antigonea, in a very strong position commanding the gorges of the Aous, so that he barred the way of the Romans to Epirus and Thessaly both.²⁰⁷) No doubt, Macedon itself was now left more or less unprotected on its western side, but Philip had sound reasons to suppose that the Romans would not choose a second time the route followed by Sulpicius, first on account of the difficulties of revictualling and the communications with the Illyrian bases, difficulties

²⁰²) It seems probable that Cento commanded this squadron just as during the preceding winter; but he is not mentioned.

²⁰³) De Sanctis IV, 1, 57, 112.

²⁰⁴) This is, however, no valid reason to assume that also Cento had returned to Corcyra in the preceding autumn (200): on that occasion it had been much later in the season still, *v. s. p.* 231.

²⁰⁵) *V. s. p.* 217 and 219 and *v. i.* footnote 210; that also P. Villius himself passed the winter at Corcyra and only took over the command of the land army in the spring of 198, appears from Liv. 32, 6, 1.

²⁰⁶) Liv. 31, 47, 1—3.

²⁰⁷) Liv. 32, 5, 9 sq., Plut. *Flam.* 3, Zon. 9, 16, 1; Holleaux, *C. A. H.* VIII, 168, Kromayer II, 33 sq.

that had clearly come to light during Sulpicius' campaign, secondly because, if they penetrated into Macedonia through the Illyrian mountains, the risk was now great that Philip from his position on the Aous would occupy their Illyrian bases behind their back, which might have had serious consequences.²⁰⁸) His calculation proved correct: after some wavering Roman head-quarters preferred to try conclusions with Philip in his strong position in northern Epirus rather than repeat Sulpicius' experiment.²⁰⁹) We cannot describe here in detail, how the consul T. Quinctius Flaminius²¹⁰) at last succeeded in turning Philip's impregnable position and thus expelling him from it.²¹¹) Suffice it for me to say that this success opened for him the way to Epirus and Thessaly and that indeed he penetrated without many pains into Thessaly.²¹²) But here he experienced the precariousness of the communications by land in a similar way as Sulpicius in the preceding year in Macedonia. The route of the fleets of transports was shifted more southward, to Ambracia, and from there the victuals had to be transported to Thessaly by a difficult way over land. So Titus couldn't manage to pass the winter of 198—197 far from the sea in the ravaged Thessalian country: he chose Anticyra in Phocis on the Corinthian Gulf for his winter quarters, because there the fleets of transports could reach him easily.²¹³) Of course Philip was now wholly separated from Greece; after his flight from the Aous he had retreated to the confines of Thessaly and Macedon.²¹⁴)

²⁰⁸) De Sanctis IV, 1, 59.

²⁰⁹) Liv. 32, 6, 3; 9, 8—11; Plut. *Flam.* 4, v. s. p. 207.

²¹⁰) P. Villius, the consul of 199, may be left out of account, because he hardly commanded at all: in the autumn of 199 he arrived at Corcyra (Liv. 32, 3, 2; 4, 1. 7), where he wintered (32, 6, 1); in the spring of 198 he had scarcely taken over the command of the land forces and got into touch with the enemy, when the consul for 198, T. Flaminius, who had crossed from Italy to Illyria much earlier in the year than both his predecessors, came to relieve him (32, 6, 1—4; 9, 6—8). The same holds good with regard to Villius' naval deputy C. Livius, who was replaced by L. Flaminius, the consul's brother and naval deputy, when in the spring of 198 he had just put to sea from Corcyra with the fleet (32, 16, 1—4). V. s. p. 217 and compare for the chronological problems de Sanctis IV, 1, 61—62 and 383—384. The battle 32, 6, 5—7 is a forgery of Antias, cf. 32, 6, 8 and Klotz 4—5; in reality Villius achieved nothing but the checking of a mutiny among his soldiers, 32, 3.

²¹¹) See Kromayer II, 40 sq.

²¹²) Liv. 32, 10—15; 17, 4 sq.; Plut. 4 sq.; Zon. 9, 16, 1—2.

²¹³) V. s. p. 206 sq.

²¹⁴) Liv. 32, 15, 9.

But in this year the Roman *plan de campagne* was built again upon the co-ordination of land- and naval actions: just as in 199 naval operations on the east-side coincided with the operations of the land army from the west and these must be discussed here in detail. L. Quinctius, who was to command the fleet as *legatus pro praetore* of his brother the consul, ²¹⁵) arrived at Corcyra in the early summer of 198, just a moment too late to find the fleet in the harbour: shortly before it had put to sea under command of C. Livius (footnote 210). But he succeeded in coming up with it off Cephallenia (its pace being slackened by an accompanying fleet of transports and by headwinds) and took over the command from Livius. ²¹⁶) The voyage to Malea was made at a very slow pace, the headwind forcing the men of war to tow the transports. ²¹⁷) From Malea he sailed ahead himself to the Piraeus with 3 quinqueremes (the rest of the fleet was ordered to follow as quickly as possible) and there took over the command of the 30 ships left behind in the autumn by L. Apustius for the purpose of hibernation and of protecting Athens. Meanwhile the Rhodian and Pergamene squadrons, consisting respectively of 20 and 24 battle-ships, had also left the home harbours and had met together at Andros, now a naval base of Attalus. From there they crossed to Euboea and plundered the environs of Carystus, as the Issaeen *lembi* had done in the preceding year, but they did not venture upon an assault, the town having been reinforced in good time with a garrison from Chalcis. So they sailed on to Eretria, where Lucius joined them with his 33 ships (the rest would follow soon from Malea via the Piraeus). An assault was started with an considerable apparatus; ²¹⁸) but the

²¹⁵) For Lucius' function p. 217 sq.

²¹⁶) For the following events Liv. 32, 16—17, 3; Zon. 9, 16, 2. C. Livius was sent home (32, 16, 4). The Roman fleet probably consisted of 20 ships, because some 25 must have been left behind for convoying services in the western waters; so in this year again 50 Roman ships (20 + the 30 at the Piraeus) operated in the Aegean with 24 Pergamene and 20 Rhodian vessels (together 94, v. s. p. 210 sq.); the 30 *lembi* from Issa (20 in the preceding year, p. 214) will probably have accompanied the Roman fleet from Corcyra, though this is not mentioned; the 50 light vessels, which appear to be present at Cenchreae, probably joined the allied squadrons during the operations (v. s. p. 210 and 225). For the fleet of transports see footnote 181.

²¹⁷) For the transports were sailing-vessels, the men of war rowing-boats; L. couldn't leave the fleet of transports to its own devices (especially not while struggling against a headwind), because in that case it might have fallen into the hands of Nabis (cf. Liv. 34, 32, 18—19).

²¹⁸) From Liv. 32, 16, 10 we get the impression that the warfleets themselves had carried all the siege-engines. as far as they were not constructed on the spot. Yet

inhabitants and the Macedonian garrison offered a strenuous resistance. However, when the wall began to give way and an attempt made from Chalcis to relieve the town had failed, the citizens entered into negotiations with Attalus (apparently they trusted him better than the Roman barbarians!). But Quintius profited by the relaxation of vigilance resulting from the hope of peace to penetrate by night into the town; thereupon the citadel soon surrendered too. After having been plundered, the town was probably handed over to Attalus like Andros and Oreus and consequently received a Pergamene garrison; but in 196 she was declared free just like Oreus and in 194 she was evacuated by the temporary Roman garrison that had replaced the Pergamene since 196.²¹⁹⁾ Thereupon the allies returned to Carystus, the inhabitants of which, impressed by the fall of Eretria (Carystus lay farther from Chalcis than Eretria and therefore could now certainly count no longer upon assistance sent from there), gave up resistance. The Macedonian garrison was allowed to withdraw to Boeotia on payment of a ransom (compare Andros in 199). That Carystus was also yielded to Attalus, seems not so certain to me as to Holleaux:²²⁰⁾ the only thing we know for a certainty is the fact that in 196 the town was declared free by the senate together with Oreus and Eretria.²²¹⁾ In 194 she is not mentioned among the towns evacuated by the Romans²²²⁾ and therefore had apparently no garrison at that moment; whether she had been left ungarrisoned since 198, I cannot make out: probably she was held by a (Roman?) garrison from 198 to 196.²²³⁾ So the whole of Euboea was now in the hands of the allies except

this can scarcely be true (*v. s.* footnote 181): we shall have to suppose that the Roman fleet of transports carried at least part of them.

²¹⁹⁾ *V. s.* p. 237 sq., Liv. 33, 34, 10 (= Pol. 18, 47, 10—11); 34, 51, 1.

²²⁰⁾ 205, 1, cf. de Sanctis IV, 1, 103. For the plundering of the town only hinted at by Livy see Paus. 7, 8, 1, Niese II, 614, 2.

²²¹⁾ Liv. 33, 34, 10 = Pol. 18, 47, 10—11; we get the impression from these passages, that the position of Carystus was not exactly the same as of Oreus and Eretria.

²²²⁾ Liv. 34, 51, 1.

²²³⁾ Did the Romans put bounds to Attalus' conquests in order to remain friends with the Rhodians? But after all it is very well possible that Holleaux is right and that also Carystus was occupied by Attalus: the available data do not allow us to form a clear notion of this matter. At any rate — and this is the main point — it is certain that in 196 Pergamum had to give up its conquests in Euboea and was only allowed to retain Andros and Aegina, see Holleaux *l. l.*

Chalcis; the united squadrons ²²⁴) sailed from Carystus to Cenchreae, the port of Corinth: at last an attempt had to be made to draw the Achaeans into the war on the Roman side and to conquer Corinth at the same time.

Before the united fleets at Cenchreae started the assault on Corinth, Philip's stronghold in southern Greece, the consul, who at that moment had already reached Phocis from Thessaly, ²²⁵) ordered envoys to be sent by L. Quinctius, Attalus, the Rhodians and the Athenians to the Achaeans in order to promise Corinth to them after the conquest, if they would make common cause with the Romans. ²²⁶) They made their appearance in the assembly at Sicyon together with envoys of Philip, who wished to make a last, desperate attempt at retaining the Achaeans. For the latter the situation was extremely difficult. In the preceding year the conquest of Oreus by the allied fleets had already brought home to them in a painful way that henceforth they had nothing to expect from Philip. It is true that during the winter of 199—198 he had still succeeded by means of far-going concessions in preventing them from passing over to the Roman side; but the presence of the consul in Phocis and of the allied fleets at Cenchreae made it now more than ever clear to them that for the future they must reckon without Philip who stood far away on the frontier of Macedon: if they refused at this juncture to join hands with Rome, the Peloponnesus would be helplessly exposed to the raids of the united squadrons. ²²⁷) No matter how much they might still feel attached to Philip, they were forced in spite of themselves to join Rome and her allies; in this case more than ever the impotency of the Macedonian fleet yielded bitter fruit to Philip. The whole Achaean army was immediately mobilized in order to take part in the siege of Corinth, which, after conquering Cenchreae, Quinctius had started in the meantime. ²²⁸)

But, though the attack on the town was made on different sides at

²²⁴) They had by now reached their full effective: 94 (roughly 100) battle-ships (50 Roman, 24 Pergamene, 20 Rhodian vessels), 50 *leviores apertae* (from the Cyclades, Athens, Crete, Byzantium, *v. s. p.* 210 and 225) and 30 *lembi* from Issa, Liv. 32, 21, 27 and footnote 216.

²²⁵) *V. s. p.* 240; the end of the season was fast approaching.

²²⁶) For the following events Liv. 32, 19—23; Zon. 9, 16, 3; App. *Mac.* 7.

²²⁷) See Liv. 32, 21, 7. 26—32 and p. 210, where some passages from Aristaenus' speech have been quoted *verbatim*.

²²⁸) Liv. 32, 23, 1—3, App. *Mac.* 7.

the same time, it resulted in a failure, first because the Corinthians loyally supported the Macedonian garrison, secondly because Italian deserters, who knew perfectly well that they were lost if the town fell, defended her with frenzy, ²²⁹) in the third place because 1500 Macedonian soldiers from Boeotia succeeded in entering the town by means of *lembi*, and finally because the end of the season was fast approaching. Moreover, there is perhaps some reason to suppose that the assault on the town was merely meant as a demonstration for the purpose of attaching the Achaeans to the Roman cause; to win the Achaeans over was the chief Roman object and it was attained. ²³⁰)

This time the whole Roman fleet returned to Corcyra for the purpose of hibernation, it being now Attalus' turn to perform the winter-service in the Aegean: after a visit to the Piraeus, he wintered at Aegina. ²³¹) The Rhodians probably sailed home.

- 197 Notwithstanding the fact ²³²) that the Achaeans had only joined the Romans in spite of themselves (Argos had even loyally kept to the Macedonian alliance and seceded from Achaea) and that Corinth had held her own, Philip's position was desperate after two campaigns. Epirus, western Thessaly, all Euboea except Chalcis, most of Locris and Phocis were lost; the defection of the Achaeans was a political calamity: the Hellenic league was breaking up from fear of Rome; moreover, Philip ran short of men. So he was driven to negotiate and make important concessions, in the hope of saving what might yet be saved. But the negotiations which took place at Nicaea in Locris during the winter of 198—197 came to nothing, because the Romans and their allies demanded the impossible in demanding the complete evacuation of Greece: Philip was ready to meet them half-way and to do even more than that, but was especially unwilling to renounce his three great strongholds. And when the senate too proved unwilling to compromise and reduce Titus' demands and maintained the Flaminini in their command, ²³³) Philip

²²⁹) V. s. p. 215 sq.

²³⁰) Liv. 32, 23, 4—13; Zon. 9, 16, 3.

²³¹) Liv. 32, 23, 13; 39, 2; v. s. p. 214.

²³²) Holleaux, C. A. H. VIII, 171 sq.

²³³) Liv. 32, 28; 32, 32, 7; 33, 25, 11; Pol. 18, 11, 1—2; 12, 1; Zon. 9, 16, 5, v. s. p. 219.

was doomed to continue the hopeless struggle to the bitter end. But before it came to that, the crumbling process in Greece still continued. Deserted by the Achaeans, Philip had turned to Nabis of Sparta and betrayed Argos to him which he could not hope to maintain himself; but Nabis, who realized that Philip's cause was lost, broke with him, supplied the Roman army with auxiliaries and for the present stopped hostilities against his arch-enemies, the Achaeans. So the whole Peloponnese was now against Philip and soon Boeotia was willy-nilly detached from him too. The Hellenic symmarchy was destroyed: except for Acarnania (Philip's most faithful ally), eastern Thessaly, Chalcis and Corinth, all the Greek allies of Macedon had been detached from it. That the navy had played an important part in this game and that the fault rested for a good deal with the impotence of the Macedonian fleet, we have sufficiently demonstrated in the preceding pages.

The campaign of 197 was marked again by combined actions of army and fleet on the Roman side; but in contradistinction to the preceding years the land army now operated in the east and the fleet on the western side. To be sure, Phocis, where Titus had passed the winter of 198—197, remained his base and starting point, because the fleets of transports could here reach him easily from the west;²³⁴⁾ but the decisive land battle was fought in eastern Thessaly, while on the other hand the whole Roman fleet, after wintering at Corcyra,²³⁵⁾ remained in 197 in the western waters and operated there against Acarnania. Naturally the Romans and their allies had also to guard against eventual surprises from the side of the Macedonian fleet in the Aegean; the whole Roman fleet now operating in the western waters, it seems probable that Attalus' squadron which had wintered at Aegina²³⁵⁾ fulfilled this task: it will have remained in the Greek waters till after the battle of Cynoscephalae which decided the war definitely in favour of Rome and only afterwards it will have returned to Asia.²³⁶⁾ On the other hand the Rhodians did certainly not

²³⁴⁾ *V. s.* p. 207.

²³⁵⁾ *V. s.* p. 244.

²³⁶⁾ We know that Attalus took part in the Roman negotiations with Nabis (*Liv.* 32, 39—40) and Boeotia (33, 1 sq.); at Thebes he was struck with a fit of apoplexy (33, 2, 2 sq.); after the battle of Cynoscephalae (33, 21) he was transported to Pergamum, where he died soon and was succeeded by Eumenes. His squadron will have sailed home with him from Aegina, though this fact has not been handed down. In 197 (or perhaps already earlier) Paros and Kythnos must have got lost to Macedon, *v. s.* p. 235 sq. and Niese II, 635.

appear with a fleet in the Greek waters in 197; this follows from the consideration that they were not needed there now as well as from the fact that in this year they reconquered their possessions in the Peraea taken from them by Philip ²³⁷) and from the ultimatum they, certainly at instigation of the Romans, addressed to Antiochus: without the presence of their entire fleet in the Asiatic waters they could never have thought of launching this; it was here that in this year they protected the Roman interests besides their own. ²³⁸) It is clear that in this year the Romans had not concentrated the available squadrons as before, but had carefully divided them in connexion with the local needs.

The battle of Cynoscephalae ²³⁹), which in the summer of 197 decided the war in favour of Rome, cannot be discussed here in detail; suffice it for me to say that the comparatively loose, open and elastic Roman tactics gained the victory over the rigid Macedonian phalanx, though it is only fair to bear in mind that the local circumstances, quite unsuitable to Macedonian tactics, contributed in a high degree to the Roman success. In the Aegean peace was not disturbed: the very presence of Attalus' squadron sufficed to prevent the weak Macedonian fleet from leaving the harbour. So we may confine ourselves to a discussion of the Roman naval action against Acarnania, which all but co-incided with the operations on land in Thessaly.

That the two-sided *plan de campagne* had been carefully prepared at Titus' head-quarters, appears from the fact that already in the winter of 198—197 he had ordered his brother Lucius to gain Acarnania over to the Roman side in the next season. ²⁴⁰) At first Lucius tried to gain his ends by means of intrigues: ²⁴¹) already before the battle of Cynoscephalae he had ordered some Acarnanian leaders to Corcyra; their influence, however, was not strong enough to obtain from the Acarnanian *concilium* a resolution to conclude an alliance with the Romans: the Acarnanians who in the main were faithful supporters of Macedon and actuated by a fierce hatred against the Aetolians, stuck

²³⁷) Liv. 33, 18.

²³⁸) Liv. 33, 20. A discussion of these affairs is out of place here; they will be treated below in connexion with the Syrian war.

²³⁹) Kromayer II, 57 sq.

²⁴⁰) Liv. 32, 39, 4; 40, 7.

²⁴¹) For the following events Liv. 33, 16—17; Zon. 9, 16, 11; v. Hille, *Geschichte von Leukas im Altertum* (Dörpfeld, *Alt-Ithaka*, 386) and Mnemos. 1917, 310 sq.

loyally to Philip. When this news had reached Lucius at Corcyra, he decided to intervene by force of arms and with his fleet ²⁴²) immediately made for Leucas, the capital of Acarnania, situated on the neck of the homonymous peninsula. On account of its situation the town lent itself rather easily to the assault, which was undertaken with a considerable besieging apparatus; but the inhabitants defended themselves with heroism and probably would have prolonged the siege for a long time, if Italian exiles residing at Leucas had not committed treason in return for the hospitality they had met with and let in soldiers! Now it was soon all over: while the Acarnanians defended themselves against the intruders, Lucius too succeeded in penetrating into the town, so that the defenders got between two fires and were partly massacred, partly forced into surrender. A few days afterwards the whole of Acarnania submitted on receiving the news of the Roman victory of Cynoscephalae. Philip's helplessness (in connexion with his naval impotence) against the Roman system of two-sided warfare is here disclosed again in a painful way: he couldn't save Acarnania, while campaigning himself in Thessaly, and even if he had *not* lost the battle of Cynoscephalae, he wouldn't have been able to do it either. During the next years Leucas became the head-quarters of the Roman navy, instead of Corcyra; ²⁴³) but the second Macedonian war was practically at an end.

Before we spend some remarks on the history of the years 196—194, especially on the war against Nabis, we must conclude the discussion of the second Macedonian war itself, which virtually came to an end in 197, by asking the question (and trying to answer it), why Roman head-quarters stuck so obstinately to a two-sided system of warfare, the land forces operating from the west, the fleet far away from them on the eastern side, in spite of the serious drawback lying in the fact that according to this system the land army must penetrate into the interior far from the coast and could only be revictualled at the cost of great difficulties. ²⁴⁴) In other words, why didn't the Romans avail themselves of their fleets of transports together with their warfleet to

²⁴²) He must have taken with him, if not his whole fleet, at least the lion's share of it, as otherwise he couldn't have disposed of a sufficient number of soldiers for the assault.

²⁴³) Liv. 34, 26, 11.

²⁴⁴) V. s. p. 206 sq.

transport the land forces round Malea to the eastern coast, where a direct attack on the center of Philip's kingdom might have been made at a short distance from the coast; in short, why two-sided operations instead of a direct co-operation, such as had already been put into practice by Scipio against Carthage? ²⁴⁵) But in the first place they would have needed for such an enterprise a naval base like Cassandrea in the immediate neighbourhood of Macedon, which in 199 they indeed attempted to master, though without success. ²⁴⁶) And even if this attempt had not failed, it seems highly questionable to me, whether Roman head-quarters would really have changed the system of two-sided operations they stuck to in such an obstinate way; ²⁴⁷) for it appears from every thing that the desirability of revictualling the land forces from the *western* coastal bases belonged to the Roman credo in this war. ²⁴⁸) And not without valid reasons! For they wanted to make safe and therefore to shorten as much as they could their maritime lines of communication. If they had transported the troops to the East round Malea, such a military transport would naturally not have been menaced by pirates, but they would have run the risk of losing thousands and thousands of precious soldiers in a single storm. Immediately after the murderous Punic war the Roman leaders could not take the liberty to run such a risk in the face of public opinion in Italy that had reluctantly resigned itself to the new adventure and which was largely formed by peasants. But there is more. In this case they would have been under the necessity of supplying the army with victuals and other necessities *round Malea again*; and then piracy would certainly have come into play. The transports which during the war supplied the fleet with necessities round Malea, suffered severely from Nabis' marauding practices; ²⁴⁹) the only convoy mentioned by Livy ²⁵⁰) was carefully protected by the Roman warfleet and, though L. Quinctius was in a hurry to start naval operations in the Aegean, he did not venture to leave it behind off Malea without a strong escort

²⁴⁵) See Clark 51.

²⁴⁶) See de Sanctis IV, 1, 59.

²⁴⁷) They might have used Cassandrea for mere naval raids against Macedon, without undertaking a regular invasion with the land forces on this side.

²⁴⁸) *V. s.* p. 206 sq.

²⁴⁹) Liv. 34, 32, 18—19.

²⁵⁰) 32, 16, 4 sq.

of men of war; ²⁵¹) it is quite superfluous to ask why. In a word, it is manifest that such a tenfold lengthening of the lines of navigation (and that on a dangerous route too!) would have seriously raised the Roman risks. So they preferred — and this is typically Roman indeed! — the difficulties of a far and troublesome transport by land into the interior. And so we always come back again to the Roman land-lubber; but . . . we have no right to say that in this war he did not realize the importance of naval operations: the two-sided plan of campaign was projected in a sensible and methodical way and the Roman and allied squadrons played a prominent and useful part in it.

The Flamini retained their command in Greece for three years after the war against Philip had been decided, in connexion with the conclusion of peace, the Roman policy of freedom and autonomy with respect to Greece, the difficulties with Antiochus and the war against Nabis of Sparta. Of these points only the last-mentioned must be discussed here in detail; we may make short work of the others. 196.

The peace was concluded in 196 on the following terms: ²⁵²) all the rest of the Greeks in Asia and Europe were to be free and governed by their own laws; the Greeks subject to Philip and the cities garrisoned by him he was to surrender to the Romans before the Isthmian festival, but he was to evacuate and leave free Euromus, Pedasa, Bargylia, Iasus, Abydos, Thasos, Myrina, Perinthus; ²⁵³) about restoring the freedom of Cius Flamininus was to write to Prusias; ²⁵⁴) before the same date Philip was to turn over to the Romans all prisoners and deserters and all his armoured vessels, except 5 ²⁵⁵) and his *ἐκκαδεκήρης*; finally he was to

²⁵¹) He sailed ahead to the Piraeus with 3 men of war, consequently leaving with the convoy 17 Roman warships + 30 *lembi* from Issa, Liv. 32, 16, 5 and *v. s.* footnote 216.

²⁵²) Pol. 18, 44 = Liv. 33, 30, 1—7; Zon. 9, 16, 12; App. *Mac.* 9, 3; Plut. *Flam.* 9, 6; Holleaux, *C. A. H.* VIII, 180.

²⁵³) For the omissions in Polybius' survey of the treaty see Holleaux *l. l.*, 180, 1 and 181, 1. Zippel (73 sq.) has proved that Pleuratus got back the Illyrian coastal area from Lissus northwards, which Philip had conquered during the first Macedonian war (*v. s.* p. 98), and that the rest of Philip's Illyrian possessions fell to the share of Rome.

²⁵⁴) The town had been conquered by Philip, but yielded to his ally Prusias.

²⁵⁵) According to Plut. *l. l.* 10; but in such cases Polybius naturally takes precedence of all others. I call attention to the fact that Philip was allowed to retain his *lembi*.

pay an indemnity of 1000 talents, half at once, and the other half by instalments extending over 10 years. It is manifest that the first term was rather more directed against Antiochus than against Philip, the former trying since 197 to extend his power in Asia Minor and since 196 even into Thrace: the germ of the future conflict with Syria lay hidden in this proclamation. As for the second point, Flamininus intended to grant liberty also to the Greek cities and populations surrendered by Philip to the Romans, as would be realized indeed during the Isthmian festival of 196.²⁵⁶) However, for fear of Antiochus a number of cities (Acrocorinth, Chalcis, Demetrias, Oreus, Eretria) were held for the present by Roman garrisons;²⁵⁷) only in 194, when Greece was completely evacuated by the Romans, the garrisons were withdrawn from them.²⁵⁸) The ten commissioners who co-operated with T. Flamininus, felt inclined to grant Oreus and Eretria, which had been handed over in 199 and 198 to Attalus, to his successor Eumenes; but Titus objected to such encroachments on the policy of freedom and autonomy and he succeeded in carrying it: these cities (together with Carystus) were declared free by the senate with the rest,²⁵⁹) though, as we remarked above, they were only evacuated in 194. So Eumenes only retained Aegina and Andros: compensations could be found for him afterwards in Asia Minor and, moreover, Rome could absolutely rely upon his loyalty on account of Antiochus' line of conduct which alarmed the Pergamene king.²⁶⁰) In conclusion a few words about the Macedonian fleet: Philip must have surrendered 15—20 armoured vessels, as he possessed 25 at the outside.²⁶¹) But what became of these ships? Were they added to the Roman fleet? I guess not, because it was not usual.²⁶²) Were they destroyed or given away to Pergamum and Rhodes? One of these two ways Rome must have chosen; but we simply do not know which of them. At any rate the Macedonian fleet which

²⁵⁶) Just as the first term of the treaty the provision about the leaving free of Philip's Greek possessions in Thrace and Asia Minor was directed against Antiochus, the mentioned cities being either menaced by him or already occupied: the senate refused to recognize this, Holleaux, *L.L.*, 181.

²⁵⁷) Liv. 33, 31 = Pol. 18, 45.

²⁵⁸) Liv. 34, 49, 4—5; 51.

²⁵⁹) Liv. 33, 34, 10 = Pol. 18, 47, 10—11, *v.s.* p. 237 sq. and 241 sq.

²⁶⁰) See de Sanctis IV, 1, 103, Liv. 35, 13, 7—10.

²⁶¹) *V.s.* p. 229.

²⁶²) Compare the first chapter.

had been weak from the beginning was now wholly eliminated by this radical bleeding.²⁶³⁾

The terms of the peace were severe indeed, but they did not destroy Philip nor were they intended to do so: he lost his navy and his Greek possessions and naturally had to abstain from meddling with "liberated" Greece, but his military power was not limited and his Macedonian kingdom was left intact, contrary to the wishes of the Aetolians. The Romans wanted to maintain Macedon as a strong bulwark against the barbarous nations in the north and intended to attach Philip to themselves after his defeat rather than to destroy him, naturally also with an eye to the approaching conflict with Antiochus. Philip soon concluded an alliance with Rome.²⁶⁴⁾

However, the Romans couldn't regard their task in Greece as fulfilled before they had settled accounts with Nabis. The Spartan tyrant had sided with Rome against Philip in 197; but his revolutionary practices were the terror of Greece, especially of the wealthy upper classes Rome chiefly relied upon; as long as Nabis was in possession of Argos,²⁶⁵⁾ the Romans couldn't think of evacuating liberated Greece and of leaving it to its own fate. Moreover, he was the terror of the seas as well; during the war against Philip even the Roman convoys had suffered severely from his marauding practices²⁶⁶⁾ and for a long time he had entertained relations with pirates' nests in Crete.²⁶⁷⁾ As long as there had not been put a stop to these evils, the pacification of the seas Rhodes tried with success to accomplish since 201—200,²⁶⁸⁾ could never be realized

²⁶³⁾ The *ἐκκαίδεκέτης*, the royal flag-ship Philip was allowed to retain with 5 others, was a parading horse as old as Methuselah! Already in 288 she had belonged to Demetrius, had passed from him to Lysimachus and had since remained in Macedonia; consequently in 196 she was more than 90 years old. In 167 after Perseus' defeat Aemilius Paulus took the ship to Italy and made his state entry in it up the Tiber (Liv. 45, 35, 3; 42, 12; Pol. 36, 5, 9; Plut. *Aem.* 30): at that time it had reached the venerable age of more than 120 years! See Tarn, *Developments*, 133 and de Sanctis IV, 1, 95, 184.

²⁶⁴⁾ Pol. 18, 48, 4—5; Liv. 33, 35, 5—7; de Sanctis IV, 1, 105. We know neither the exact date nor the exact form of this alliance; but already in 195 Philip supported the Romans with troops against Nabis.

²⁶⁵⁾ V. s. p. 245.

²⁶⁶⁾ Liv. 34, 32, 18—19, v. s. p. 248.

²⁶⁷⁾ Pol. 13, 8, Liv. 34, 36, 2—3, Ormerod 148—150 and 187.

²⁶⁸⁾ V. s. p. 224 sq.

completely. So Nabis had to be chastised; the war against him filled the military season of the year 195.

The idea of punishing Nabis was welcomed by Greece with cheers; except for sulking Aetolia, all Greek states joined in this war with the Romans, sending auxiliaries to Flamininus (the Achaean contingent amounted to 10,000 foot-soldiers and 1000 horsemen; Philip sent 1500 men),²⁶⁹) while the fleet exhibited its normal composition: the 40 Roman ships brought by L. Quinctius from Leucas²⁷⁰) to Laconia, were seconded by 18 Rhodian battle-ships and 10 of Eumenes (together 68), the latter bringing besides 30 *lembi* and other light craft.²⁷¹) That Rhodes as well as Pergamum took part in this expedition with enthusiasm, goes without saying: the suppression of Nabis' piracies concerned both of them deeply. While the land forces under command of T. Quinctius, after a vain attempt to master Argos and some skirmishes with Nabis' troops, laid waste the Laconian country with impunity, Lucius reduced the maritime towns and finally made an attack on Gytheum, Nabis' chief coastal basis.²⁷²) The town was strong and well defended; but according to Roman custom Lucius employed the *socii navales* of the united squadrons (\pm 20,000 men)²⁷³) for getting ready the siegeworks as quickly as possible and the assault seemed to make rapid progress. Soon a breach was made in the wall; but the plan for penetrating into the town on two sides (on the side of the harbour and through the breach) was delayed by the offer of surrender Lucius secretly received from one of the two commanders of the town. The traitor having been killed in time by his colleague, the assault had to be started afresh. However, the appearance of T. Quinctius, who had his quarters in the neighbourhood, with 4000 picked soldiers convinced the remaining commander of the town of the uselessness of further resistance and, following the lead of the traitor he had executed,

²⁶⁹) Liv. 33, 43—45; 34, 22 sq.; 25, 3; 26, 10; the land army amounted to a sum total of \pm 30,000 men.

²⁷⁰) Since the conquest of Leucas in 197 she had become the chief naval base of Rome in the western waters instead of Corcyra.

²⁷¹) Liv. 34, 26, 11; Zon. 9, 18, 3, v. s. p. 214 and for Eumenes' *lembi* footnote 63.

²⁷²) Liv. 34, 29.

²⁷³) If we reckon an average of 250 men a ship for the crews of the 68 battle-ships (the quinquereme had 300 rowers, the quadrireme and trireme of course proportionally less), we get a total number of 17,000 men, to whom the crews of the light craft must be added.

he capitulated on condition that the garrison should be allowed to withdraw. The great importance of the fall of Gytheum lay in the fact that Nabis was now wholly cut off from the sea and had no outlet left.²⁷⁴⁾ So he decided to enter into negotiations, notwithstanding the fact that Pythagoras, his deputy at Argos, had just brought him 3000 men;²⁷⁵⁾ but.... the terms, offered by T. Quinctius²⁷⁶⁾ in spite of the resistance of his Greek allies, who wanted to ruin Nabis, not to spare him,²⁷⁷⁾ were deemed too hard by Nabis and consequently rejected by him.²⁷⁸⁾ So the war began afresh and for the assault on Sparta, which had now become unavoidable, Titus raised his forces from 30,000 to 50,000 men by ordering all *socii navales* (\pm 20,000 men) from Gytheum and adding them to his army.²⁷⁹⁾ Sparta, which was only partly fortified, would certainly not have resisted the general attack which was now launched against her, had not Pythagoras driven out the intruders by starting fires. But Nabis was by now sufficiently intimidated to accept the terms he had rejected formerly.²⁸⁰⁾ He had to give back²⁸¹⁾ the ships he had taken from the maritime towns and was not allowed to possess ships in future except for 2 *lembi* with no more than 16 oars each; the Cretan towns²⁸²⁾ he had been in possession of he must hand over to the Romans nor was he allowed to possess any town in the island in future; he had to renounce the right to make any alliance either with Cretans or with anybody else and to wage war; he must give up for good and all the Laconian coast towns and of course evacuate Argos. Other less important clauses I leave out of account. That the object of these terms was above all things to cut off Nabis from the possibility of practising piracy again, is manifest at the first glance. It appears that he held some places in Crete; the fact that from now onward he was forbidden every contact with the Cretan pirates' nests must have been welcomed by the Rhodians, who had successfully

²⁷⁴⁾ Liv. 34, 30.

²⁷⁵⁾ Liv. 34, 29, 14.

²⁷⁶⁾ Liv. 34, 35.

²⁷⁷⁾ Liv. 34, 30—34.

²⁷⁸⁾ His chief objection was, that his piratical venom-teeth were to be drawn, 34, 36, 1—3.

²⁷⁹⁾ 34, 38, 1.

²⁸⁰⁾ 34, 38—40, 4.

²⁸¹⁾ For the terms Liv. 34, 35.

²⁸²⁾ Liv. 35, 12, 7—8; 13, 1—3; 38, 31, 2: they were placed by T. Quinctius under the protection of the Achaean league, without becoming members of it.

wound up their war against Crete since 201²⁸³), but apparently had not yet completely succeeded in stamping out Nabis' influence with the island. The co-operation between Rome and Rhodes in fighting the evil of piracy left little to be desired in this period; but, alas, a change for the worse would soon make its appearance, and the fault rested with Rome.

In the meantime Argos had expelled its Lacedaemonian garrison, weakened as it was by Pythagoras' withdrawal.²⁸⁴) Titus visited the town on his way back to Phocis, from where he had begun the war and where he was going to winter now.²⁸⁵) Eumenes, the Rhodians and Lucius returned to the fleet and put to sea, Lucius to Leucas, the others homewards.²⁸⁶) At the beginning of 194 the peace with Nabis was ratified at Rome;²⁸⁷) to be sure, his fangs had been extracted, but he was still in his place himself, to the great disappointment of most Greeks.²⁸⁸)

In 194 Greece was at last completely evacuated by the Romans; even from Oreus, Chalcis, Eretria, Demetrias and Acrocorinth the garrisons were withdrawn.²⁸⁹) The Roman troops marched through Thessaly and Epirus to Oricum, where L. Quinctius had gathered a great number of merchantmen for the transport.²⁹⁰) From there the army crossed to Brindisi;²⁹¹) we are not told that the warfleet also returned to Italy, but this goes without saying. But if the Romans believed that by means of their policy of freedom and autonomy they had sufficiently attached the Greeks to themselves, they met with a bitter disappointment. No doubt, Greece had been declared free, but no genuine Greek could overlook the distressing fact that his country now practically found itself under the protectorate of Rome (hadn't, for instance, Flamininus done his best to lay the government of the Greek states as much as he could into the hands of the well-to-do, whose orientation was most strongly anti-Macedonian and therefore more or less pro-Roman?); and since 196 the Aetolians,

²⁸³) V. s. p. 224 sq.

²⁸⁴) Liv. 34, 40, 5 sq.

²⁸⁵) He had had his head-quarters in Phocis since the autumn of 198.

²⁸⁶) Liv. 34, 40, 7—41, 7; 48, 2 sq.

²⁸⁷) Liv. 34, 43, 1—2; Diod. 28, 13.

²⁸⁸) That Nabis would try to recover his bases on the coast as soon as the opportunity offered, is only natural, cf. Liv. 34, 36, 2 sq.; 35, 12, 7—8; 13, 1—3; we shall come back to this revolt afterwards.

²⁸⁹) Liv. 34, 49, 4—5; 50, 8—51.

²⁹⁰) Liv. 34, 50, 11.

²⁹¹) Liv. 34, 52, 2.

who had hoped for a better reward and considered themselves slighted by Rome, acted diligently as fire-brands. So Greece in consequence of the evacuation became a vacuum, which automatically provoked interference from without.²⁹²⁾ Not without reason Scipio had warned against the evacuation in view of Antiochus; but Rome had not listened to him.²⁹³⁾

B: the Syrian war. Introduction. Naturally we cannot think of treating here *in extenso* the complicated antecedents of the Syrian war: we must limit ourselves to maritime history; but a brief survey of them is indispensable as basis for our theme.²⁹⁴⁾ Towards 197, when Philip's defeat seemed imminent, Antiochus thought fit to profit by the favourable opportunity (before the Romans got their hands free again) to reconquer his ancestral possessions in Asia Minor and Thrace that had passed into Egyptian or Macedonian hands. A great expedition with a land army and a fleet of 100 *naves tectae* and 200 ships of lighter types was prepared during the winter of 198—197 and launched in the spring.²⁹⁵⁾ Antiochus himself commanded the fleet and he opened his naval campaign with the subjection of the Cilician coast, where the Ptolemaic cities immediately surrendered except Coracesium, which had to be besieged. The Romans looked at this action with suspicion: they ascribed to Antiochus the intention to come to Philip's assistance. Undoubtedly they were wrong in thinking so: notwithstanding their seemingly good thieves' companionship, the two kings were substantially antagonists; at the most Antiochus may have intended to prevent a rather too serious disturbance of the equilibrium in favour of Rome by appearing himself with considerable forces in the Aegean. Be this as it may, the Rhodians, undoubtedly at Flamininus' instigation, barred his way: they announced that they would not allow him to pass the Chelidonian islands.²⁹⁶⁾ Antiochus didn't want a collision with the Rhodians, who, if it came to fighting, would be backed up by the Roman and Pergamene fleets; so a diplomatic parleying was started,

²⁹²⁾ See *i. a.* Liv. 35, 12 and the excellent remarks of Holleaux, *C. A. H.* VIII, 193—198.

²⁹³⁾ Liv. 34, 43, 3—9.

²⁹⁴⁾ For a detailed discussion the reader is referred to Niese II, 637 sq., de Sanctis IV, 1, 114 sq., *C. A. H.* VIII, 173 sq., Cary 206 sq., Kromayer II, 127 sq.

²⁹⁵⁾ Liv. 33, 19, 6—20; Pol. 18, 39, 3—4; 41^a; Dio fr. 60.

²⁹⁶⁾ *V. s.* p. 246.

which, however, was ended by the news of Cynoscephalae: now that Rome had beaten Philip decisively, the Rhodians judged it unnecessary to bar Antiochus' way any longer. Consequently the latter's plans of conquest were carried out: in the course of some years he occupied not only a considerable part of Asia Minor,²⁹⁷⁾ but also extended his conquests beyond the Hellespont to Thrace, where he rebuilt and fortified Lysimachia on the neck of the Chersonese, which had been recently destroyed by the Thracians, and even occupied Aenus and Maronea.²⁹⁸⁾ It stands to reason that this Syrian expansion was not at all fitted to take away the Roman suspicion. They regarded the occupation of Thrace as a first step towards meddling with the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula which just now they were trying to settle themselves under the motto of Greek freedom and autonomy,²⁹⁹⁾ and they couldn't allow possessions of Philip, who had been defeated by themselves, to be appropriated by Antiochus. The fact that Hannibal, who had been forced to leave Carthage in 195, had found a refuge at Antiochus' court, heightened their fear; and Eumenes, who rightly considered his own position threatened by Antiochus' action in Asia Minor and on the Hellespont and who may be regarded as the principal instigator of the Syrian war, did his level best to foment the suspicion of the Romans and to involve them in the Asiatic affairs. Partly at his instigation some Greek cities in Asia Minor³⁰⁰⁾ refused to submit to Antiochus and appealed to the Romans, who, in connexion with the device of Greek freedom loudly proclaimed by themselves, could scarcely repudiate such an appeal. We remarked before,³⁰¹⁾ that the treaty of peace concluded in 196 between Rome and Macedon contained several terms which were rather more directed against Antiochus than against Philip; this circumstance became the starting point for an endless diplomatic conflict, Rome presumptuously demanding from Antiochus that he should not only give up his conquests in Europe, but also evacuate

²⁹⁷⁾ Ephesus became his naval base in the Aegean area; yet he carefully respected and even furthered the interests of the Rhodians (they were allowed to take under their protection Samos, Halicarnassus and some other places), and left Pergamum untouched.

²⁹⁸⁾ Liv. 33, 38 sq., App. Syr. 1 sq., Zon. 9, 18, 8; Liv. 34, 33, 12, App. Syr. 6; for Aenus and Maronea Liv. 37, 60, 7.

²⁹⁹⁾ Probably they were wrong in thinking so: to Antiochus the expansion into Thrace meant no more than the reconquest of ancestral possessions, Kromayer *l. l.*

³⁰⁰⁾ Lampsacus and Smyrna, see for instance Dtb.³ 591.

³⁰¹⁾ *V. s.* p. 249 sq.

the Ptolemaic possessions he had occupied and respect the autonomy of the Greek cities in Asia Minor. It stands to reason that Antiochus couldn't think of complying with such a demand; and even when finally the Romans lowered their pretensions at least so far as to declare their willingness to abstain from meddling with the Asiatic affairs on the understanding that Antiochus should withdraw from Europe,³⁰²⁾ he refused to enter into such a compromise, though it would probably have been a sound line of conduct to accept it:³⁰³⁾ in this case he might perhaps have secured a lasting peace in Asia Minor, though at the sacrifice of his possessions in Thrace. So things were in a high state of tension and it was only natural that also after 196 the Romans still continued for a considerable time to hold the chief strongholds in Greece for safety's sake and that in 194 Scipio warned against its evacuation. But Rome could scarcely do anything less than fulfil Flamininus' promise: by continuing the occupation of Greece she would have brought grist to the mill of the Aetolians, who for a long time past had fanned the fire against the Romans and pilloried their device of freedom and autonomy, she would have raised a storm of indignation and rage throughout the country and made it wholly liable to the Aetolian propagandism. So Greece was completely evacuated, but... the result remained exactly the same. For Greece now became a vacuum, where the cry for real freedom diligently intoned by the Aetolian propagandism, called forth a lively response from the hearts of the lower classes that had been robbed of every influence by Rome, a vacuum therefore which automatically provoked interference from without. Here Antiochus found an opportunity for a countermove against Roman insolence. Originally it had certainly not been his intention to meddle with Greece; but the presumptuous and aggressive interference of the Romans with Asiatic affairs unavoidably provoked a reaction on his part. If they claimed the right to stand up for the liberty of the Greek cities in Asia Minor, he in his turn would bring real liberation to Greece quasi-liberated, but really bullied by Rome. So he responded to the call of the Aetolians and in the autumn of 192 landed in Greece with modest forces. Probably even this action was not intended to be the first step towards a definitive measuring of strength

³⁰²⁾ Here it becomes most miserably apparent, how little Rome cared in reality for Greek freedom.

³⁰³⁾ Cary 208.

with Rome, but only a comparatively innocent move on the chess-board of diplomacy, a military demonstration: Greece was a surety he wanted to secure in order to be able to force the Romans to renounce their insulting demands with respect to Thrace and his empire in Asia.³⁰⁴) But if he hoped to attain his object by this way, he was ill acquainted with Roman popular character: after such an act of aggression, which, moreover, seemed to confirm their suspicions concerning Antiochus, *they* would have it out with him and go through with the job to the bitter end.

That the navy played a very important part in the Syrian war, is a fact scarcely needing explanation. No doubt, in its first phase the war was waged in Greece nor was Antiochus able to prevent the Roman legions from reaching this country easily by sea; but the decisive battle could only be fought in Asia. The Roman army intended for this big fight had to choose between two routes: from Greece by sea to one of the many Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor that would welcome the Romans with cheers; or by land through Macedonia and Thrace. If they chose the former route (but we shall see that the Roman land-lubbers did not even take it into consideration), it is manifest that, to begin with, they *must* command the waters of Asia Minor. But if they preferred the way by land, the case remained exactly the same with regard to maritime supremacy; for the land army could never pass the Hellespont if Antiochus commanded the sea. So the Roman navy, in co-operation with the squadrons of Rhodes and Pergamum, had to acquire in a hard struggle the supremacy in the Asiatic waters before there could be question of a decisive battle on land. The progress of this struggle forms one of the best-known, most important and most thrilling episodes of Roman naval history.

*The fleetnumbers.*³⁰⁵) The problem of the fleetnumbers is one of the most ticklish questions the Syrian war confronts us with, and it must therefore be discussed in detail. The difficulty lies chiefly in the fact that the fleetnumbers during the operations, which in the main come from Polybius, are not consistent with the numbers of the ship-building and equipping arrangements as given by the annalists. In such a case the only admissible method is this, that we start from the fleetnumbers of the operations, first because they provide us with the effectives on active

³⁰⁴) Kromayer *l.l.*, C. A. H. VIII, 203.

³⁰⁵) The discussion of the fleetnumbers by Clark (106 sq.) is quite insufficient.

service, secondly because they are protected by Polybius' authority; with these reliable data the annalistic tradition about the ship-building and equipping measures must subsequently be confronted.

Of the effectives on active service we have to mention in the first place the squadron of the praetor A. Atilius Serranus, which operated in the Greek waters from the spring of 192 to the summer of 191. Polybius gives him 24 quinqueremes in 192 during the operations near Gytheum (Liv. 35, 37, 3), but 25 *naves tectae* (= quinqueremes, Liv. 36, 42, 7) in the summer of 191, when he transferred his squadron to his successor C. Livius Salinator at the Piraeus. The difference is of no consequence: in the former case one ship may have been out of repair or temporarily sent elsewhere; we may therefore fix the number of Atilius' squadron at 25 sail. Or are we to estimate it with de Sanctis³⁰⁶) at 30 sail, because we must add to it those few ships with which by order of Atilius his legate A. Postumius checked Cephallenia in the early spring of 191 and which also contributed to keeping Acarnania on the Roman side against Antiochus (Liv. 36, 11, 9; 12, 9 sq.)? I guess not: Atilius' squadron numbered 25 sail, including those ships, not exclusive of them; after the Spartan complications which took place in the summer of 192 and during which Atilius still had his complete squadron at his disposal, they will have been detached by him to Cephallenia, have passed the winter there and returned to Atilius in the early spring of 191, shortly after Antiochus had withdrawn from Acarnania (Liv. 36, 12, 11). For, when C. Livius passed by Cephallenia on his voyage to the Piraeus (about June 191), he chastised the island, because it had joined the Aetolians (Liv. 36, 42, 5). This proves conclusively that at that moment Postumius' little squadron was no longer present at Cephallenia.³⁰⁷) Had Postumius on his own account

³⁰⁶) IV, 1, 173, 98. He arrives at this estimate *i. a.* because he is influenced by the fact that the annalists (Liv. 35, 20, 12) give 30 ships to Atilius. But it is more correct from a methodical point of view to deduce first of all the real effective from the operations and to confront this subsequently with the annalistic data. *V. i.*

³⁰⁷) Or are we to suppose that it *was* present at the time of Livius' appearance, but that it had proved too weak to keep the island permanently in check? I think not; for in this case either Livius would have taken these ships with him to the Piraeus, which did *not* happen (Livius left Italy with 50 Roman ships and only the 25 of Atilius were added to this number, Liv. 36, 42, 1 *coll.* 42, 2 and 7—8), or they would have remained in the waters of Cephallenia, which is quite impossible. For from the spring of 191 to the spring of 190 piracy flourished in those waters at the cost of the Roman transports, Liv. 37, 13, 11—12. Undoubtedly this phenomenon resulted from

sailed back with it to Italy? It is impossible, because he was a subordinate officer and because the military conjuncture would have stamped such a line of conduct as pure madness: the Roman fleet in the Greek waters was weak enough without humbug! So there remains but one possibility: before Livius' arrival at Cephallenia Postumius' squadron had returned to Atilius, which implies that it was included in the 25 quinqueremes which in the summer of 191 were handed over by Atilius at the Piraeus to C. Livius.

With this datum from Polybius the communication of the annalist Antias³⁰⁸) that in the spring of 192 Atilius³⁰⁹) was ordered by the senate *triginta naves quinqueremes facere et ex navalibus veteres deducere, si quae utiles essent* (Liv. 35, 20, 12), is not inconsistent at all, if we only trouble to read it as it stands: *Antias does not say that Atilius took those 30 new ships to Greece*. It is far from impossible that the much reviled Antias (and I do not say that he doesn't deserve blame!) here for once did not commit a forgery, but that really at the beginning of 192 the senate ordered 30 new ships to be built (*v. i.*). But, when shortly afterwards the departure of a Roman fleet for Greece appeared to be urgent (Liv. 35, 22, 2), of course those new ships were not yet ready and so Atilius put to sea with 25 *old* quinqueremes.

Next to Atilius' squadron we have to consider the naval forces of his successor C. Livius. In the spring of 191 he sailed from Rome with 50 *naves tectae* (Liv. 36, 42, 1); at the Piraeus the 25 quinqueremes of Atilius were added to this number (36, 42, 7—8), so that the sum total of Roman ships operating in the Asiatic waters since the late summer of 191 amounted to 75.³¹⁰) These data come from Polybius again, but

the very fact that Postumius' ships had returned to Atilius' squadron and that subsequently the latter's complete effective had crossed with Livius to Asia, where every ship was badly needed. Atilius will have gathered his entire fleet at the Piraeus about April 191 with a view to the decisive battle in the Thermopylae between Glabrio and Antiochus; he really intercepted a Syrian convoy after Antiochus' defeat.

³⁰⁸) In books 31—38 he is Livy's chief annalistic authority, Klotz 1 sq., 24 sq.

³⁰⁹) The mistake about Atilius and Baebius Tamphilus (35, 20, 10 *coll.* 11—12) is a simple slip of Livy himself.

³¹⁰) In the number of 81 *naves constratae* of Liv. 36, 42, 8 (cf. App. Syr. 22, 101, Just. 31, 6, 7; Liv. 36, 43, 13) 6 Punic ships (Liv. 36, 42, 2, App. *l. l.*) are included. What does Appian mean, when he calls C. Livius Salinator *τὸν φύλακα τῆς Ἰταλίας*?

Did he confound him (cf. 15, 64) with his partial namesake L. Oppius Salinator, who commanded the Sicilian squadron in 192 (35, 23, 6—7) and was praetor in 191 with C. Livius (35, 24, 6)? Clark (58) commits the same blunder!

this time they are flatly incompatible with Antias, who gives only 30 ships to Livius (Liv. 36, 2, 14). Of one of those forgeries usual with Antias there can naturally be no question here, because this worthy man never tends to belittle Roman achievements, but always to magnify them; so the number of 30 ships must be due to a simple mistake on his part, as Polybius naturally takes precedence of Antias and the number given by him (50 sail) has been handed down by Livy as well as by Appian.³¹¹⁾

Besides these 75 Roman ships that had to wage the war against Antiochus in the Asiatic waters, there were two secondary squadrons, our knowledge of which we chiefly owe to the annalists. In the first place a squadron of 20 ships (the type is not mentioned) was sent in 192 to the Sicilian waters under command of L. Oppius Salinator, for fear lest Antiochus should employ Hannibal to draw Carthage into the war and should launch a diverting offensive against Sicily (Liv. 35, 23, 6 sq.; App. Syr. 15, 64).³¹²⁾ These ships remained in the Sicilian waters till the end of 189, that is to say during the whole war.³¹³⁾ The tradition about this squadron seems to be authentic, though it rests almost entirely upon the annalists. The odds are ten to one that the ships were old ones; for the Romans were not mad enough to spend new ships, if they had them, on a quite secondary patrolling service, while they had to wage a very difficult naval war against Antiochus himself, and secondly L. Oppius put to sea shortly after A. Atilius, so that the 30 new ships the latter had been ordered to build (*v. s. p.* 260) probably were not available for Oppius either.

The most painful tooth remains to be drawn: the squadron of L. Aemilius Regillus, who in 190 commanded the Roman fleet in the Aegean. According to Antias 20 ships were assigned to him in the spring of 190, before he departed for the Aegean in order to succeed C. Livius in the war against Antiochus' naval forces; the ships were old ones, which the *praetor urbanus* of 191 had made seaworthy by order of the senate (Liv. 36, 2, 15; 37, 2, 10; the type is not mentioned, but at any rate

³¹¹⁾ Klotz 97—98.

³¹²⁾ The vague indication given by Appian is the only survival of Polybius' communications regarding this precautionary measure; but Polybius' own account cannot have been detailed either, as it concerned a quite secondary matter.

³¹³⁾ Liv. 36, 2, 11 (191); 37, 2, 8 (190) the squadron is not mentioned, but 37, 50, 9 (189) proves that also in 190 it had remained in the Sicilian waters; it was recalled towards 188 (38, 36, 2).

two of the vessels were quinqueremes, Liv. 37, 14, 2); they were expressly intended to reinforce the squadron in the Asiatic waters. May we regard this version as compatible with Polybius' account? It runs as follows: when Regillus reached the Piraeus, he found there 4 ships, sent by C. Livius from Samos in order to shield the Roman transports from piracy in the waters of Cephallenia (*v. s.* footnote 307); on receiving the news of the Rhodian defeat (the disaster of Pausistratus' squadron is meant, compare the systematic survey of the events) he took the 4 ships back to Asia Minor, as he had only 2 quinqueremes himself (Liv. 37, 13, 11—14, 2). So we find no trace here of Regillus' 20 ships. Now we must of course take into account that Regillus, even though being a fool of the first water, could only take back the 4 ships to Asia on the understanding that the protection of the transports had been otherwise provided for: such a measure was of vital importance for the revictualling of the allied fleets in the Asiatic waters, on the success of which the result of the whole war depended. While reading the quoted passage of Livy we wonder why for heaven's sake C. Livius had to send 4 ships of his poor squadron from Asia to Cephallenia in order to protect transports, in other words why no action was taken against the pirates of Cephallenia from Italy! Indeed; but, though a distressing degree of maritime inertness on the part of the senate is revealed by the fact that they had suffered this matter to drag on for such a long time that finally C. Livius was forced to interfere with it from Samos, nevertheless in the spring of 190 it had apparently begun to dawn at last upon the Fathers that this dangerous situation must be met with and finished at any price. So they changed Regillus' mandate before his departure: he was now ordered to leave the bulk (18) of the 20 ships, which according to the original plan he was to take to Asia, in the waters of Cephallenia in order to fight the pirates and protect the transports. So he reached the Piraeus with only 2 quinqueremes and could safely take back the 4 ships of Livius to Samos, because they were now as superfluous in the waters west of Greece as they were bitterly needed in the Asiatic area.³¹⁴) This opinion is corroborated by the fact that immediately after Regillus' departure the senate ordered the *praetor urbanus* to build 50 new ships (30 quinqueremes, 20 triremes) *for the war in the Asiatic waters*, of course to replace Regillus' squadron which had not reached

³¹⁴) Similarly de Sanctis IV, 1, 211, 154; wrongly Klotz 88.

its original destination (Liv. 37, 4, 5). No doubt, it remains a strange and unaccountable fact, that Polybius or at least Livy in reproducing Polybius' account³¹⁵) doesn't even hint at the bulk of Regillus' fleet having been left behind in the waters of Cephallenia; but... a year later, in 189, Polybius' account of the definitive conquest and occupation of Cephallenia by the consul M. Fulvius Nobilior, who had fought the Aetolians before, presupposes the presence of Regillus' 18 ships in the waters west of Greece, as Fulvius' expedition against the island would otherwise have been impossible.³¹⁶) At least in my humble opinion; but according to Antias the 50 new ships the senate had ordered to be built in the spring of 190 for the war in the Asiatic waters, should now have been assigned to Fulvius Nobilior for the conquest of Cephallenia (Liv. 37, 50, 5)! With de Sanctis³¹⁷) I believe that this statement must be incorrect. Is it really imaginable that those brand-new ships were *not* sent in 190 to the Asiatic waters, though they had been expressly intended for warfare in that area (Liv. 37, 4, 5) and were badly needed there — alas, we know with absolute certainty that they were not sent there³¹⁸) —, but that they *were* employed in 189 for the petty expedition against Cephallenia, though 18 ships of Regillus, a squadron amply sufficient for this modest task, were cruising in those waters since the spring of 190? No, Antias must have made a mistake, and it is rather easy to imagine how he came to it: he knew, that the 50 new ships had never reached their original destination, the Asiatic waters, and so he was at a loss what to do with them, because it did not occur to him that they might perhaps have been left unfinished; so he assigned them to Fulvius in 189, the presence of Regillus' 18 ships in the Cephallenian waters having passed out of his mind. An explicable and pardonable mistake; we too have been put to great trouble to discover where Regillus' squadron was hiding! We do not know the commander of those 18 ships; a legate of Regillus will have commanded them in 190, a legate of Fulvius in 189.

Let us sum up: in the Asiatic waters a sum total of 77 Roman ships took part in the naval war (25 of Atilius, 50 of Livius, 2 of Regillus);

³¹⁵) Is the little word *tantum* 37, 14, 2 (*only* 2 quinqueremes) perhaps to be regarded as the only survival of a communication of Polybius about the rest of the squadron? Livy often shortens his sources in reproducing them.

³¹⁶) Liv. 38, 9, 10; 10, 2; 11, 7; 28, 5—30, 1; Pol. 21, 30, 5; 32, 12; 32b; Zon. 9, 21, 4.

³¹⁷) IV, 1, 211, 154.

³¹⁸) Probably these 50 ships were never launched, *v. i.*

18 ships of Regillus were on service in the waters west of Greece and 20 in the Sicilian waters, so that we arrive at a total effective of 115 Roman ships. The squadrons of Atilius and Regillus certainly belonged to the old stock of ships and with respect to the Sicilian squadron the same appeared to be highly probable (*v. s.*); only for the 50 ships of Livius we had to leave this question open for the present. But we must now try to solve the problem. Is it possible that *all* the 115 ships on active service were old ones or *must* we reckon with the building of new vessels during this war? Let us try to answer this question *a priori*, before we consider the annalistic tradition concerning the ship-building and equipping measures. Of the numerous ships employed by the Romans during the second Punic war 180 had been built during the war itself: 60 in 217, 100 in 214, 20 in 208. Now then, is it possible that of those 180 ships (I leave out of account the older vessels which were available in 218 and had been built in 242,³¹⁹) though even of those some may have been fit for service in 192) 115 or even more were extant *and* really fit for service in 192? Undoubtedly it *is* possible: in the first place very few Roman warships had perished during the second Punic and the second Macedonian war; secondly it is true, no doubt, that a great number of Roman men of war had been continually on active service during both of them, but we must not forget that ships wear sooner away when they are lying in the dockyards in a neglected state (as used to be the case at Rome in times of peace) than while being on active service; thirdly those men of war were not exorbitantly old in 192: the ships built in 217 had reached an age of 25 years, those dating from 214 of 22, those from 208 of 16 years. We may compare the 220 ships available at the beginning of the second Punic war, which had been built in 242 and consequently were 24 years old in 218; for similar instances from the first century b. C. I refer the reader to Kromayer, *Flotte*, 432. So we may safely suppose that in 192 at the very least still 120 of the afore-said warships were available, and this result obtained by deduction tallies in a wonderful way with the annalistic tradition about the Roman naval arrangements of 192 and the next years. For apart from the old ships A. Atilius at the beginning of 192 was ordered to fit out besides 30 new ones (*v. s. p.* 260; this piece of information is too vague to build upon), we are told that in 192 the *praetor urbanus* and the *praetor*

³¹⁹) See chapter II, footnote 11.

peregrinus were ordered *centum quinqueremes parare* (Liv. 35, 21, 1), an expression naturally having reference to the fitting out of old ships, as Livy with respect to the building of new ships in those years always uses the phrase (*novas*) *naves facere* (35, 20, 12; 24, 8; 37, 4, 5); and to those 100 ships must be added the 20 old vessels of Regillus that had been made seaworthy by the *praetor urbanus* of 191 (36, 2, 15; 37, 2, 10). Consequently at least 120 old ships were employed by the Romans during the Syrian war; after deducting the 115 ships on active service there remained a surplus of at least 5 vessels for the transport of envoys, couriers and such like. *So we arrive at the conclusion that from the operations as well as from the communications about the numbers of ships fitted out during the Syrian war we are able to gather a quite reasonable notion of the Roman navy in this war without reckoning in the least with the building of new ships.* But... there is a serious but! Besides at least 120 old vessels that were made seaworthy again, the annalists do mention the building or at least the laying down of a hundred new ones: according to them A. Atilius at the beginning of 192 was ordered to build 30 new quinqueremes (Liv. 35, 20, 12), shortly after the *praetor urbanus* of 192 was charged to build 50 new quinqueremes (35, 24, 8) and finally the *praetor urbanus* of 190 to lay down 30 quinqueremes and 20 triremes (37, 4, 5, *v. s. p.* 262 sq.). That is to say that a total amount of *a hundred* new ships were built according to the annalistic tradition: we remarked before that Atilius' 30 ships were not ready at the time of his departure and therefore did not sail with him to Greece (*v. s. p.* 260); so the number of ships to be built will simply have been raised from 30 to 50 in the course of 192. How are we to solve this difficulty? We stated above that we do not need these new ships to account for the real effectives of the operations. Of Atilius' and Regillus' ships we know for a certainty and of the Sicilian vessels it is at least highly probable that they were old ones; at the most we might feel inclined to find back the 50 new ships projected in 192 in Livius' 50 sail of 191. But even this seems not probable, as the 100 old ships repaired in 192 were amply sufficient to cover Atilius' 25, Livius' 50 and 20 Sicilian vessels. Moreover, we can scarcely suppose that in 191 the Romans should have sent only 75 ships to the Asiatic waters, if besides the 100 old vessels 50 new ships had been available: in the naval war against Antiochus the Roman navy had to muddle through with a number of ships that was evidently rather limited and insufficient,

especially in 190. That also the squadron of 50 sail projected in 190 never reached its destination, the Asiatic waters, and that the annalist Antias wrongly detached it to Cephallenia in 189, we remarked before. Are we then simply to regard the building of 100 new ships as a fable of the annalists? That is going too far in my opinion. The orders to build new ships may very well be authentic; but.... they were not carried out. It is quite natural that in 192 the senate ordered 50 new vessels to be laid down: on account of Hannibal's presence at Antiochus' court and of sundry rumours they expected a far more serious attack than would happen in reality; they feared that Carthage should be involved in the conflict, that a diverting offensive should be launched against Sicily and perhaps even an attack on Italy itself.³²⁰) The Punic wars prove that, if Italy or Sicily were at stake, the senate was ready enough to attend carefully to the step-child called navy; in 208 for instance the fleet had been considerably and quickly reinforced on the mere rumour of a great Punic naval offensive. So it is only natural that in 192 they acted in the same way; but.... something had changed nevertheless. For this time they suffered the matter to drag on and, when in the autumn it became manifest that Antiochus only aimed at a modest offensive in Greece, apparently the building plan was brought to a stop. That in the spring of 190 the senate, on receiving the news that Antiochus after his defeat off Cissus was reinforcing his fleet considerably (Liv. 37, 4, 5), ordered anew 50 ships to be built, is quite natural again: the events of this year prove that indeed the allied fleets in the Asiatic waters bitterly needed reinforcements. But again the building project was allowed to drag on and the ships were not finished; for it is absolutely certain that the new vessels never reached the Asiatic waters. This mental change is connected with the auxiliary system and it is certainly to be regarded as a symptom of decline: Rome now relied upon her naval allies and let things drift. The speculation proved lucky: the Rhodians were really more or less infallible in the maritime sphere and *they* won the game for Rome. But such a speculation was not made less risky and condemnable by the fact that after all it appeared to have succeeded: in this war the Romans had to squeeze themselves through the narrow eyes of two needles; the names of those needles were Side and Myonnesus.

So the long and short of it is that the senate indeed decided to build

³²⁰) See for instance Liv. 35, 23.

a hundred new ships, but that these ships were never launched. In this connexion the annalist Antias is only slightly to blame: he gave 30 ships to Livius instead of 50, a simple mistake; and the 50 new ships of 190 he assigned to Fulvius Nobilior in 189, because he did not realize that those ships had never been finished and he had to get rid of them somehow: a forgery no doubt, but neither a serious one nor committed in bad faith.

And yet. . . . and yet there is a serious but. Against the view defended in the preceding pages one very grave objection can be raised, which — I readily acknowledge it — weighs heavily with me and must be discussed here in detail. During the third Punic war (the last war before the naval revival in the first century in which the Roman navy played a certain part) a Roman fleet took part in the operations, which, apart from a great number of light craft, was composed of 50 quinqueremes.³²¹⁾ Now we may suppose that the lighter types and even part of the heavy battle-ships were furnished by allies (why shouldn't for instance Pergamum and Rhodes have contributed to this fleet?), but at any rate we have to presume that a considerable part of the quinqueremes were Roman vessels.³²²⁾ As furthermore it is quite certain that Rome did not build new ships for the third Macedonian war in 172 (compare the discussion of this war below) and as it is highly improbable that for the third Punic war a new fleet should have been built, the unavoidable consequence of our supposition that during the Syrian war Rome managed with nothing but old men of war appears to be that the 50 quinqueremes of the third Punic war still formed part of the ships built during the second Punic war, that is to say that they dated from the years 214 and 208. Consequently in 146 those quinqueremes should have reached the venerable age of 62—68 years! This objection against my way of viewing the matter is serious, I can't deny it. And yet — the Macedonian flagship was more than 120 years old in 167³²³⁾ and, though at that moment it had been out of commission for a long time past, it was still seaworthy enough to make the long voyage from Macedon to Rome; the flagship, employed by Philopoemen against Nabis in 192, was more than 80 years old and, though it was as leaky as a basket and it was crushed at the first blow, we must not forget, that it had been put in commission in a hurry, without

³²¹⁾ App. *Lib.* 75, 350.

³²²⁾ Cf. Pol. 34, 15, 7 = Plin. *N. H.* 5, 9.

³²³⁾ *V. s.* footnote 263.

careful repairs.³²⁴) Now then, though the Romans of the second century were very slack as far as the building of new ships was concerned, they certainly used to *repair* in a careful way the old vessels they had; and after all an old hulk can almost be transformed into a new ship, provided we do not take the notion of repairing in a too narrow sense; moreover, the achievements of the Roman fleet in the third Punic war were certainly not impressing. He who regards as insurmountable the objection raised here by myself against myself, will have to suppose that the 50 new ships projected in 192 were really launched and sent with C. Livius to Asia in 191. Might this be true, then the fault of Roman naval policy would not have lain in neglecting the launching of new ships, but in the fact that they didn't send more ships to Asia in 191 and 190, though besides the 50 new ships numerous old ones would have been disposable for this purpose and though naval reinforcements were badly needed in the Asiatic waters (*v. s. p.* 265): a blunder still more unaccountable and unpardonable than the neglecting of building new ships supposed by me. A certain support for such a view might be found in the fact that at the beginning of the third Macedonian as well as of the third Punic war 50 quinqueremes were put in commission: according to my imaginary opponents these might have been the 50 new vessels of 192.

As for the types of warships, we know that the 77 men of war in the Asiatic waters were all quinqueremes; probably the same holds good with respect to the 20 Sicilian ships, as the 100 old ships put in commission in 192 were quinqueremes. We do not know the type of the 18 vessels in the Cephallenian waters; they may have been triremes. But at any rate the bulk of the Roman fleet was composed of quinqueremes, as usual.

Now we must turn our attention to the auxiliary squadrons of the allies, which, as was indicated already in the afore-going discussion, played a highly important part in this war. The Italiot towns were bound *ex formula* to supply the Romans with ships; but, after they had ferried the army of fleetless Rome to Sicily in 264 (*Pol.* 1, 20, 13 sq.; probably they continued to transport Roman forces to Sicily in the following years (263—261), see Ciaceri 52), these contingents had scarcely played a part at all in Roman naval warfare during the Punic wars themselves: perhaps those towns had contributed a modest number of ships to the first Roman

³²⁴) Liv. 35, 26 and *v. i. sub anno* 192.

fleet in the first Punic war;³²⁵) and during the second Punic war 12 ships of theirs had come to the rescue in a case of emergency in the Tarentine waters in 210 (Liv. 26, 39; *v. s. p.* 112). And that is all, as far as we know. But it stands to reason that, when after 201 the auxiliary system began more and more to predominate in Roman naval warfare, these contingents also came to the front again, a kind of regression to the state of things that had prevailed before 264. To be sure, they took no part in the second Macedonian war, though during this war (in 195) 5 ships of Italiot towns did sail to Spain with 20 Roman vessels.³²⁶) But in the Syrian war Rome began to exploit these squadrons in an intensive way. In the spring of 191 C. Livius collected 24 ships *ex foedere* from the Greek maritime towns in southern Italy and took them together with the Roman fleet via the Piraeus to the Asiatic waters.³²⁷) These vessels were *naves apertae* (Liv. 36, 42, 1), that is to say triremes (37, 13, 11) and still lighter types (36, 42, 8); they remained on service in the East during the whole naval campaign.

The second auxiliary squadron from the West is to be mentioned next: 6 *naves tectae* which Carthage was bound *ex foedere* to furnish³²⁸) (she had become a Roman ally in 201). One of these ships got lost in the battle off Cissus (in the autumn of 191).

But far more numerous and important auxiliary squadrons were furnished by Rome's eastern allies, especially by Pergamum and Rhodes, who already during the second Macedonian war had contributed in such a high degree to the efficiency of Roman sea-power. As early as 192 Eumenes co-operated with Atilius in the waters of Greece and from there he crossed with C. Livius to Asia in the summer of 191; he had only a few ships at the time (Liv. 36, 42, 6). But he took part in the battle of Cissus with 24 *naves tectae* and 26 *apertae* (together 50 ships, Liv. 36, 43, 12, App. Syr. 22, 101; in consequence of his injudicious and

³²⁵) Tarn, *Fleets*, 50; as far as the *ships* are concerned, Ciaceri certainly exaggerates the part the Italiots took in Roman naval warfare from 260 to 241.

³²⁶) Liv. 34, 8, 4—7; and compare my discussion of naval warfare in the western waters during this period.

³²⁷) Liv. 36, 42, 1—2; the number of 24 ships follows from Liv. 36, 43, 12—13 coll. App. Syr. 22, 101.

³²⁸) Liv. 36, 4, 7—9; 42, 2. The 81 ships of the line which sailed with C. Livius from the Piraeus to Asia Minor comprised the 6 Punic ships besides his own 50 and the 25 of Atilius, Liv. 36, 42, 8; App. Syr. 22, 101; *v. s.* footnote 310.

careless method of shortening his sources the latter already ascribes this strong fleet to him at the Piraeus). In the spring of 190 he took part in Livius' expedition to the Hellespont with 7 quadriremes (Liv. 37, 9, 6); after this campaign no numbers of Pergamene ships are mentioned. But the course of events proves again and again that during the whole year he continued to assist the Romans with his fleet, the special task having been assigned to him to prepare the crossing of the Hellespont by Scipio's army, while the Roman and Rhodian squadrons kept the Syrian fleet engaged. We may suppose that in fulfilling this task he served the Roman cause with 24 ships of the line and a number of light craft, just as in the battle of Cissus and during the second Macedonian war. But we do not know it for a certainty.

The Rhodian fleetnumbers are of a much more complicated and changing character; I must limit myself to the discussion of some main points: the details about the continually changing naval detachments will be treated in the systematic survey of the events. In the autumn of 191 the Rhodians made their appearance with 25 or 27 ships, too late to take part in the battle off Cissus.³²⁹⁾ In the spring of 190 they furnished 36 ships, 20 of which were captured by the Syrian fleet.³³⁰⁾ But in spite of this catastrophe they immediately afterwards furnished 23 ships again,³³¹⁾ probably all that was left to them at that moment. In the summer of 190 they must have built new ships; for in the battle of Side they had 36 vessels,³³²⁾ while 3 remained with the Roman fleet,³³³⁾ so that with a total effective of 39 sail they had now (August 190) almost

³²⁹⁾ Liv. 36, 45, 5 (25); App. Syr. 22, 107 (27).

³³⁰⁾ Liv. 37, 9, 5; 11, 11—14; App. Syr. 24, 120. It is usual to assume on account of Livy's narrative that some 30 ships got lost; but Livy and Appian both (= Polybius) say positively that a number of Pausistratus' ships was absent at the time of the catastrophe for the purpose of revictualling (Liv. 37, 10, 11; App. Syr. 24, 116), so that the number of 20 ships lost as given by Appian is certainly correct. *Livy does not mention the number of Rhodian losses.* Wrongly Kromayer II, 159, 2.

³³¹⁾ Liv. 37, 12, 9; App. Syr. 25, 121; Liv. 37, 16, 3. So it is quite certain that at the moment of the catastrophe the Rhodians had 43 warships, 20 of which got lost; but they did certainly not possess more than 43, because the supreme limit of their maritime efforts always lay in the neighbourhood of 40 ships, Kromayer II, 159, 4.

³³²⁾ Liv. 37, 22, 2—23, 4.

³³³⁾ Of the 20 Rhodian ships originally present here (Liv. 37, 12, 9) at first 4 (Liv. 37, 16, 1. 13) and subsequently 13 (37, 22, 2) had been sent elsewhere. For the Rhodian squadrons Kromayer II, 159, 4 is to be compared especially, and *v. i.* footnote 574.

reached again their maximum of ± 40 ships. Henceforth this number was maintained; for the repeated displacements the reader is referred to the survey of the events. — Let us now try to ascertain, how many ships Rhodes furnished to the Romans in this war. It goes without saying that we have no right simply to add together all the squadrons mentioned by Livy or Appian; the squadron of 36 ships in the spring of 190 for instance included the 25 ships of the autumn of 191 and the 39 of the summer of 190 still comprised the vessels that had escaped from the catastrophe in the spring. We arrive at a sum total founded in reality by adding the 20 ships that were lost in the spring of 190 (they perished while serving the Roman cause) to the maximum of 39 sail of August 190 (for the vessels not lost during the preceding campaign are included in this number): in this way we get a number of roughly 60 sail,³³⁴) an amount exorbitantly high for such a small republic. To realize the importance of Rhodian naval achievements we have only to confront this number with the 77 ships furnished for the war in the East by the powerful Roman state itself! In connexion with the fact that the eminent Rhodian sailors always preferred nautical skill and ramming tactics to boarding tactics, the Rhodian ships of the line used to be of a comparatively light type: their battle-fleet consisted for the greater part of quadriremes, in a less degree of triremes.³³⁵)

Finally the Romans employed the ships of several Greek cities in the war against Antiochus, however modest these naval contingents might be. A short enumeration of them, based on the data of Livy's narrative, may follow here: 2 ships (type not mentioned) of Cos (37, 11, 13); some triremes of Erythrae (37, 11, 14; the exact number is not mentioned); 2 triremes of Mytilene (37, 12, 5); some open ships from Athens (37, 14, 2; number not mentioned); 2 open ships from Smyrna (37, 16, 1; whether also Miletus, Myndus, Halicarnassus, Cnidos and Cos furnished *ships* on this occasion (16, 2), is not ascertainable); 1 quinquereme from Cos and 1 from Cnidos (37, 22, 2). As the numbers are not always mentioned and as, moreover, we may safely suppose that sometimes these small contingents have been passed over in silence by Livy, it is rather difficult to arrive at a reasonable estimate of the sum total of

³³⁴) Tarn (*Companion* 759) arrives at a sum total of 77 sail, but I am not able to check his calculation: I am afraid he has made a mistake in adding up.

³³⁵) Liv. 37, 23, 4.

this group of ships: in fixing it at ± 20 we may possibly not be wide of the mark. Apparently these contingents consisted for the greater part of light, open vessels.³³⁶) If finally we take into account, that in the waters west of Greece the Achaean league undertook an unsuccessful expedition with some ships against Nabis of Sparta in 192 before the arrival of Atilius' squadron³³⁷) and that in 189 during the war of Fulvius Nobilior against the Aetolians ships of Rome's Illyrian and Achaean allies plundered the Aetolian shores,³³⁸) we have made the round of the auxiliary squadrons, as far at least as our knowledge reaches.

If, leaving out of account the last-mentioned items, which are of no consequence at all, we try to calculate the total amount of auxiliary vessels, we arrive at ± 85 *naves tectae* (24 of Eumenes, 6 from Carthage, 50 from Rhodes,³³⁹) 5 furnished by other Greek city-states)³⁴⁰) and ± 75 ships of lighter types (24 from Italy, 26 of Eumenes, 10 from Rhodes, 15 from other Greek cities; I leave out of account the contingent of Issa, which cannot be ascertained). On the other hand Rome furnished 77 battle-ships of her own. So it is perfectly clear at the first glance that since the second Macedonian war the proportion of Roman to alien naval contingents had considerably shifted in favour of the auxiliary system: during that war the ratio had nearly been half-and-half (p. 214 sq.); but now the auxiliary squadrons preponderated considerably and even if we include in the account the Roman ships near Sicily and in the Cephallenian

³³⁶) Did Issa furnish a number of *lembi*, as in the second Macedonian war (v. s. p. 214)? During Livius' campaign against Patara (Liv. 37, 16, 8) *auxiliares* from Issa appear suddenly on the scene, but Issaean ships are mentioned neither here nor elsewhere; so it is fairly possible that Issa sent only troops to Livius, when in the spring of 191 he touched at Corcyra on his voyage to the East (36, 42, 3). Especially the fact that at the beginning of Livius' expedition against Patara his slight naval forces are carefully specified (37, 16, 1), makes it rather difficult to suppose that a number of unmentioned *lembi* from Issa were among them. But... with respect to such omissions in the sphere of naval affairs the range of possibilities with Roman historiography is wide. *Non liquet*. Zippel (92) assumes a naval contingent from Issa to have been present on this occasion, just as in the second Macedonian war.

³³⁷) Liv. 35, 25—27; Plut. *Philop.* 14.

³³⁸) Liv. 38, 7, 2—3.

³³⁹) In the battle off Side 6 out of 36 Rhodian ships were *apertae* (Liv. 37, 22—23); so the total amount of 60 ships may have comprised some 10 *apertae*.

³⁴⁰) I reckon 5 *tectae*, 15 *apertae* (sum total ± 20); but such an estimate is highly uncertain.

waters and base our calculations on a total Roman effective of 115 sail, the predominance of the auxiliary element remains. If we add to this fact the slack and abortive attempts of the senate at raising the effective of the Roman fleet, we arrive at the painful, but unavoidable conclusion that in spite of the numerous successes obtained in it the Syrian war revealed serious symptoms of regression and decline; all the *triumphi navales*, dealt out lavishly and foolishly by the senate, cannot wipe out this rather shameful fact. For the keen observer the fleetless era begins to heave in sight.

Let us now pass on to the naval forces of the Syrian adversary.³⁴¹⁾ At the time of his first great expedition to the Aegean in 197³⁴²⁾ Antiochus had 100 *naves tectae* and 200 vessels of lighter types.³⁴³⁾ When he crossed to Greece in the autumn of 192, 40 *naves tectae* and 60 *apertae* accompanied him,³⁴⁴⁾ but of course these were only a part of his navy, as the whole expedition, also with respect to the land army, was of a very modest character and as he certainly needed no greater number of warships for the protection of his transports, only 25 Roman and 3 Pergamene men of war operating at that moment in the Greek waters. So it is only natural that in the battle off Cissus (in the autumn of 191) Polyxenidas, Antiochus' admiral, could dispose of much stronger forces: according to Livy (36, 43, 8) he had 70 *tektae* and 30 *apertae*, according to Appian (*Syr.* 22, 103) 200 ships, much lighter than the hostile vessels;

³⁴¹⁾ A survey of the naval forces of the Seleucid empire is to be found in Bikerman's book (*Institutions des Séleucides*, Paris 1938), 98—100; but it is rather superficial and unsatisfactory.

³⁴²⁾ *V. s.* p. 255.

³⁴³⁾ A hundred *naves tectae* figure also in the well-known war-plan of Hannibal, which, however, in the form handed down to us did certainly not spring from the brain of this highly sensible as well as ingenious general, but arose from rumours and Roman *pavor nocturnus* (Liv. 34, 60, 5; Just. 31, 3, 8). De Sanctis (IV, 1, 121, 16) suspects the fleetnumbers of 197, because afterwards Antiochus never succeeded again in gathering 100 *naves tectae* in the Aegean. This last assertion is formally correct, but not to the point. For de Sanctis forgets 1° that in 196 Antiochus lost a considerable part of his fleet in a storm on the southern coast of Asia Minor (Liv. 33, 41, 7 sq.; App. *Syr.* 4, 17; Zon. 9, 18, 10), 2° that in the summer of 190 Hannibal's fleet off Side comprised 47 ships of the line (Liv. 37, 23, 5) and the Syrian fleet at Ephesus 89 (Liv. 37, 30, 2, *v. i.*), together 136, not to speak about the lighter types. So there is no reason for de Sanctis' scepticism on this point.

³⁴⁴⁾ Liv. 35, 43, 3.

this last point is also emphasized by Livy.³⁴⁵) It is difficult to choose between these two contradictory accounts.³⁴⁶) On the one side (it is the point of view of Kromayer) we can scarcely presume that, if Polyxenidas had had to face 105 *tektai* and 50 *apertai* with 70 *tektai* and 30 *apertai*, all of which were lighter than the ships of the adversaries, he would have been *occasione pugnandi laetus* (Liv. 36, 44, 1): to have a chance of victory his smaller number of *tektai* must be counterpoised by a far greater number of *apertai*. And the number of 30 *apertai* is all the more surprising because Antiochus had 60 of them at the moment of his landing in Greece, when he did not employ his entire fleet. It is therefore natural to suppose that Appian's total number of 200 ships is accurate and that in the relative passage of Livy (36, 43, 8) C C (*ducentis*) must be read instead of C (*centum*). Might this be true, then the Syrian fleet would have been composed of 200 ships *minoris formae*: 70 *triremes tektai* and 130 *naves apertai*. Such a reasoning seems very plausible indeed, but one serious objection can be raised against it, which has been overlooked by Kromayer: neither à propos of the catastrophe of Pausistratus' fleet in the spring of 190 nor of the battle off Myonnesus in the autumn of 190 the presence of open ships on the Syrian side is even hinted at; and the remains of the Syrian fleet, brought by Polyxenidas to Patara after the battle of Magnesia and destroyed there by the Romans (Liv. 37, 45, 2; 38, 39, 2—3), again consisted exclusively of *naves tektai*. However, even this objection is not weighty enough to force us to reject Kromayer's opinion: it is possible that in 190 Polyxenidas left his open ships in the dockyards, because in the battle of Cissus they had by no means answered the expectations (learnt by the sad experience of the battle of Cissus the Syrians even turned to building heavier ships during the winter of 191—190, *v. i.*), and that also when he fled to Patara, he left his open ships at Ephesus or did take them to Patara, but without it being hinted at; subsequently they may very well have been destroyed by the Romans either at Ephesus or at Patara, without

³⁴⁵) 36, 45, 3 (cf. App. 22, 107); 43, 6; 43, 8; in the last-quoted passage he says positively that *all* the Syrian ships, including the *tektai*, were *minoris formae*, in other words that the fleet consisted of 70 *triremes* (the maximal type *minoris formae*) *tektai* and for the rest of *apertai*, which for the greater part were probably smaller than *triremes*. See Kromayer II, 157, 4; wrongly Tarn, *Developments*, 130, 1: *triremes* were not always open ships.

³⁴⁶) As Livy and Appian rest both upon Polybius, almost certainly a clerical error must be hidden here in one of the two texts.

such a secondary detail being expressly mentioned. So I feel inclined to believe with Kromayer that in the battle off Cissus 200 Syrian ships faced the Romans, 70 of which were *tectae*.

Of the latter 23 got lost during the battle (Liv. 36, 45, 3); during the winter of 191—190 they were replaced by new vessels, as in the spring of 190 Polyxenidas had 70 *tectae* again.³⁴⁷) These 23 new ships were undoubtedly of a heavier type than their predecessors, because in the battle of Cissus the smaller types hadn't stood their ground against the heavy Roman ships and consequently during the winter an attempt had been made at adapting the new ships to the Roman style of fighting:³⁴⁸) at any rate 3 of them were *hexeres* and 2 *hepteres* (Liv. 37, 30, 2) and the remaining will have been *penteres* and *tetreres*, so that the 70 *tectae* now comprised 2 *hepteres*, 3 *hexeres*, 18 *penteres* and *tetreres* and finally 47 *trieres*. By the capture of the 20 Rhodian ships of Pausistratus³⁴⁹) in the spring of 190 this effective of 70 *tectae* was raised to 90 (App. Syr. 27, 132; the number has probably been rounded off) or 89 (Liv. 37, 30, 2), the effective of Myonnesus. Besides this Aegean fleet there was the other squadron of Phoenician and Cilician ships, which in the summer of 190 tried in vain to reach the Aegean and to join Polyxenidas; it was commanded by Hannibal and consisted of 37 heavy ships of the line³⁵⁰) and 10 *trieres* besides a number of open vessels,³⁵¹) so that in the summer of 190 the total Syrian naval effective amounted to 136 or 137 *tectae* and numerous *apertae*.

We have only to confront these fleetnumbers with those of the allied powers to realize that Antiochus' naval forces were no match for the

³⁴⁷) Liv. 37, 11, 5; for the building project 37, 8, 1—3.

³⁴⁸) See Kromayer II, 158, 1 and 2 and Rodgers 403—422.

³⁴⁹) V. s. p. 270. It is usual to assume that the complete effective of Myonnesus (90 *tectae*) had already been reached during the winter of 191—190 by building new ships (thus even Kromayer II, 158), but this cannot be true, because Livy states expressly that Polyxenidas' effective amounted to 70 *tectae* in the spring of 190: it was the capture of the 20 Rhodian ships that raised it to 90.

³⁵⁰) Here too the system had been changed in connexion with the Roman style of fighting: among the 37 heavy ships were 3 *hepteres* and 4 *hexeres*, the rest will have consisted of *penteres* and *tetreres*. It was bad luck for Hannibal that in the battle off Side his fleet had only to confront the nimble Rhodian ships and no Roman squadron, so that the heavy and unwieldy new battle-ships were of no use at all. Cf. Liv. 37, 23, 5 and v. s.

³⁵¹) Liv. 37, 24, 6.

united fleets of Rome and her allies. A certain lack of maritime energy and of sound, solid maritime traditions (only in 200 Antiochus had conquered Phoenicia, only in 197 Cilicia, the two most "seaworthy" parts of his empire!) was an important factor with Syria as well as with Rome and the unwieldy military machinery of the Seleucid empire, which impeded a quick mobilization and concentration of military forces, made matters worse. On the other hand Rome and her allies had not only to blockade Polyxenidas and to prevent Hannibal from joining him, but also to set apart a number of ships for the purpose of preparing the crossing of the Hellespont by Scipio's army and of actually ferrying it, if the allied fleets had not gained a decisive victory before. So the Romans, quite contrary to their land-lubbers' custom, were forced to fight the battles of Side and Myonnesus against odds,*) nor can the senate be acquitted of the charge of having played with fire by not providing in good time for the building of new squadrons: it was only thanks to the formidable seamanship of the Rhodians that in both battles victory could be dragged from the very gates of hell.

The naval personnel. Our information about the Roman naval personnel during the Syrian war is very scanty and so we shall be brief on this point. As for the naval personnel in the strict sense of the word (the oarsmen and sailors), their origin is only mentioned twice. For the old ships the *praetor urbanus* of 191 made seaworthy by order of the senate, he enlisted freedmen as *socii navales* (Liv. 36, 2, 15); the freedmen were a regular part of the nautical personnel (*v. s. p.* 195—198) and in this case they served on board the ships of Regillus that in 190 were stationed in the Cephallenian waters (Liv. 37, 2, 10; *v. s. p.* 261 sq.). Secondly we know that C. Livius, the naval commander of 191, mobilized the citizens of the maritime colonies for naval service (of course on board the 50 ships that were to sail with him to the Asiatic waters, Liv. 36, 3, 4—6). The condition of this category remains more or less a mystery: in 207, when Hasdrubal menaced Italy, they were called out for service on land (Liv. 27, 38, 3—5; *v. s.* chapter II, footnote 558), in 191 for naval service; but... in both cases they appealed to their *vacatio!* However, from the

*) No doubt, this would not have been necessary, if 20 Rhodian ships had not got lost to Rome and been added to the Syrian fleet in the spring of 190 and if Regillus, the Roman naval commander in 190, had not been a downright fool; but the senate ought to have reckoned with such eventualities.

quoted passages we get the impression that in 207 their *vacatio* from military service was not denied by the senate, but only suspended on account of the menace of Hasdrubal, whereas in 191 the exemption from naval service was denied as such. So we may safely presume that the citizens of the maritime colonies were normally liable to naval service; but, if so, how could they appeal to a pretended *vacatio* and even invoke the protection of the tribunes?! Probably the answer is that they regarded it as a part of their duty to protect the Italian shores, but not to take part in a naval expedition to the far distant Greek waters; and I will add that in my modest opinion they were perfectly right in thinking so. It is a symptom of the aversion to the imperialism of the senate which in those times was apparently still alive in wide ranges of the Roman people. The citizens of the *coloniae maritimae* were the only category of full citizens liable to naval service: the freedmen were of foreign extraction and, moreover, did not possess the full citizenship. That besides these two categories also *socii navales* in the proper sense of the word, that is to say allies, were mobilized for naval service during this war, stands to reason, but is not expressly mentioned by the ancient authorities.

In conclusion a few words about the marine troops. The standing garrisons of the galleys used to be recruited from Roman proletarians and to be supplemented with legionaries before a battle. But that allies were also employed for military service on board the warships, becomes apparent during this war: in 192 the praetor A. Atilius received 2000 *socii* and Latins and 1000 Romans³⁵²) to serve as soldiers on board his ships (Liv. 35, 20, 12; compare the second chapter, footnote 287). We are not acquainted with the organization of the marine troops; it must, however, have been on a military basis, as during this war we hear of tribunes in command (in 190, Liv. 37, 17, 9), who cannot have belonged to the land army (in the Asiatic waters!).³⁵³)

³⁵²) Were these Roman proletarians, intended to form the standing garrisons of Atilius' ships? It is highly probable, as the standing garrison of a quinquereme usually amounted to 30—40 men (Kromayer, *Flotte*, 486); if this be true, the 2000 *socii* must have formed the supplementary garrisons instead of the more usual legionaries. If we base our calculation on the number of 30 quinqueremes originally planned for Atilius, we arrive at an average of 100 men a ship, if, on the other hand, we start from the 25 quinqueremes really sent with him, we get 120 men a ship, both of which numbers are in perfect accordance with Roman custom.

³⁵³) See Tarn, *Companion*, 761.

The naval command. During the Syrian war the naval commanders were appointed in quite a different way than during the second Macedonian war: during the latter the consul used to delegate the naval command by order of the senate to a *legatus pro praetore*; the consular command legally embraced land and sea both, the province of the consul being no longer limited as it had been during the second Punic war.³⁵⁴) In the Syrian war on the other hand the fleet was commanded by one of the praetors annually elected by the people, to whom it fell by lot and whose naval command was independent of the consuls. In other words, Rome now returned to the system of the second Punic war, when, temporarily at least, the circumstances had forced upon her the creation of independent praetorian naval commands;³⁵⁵) alas with one important exception: the *standing commands* of the second Punic war, which had been necessitated by its dangerous character and especially by the fact that the enemy must be faced on numerous fronts at the same time, were not established again in the Syrian war; not one of the consuls or praetors saw his command prolonged. So the praetor A. Atilius Serranus was in command of the fleet in 192 (he had at least been charged with it by special decree of senate and people, Liv. 35, 20, 9); C. Livius Salinator in 191 (by lot, Liv. 36, 2, 6); L. Aemilius Regillus in 190 (by lot, Liv. 37, 2, 1); Q. Fabius Labeo in 189 (by lot, Liv. 37, 50, 8). Naturally the consul who commanded the land army could give orders to the praetor in command of the fleet in virtue of his *imperium maius*, at least if he was on the spot; Manlius for instance ordered the praetor Labeo who commanded the fleet to sail to Patara in order to destroy the fleet of Antiochus there present in accordance with the treaty of peace (Liv. 38, 39, 2). But nevertheless the praetor was no mandatary, no *legatus* of the consul and did not derive his own *imperium* from him; no doubt, the praetorian *imperium* was subordinate to that of the consul, but all the same it was like-natured and the praetor had a right to it of his own.³⁵⁶) As long as the consul was not present (and during the naval operations of this war he was never on the spot), the naval command of the praetor was perfectly independent, not only in fact, but also by right, as is conclusively proved by the facts of naval warfare. In the summer of 191

³⁵⁴) V. s. p. 216 sq.

³⁵⁵) V. s. p. 194 sq.

³⁵⁶) Leifer 201 sq., especially 204, 2 and compare chapter II, footnote 554.

for instance C. Livius probably decided independently to transfer the war to the Asiatic waters, thus anticipating in a daring way (he was an excellent admiral) the war-plan of the Scipios (when he departed from Rome in the spring of 191, the battle of the Thermopylae had not yet been fought, so that he can scarcely have brought instructions from Rome to cross to Asia; nor did he apparently get into contact with the consul Glabrio in Greece); and the independence of the praetorian naval command appears as well from the whole line of conduct, foolish as it was, of his successor Regillus (see for instance Liv. 37, 26, 10 sq.). Moreover, we meet with several *triumphi navales* during this war (Regillus and Labeo, perhaps also C. Livius); and there is certainly a correlation between these triumphs and the fact that C. Livius is once called *imperator* (36, 41, 4). If in the spring of 191, after the expiration of his term of office, A. Atilius is called *legatus* or *praefectus* by Livy (36, 12, 9; 20, 7), this is due to the fact that his successor C. Livius, though not yet present, nevertheless had already assumed the naval command, so that Atilius now had become his substitute and mandatary. Even the fact that C. Livius is once called *classis praefectus* during his own term of office (Liv. 36, 42, 1), is formally not incorrect, as the consul was in possession of the *imperium maius*; but he is rightly *not* called *legatus*.³⁵⁷) Only in one case the procedure of the second Macedonian war was put into practice during the Syrian war: in 192 L. Oppius Salinator was appointed *legatus* of the Sicilian squadron in exactly the same way as Valerius Laevinus in 201.³⁵⁸)

The objections that can be raised against this change of system do not regard the independence of the naval command. In the second Macedonian war co-operation between land- and naval forces had been necessary; so it was only natural that during that war the naval commander had been a deputy of the consul in command and quite subordinate to him. But the conditions of the Syrian war were wholly different. No doubt, in the first (Greek) phase of the war there might have been thought of a plan of war based on co-ordinated actions...., if besides Atilius' poor squadron a Roman land army had been on the spot! But it was not: during the winter of 192—191 very modest Roman land forces

³⁵⁷) Tarn, *Companion*, 760, Leifer 204, 2.

³⁵⁸) Liv. 35, 23, 6—7, v.s. p. 216 sq.; the only difference is (and it was not a legal one) that the *praetor urbanus* delegated the *imperium* to Oppius, the consul to Laevinus.

were lying in Illyria under command of a praetor; only in the spring of 191 a consular army under command of M. Acilius Glabrio arrived in Greece. Consequently Atilius operated quite independently in 192, though with the support of the authority of T. Quinctius Flamininus, who was present in Greece as leader of a Roman embassy. In the second, decisive phase of the war there could be no question at all of co-operation between land- and naval forces: the fleet had to open the way to Asia Minor for the land army and the latter arrived at the Hellespont, after the naval war had been decided in favour of Rome. So it goes without saying that the praetor who commanded the fleet must be perfectly free to conduct the naval war according to his own lights.

No, the real objections against the change of system lie in the method of appointing the naval commanders and in the absence of *prorogatio*. In the second Macedonian war the consul had appointed the naval commander by order of the senate; it was a sound system: not one of the men appointed in this way had proved a failure. But now the naval command fell by lot to one of the praetors yearly elected by the people. Consequently the appointment depended in the first instance on oligarchic family-intrigues and on the whims of popular favour, in the last instance on the blindness of lot, and it was only due to the merest chance, if the lot fell upon a really able naval commander.³⁵⁹) So it was unavoidable that the naval command sometimes fell to mere nonentities: Aemilius Regillus, the naval commander of the decisive year 190, was one of those smart, gallant officers without brains who may do very well as subordinates, but must be failures in a leading position; at any rate he was wholly unqualified for his task as an admiral and it was certainly not thanks

³⁵⁹) I know very well that to a certain degree the same objection can be raised against the Roman method of appointing the consuls and dividing the consular commands between them; but in the first place the consuls were the regular commanders of the Roman forces, so that sometimes at least (in case of an important war or campaign) the military gifts of the candidates were taken into account at the consular elections, and secondly the Romans were land-lubbers, so that men who had some notion of naval warfare were scarce at Rome, whereas every Roman aristocrat, however mediocre he might be, was a reasonably experienced officer on land and therefore more or less qualified for the consulship. I know also, that in case of emergency the Romans were sometimes sensible enough to influence the lot in such a way that it appointed the right man; but the point is that in the main the senate did not regard naval warfare as important enough to justify such a pious fraud with respect to a naval commander. Otherwise the fool Regillus would not have been appointed.

to his insight that in this year Roman naval warfare did not end in a catastrophe. The second objection, the absence of *prorogatio* during this war, is immediately connected with the afore-going. In the second Punic war the existence of numerous dangerous fronts had forced the Romans to establish standing commands whether they liked it or not and in the second Macedonian war at least the naval command of L. Quinctius Flamininus, together with the consular command of his brother Titus, had been prolonged for years. But by the time of the Syrian war the *prorogatio* had almost become taboo: the sacred oligarchic system of a yearly change of commands, jealously guarded by Roman aristocracy, ranked uppermost in those years and scarcely allowed any exception to the rule.³⁶⁰) That the eminent admiral C. Livius, who in 191 had furnished the most conclusive proof of his ability, was replaced by the fool Regillus instead of being maintained in the decisive year 190, is a grave scandal painfully accentuated by the farce of Regillus' triumph. It was only thanks to Eumenes and the Rhodians that this blunder did not prove fatal to Rome; for at least one good thing may be said of Regillus' nullity, *viz.* that he suffered himself more or less to be guided by his assistants. But the fact that the Roman senate suffered such a man to command the navy in the most decisive year of the war, can never be excused in this way.

Survey of the events. The war in Europe. We cannot say that the Romans did not expect the conflict with Antiochus: they even feared it beyond measure and, moreover, they had provoked it themselves. But, when in the autumn of 192 the Syrian king landed in Greece, they were nevertheless far from ready to resist this invasion immediately; perhaps it is not a foolish paradox to say that this limping behind the events resulted from the exaggerated notion they had formed of the imminent Syrian offensive on account of Hannibal's presence at the Syrian court and of sundry wild rumours, though it is only fair to add that the senate's line of conduct was also due to the fact that for the present there was no sound *casus belli*. They feared that Antiochus should get into contact with Carthage and that Sicily or even southern Italy should be invaded; in view of such eventualities they temporized for the present and

³⁶⁰) *V.s.* p. 218 sq.; only the commands of 189 were prolonged (that is to say towards 188, when all fighting was past!), *Liv.* 38, 35, 7 sq.

entrenched themselves in their own country, while Greece, evacuated since 194, was left unprotected. Consequently in 192 strong forces had been concentrated in southern Italy and Sicily and a squadron of 20 sail had been sent to the Sicilian waters, while for the protection of Italy not only the extant warships were made seaworthy again, but also 50 new vessels were laid down;³⁶¹⁾ in Greece, however, Rome scarcely intervened, notwithstanding the increasingly aggressive behaviour of the Aetolian fire-brands.³⁶²⁾ The result of this policy was that, when in the autumn of 192 Antiochus crossed to Greece, the only Roman counterpoise against his invasion consisted in the fleet of 25 quinqueremes under command of the praetor A. Atilius Serranus, which had been sent in the spring against Nabis of Sparta and not against Antiochus,³⁶³⁾ and... in an embassy³⁶⁴⁾ headed by T. Quinctius Flaminius! Besides, a modest force under command of the praetor M. Baebius Tamphilus passed the winter of 192—191 in Illyria; but only in the early spring of 191 these troops as well as the consular army of M. Acilius Glabrio would start the real offensive in co-operation with Philip of Macedon, though in January 191 a detachment of Baebius' forces succeeded in shielding the town Larisa in northern Thessaly from being conquered by the Syrian troops.

It is obvious that Atilius with his small squadron (at the moment of his landing Antiochus had 40 *tectae* and 60 *apertae* against Atilius' 25 quinqueremes!) could not even think of preventing the Syrian invasion of Greece and that also subsequently he could achieve but little in the European phase of the Syrian war. So we may make short work of this episode of the war; but first we must fix our attention on Nabis' revolt which occasioned Atilius' mission and took place before Antiochus' invasion.³⁶⁵⁾

³⁶¹⁾ *V. s.* my discussion of the fleetnumbers.

³⁶²⁾ The Roman fear was in the main unfounded. That there was via Hannibal a certain contact between Syria and Carthage and that Antiochus hoped to draw Africa into the war against Rome, seems all but certain; and that under Hannibal's influence he thought of a diverting offensive against Sicily on a small scale, is far from impossible. But a great offensive against Italy lay completely beyond Antiochus' Hellenistic horizon. Hannibal's plan for such an invasion cannot have sprung from the brain of this great general in the form handed down to us: he was not mad (*v. s.* footnote 343); it must have arisen from wild rumours and Roman *pavor nocturnus*.

³⁶³⁾ Liv. 35, 22, 2.

³⁶⁴⁾ Liv. 35, 23, 5; 31 sq. and *passim*; regarding the other facts mentioned here I do not give references, because they are of no consequence for maritime history.

³⁶⁵⁾ Compare for the following events Liv. 35, 12—13, 3; 20, 13; 22, 2; 25—30;

Already in 193 the Aetolians had concentrated their action upon Antiochus, Philip and Nabis at the same time. But Antiochus was not pressed for time, Philip on the other hand felt little inclined to throw in his lot with his old enemies, the Aetolians, and his former boon companion Antiochus, who had profited by his defeat to appropriate his possessions in Asia Minor and Thrace. Nabis alone promptly responded to their call, as he was consumed by the desire to reconquer the Laconian coast towns, which had been taken from him in 195 and placed under the protection of the Achaean league and which had been the chief basis of his power.³⁶⁶) His reaction was even too prompt: he would have done better by waiting till Antiochus on his part also opened the war. But he did not wait: at the end of 193 he began to kindle civil strife in the Laconian coast towns in order to obtain a pretext for intervention and he succeeded in winning them all back except Gytheum, which had been reinforced in good time with an Achaean garrison, so that he was forced to lay siege to it. The Achaeans protested against this action and sent envoys to Rome in order to make complaints. We remarked above that in reply to this appeal Rome sent Atilius with 25 ships to Greece in the spring of 192 and at the same time an embassy led by T. Quinctius Flaminius. But in spite of the latter's advice to wait for the Roman fleet which was on the way, Philopoemen, the strategus of the Achaean league, decided to open hostilities on his own account, in order to prevent the fall of Gytheum. But the only result was a naval defeat: Nabis who had lost his fleet in 195, had by now collected some ships again, 3 *tectae* and a number of light craft, undoubtedly requisitioned from the Laconian coast towns he had conquered already; he employed this little squadron for blockading Gytheum on the sea side and by means of daily exercises had increased its readiness and efficiency to a high degree.³⁶⁷) Philopoemen, an excellent *condottiere* on land, but a typical Arcadian inlander, underrated like all land-lubbers the difficulties of naval warfare and sailed with a few ships from the Corinthian Gulf round the Peloponnese to the Laconian coast; a quadrireme more than 80 years old, thoroughly worm-eaten and leaking on all sides, functioned as flagship! In the

35—37, 3; Plut. *Philop.* 14—15; Paus. 8, 50—51; Just. 31, 3, 3; Zon. 9, 18, 6; 19, 1—3; de Sanctis IV, 1, 132—140; C. A. H. VIII, 203 sq.

³⁶⁶) V. s. p. 253; Liv. 35, 12, 7.

³⁶⁷) Liv. 35, 26, 1 sq.; Graefe, *Hermes* 54, 222.

engagement with Nabis' flotilla which ensued the old hulk was crushed at the first blow; Philopoemen took to flight in a rather shameful way with the other ships.³⁶⁸) "Farsa," remarks de Sanctis rightly,³⁶⁹) "più che battaglia questo scontro tra un re pirata e "l'ultimo degli Elleni", che fu l'ultima giornata navale combattuta fra Greci nelle acque della loro penisola: tanto più grottesca quando la si confronti alle battaglie con cui avevano conteso agli Spartani il dominio di quei mari Formione, Timoteo od Ificrate." So the blockade of Gytheum was maintained on land and sea. To be sure, Philopoemen succeeded in approaching with light craft from Argolis the encampment of a part of Nabis' forces and setting it on fire by night and thereupon he invaded the Laconian country with the land army; but it was too late: Gytheum fell. However, this was to be the end of Nabis' prosperity: Philopoemen now destroyed a great part of his army and blockaded him in Sparta; at the same time Atilius' fleet, seconded by Eumenes, made its appearance in the Laconian waters and naturally succeeded without great pains in wresting Gytheum and the other coast towns from the tyrant's grasp again;³⁷⁰) thereupon Flamininus co-operated with Atilius in establishing a truce between Rome and Nabis.³⁷¹)

For the rest we may make short work of Spartan affairs. The Aetolians, disappointed by the fact that Nabis' revolt had failed, decided to make away with him and to master Sparta themselves. An "auxiliary corps",

³⁶⁸) Liv. 35, 26; Plut. *Philop.* 14; Paus. 8, 50, 7.

³⁶⁹) IV, 1, 134.

³⁷⁰) Livy does not mention the intervention of the Roman fleet *suo loco*, but only afterwards he informs us incidentally (35, 35, 2) that the Romans had taken back the coast towns from Nabis. Neither Livy nor the other literary sources mention the fact that Eumenes took part in the Roman operations against Sparta: only afterwards (35, 39, 1) he suddenly appears to be present in Greece. But from an inscription (Dtb.³ 605) we know for a certainty that he did join in the operations against Nabis. He was the most faithful ally of Rome and, moreover, the war against Antiochus of which the conflict with Nabis was the forerunner concerned him more deeply than anybody else: so he had apparently joined the Romans immediately. His assistance is probably passed over by the ancient authorities, because at this juncture he furnished only a few ships: in the summer of 191, when he sailed from Aegina to meet C. Livius, he had no more than 3 (Liv. 36, 42, 6); only in the autumn of 191 before the battle of Cissus (36, 43, 12) he reinforced Livius' fleet in the Asiatic waters with 50 sail of his own: apparently the bulk of his fleet had been left behind in Asia.

³⁷¹) Livy does not mention the armistice; it has been handed down by Pausanias (8, 50, 10) and Plutarch (*Philop.* 15).

sent to Nabis during the armistice, murdered him and took possession of the town; but they pillaged it in such a brutal way that the Spartan population flocked together and massacred them. Thereupon Philopoemen marched to Sparta, and, as at the same time Atilius' fleet appeared off Gytheum, the town submitted: she became a member of the Achæan league,³⁷²) but her time-honoured institutions were respected for the present.

These Spartan entanglements filled the spring and the summer of 192 and they were settled shortly before Antiochus' landing, which took place in the autumn. The other simultaneous events (the incessant action of the Aetolians and the diplomatic counteroffensive of Flamininus' embassy) may be passed over in silence, because they do not come within the range of my subject; I only mention by the way, that Demetrias (its inhabitants feared probably not without some reason that the town should be the price, paid by the Romans to Philip for his eventual support against Antiochus and the Aetolians) got lost to Rome: it was occupied by the Aetolians, a considerable success, as they were now in possession of an excellent harbour to receive ere long Antiochus' invasion-army.³⁷³) On the other hand an attempt at surprising Chalcis in the same way failed, because the pro-Roman leaders of the town were on the *qui vive*.³⁷⁴) On receiving the news of the *coup de main* against Chalcis T. Quinctius Flamininus sailed there from Corinth;³⁷⁵) in the Euripus he met with Eumenes, who apparently had hurried there already before from Aegina, the old naval base of the Attalids in the Greek waters.³⁷⁶) They resolved that Chalcis should be reinforced with a garrison of 500 Pergamene soldiers apparently carried by Eumenes' ships and that Eumenes himself should touch at the Piræus³⁷⁷) on his way back to Aegina. The Romans

³⁷²) Liv. 35, 37, 1—3; Paus. 8, 51, 1; Plut. *Philop.* 15; Zon. 9, 19, 2.

³⁷³) Liv. 35, 31, 34.

³⁷⁴) Liv. 35, 37, 4—38.

³⁷⁵) Apparently Atilius' fleet (except for the flotilla of A. Postumius, *v.i.*) was lying at Corinth after settling the Spartan affair: it now sailed from there to the Euripus. Naturally Atilius was in command, as he was the admiral; but the presence aboard of the influential envoy Flamininus caused Atilius' name to be suppressed. It is, however, also possible that Atilius remained with part of the fleet at Corinth and that Flamininus borrowed some ships from him for the expedition to Chalcis.

³⁷⁶) Liv. 35, 39.

³⁷⁷) Was there something brewing at Athens too? Considering the events after Antiochus' arrival in Greece (35, 50, 4) and the fact that the city had favoured

sailed on in the direction of Demetrias, hoping to win the city back to the Roman side. But the attempt failed: Villius, one of the envoys, who had been sent ahead to Demetrias on board a quinquereme in order to enter into negotiations, returned without having effected his purpose and the Roman fleet sailed back to Corinth. Thus we are told by Livy; but without any doubt there are gaps in his narrative. At the time of this expedition it must already have been autumn and it will more or less have coincided with Antiochus' invasion of Greece (just as Flamininus' expedition this invasion was a direct reaction upon the occupation of Demetrias): this is proved by the fact that a long time afterwards, à propos of the negotiations between Scipio and Antiochus in Asia Minor, the better tradition informs us that on the way from Chalcis to Oreus or to Demetrias (that makes no difference) Scipio's son had been made prisoner by ships of Antiochus.³⁷⁸) Consequently a skirmish must have taken place in the waters of Euboea between the Roman and Syrian warfleets, in which at least one ship (carrying Scipio's son) was captured by the Syrians. Why does Livy suppress here this military incident and does he represent the naval expedition to Demetrias to have been nothing but a diplomatic mission, Antiochus' forces being still far away? Did he (or perhaps already Polybius before him?) regard the real story as a rather too painful *testimonium paupertatis* for the senate, who had sent no more than 25 ships to the Greek waters, and did he therefore try to cover it with the cloak of charity? It seems not impossible to me, and at any rate there *must* have been an engagement between the two warfleets³⁷⁹) (though possibly a very slight one), because the capture of Scipio's son, however insignificant it may be in itself, demands an explanation.³⁸⁰)

somehow the *coup de main* against Chalcis (35, 37, 6; 38, 13), it seems far from improbable; so the purpose of Eumenes' mission may have been to influence Athens in favour of Rome: the Attalids were held in great respect there (*op. cit.* p. 224).

³⁷⁸) Liv. 37, 34, 5; App. *Syr.* 29, 146; Diod. 29, 8; this version of the story comes from Polybius, see Boerma ad Justinum 31, 7, 4 and Mommsen, *Röm. Forschungen* II, 515 sq.

³⁷⁹) It is not possible to find a moment suitable to this event in a later stage of the war: between Antiochus' landing and the conquest of Chalcis Roman ships will scarcely have ventured to sail in the direction of Demetrias.

³⁸⁰) Is the loss of this ship consistent with the fact that in 191 Atilius transferred his entire fleet of 25 ships to C. Livius? The answer is that undoubtedly some extra quinqueremes were lying at Corinth, which had transported the envoys to Greece and there continued to be at their disposal. So the effective of Atilius' squadron could be maintained by substituting one of these ships for the lost vessel.

We will scarcely touch here upon the landing of Antiochus' not very considerable forces (roughly 10,000 men). That it could not be prevented or even hindered by Atilius' squadron, goes without saying: the \pm 20 Roman ships ³⁸¹⁾ were no match for Antiochus' 40 *tectae* and 60 *apertae*. ³⁸²⁾ For the present Demetrias became the Syrian headquarters. ³⁸³⁾ — But, though we might almost say that in 192 the Romans were conspicuous by their absence from Greece, Antiochus on his part did not seize the opportunity: as usual, Rome profited by the mistakes of her adversaries. By acting promptly and resolutely Antiochus might have called forth a violent anti-Roman movement of the lower classes in Greece, even in spite of his weak army; but he was of a prudent and moderate, not very sweeping character. Not to speak about facts of minor importance, ³⁸⁴⁾ the Achaean league in the south, Macedon in the north were not won over to his side: shortly after his landing the former declared war upon him, at an earlier date than Rome herself; ³⁸⁵⁾ and by invading Thessaly he threw away his last chance of winning Philip, whom he had irritated before by his conquests in Asia Minor and Thrace and who now looked with envious eyes at his acting the liberator in that same Greece that had been protected by himself in former days. To make matters worse the unwieldy military machinery of the Syrian empire prevented him from being supplied in good time with strong forces: when according to their custom the Romans made up for their initial slackness with the utmost energy by sending a consular army (under command of M'. Acilius Glabrio) to Greece at the very beginning of 191, his army was scarcely stronger than at the time of his landing. So he was crushed in the Thermopylae in April 191 and was forced to evacuate Greece precipitately.

The events in Greece between Antiochus' landing in the autumn of 192 and his shameful retreat in the spring of 191 lie beyond the scope of our subject; ³⁸⁶⁾ we limit ourselves to the part played in them by the Roman fleet, a part which naturally was far from important. Though in a modest and indirect way, Atilius' squadron contributed to a vain attempt

³⁸¹⁾ At this moment some ships were in the Cephallenian waters.

³⁸²⁾ *V. s.* p. 273.

³⁸³⁾ For the Syrian invasion of Greece *Liv.* 35, 42—44.

³⁸⁴⁾ In Central Greece he met with successes, but with resistance as well.

³⁸⁵⁾ *Liv.* 35, 50, 1—2; *Pol.* 39, 3, 8; *Kromayer II*, 222, 3.

³⁸⁶⁾ For this phase of the Syrian war the reader is referred to *Kromayer II*, 127 sq.

at retaining Chalcis at the end of 192; and in the early spring of 191 a small number of ships detached to Cephallenia succeeded in holding back at least a part of Acarnania from joining Antiochus. And that is all!

After a vain attempt of Antiochus to master Chalcis in November 192,³⁸⁷) the Romans tried in a hurry to reinforce the town against an eventual repetition of this enterprise on a larger scale. The Achaean league, who recently had decided to go to war against Antiochus,³⁸⁸) sent 500 soldiers to the menaced fortress at Flamininus' request³⁸⁹) and Eumenes also sent a small garrison from Aegina where he was passing the winter.³⁹⁰) These troops succeeded in reaching Chalcis by land, before the ways of access were cut off by Antiochus' forces. But 500 Roman soldiers of Atilius' fleet,³⁹¹) who tried to reach Chalcis by land from Corinth, found the way to Aulis already barred and turned to Delium in order to cross from there to Euboea. Here they were (on sacred ground too!) surprised by Antiochus' troops and killed or taken prisoner for the greater part; only a few succeeded in escaping.³⁹²) The now isolated Chalcis capitulated soon (December 192); only Salganeus was held for some time by the Pergamene and Achaean soldiers and another fort by a handful of Romans, but they too were soon forced to give up resistance.³⁹³) With Chalcis

³⁸⁷) Liv. 35, 46; the attempt was made with a small force.

³⁸⁸) V. s. p. 287.

³⁸⁹) Liv. 35, 50, 3; moreover, 500 Achaean soldiers went to the Piraeus, because Athens was wavering (*v. s.* footnote 377); but order was soon restored in favour of Rome by the influence of Flamininus and probably also of Eumenes (*de Sanctis* IV, 1, 150, *v. s.* 11; Liv. 35, 50, 4).

³⁹⁰) Liv. 35, 50, 6.8; it was the second garrison he sent to Chalcis: some time ago he had already thrown soldiers into the town, in connexion with the attempt made upon it by the Aetolians, *v. s.* p. 285.

³⁹¹) That the soldiers came from Atilius' fleet is certain, because there were no other Roman forces in Greece at that moment: the little detachment cannot have marched to the Euripus from Baebius' camp in Illyria! That Atilius' fleet was still lying at Corinth (*v. s.* footnote 375), follows from Liv. 35, 50, 10 *coll.* Diod. 29, 1. I call attention to the fact that not the fleet itself, but only soldiers from it were sent to Chalcis: no wonder, as Antiochus used his whole fleet for the attack on the town (Liv. 35, 50, 7)!

³⁹²) Liv. 35, 50, 9—51, 4; App. *Syr.* 12, 49.

³⁹³) Liv. 35, 51, 6 sq. How had these Romans reached Chalcis? Were they the remains of the corps massacred at Delium and had they escaped by sea to Euboea (35, 51, 4)? Or had another small garrison been sent by Atilius to Chalcis (before the 500 soldiers), which had reached the town in good time? *Non liquet*; but the former alternative seems more probable to me.

the whole of Euboea fell into Antiochus' hands. This affair reveals painfully the miserable weakness of the Roman position in Greece in 192; but the fault rested with the senate, not with Flamininus or Atilius: as matters stood, they couldn't have done more than they did; in bringing the weak fleet itself into action they would have run the risk of losing it without any reasonable chance of saving Chalcis. The massacre of Delium stamped Antiochus as the aggressor; the Roman declaration of war which was voted before the beginning of 191 appealed especially to this fact! ³⁹⁴)

The intervention of the Roman fleet in Acarnania (probably in March 191) ³⁹⁵) met with more success, *i. a.* because in the waters west of Greece the Syrian fleet couldn't dispute its supremacy (especially during the winter!). We stated before, ³⁹⁶) that Atilius had detached a small number of ships under command of the legate A. Postumius to Cephallenia, in order to prevent this island from joining Antiochus and the Aetolians (for a long time past it had belonged to the Aetolian league). He will have sent them late in the summer of 192 from Gytheum, after settling the Spartan affair, ³⁹⁷) when he sailed himself to Corinth with the rest of his fleet; for it seems not reasonable to suppose that in the late summer of 192 he should first have taken them with him to Corinth and subsequently should have sent them during the first months of 191 (in the depth of winter!) round the dangerous Malea to the west. So the ships probably wintered at Cephallenia. When in the first months of 191 Antiochus marched from his new head-quarters Chalcis to Acarnania, it was the fear of this fleet that held back part of Acarnania (especially the capital Leucas, which was situated on the coast in a rather vulnerable position) from joining him. ³⁹⁸) Nor did the small Roman squadron remain inactive; Quinctius sent one of his fellow-envoys, Cn. Octavius (undoubtedly the same who had played a part as naval commander during the last phase of the second Punic war), to Cephallenia; he received ships and troops from A. Postumius, crossed to Leucas and informed the Leucadians that the consul M. Acilius had crossed from Italy to Illyria and that the Roman

³⁹⁴) Liv. 35, 51, 5; 36, 1, 4 sq.; Diod. 29, 1; App. Syr. 15, 60.

³⁹⁵) Kromayer II, 222.

³⁹⁶) *V. s.* p. 259.

³⁹⁷) *V. s.* p. 259.

³⁹⁸) Liv. 36, 11—12, especially 11, 9; according to Livy the Leucadians apparently reckoned with the possibility that also the main body of Atilius' fleet would appear in the waters of western Greece.

army was already in Thessaly. The news was true: Acilius had departed from Italy very early in the year and really appeared in Thessaly in March.³⁹⁹) At any rate the information restrained the Leucadians from defection; Antiochus, who apparently had also been informed of Acilius' approach, returned from Acarnania to Chalcis.⁴⁰⁰) So the Roman navy achieved at least something in this case. We may suppose that Postumius' ships returned to Atilius' fleet immediately after Antiochus' retreat. For, when a few months later C. Livius, the naval commander for 191, passed Cephallenia on his voyage to the Aegean, he chastised the island, because it had joined the Aetolians: the check put upon the islanders during the winter, had apparently been removed in the spring.⁴⁰¹) Probably Atilius had recalled the squadron to the main body in view of the approach of the consular army, because the decisive battle was close at hand and he wanted to have his entire fleet at his disposal for an eventual co-operation with the land army. Let us now see what came of it.

A co-operation during the battle in the Thermopylae (for instance an attempt on the part of Atilius' fleet at landing troops in Antiochus' rear) was naturally quite impossible: the bulk of Antiochus' fleet was lying at Chalcis (only 10 ships under command of a certain Isidorus lay at Thronium on the *sinus Maliacus* during the battle, Liv. 36, 20, 5—6); so Atilius could not think of penetrating into the area of the Thermopylae through the Euripus (he had 25 ships + perhaps a few ships of Eumenes against 40 *tectae* + 50 *apertae*⁴⁰²) of Antiochus and Chalcis was in the hands of the enemy) and, if he tried to reach the straits by rounding Euboea, Antiochus' fleet would sail northwards through the straits in time to bar his way off Oreus. For the same reason (his inferior numbers) Atilius could neither prevent nor disquiet Antiochus' retreat from Chalcis to Ephesus.⁴⁰³) The only thing he was able to achieve was the interception

³⁹⁹) Kromayer II, 223; de Sanctis IV, 1, 389.

⁴⁰⁰) Liv. 36, 12, 9—11; App. Syr. 16, 70.

⁴⁰¹) Liv. 36, 42, 5, v. s. p. 259 sq.

⁴⁰²) The ships of Isidorus will have been *apertae*, v. i.

⁴⁰³) Liv. 36, 21, 1; App. Syr. 20, 91; Plut. *Flam.* 16. It goes without saying that at that moment C. Livius was not yet present in the Aegean with his strong squadron: already in January 191 Acilius had crossed to Illyria (de Sanctis IV, 1, 389; Liv. 36, 3, 13), because such a short passage could even be made in the depth of winter on a carefully chosen day of favourable weather; hence the early date (April) of the battle in the Thermopylae. But for the long voyage with highly vulnerable warships round Malea Livius had to wait for the season of navigation and, moreover, he lost

of a large convoy intended for Antiochus, which was on the way from Asia to Chalcis and had already passed through the straits between Andros and Euboea: some ships were sunk, some, which brought up the rear, succeeded in returning to Asia Minor; but the bulk of the transports were captured and brought to the Piraeus, which was now Atilius' naval base instead of Corinth. A large quantity of grain, found on board the prizes, was divided among the Athenians and other allies.⁴⁰⁴)

It is very strange that Isidorus' 10 ships, which had been lying at Thronium during the battle and subsequently had sailed to Demetrias,⁴⁰⁵) were suffered to escape. Only towards August the town was forced into surrender by Philip: the Syrian garrison and the ships were allowed to withdraw,⁴⁰⁶) though a child might have realised that the vessels would form a welcome reinforcement of Polyxenidas' fleet that would give so much trouble to the allied fleets in the Asiatic waters. Why didn't the Romans reconquer Demetrias themselves at an earlier date and make away with those ships? After Antiochus' withdrawal they might have easily blockaded the town with their whole fleet. Why was the matter allowed to drag on till August, when there was no Roman ship left in the Greek waters (at that moment C. Livius lay with the entire fleet at Delos, struggling against the Etesian winds (Liv. 36, 43, 1), while Isidorus brought his 10 ships safely to Ephesus!)? And *if* the Romans wanted to leave the matter to Philip, why didn't they give him positive orders to seize those ships at any price? We must, however, not forget that our knowledge of these events is too lacunary to justify unreserved censure. In the first place it is possible that immediately after Antiochus' retreat a part of Isidorus' 10 ships had already followed him from Demetrias to Ephesus; for Livy says that at the time of the capitulation *paucæ naves* were lying in the harbour of Demetrias (36, 33, 7), a number that

time in gathering naval contingents in southern Italy (Liv. 36, 42, 1 sq.): when at last he arrived at the Piraeus, it was summer and Antiochus had crossed to Asia long ago.

⁴⁰⁴) Liv. 36, 20, 7—8; Appian (Syr. 20, 91), probably in consequence of his careless method of shortening his sources, represents the captured convoy as part of Antiochus' fleet retreating from Chalcis to Asia. Was the distribution of grain meant as a compensation for the maintenance of Atilius' troops at Corinth and the Piraeus? It seems not impossible, as apparently only from the year 191 the Roman government began to send regularly grain to Greece (Liv. 36, 2, 12—13; 4): in 192 "only" the small squadron of Atilius had been stationed there, but no Roman army.

⁴⁰⁵) Liv. 36, 20, 5—6.

⁴⁰⁶) Liv. 36, 33.

may refer to 3 ships as well as to 10. Secondly the ships may have been *naves apertae* which in reality did not mean a very considerable reinforcement of Polyxenidas' fleet. And finally in the summer of 191 no Roman in Greece will have thought of the coming war in Asia: they had got rid of Antiochus and were now wholly occupied by the desire to chastise the Aetolians. There was but one man who realised already at that moment that the war must be decided in Asia, who immediately crossed thither and thus became the bold and gifted forerunner of the Scipios: I mean C. Livius, the admiral of 191; but he only touched for a moment at the Piraeus in the summer and he was naturally and rightly eager to sail to Asia Minor as soon as he could. Thus Isidorus' ships escaped.

The remaining events in Greece of the year 191 need scarcely to be discussed here: the whole Roman fleet sailed to the Asiatic waters in the summer, so that henceforth Greece itself was no longer of any importance from a maritime point of view. So we shall not speak of Philip's conquests, nor of the difficulties in the Peloponnese and the protracted conflict with the Aetolians. Suffice it to say that if the Aetolian conflict had exerted an unfavourable influence upon the result of the war in Asia, the fault would have rested with the Romans themselves. With genuine Roman tactlessness Glabrio threw away a reasonable chance of reaching an agreement; and though Flaminius succeeded nevertheless in mediating a truce in the autumn, the senate stuck to Glabrio's obstinate line of conduct, so that the Aetolian war had to be continued in 190. The results of this blunder might have been serious, because the Scipios could scarcely have marched on with their army to Asia in the early summer of 190, if they had been forced to leave a rebellious Aetolia in their rear. It was a piece of good luck for Rome that this time again the Aetolians consented to an armistice, because they were artless enough to expect a reasonable arrangement: the Roman army could now safely march to Asia. But nevertheless Glabrio and the senate had foolishly played with fire.

Only one fact must be mentioned here in conclusion: the annexation by Rome of the island Zacynthus in the summer of 191. During the second Punic war Laevinus had conquered the island (except for the citadel) in the year 212 and had handed it over to the Aetolians who were allies of Rome at that time; but in 207 Philip had wrested it from them again.⁴⁰⁷) Thereupon Philip had given it away to Amynder, who afterwards

⁴⁰⁷) V. s. p. 102 and 136.

during the Syrian war joined Antiochus and the Aetolians. Finally the commander, sent by Amynder to the island, had sold it to the Achaean league after Antiochus' defeat and the fall of Amynder connected with it. But this was not in accordance with the desires and interests of the Romans: *they* had beaten Antiochus in the Thermopylae and therefore they rightly regarded Zacynthus as part of the booty due to themselves; and besides Corcyra they also wanted to control the other islands in the waters west of Greece, in order to be able to protect their merchantmen and convoys effectively against piracy (in the same way Cephallenia would be occupied by them in 189). Consequently T. Quinctius demanded from the Achaean assembly that Zacynthus should be yielded to Rome, a demand naturally complied with at once (August 191).⁴⁰⁸ But nevertheless Roman naval supremacy in the waters of western Greece remained more or less imaginary for the present: from the spring of 191, when A. Postumius' flotilla returned from Cephallenia to Atilius' headquarters,⁴⁰⁹ to the spring of 190, when Aemilius Regillus left 18 ships in the waters of Cephallenia,⁴¹⁰ there was practically no Roman warship in the waters west of Greece and the Roman convoys were exposed to the piracy of the islanders.⁴¹¹ A serious fact which might have had evil results for the revictualling of the Roman warfleet in the Asiatic waters and which throws a glaring light upon the maritime short-sightedness of the senate.

Warfare in the Asiatic waters. The war in Europe had been no more 19
than an insignificant prelude to the Syrian war in the proper sense of the word, which had to be fought and decided in Asia; for it was only there that Antiochus could really be defeated. Humble as the part of the Roman navy had been in the preceding phase of the war, the more important it would become now. For no Roman army could step ashore in Asia Minor

⁴⁰⁸) Liv. 36, 31, 10—32; Plut. *Flam.* 17. The chastisement Zacynthus as well as Cephallenia were subjected to by C. Livius, because they sided with the Aetolians (Liv. 36, 42, 5), naturally preceded the transfer of the island by the Achaean league to Rome: the former fact probably took place in June 191 (Kromayer II, 226), the latter in August.

⁴⁰⁹) V. s. p. 290.

⁴¹⁰) V. s. p. 261 sq.

⁴¹¹) Liv. 37, 13, 11—12.

without Rome commanding the Asiatic waters; so naval supremacy in that area must be wrested by the Roman navy from the Syrian fleet in a long and laborious struggle. Most scholars are in the habit of crediting the great Scipio with the right notion that the war against Antiochus must be decided in Asia Minor. It may be true, but he was not the first to realize it or at least to put it into practice: C. Livius Salinator was his highly gifted and independent forerunner. When he put to sea with his fleet from Ostia in the early spring of 191, the battle in the Thermopylae had not yet been fought and consequently an offensive against Asia itself could scarcely be thought of by the senate at that juncture; during his very short stay at the Piraeus (summer 191) he probably had no contact at all with the consul M'. Acilius Glabrio, who had already crossed to the Balkan Peninsula in January and was now wholly occupied by the Aetolian difficulties: from this strenuous, but narrow-minded Roman the plan for an offensive against Asia did certainly not originate. So it is a reasonable supposition that the admiral arrived independently at the bold decision to transfer the war immediately to the Asiatic waters,⁴¹²) and this stamps him as the great figure of the Syrian war next to Scipio.⁴¹³) For if Livius had hesitated one moment to cross to Asia Minor, it would have been too late for that year (even now the battle off Cissus was fought in the autumn, immediately before the end of the season); and if the Roman fleet had made its first appearance in the Asiatic waters in the early summer of 190, it would probably have had to confront a Syrian fleet considerably reinforced with new vessels built during the winter and the excellent, but comparatively small squadrons of Rome's naval allies Pergamum and Rhodes might have been separately crushed before by Polyxenidas' superior numbers. So Livius' decision was of the utmost importance for the result of the war; we shall now follow him on his way to the East.

⁴¹²) Possibly Eumenes, who joined Livius in the Greek waters (Liv. 36, 42, 6) and who piloted the Roman fleet into the Asiatic waters, may have advised him to do so: he was a man of great military experience and, moreover, it was his interest to transfer the war between Antiochus and Rome to Asia and to prevent it from being ended half-way (he had been the principal instigator of the war, because he was (rightly) afraid that without Roman intervention he should get into a dependent position towards Antiochus).

⁴¹³) The Livii being by no means intimately attached to the Cornelii, it seems not probable, that Livius acted merely under Scipio's influence, Münzer 233 and for Livius' career 232 sq.

In the spring of 191 C. Livius sailed with 50 *naves tectae* from Rome to Naples, where he gathered the open ships the allies of that coastal area were bound *ex foedere* to furnish, and from there to the straits of Messina; Rhegium, Locri and other towns on the southern coast contributed their naval contingents to his fleet, while 6 *naves tectae* from Carthage also joined him *ex formula*. So he started for Greece with 56 *naves tectae* and 24 *apertae* of the Italian allies.⁴¹⁴) Probably he arrived at Corcyra about June;⁴¹⁵) from there he hurriedly continued his voyage in the direction of the Peloponnese, the islands Cephallenia and Zacynthus being chastised by him *en passant*, because they had joined the Aetolians.⁴¹⁶) He rounded Malea and safely reached the Piraeus, where Atilius' fleet was lying at that moment.⁴¹⁷) Eumenes, who had passed the winter at Aegina,⁴¹⁸) had joined him with 3 ships⁴¹⁹) off Cape Scyllaeum, where he had sailed to meet him;⁴²⁰) he would not budge from his side for the rest of the year and would pilot him to Asia. At the Piraeus A. Atilius transferred his 25 quinqueremes to Livius and returned himself to Rome; so Livius' fleet now consisted of 81 *tectae* (50 of his own, 25 of Atilius and 6 from Carthage) + 24 *apertae* of the Italian allies, varying from triremes to light reconnoitring vessels,⁴²¹) to which number must be added the few ships of Eumenes. After consulting with the latter,⁴²²) he decided to transfer the war to the Asiatic waters and crossed to Delos without long delay.

In the meantime Antiochus had not been idle. With the ships that were ready and well fitted-out he sailed — according to ancient tradition he did so by Hannibal's advice, which may be true, as this great general naturally realised beforehand that the Romans would come to Asia to have it out with Antiochus — to the Thracian Chersonese, where he took measures to bar the way of the enemies, if they should send an army to Asia; especially Lysimachia on the neck of the Chersonese, which

⁴¹⁴) Liv. 36, 42, 1—2; App. Syr. 22, 101; for the fleetnumbers *v. s. p.* 260 and 269.

⁴¹⁵) Liv. 36, 42, 3—4; Kromayer II, 226—227.

⁴¹⁶) Liv. 36, 42, 4—5; *v. s. p.* 290.

⁴¹⁷) *V. s. p.* 291; Liv. 36, 42, 4—5; App. *l. l.*

⁴¹⁸) *V. s. p.* 288.

⁴¹⁹) He will scarcely have had more at that moment in the Greek waters, *v. s. p.* 269 and footnote 370.

⁴²⁰) At the same point Attalus had joined L. Apustius in 199, *v. s. p.* 234.

⁴²¹) Liv. 36, 42, 7—8; App. *l. l.*; *v. s. p.* 269.

⁴²²) Liv. 36, 42, 8; *v. s. p.* footnote 412.

had been recently rebuilt by him,⁴²³⁾ was made into a mighty arsenal. He had ordered his admiral Polyxenidas, a Rhodian exile, to make the rest of his fleet seaworthy in the meantime at Ephesus. Scouting vessels were sent round the islands in order to prevent surprises from the side of the Roman navy.⁴²⁴⁾ So it goes without saying that by means of his reconnoitring vessels Polyxenidas was immediately informed of the presence of the Roman fleet at Delos, where Livius was forced to stay for a considerable time, because the strong Etesian winds — it had become August by this time — prevented him from sailing in a north-eastern direction;⁴²⁵⁾ and Syrian head-quarters at Ephesus will also have been exactly acquainted with Livius' effectives. Polyxenidas immediately sent word to Antiochus and the latter gave up his preparatives on the Hellespont and returned forthwith with his warships to Ephesus, so that the whole fleet was now united again.⁴²⁶⁾ The importance of Livius' decision to sail to Asia becomes manifest already at this juncture: the very fact of his approach immediately effected the evacuation of the Hellespont by the adversary! It stands to reason that Antiochus' council of war decided to bring Livius to battle as soon as possible. The Syrian fleet, which consisted of 70 *tectae* and 130 *apertae*,⁴²⁷⁾ could somehow venture to face the Roman fleet, which, including the few vessels of Eumenes, numbered \pm 85 *tectae* and 24 *apertae*, as Antiochus' great superiority in open vessels made up for his inferiority in ships of the line. Moreover, Polyxenidas and his men were to operate in their own sphere, where they perfectly knew sea, land and winds and, being near home, could venture to confront the enemy without loading their ships with lots of victuals, while the Romans, who appeared in those waters for the first time, couldn't feel at home there and, coming from far, were forced to carry considerable quantities of necessaries.⁴²⁸⁾ But as soon as the Romans

⁴²³⁾ V. s. p. 256.

⁴²⁴⁾ Liv. 36, 41; App. Syr. 21, 97—99.

⁴²⁵⁾ Liv. 36, 43, 1—2. 11; for the chronology Kromayer II, 226—227. We might ask, why Livius did not brave the Etesian winds; for warships were rowing-vessels. He could, however, expect to a certainty that Polyxenidas would try to engage with him on his way to Asia, before he could join the squadrons of Rhodes and Pergamum; so it would have been little short of suicide to exhaust his rowers by rowing against the strong wind, while expecting a heavy naval battle!

⁴²⁶⁾ Liv. 36, 43, 3.

⁴²⁷⁾ V. s. p. 273 sq.

⁴²⁸⁾ Liv. 36, 43, 4—8. If it is true that in the council of war Polyxenidas called

should have joined the Pergamene or the Rhodian fleet or both, the situation would change forthwith: the Syrian fleet would have to face a crushing numerical superiority and the Roman lack of familiarity with the Asiatic waters would be no longer a factor of importance.⁴²⁹ Consequently Polyxenidas had to choose his position in such a way that he cut off the Roman fleet from the Pergamene and Rhodian squadrons and could force it to accept battle without the support of its allies. That this problem could not easily be solved, follows from the simple fact that Ephesus, the Syrian naval base, lay almost in the centre of the western coast of Asia Minor, Elaea, the naval basis of Pergamum, far to the north, Rhodes, on the other hand, far to the south of it. If Antiochus had been vastly superior in naval numbers, he might have divided his fleet in order to cut off the Romans from both their Asiatic allies at the same time; but now there couldn't even be thought of such a line of conduct, because his complete fleet was only just large enough to confront the Roman with a chance of success and therefore could by no means be divided. How Polyxenidas tried to solve this difficulty, we shall see presently; now we must first for a moment fix our attention upon the Rhodians, because to form a sound judgment of the military situation it is necessary to know, at what moment Livius as well as Polyxenidas were notified that Rhodes really would support Livius with a fleet.

After the ultimatum addressed to Antiochus in 197,⁴³⁰ the Rhodians had been at peace with him, nor had they had to complain of his conduct: in conquering the Ptolemaic possessions in Asia Minor he had carefully respected the Rhodian interests and even allowed the Rhodians to take part of them (*i. e.* Samos) under their own protection.⁴³¹ Consequently they had abstained from meddling with the conflict between Antiochus and Rome, as long as it remained limited to Europe. But now the appearance of Livius' squadron at Delos proved clearly that Rome would

the Roman ships unwieldy and built without technical experience, he was sorely mistaken with respect to the second point: the Roman men of war were indeed heavier than the Syrian (quinqueremes against triremes, *v. s.* p. 274), but nevertheless quite equal to their task.

⁴²⁹) Polyxenidas forgot, however, that already from the Piraeus Eumenes piloted the Roman fleet.

⁴³⁰) *V. s.* p. 255 sq.; for the following remarks cf. de Sanctis IV, 1, 175 sq.

⁴³¹) *V. s.* p. 256.

seek the decision in Asia; so they had to make up their mind and it was only natural that they decided to side with Rome against Antiochus. In spite of the moderateness of Antiochus' behaviour they had looked with suspicion at his conquests in Asia Minor and on the Hellespont, where he now commanded the straits, and at the rise of his naval power: the equilibrium in the Aegean was disturbed; Macedon and Egypt were practically eliminated as maritime powers and the excellent, but small squadrons of Rhodes and Pergamum were, if left to themselves, no match for the much stronger Syrian fleet; so these vigorous, but small states threatened in the long run to become dependencies of Syria in one form or another. Such a development of the situation in the Aegean was anticipated with fear by the Rhodians and they realized that Rome alone could furnish a counterpoise against it; moreover, they rightly supposed that Rome would never keep standing squadrons in the Aegean, so that in their opinion after Antiochus' defeat Rhodes and Pergamum would have it all their own way in that area. Finally they regarded Antiochus' defeat as a certainty — and they were quite right in thinking so — unless they should join hands with him themselves, which was far from their mind; consequently they were not willing to forfeit their own share of the spoils by standing aloof. So they decided to throw in their lot with the Romans,⁴³²) who, moreover, had begun the war *i. a.* for the sake of Rhodes' cherished ideal, the liberty and autonomy of the Greek cities in Asia Minor. In doing so they naturally forgot one thing: that the balance of power which was now disturbed in the Aegean would be broken for ever and a day in consequence of a Roman victory and that the liberty of all others in that area as well as their own would become wholly dependent on the good graces of Rome, in spite of the Roman land-lubbers' mentality and their lack of interest in maritime affairs connected with it.

In a word, we take it for granted that the appearance of Livius' fleet in the waters of Delos occasioned Rhodes to join hands with the Romans; moreover, the following events tell the same tale. But at which moment were Livius and Polyxenidas informed of this decision? Did the news that a Rhodian squadron was sailing northward to support him, reach Livius during his stay at Delos or only afterwards? It is not easy to

⁴³²) They were quite free to decide as they liked, because no formal alliance bound them to Rome, *v. s.* footnote 55.

answer this question. At first sight we might feel inclined to decide in favour of the latter alternative, because as a matter of fact Livius sailed from Delos in a north-eastern direction in order to join the Pergamene fleet and for the present did not mind at all the Rhodian squadron that was on the way. But on second thoughts such a view of the matter appears to be untenable. As a matter of course Livius' intention to sail northward and join the Pergamene fleet dated already from the time of his stay at the Piraeus; for he was to be piloted by Eumenes, therefore followed naturally in the latter's wake and, moreover, he was at that moment as yet wholly uninformed of the attitude of Rhodes. During his stay at Delos he stuck to this line of conduct; for the delay was occasioned exclusively by the strong northern wind and this proves that he clung to his original plan of sailing northwards and joining the Pergamene fleet. But does it prove at the same time that he was *not* informed of the Rhodian decision in favour of Rome during his stay at Delos, but only afterwards? It does not: Livius could stick to his original plan in spite of such news; for there were but two alternatives (to join *either* the Pergamene *or* the Rhodian squadron), as he could not think of dividing his fleet in order to fetch the two allied squadrons at the same time; moreover, Eumenes was present as pilot to his fleet and the inclination of the Romans naturally tended more towards the faithful, submissive client-king, who had joined them immediately during the European stage of the war, than towards the proud, self-reliant republic. There is yet another strong reason for supposing that Livius received the news from Rhodes at Delos. Polyxenidas was informed of the Rhodian decision at Phocaea (*v. i.*); as this decision was in favour of Rome, it is reasonable to assume that Livius was informed of it at an earlier date than Polyxenidas; and as the latter moved probably earlier and certainly not later from Phocaea to Cissus than Livius from Delos to Chios, because otherwise the two fleets would have met in the straits of Chios (which did *not* happen; the order of events in Livy's narrative clearly proves that Polyxenidas was lying at Cissus, when Livius was approaching Chios), Livius must have received the news at Delos. In spite of it he stuck to the northern route originally planned; whether this was a sound line of conduct, is another question: it would be very difficult now to elude the fleet of the enemy (in reality it *was* touch-and-go whether he got past), whereas he might have joined the Rhodian squadron without any chance of an engagement with Polyxenidas by

sailing to Samos or still more southwards. — Let us now turn to Polyxenidas. He first stationed his fleet at Phocaea, evidently because this was the most suitable point for cutting off the Roman fleet on its northern route from the Pergamene naval base Elaea and thus forcing it to accept battle without the support of the Pergamene fleet. But... he suddenly changed his project: he shifted his fleet from Phocaea to Cissus, a port on the coast of the continent between Point Argennum and Corycus opposite Chios, that is to say much more towards the south than Phocaea. What did he hope to obtain by this change of position? The answer is: evidently he hoped to command from here not only the northern route, in case the Roman fleet should make for Elaea, but also the southern, if unexpectedly it should try to join the Rhodian squadron first. In other words, it seems pretty certain that the news of the Rhodian decision to send a squadron to Livius did not reach Polyxenidas at Ephesus, but only at Phocaea.⁴³³) In my opinion this sudden movement of the Syrian fleet implies a serious tactical mistake on Polyxenidas' part. He wanted to outwit his adversaries in rather too clever a way and to leave nothing to chance, but for that very reason he failed. In the first place he could expect on psychological grounds (*v. s.*) that Livius would cling to his original project. Nay, he could know it; for the prolonged stay at Delos proved that the Romans stuck to the northern route, as they would have had to follow a far more southern route to meet the Rhodian squadron and would'nt have been hindered by the Etesian winds in this case. Moreover, the position of Cissus was much less favourable with respect to the northern route than Phocaea; and on the other hand Cissus didn't lie sufficiently towards the south to prevent Livius from sailing to Samos far out of his reach and joining there the Rhodian squadron. Was Polyxenidas afraid of being cut off from his basis Ephesus, if he remained at Phocaea? We do not know it; but at any rate his new project halted between two opinions and for that very reason it failed.

⁴³³) Such a view is not inconsistent with the fact that already in the council of war at Ephesus Polyxenidas advised to fight Livius before he could join the Pergamene and Rhodian squadrons (Liv. 36, 43, 4): apart from the question whether the account of this council of war may be regarded as representing nothing but what was said in reality (under the influence of the following events historiography may have anticipated here the mentioning of the Rhodian squadron), it is only natural that already at that moment Syrian head-quarters reckoned with the possibility of Rhodes sending a squadron to Livius, even though at the time nothing was known about the line of conduct that would be followed by Rhodes.

Revenons à nos moutons! As I remarked above, Polyxenidas sailed with his entire fleet from Ephesus to Phocaea, but sailed back shortly afterwards and stationed his fleet half-way between Phocaea and Ephesus at Cissus, because he regarded this as a more favourable point to wait for the enemy.⁴³⁴) The Romans, on the other hand, sailed, as soon the strong northern wind abated, from Delos to Phanae, a port of the island Chios on the side of the open sea, west of the homonymous promontory. From there they sailed round the southern part of the island to the town of Chios, where they loaded victuals,⁴³⁵) and sailed on to Phocaea, which had just been evacuated by the Syrian fleet: though being subject to Antiochus, the town was sufficiently impressed to receive the Roman fleet without resistance.⁴³⁶) This means that Polyxenidas' design had failed, the Roman fleet having slipped past him, so that it could now join the Pergamene squadron unhindered. How this happened, is and remains one of the great puzzles of this naval war.⁴³⁷) No doubt, the position of Cissus was far more unfavourable to cutt off the Roman fleet on its northern route than Phocaea: the coast of the mainland between Argennum and Corycus recedes very strongly in a south-eastern direction, so that, if Livius on his way from Phanae to Chios kept close to the coast of the island, he remained at a distance of at least 25 kilometers from the base of the Syrian fleet. Did he, moreover, achieve this part of his voyage by night? It is possible, as he found in Eumenes a good pilot, who was thoroughly acquainted with those waters; but we do not know it. And at any rate even such considerations do not suffice to explain the amazing fact that Polyxenidas did not seize the opportunity: he was a good admiral and here he could have stopped the Roman fleet; what factors prevented him from doing so (perhaps a strong westerly wind?),

⁴³⁴) Antiochus himself made for Magnesia in order to superintend the preparatives on land; of course there had to be reckoned with raids of the Roman marine troops. Livy's assertion that at that moment it was known at the Syrian headquarters that the Roman fleet was approaching, cannot be correct, as in this case Phocaea would certainly not have been left for Cissus: this change originated from the very fact that Polyxenidas reckoned with a more southward course of Livius for the sake of joining the Rhodian squadron.

⁴³⁵) During the war Chios remained the centre of revictualling for the Roman fleet, Liv. 37, 27, 1.

⁴³⁶) Liv. 36, 43, 8—11; App. Syr. 22, 102.

⁴³⁷) De Sanctis IV, 1, 178, 105; his excellent remarks (174—179) may be compared for this entire episode.

has not been handed down to us; but, be this as it may, the fact that Phocaea had been changed for the far more unfavourable Cissus yielded bitter fruit.⁴³⁸) Eumenes made immediately for his naval base Elaea and returned after a few days to Phocaea with 50 sail (24 *tectae* and 26 *apertae*), so that Livius' effective now embraced 105 *naves tectae* and 50 *apertae*.⁴³⁹) Of the *tectae* at least 75 were quinqueremes; so Livius could now with confidence begin the struggle against Polyxenidas, who had 70 *tectae* (all of them triremes) and 130 *apertae*,⁴⁴⁰) though the latter was still enabled by his superiority in open ships to accept battle with a modest chance of standing his ground.

Naturally Livius must now first of all make an attempt to join the Rhodian squadron that was on the way. The latter could by no means come to him: it numbered 25, at best 27 sail⁴⁴¹) and consequently couldn't get past the far stronger Syrian fleet at Cissus which separated it from the Roman. So it will have been waiting at Samos, which was allied with Rhodes, and Livius had to sail southwards himself in order to fetch it. As a matter of course he intended again to slip, if possible, past the Syrian fleet at Cissus without entering into conflict with it and to join the Rhodian squadron before he accepted a decisive battle: after those 25 first-rate ships should have been added to his fleet, he would be quite unassailable to Polyxenidas. On the other hand it is only natural that he expected an engagement with Polyxenidas on his passage to the south and reckoned with it: for the latter it was a question of now or never; he could face at a pinch the united squadrons of Livius and Eumenes, but after they had joined the Rhodians, he could no longer think of accepting battle. So we may readily believe Polybius, that, when the allied squadrons sailed southwards from Phocaea, they were ready for battle (Liv. 36, 43, 12; App. Syr. 22, 102).⁴⁴²)

⁴³⁸) One solution of this puzzle is certainly *not* possible: that Polyxenidas should have arrived at Cissus *after* the Roman fleet had passed northwards to Chios. Rodgers (398), who apparently seeks the solution in this direction, seems to forget that P. came from Phocaea and that consequently in this case he must have passed the Roman fleet in the straits between Chios and the mainland!

⁴³⁹) Liv. 36, 43, 12—13; App. Syr. 22, 101; *v. s.* p. 269.

⁴⁴⁰) *V. s.* p. 273 sq.

⁴⁴¹) *V. s.* p. 270.

⁴⁴²) For the episode of the battle of Cissus see, besides de Sanctis *l. l.*, C. A. H.

Alas, Polybius' account of this voyage and of C. Livius' *plan de (Batt campagne)* has been shortened by Livy and Appian both. The latter passes immediately from Phocaea to the description of the naval battle; Livy gives some more details, but nevertheless it is clear that he too has curtailed the communications of his source and that his own scanty notion of the local conditions played him false in doing so. To begin with I will write out his account of the antecedents of the battle: after the departure from Phocaea *primo aquilonibus transversis cum urgerentur in terram, cogeantur tenui agmine prope in ordinem singulae naves ire; deinde, ut lenita paulum vis venti est, ad Corycum portum, qui super Cissuntem est, conati sunt traicere* (36, 43, 13). It is manifest that the first part of this description (that they were driven in the direction of the coast by a strong northern side-wind and therefore were forced to sail in line ahead in order to avoid shipwrecks and collisions) must refer to the voyage from east to west along the northern side of the Ionian Peninsula ⁴⁴³); the second part on the other hand suddenly relates to the crossing from Point Argennum ⁴⁴⁴) to Corycus. In other words, the whole voyage through the straits of Chios is passed over in silence; isn't it reasonable to suppose that part of Polybius' account of Livius' war-plan has been suppressed at the same time? For this war-plan we are now thrown upon Livy's last-quoted words *deinde ad Corycum portum, qui super Cissuntem est, conati sunt traicere*. That the Roman admiral must have *planned* this *beforehand*, follows from the fact that, when the Romans doubled Point Argennum, they saw the hostile fleet barring their way in battle formation (*v. i.*), so that at that moment an attempt at crossing to Corycus could no longer be thought of: they had *planned* such an attempt *before* (while sailing through the straits of Chios), but it was frustrated by the movements of the enemy; led astray by the defective notion he had of the local conditions (apparently he was *i. a.* not acquainted with the existence of Point Argennum), Livy must have incorrectly shortened and shifted Polybius' account of the Roman plan

VIII, 217 sq., Rodgers 398—401, Kromayer II, 154 sq. For the chronology (the battle took place in September 191) Kromayer 227.

⁴⁴³) See Weissenborn *ad locum*.

⁴⁴⁴) Here, under the lee of Point Argennum, they came indeed for the first time into sheltered waters.

of war. Now what did this war-plan consist in? To realize this it is first of all necessary to ascertain the exact position of Cissus. We may derive it with a reasonable degree of certainty from Livy's words: coming from Point Argennum, Corycus, he says, lay *beyond* Cissus, in other words *Cissus lay on the coast of the mainland half-way between Argennum and Corycus*.⁴⁴⁵) Secondly we may take it for granted that C. Livius was acquainted with the fact that the Syrian fleet was lying at Cissus: he had his intelligence and scouting service as well as Polyxenidas and, moreover, he had already once given it the slip in those waters on his voyage to the north. Now then, he would try to give it the slip again, though this time the operation planned by him had the character of a menacing demonstration rather than of an attempt at slipping by: his tactical scheme turned on an attempt to reach Corycus from Point Argennum, close past the naval base of Polyxenidas. If the enemy, intimidated by this demonstration of the superior allied fleet, remained within the harbour (and this was the end Livius hoped to attain), an important positional advantage would be gained, because after reaching the port of Corycus the Roman fleet would separate Polyxenidas from his principal base (Ephesus) as well as from the Rhodian squadron; if, on the other hand, Polyxenidas decided to risk a naval battle, the Romans would certainly not shirk such a measuring of strength, though at that moment they did not long for it either. After rounding Point Argennum they could naturally continue sailing in line ahead during the passage to Corycus, because in case of need (if Polyxenidas decided to fight them) they could pass into line abreast in a moment by means of a simple change of front; the only thing one had to do while rounding Point Argennum was to strike sails and masts and to clear the decks for action. But the scheme was not put into practice, because as a matter of course Polyxenidas was firmly resolved to fight the enemy now or never. And right he was; for, if at this juncture he suffered the adversary to slip by, he would himself be cut off from Ephesus and thus forced into a highly precarious position, and on the other hand the hostile fleet would be reinforced with 25 first-rate Rhodian vessels. While the Roman fleet was passing through the straits of Chios and could not yet be sighted from

⁴⁴⁵) And not (de Sanctis 177, 104) beyond Corycus: Livy's words admit of only one interpretation, that is to say the interpretation given in my text. Rodgers' map (378) gives the correct position of Cissus. The harbour of Corycus was of course in the immediate neighbourhood of the homonymous promontory.

Cissus, his reconnoitring service informed him that the enemy was approaching. He immediately left the harbour with his fleet; he himself deployed the left wing in the direction of the open sea (he would command it during the battle) and he gave orders to deploy the right wing on the land side in such a way, that it leant upon the coast. Thus drawn up into battle array, he advanced in the direction of the yet invisible enemy. ⁴⁴⁶⁾

In the narrow straits between Chios and the mainland the allied fleet had naturally continued to sail in line ahead; C. Livius was in the van, Eumenes' squadron brought up the rear. While rounding Point Argennum, the Roman admiral gained sight of the hostile fleet, which was approaching in line abreast, ready for battle. He can scarcely have been surprised by this sight; he had reckoned beforehand with the possibility, nay the probability of such an event. Moreover, at all events it had been his intention to take in sails and masts immediately after rounding Point Argennum (*v. s.*); the only difference was that now this manoeuvre had to be executed at full speed, under the very eyes of the enemy, who was ready for battle, and that the fleet had to be drawn up into battle array at the same time. Immediately the sails and masts were struck; ⁴⁴⁷⁾ at the same time the ships leading the van slowed, in order to enable the rest of the fleet to come up into line. The head of the column under command of Livius himself formed the right wing on the side of the open sea opposite Polyxenidas; on Livius' left the following ships came successively up into line abreast, clearing for action as they did so. Consequently Eumenes, who brought up the rear, was intended to form the extreme left wing on the land side. In order to gain sufficient room for this manoeuvre and certainly also (for his own ships of the line strongly outnumbered those of Polyxenidas) in order to envelop the enemy's left wing on the sea side, Livius stood off shore in the direction of the open sea with about 30 ships (= the right wing), which by this time had come up into line; for this purpose he made use of the so-called *dolo*, the subsidiary sail fastened to the small, slanting foremast, which

⁴⁴⁶⁾ Liv. 36, 44, 1; App. Syr. 22, 103.

⁴⁴⁷⁾ Note the fact that apparently the Roman fleet had *sailed* the whole distance from Phocaea to Point Argennum and not *rowed*: Livius had to reckon with the probability of a naval battle and therefore saved the rowers' strength till the last moment. *V. s.* footnote 425.

was not struck before battle like the mainmast: ⁴⁴⁸) a fact, as Rodgers rightly remarks, which proves in a striking way, how very carefully the rowers' strength used to be saved till the last moment before battle! ⁴⁴⁹)

Alas, we are scarcely able to form an adequate notion of the naval battle which now ensued, because the two principal authorities, Livy and Appian, concentrate their attention upon some particular exploits and show but little understanding for the tactical schemes put into practice by both parties. Nevertheless we may distil anyhow a certain kind of essence from their partially very vague indications. ⁴⁵⁰) Livius' right and Polyxenidas' left wing had already come into contact on the side of the open sea, while Eumenes who brought up the rear was still coming up into line on the left. So the flanks covered by the shore had not yet engaged, when the wings on the sea side already closed in upon each other. ⁴⁵¹) Here 2 Punic ships engaged with 3 vessels of Polyxenidas. Two of the latter attacked together one of the Carthaginian ships: they swept away her oars on both sides and then boarded and mastered the now motionless and helpless vessel, the men being killed or thrown into the sea. The other Punic ship, which had had to face only one adversary, now returned to the line of battle in order to escape from being overpowered by three antagonists at the same time. But Livius took vengeance immediately. He advanced with his flagship and naturally was attacked at once by the two victorious ships. But Livius ordered his rowers to

⁴⁴⁸) The *dolones* were especially utilized for the purpose of escaping after a lost battle, see for instance Liv. 36, 45, 1. Wrongly Weissenborn ad 36, 44, 3; see *i. a.* Köster 121 and 171 sq.

⁴⁴⁹) Liv. 36, 44, 2—4; App. *Syr.* 22, 103. See footnote 447.

⁴⁵⁰) Justinus (31, 6, 7 sq.) must be mentioned next to Livy and Appian as third authority; but his version is of slight value. The four naval battles that took place in this war have been reduced to one in Justinus' account, so that there is even serious divergence of opinion about the question, which is meant by him! Nevertheless it seems probable that his description chiefly refers to the battle of Cissus, first because it tallies in some respects with Appian's version, secondly because according to the best mss. Livius was the Roman admiral (according to the *deteriores* Aemilius, which, if correct, would lead to Myonnesus). Justinus contrives to juggle Hannibal into the function of admiral of the Syrian fleet instead of Polyxenidas and he has this strange aberration in common with other inferior authorities (Orosius, Florus, Eutropius), who make Hannibal command the Syrian fleet in the battle of Myonnesus. This confusion may result from a contamination of Cissus and (or) Myonnesus with Side, where Hannibal had commanded in reality. See for this problem Boerma *ad locum*.

⁴⁵¹) Liv. 36, 44, 4. 11.

keep their oars in the water in order to hold the ship steady and threw grapnels into both of them at the same time. Thus the naval battle was transformed into a land battle (after the genuine old Roman style!) and from this moment the excellent Roman soldiers had the best of it: both vessels were soon overcome by Livius' single quinquereme.⁴⁵²) Appian as well as Livy (and consequently Polybius too perhaps) concentrate their attention upon this *προαγώνισμα*, as Appian calls it; but of the battle as a whole, which ensued from it, they dispose with some vague indications. Nevertheless it is clear from their accounts of the battle that the Romans relied upon the solid strength of their heavier ships and the excellence of their soldiers, that is to say upon boarding tactics, whereas the adversary, who had much lighter ships (his *naves tectae* were triremes, the Roman ships of the line being quinqueremes), preferred the nautical manoeuvre.⁴⁵³) On the other hand two things are almost completely neglected by our ancient informants, notwithstanding the fact that they were of the utmost importance: first the strong Roman superiority in ships of the line (105 against 70), secondly the activity of the light open ships, of which Polyxenidas had 130 against Livius 50 and which had to make up for his inferiority in ships of the line. As for the latter point, the co-operation between ships of the line and light craft had been an invention of Philip which he had put into practice for the first time in the battle off Chios in 201 and which had been imitated by other naval powers since.⁴⁵⁴) It is not perfectly clear what was the function of the light craft during the battle; probably it was their task to move

⁴⁵²) Liv. 36, 44, 5—9 and almost conform, but with some of his usual careless mistakes App. Syr. 22, 104—106. That the type of the Roman warships had become considerably lighter since the days of Mylae and Ecnomus (though they naturally were still heavier than the Syrian vessels), appears from the fact that Livius' quinquereme could not throw grapnels without the rowers keeping their oars in the water to hold her steady (Tarn, *Developments*, 149). So the *ferreae manus* cannot have been *corvi* (boarding-bridges), as is wrongly supposed by de Sanctis (179) and Weissenborn (ad 36, 44, 8); the same follows from the fact that two were thrown at the same time, which is thoroughly inconsistent with Polybius' description of the boarding-bridge (1, 22). See the last chapter and *v. s.* chapter II, footnote 469.

⁴⁵³) Liv. 36, 43, 5—6; 45, 1, 3; App. Syr. 22, 107; Just. 31, 6, 9. The same appears from the *προαγώνισμα* itself: no doubt the Syrian ships captured the Punic vessel, but a modification of the *διέκπλους* preceded the capture, whereas Livius limited his action to mere boarding tactics. The numbers of the Syrian losses (10 ships sunk against 13 captured) also prove the predominance of boarding tactics on the Roman side.

⁴⁵⁴) *V. s.* footnotes 12 and 63.

nimbly about the large ships of the enemy, to harass them with light missiles, to break their oars and to impede nautical manoeuvres.⁴⁵⁵) We get, however, the impression that they were not able to annoy seriously the heavy Roman ships of the line and that the latter concentrated upon the hostile battle-ships without paying much attention to the small craft.⁴⁵⁶) In this way the silence of the authorities about the activity of Polyxenidas' light craft may be reasonably explained; and we may add that this type of ships were indeed more suitable for impeding battle-ships that relied upon nimbleness and skilful nautical movements (e. g. for frustrating a *διέκπλους* and such like) than to molest seriously the heavy Roman ships, which manoeuvred as little as they could and fully concentrated upon boarding tactics. Hence the fact that Polyxenidas tried to adapt the type of his ships to Roman fighting tactics by supplementing his battle-fleet of triremes with heavier types during the winter of 191—190 and that in the battle of Myonnesus the Syrian small craft are no longer heard of:⁴⁵⁷) in the battle of Cissus they had not answered the expectations. In doing so he forgot, however, one thing: that it was dangerous to adopt the Roman system of fighting without having *soldiers* as excellent as the Roman and that in a general way it is risky to imitate alien tactics without having time to become quietly and thoroughly familiarized with them. But the other point is much more important. We stated that before the beginning of the battle C. Livius on the right wing stood off shore in the direction of the open sea with some 30 ships in order to gain sufficient room for the rear to come up into line on his left. Some 30 ships: the number speaks volumes! For the Roman admiral had 105 ships of the line against Polyxenidas 70 and, as on the land side the flanks leant upon the coast, he had on the side of the open sea an overlap of 35 ships (according to Livy's rough estimate *ferme triginta*). For what purpose he made use of these vessels, we are not told; but from the priceless piece of information about his sideward movement with \pm 30 ships before the battle we may conclude with confidence that he must have made an attempt with them to attack the enemy in flank or rear, enveloping his left wing and rolling up his line. The same follows from the fact mentioned by Livy, that the

⁴⁵⁵) Rodgers 401, Tarn, *Developments*, 147 sq.

⁴⁵⁶) Rodgers l.l.

⁴⁵⁷) V.s. p. 274.

defeat and flight of the Syrian fleet originated from Polyxenidas' wing on the sea side, while on the land side, where Eumenes' coming up into line took some time, so that he closed with the enemy later than Livius on the side of the open sea, the struggle remained undecided till finally the right wing of the Syrian fleet followed the lead of Polyxenidas and took to flight in its turn.⁴⁵⁸⁾

The Syrian fleet fled under dolons before the wind to Ephesus. The Romans and Eumenes pursued the enemy as long as the rowers could hold out; but the Roman ships were heavier than the Syrian and were moreover loaded with supplies, so that the chase had to be given up. Polyxenidas had lost 23 ships⁴⁵⁹⁾ (10 sunk, 13 captured), while the Romans had only to deplore the loss of the Punic vessel overpowered at the beginning of the battle. The allied forces passed the rest of the day at Cissus, where Polyxenidas had been lying before the engagement; on the next they sailed to Ephesus. The Rhodian squadron (25 *naves tectae*, according to Appian 27) under command of the admiral Pausistratus joined them during this passage: it will have been waiting in the waters of Samos and have been informed during the night that Polyxenidas had been beaten and that consequently the way was no longer barred. So the allied forces now comprised some 130 ships of the line, besides the light craft; this powerful fleet now concluded the season (which was almost at an end) with a naval demonstration before Ephesus. Outside port the ships formed line-of-battle. But Polyxenidas naturally declined to come out with the 47 battle-ships left to him and be crushed by overwhelmingly superior numbers; by remaining within the harbour he acknowledged the fact that his opponents now commanded the waters of Asia Minor. So the Rhodian and Pergamene squadrons were sent home for the winter: for the moment C. Livius was quite able to rule the waves alone with his 80 battle-ships and 24 open vessels. He went to Chios, where the rowers were allowed a brief rest, and thence to Phocaea. As he did not quite trust the disposition of the population — and the events would prove only too soon that he was right in suspecting them —, he left 4 quinqueremes to guard the town. The rest of the fleet sailed on to Canae;

⁴⁵⁸⁾ Liv. 36, 44, 10—11; 45, 1. Rodgers is perfectly right in concluding from the situation the Roman attempt at enveloping Polyxenidas' left flank; his sailor's eye perceived immediately that the situation implied it beyond any doubt.

⁴⁵⁹⁾ We do not know what became of the captured ships. They will have been destroyed or given to Eumenes.

here, in the neighbourhood of Elaea, on Pergamene territory, the ships were hauled ashore and surrounded with defensive works for the purpose of hibernation ⁴⁶⁰) (October 191) ⁴⁶¹).

So the Asiatic expedition of C. Livius' fleet had already met with a complete success in 191. The task of the navy seemed to be accomplished: the very appearance of the Romans at Delos had forced the Syrian king to gather all his naval forces at Ephesus and to clear the Hellespont; now the only squadron he could dispose of in Asia Minor was lying idle in the harbour of Ephesus, unable to command even the adjoining bay; to make matters worse, several Greek cities on the Asiatic coast had joined the Romans. ⁴⁶²) Towards 190 the way seemed to lie open to the Roman land forces, whether they wanted to go to Asia by land, through Macedon and Thrace and across the Hellespont, or by sea from Greece. But.... events would prove that it was more difficult to maintain the advantages gained than it had been to obtain them. ⁴⁶³)

Before we try to demonstrate this fundamental truth by help of the events of the year 190, one question remains to be discussed: the problem of the revictualling of the Roman naval forces. We pointed out before (footnote 435) that Chios was the centre of revictualling for the Roman fleet in the Asiatic waters. "All the merchantmen sent from Italy," says Livy (37, 27, 1), "used to sail there; it was the Roman granary." And to this general remark he adds the special communication that a large quantity of grain had arrived from Italy at Chios. This piece of information originates with Polybius and therefore cannot be rejected; but.... it is not imputable to chance that it is all but unique and that it refers to

⁴⁶⁰) Liv. 36, 45, 1-8; App. Syr. 22, 107. Appian makes the Roman fleet sail to Chios immediately after the battle and be joined there by the Rhodian squadron: one of his numerous careless abbreviations.

⁴⁶¹) Kromayer II, 227.

⁴⁶²) Already before the war Smyrna, Alexandria Troas and Lampsacus (on the Hellespont!) had braved Antiochus and made overtures to Rome (*i. a.* Liv. 35, 42, 2), and that Canae and Elaea on Pergamene territory were at the Romans' disposal, goes without saying. But now not only Phocaea, but also Cyme, Erythrae and other cities were added to this number, see Liv. 37, 11, 14-15 and de Sanctis IV, 1, 178, 106. And though Phocaea and Cyme soon would get lost again, numerous other acquisitions made up for this loss. So it might have been worth considering to transport the Roman army to Asia by sea and not by land; but apparently such a thought didn't even cross the Roman mind.

⁴⁶³) Kromayer II, 158.

the year 190 (cf. Liv. 37, 14, 3, where we are told that in the spring of 190 privateers of Antiochus tried to intercept the Roman transports off the coast of Chios). For from the spring of 191 to the spring of 190 (that is to say for a full year!) there were no Roman warships in the waters west of Greece and the pirates of Cephallenia profited by this pretty state of things to molest seriously the transportation of Roman supplies to the Aegean.⁴⁶⁴) So it is far from probable that before the summer of 190 the Roman fleet was regularly revictualled from Italy; and really the ancient authorities give rather clearly to understand that in the main it was thrown upon plundering and requisitions.⁴⁶⁵) The indifference towards the interests of the navy, displayed by the senate in this case (fancy that for a full year they let piracy have its way in the waters of western Greece and that only in the spring of 190 they detached 18 ships to Cephallenia; so C. Livius was even forced to send some ships there from the Asiatic waters!), seems also to be proved by the information we have about the revictualling measures taken by the Roman government: we hear of no such measures for the year 192 and no wonder: at that moment there was as yet no Roman army in Greece, but "only" the fleet of Atilius (v. s. footnote 404); towards the year 191 the senate decided to send Sicilian grain to the army in Greece and to buy corn from Carthage and Masinissa for the same purpose:⁴⁶⁶) the fleet is not even hinted at; towards 190 not only Sicilian, but also Sardinian grain was intended for the army in Aetolia⁴⁶⁷) (again no word is said about the fleet); only towards 189 the Sicilian and Sardinian grain was intended partly for Aetolia, partly for Asia Minor:⁴⁶⁸) by this time a Roman land army was operating there! To be sure, this does not mean that the fleet was left wholly without supplies (Liv. 37, 13, 11—12 and 37, 27, 1 sq. furnish proof of the contrary); but at any rate it proves that no regular, serious attention was paid to the interests of the navy. In the second Macedonian war the Romans had kept a squadron in the waters west of Greece for convoying and patrolling services, because the *land army* was wholly dependent on transmarine supplies in its struggle with

⁴⁶⁴) V. s. footnote 307 and p. 259 sq.; Liv. 37, 13, 11—12.

⁴⁶⁵) See *i. a.* Liv. 36, 43, 11; 37, 8, 6—7; 9, 1 sq. (= Pol. 21, 6); 12, 5—6; 13, 9; 19, 4 (= Pol. 21, 10, 9); 27, 3, 9; 28, 1—2; compare C. A. H. VIII, 218.

⁴⁶⁶) Liv. 36, 2, 12; 4.

⁴⁶⁷) 37, 2, 12.

⁴⁶⁸) 37, 50, 9—10.

Philip; ⁴⁶⁹) on the other hand the pirate Nabis had been left alone till 195 and thus the revictualling of the Roman fleet in the Aegean had been exposed to serious molestations. ⁴⁷⁰) But now Philip supported the Romans, so that the Roman land army in the Balkan Peninsula was not menaced with starvation; moreover, the victuals intended for it could now be transported directly from Brindisi to Apollonia without fear of intervention from the side of the pirates and from there, with Philip's aid, by land to Greece. So the waters west of Greece, which had been carefully policed in the second Macedonian war for the sake of the land forces, were now also neglected, because it wasn't deemed worth while to police them for the naval step-child alone. That nevertheless the news of Livius' victory off Cissus was received at Rome with great joy, ⁴⁷¹) is only natural: the Romans at home realized the importance of it, because just now schemes were being projected in the capital for sending a land army to Asia Minor in 190. Moreover, the Roman navy had fought no battle since the victories gained over the Carthaginians in 208 and 207; so Livius' conspicuous naval victory was welcomed with enthusiasm. Yet this enthousiasm is not incompatible with the Roman land-lubbers' mentality stigmatized just now: they were not willing to take great pains for the navy and regarded the sea as an unfamiliar, alien element, but for that very reason they were all the more proud of successes gained in that alien sphere. The naval triumphs dealt out lavishly and foolishly during this war are likewise to be regarded as a symptom of exaggerated land-lubbers' vanity with respect to maritime achievements, a symptom that had been present from the beginning of Roman naval history. The fact that the prow of a warship parades on the *aes grave*, the oldest Roman coins, is, however strange and paradoxical it may seem to be, a symptom of landlubberism, of a somewhat shoddy vanity displayed by land-lubbers à propos of naval successes obtained by them, and at any rate it does *not* prove that at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the third century b. C. Roman mentality should have been less land-lubberish, more turned towards the sea than afterwards; ⁴⁷²) our knowledge of the history of those years, however scanty it may be in many regards,

⁴⁶⁹) V. s. p. 211.

⁴⁷⁰) V. s. p. 251 sq.

⁴⁷¹) Pol. 21, 2, 1—2.

⁴⁷²) Thus Mattingly, *Roman coins* (London 1928), 49; compare the good remarks of Adcock 32 sq.

is nevertheless full enough to prove the contrary: the whole of southern Italy was conquered by Rome from within (by land) and, when in 264 the Romans wanted to cross to Sicily, they had practically no navy at all! The *columna rostrata* of Duilius likewise originates from the tendency typical of landlubbers to pride themselves excessively on a naval victory.

The year 190 centered wholly on the naval operations: it was they that 190 opened and paved the way for the land campaign of Magnesia in the winter of 190—189. For that very reason we will first of all discuss here in a few words the Roman plans for the war on land: this done we can concentrate all our attention upon naval warfare in the Asiatic waters. At the end of 191 the Roman government was firmly resolved to bring the war to a decision in Asia Minor, and as a matter of course the great Scipio was the right man for such a task. He had, however, been consul in 194 and therefore couldn't stand for the consulship now; so his brother L. Cornelius Scipio and his old, faithful assistant and friend C. Laelius were elected.⁴⁷³⁾ They left the task of dividing the consular provinces to the senate, who assigned Greece to the insignificant L. Scipio, after the great Scipio had declared that he would accompany his brother. The consul to whom Greece had been allotted was authorized to transfer the war to Asia, if he deemed it beneficial to the Roman state. Of the praetors L. Aemilius Regillus was appointed by lot to succeed C. Livius in the naval command; 20 old ships were sent with him.⁴⁷⁴⁾ In March 190 the consul as well as the praetor departed for the East.⁴⁷⁵⁾ The latter will naturally fall under discussion in connexion with the naval operations; the Scipios crossed during the same month from Brindisi to the Balkan Peninsula, transports having been requisitioned and gathered at Brindisi for this purpose.⁴⁷⁶⁾ We remarked before, that M'. Acilius

⁴⁷³⁾ Liv. 36, 45, 9.

⁴⁷⁴⁾ Liv. 37, 2, 1—10; v. s. p. 261 sq. and 278.

⁴⁷⁵⁾ Liv. 37, 4, 1—5.

⁴⁷⁶⁾ Liv. l. l.; two of the three legates who gathered the transports we have met before in Roman naval history: Sex. Digitius in 209 at New Carthage (p. 119) and L. Apustius as naval commander in the second Macedonian war. Afterwards the latter appears to serve in the navy during the operations against Patara (37, 16, 12), where he fell: after accomplishing his task at Brindisi he had apparently not accompanied the Scipios, but Regillus. This is quite natural, because he had maritime experience

Glabrio and the senate had not succeeded in arriving at an arrangement with the Aetolians on account of their exacting tactlessness; ⁴⁷⁷) so the war in Greece had to be continued in 190, for the present under command of Acilius, Antiochus laughing in his sleeve the while. Naturally such a state of affairs didn't tally with Scipio's plans: the real enemy was not Aetolia, but Antiochus and therefore he wanted to go on to Asia Minor as soon as he could. He succeeded in concluding an armistice with the Aetolians, so that the Roman army could now march to Asia. Apparently the possibility of reaching it by sea was not taken into consideration, ⁴⁷⁸) though it might have been possible. It is true that in 190 Polyxenidas gave very much trouble to the allied fleets in the Asiatic waters; but these difficulties resulted from the very fact that the army was expected by land and for this reason a squadron had to be kept apart for the Hellespont and that, on the other hand, Hannibal's way had to be barred. If the land route had been given up, the Roman and Rhodian squadrons would have been strong enough to blockade Polyxenidas, while Eumenes' fleet escorted Scipio's army from Greece to Asia instead of waiting for it in the Hellespont. No doubt, in this case it would have been necessary to requisition a very great number of transports; but such a measure lay not without the range of possibilities and it would have been worth while, because in this way the land army would have made its appearance in Asia at a much earlier date than was the case in reality, at any rate long before Hannibal could think of putting to sea. It is typical of the Roman state of mind, that apparently such a course was not even taken into consideration. So the Scipios marched from Greece northwards in May 190 with Acilius' army and the reinforcements brought by themselves from Italy: through Thessaly, Macedon and Thrace to the Hellespont. It was a long and very difficult march which they could never have achieved without Philip's very active assistance. ⁴⁷⁹) Not before November they would reach the Hellespont.

In the meantime Antiochus had not been idle; during the winter of 191—190 he had naturally carried on his preparations on land, but besides he had paid special attention to the reinforcement of his fleet. ⁴⁸⁰)

and such men were not numerous among Romans. For Digitius' career cf. Münzer 92 sq.

⁴⁷⁷) *V. s.* p. 292.

⁴⁷⁸) *V. s.* p. 258 and footnote 462.

⁴⁷⁹) *Liv.* 37, 7, 8—16; *App. Mac.* 9, 5, *Syr.* 23.

⁴⁸⁰) *Liv.* 37, 8.

He had lost the battle of Cissus without the Rhodian fleet taking part in it; and as it was practically certain that in 190 the Rhodians would be present in good time⁴⁸¹⁾ and, moreover, he had lost no less than 23 ships off Cissus, he realized that he must increase the number of his naval forces. So he sent Hannibal to Syria in order to fetch the Phoenician and Cilician ships, while Polyxenidas was ordered to repair the ships still available at Ephesus and to build new vessels in addition.⁴⁸²⁾ He himself passed the winter in Phrygia, where he devoted himself to the increasing of his land forces; his son Seleucus had been left behind with an army in Aeolis in order to keep in check the coast towns of that area, which Eumenes and the Romans tried to gain over to their side.⁴⁸³⁾ Undoubtedly the Syrian king spared neither trouble nor expense during this winter to bring his navy up to the mark again: in the early spring of 190 the fleet at Ephesus comprised 70 battle-ships again; on account of the experience gained in the battle of Cissus the 23 ships lost there had been replaced by new vessels of heavier types, so that the battle-fleet now consisted of 47 trieres, 18 tetreres and penteres, 3 hexeres and 2 hepteres.⁴⁸⁴⁾ On the other hand the squadron gathered by Hannibal in Phoenicia and Cilicia comprised 3 hepteres, 4 hexeres, 30 penteres and tetreres and 10 trieres.⁴⁸⁵⁾ So the sum total of Syrian battle-ships now amounted to 117, not to speak about the numerous small craft; a considerable force, but.... Antiochus' exertions came rather late, even too late.⁴⁸⁶⁾ When he entered into the conflict with Rome, he ought to have realized that the Romans would go through with the job to the bitter end and that, if he wished to have a chance of victory in this struggle, he must first of all outdo them on sea. Already from 197 he ought systematically to have built new vessels and at any rate he ought to have gathered his complete naval forces in the Aegean as early as 192. By doing so he might have spared himself the evacuation of the Hellespont and the defeat of Cissus in 191. But, when he crossed to Greece in 192, he did in reality not realize at all that he was going to provoke a war

⁴⁸¹⁾ Liv. 37, 8, 2; 9, 5.

⁴⁸²⁾ Liv. 37, 8, 3; 15, 8; App. *Syr.* 22, 108.

⁴⁸³⁾ Liv. 37, 8, 4—5.

⁴⁸⁴⁾ *V. s.* p. 275 and 308.

⁴⁸⁵⁾ Liv. 37, 23, 5; apparently here too the system had been changed in connexion with the Roman style of fighting, *v. s.* p. 275.

⁴⁸⁶⁾ De Sanctis IV, 1, 183.

to the death; moreover, Syria had no sound maritime traditions: ⁴⁸⁷) Antiochus was quite satisfied with the fleet of some 100 battle-ships he had at his disposal and did not think of projecting a huge building program nor of concentrating the ships he did possess. So the result was, that, when in 191 C. Livius crossed to Asia, only two thirds of Antiochus' fleet were lying at Ephesus, the rest in Syria, so that he immediately lost the supremacy in the waters of Asia Minor and the control of the Hellespont. And when at the eleventh hour in the winter of 191—190 he decided to build a great number of extra ships and to unite the Syrian home fleet with the fleet in the Aegean, the slowly working machinery of his military organization played him false in a serious way: the new ships ordered to be built in Cilicia and Phoenicia were terribly long in being launched and in putting to sea for their important expedition to the Aegean! The battle of Side was fought in *August* 190! This snail's pace was naturally not imputable to Hannibal, but to the clumsy military organization of the Syrian empire; the fact that Antiochus, after having crossed to Greece in the autumn of 192, had not yet received adequate reinforcements in April 191, ⁴⁸⁸) is a symptom of the same disease. Now it is certainly true that on the other hand the Roman government didn't die of naval enthusiasm either and for instance neglected in 190 to reinforce the fleet in the Asiatic waters with a considerable number of new vessels, though this was highly necessary; and this fact in connexion with the capture of a Rhodian squadron by Polyxenidas in the spring of 190 and with the necessity the Romans were under of setting apart a squadron for the Hellespont forced them to fight the battles of Side and Myonnesus both against odds. But.... the Roman navy had the priceless support of the Rhodians, who saved the situation in both cases by their superior seamanship; and at any rate the difficulties the Roman navy had to confront in the decisive year of the war prove all the more clearly, what a pity it was from a Syrian point of view that only in the winter of 191—190 Antiochus had begun to display his maritime energy. If only a few years before he had started building additional ships in a systematic way (and I should like to know, why this wasn't possible!), the Roman navy would probably have come off badly; though we must add that in such a case of emergency the Roman senate would certainly have

⁴⁸⁷) V. s. p. 276.

⁴⁸⁸) V. s. p. 287.

risen to the occasion, have built a powerful new fleet with the utmost energy and speed and have won the game after all, though perhaps several years later than was the case in reality.

In the spring of 190 C. Livius made his only mistake, but, alas, a very serious one. Instead of sailing first of all southwards from Canae and joining the Rhodian squadron, which this time had been sent out very early, he made for the Hellespont with 37 ships in order to prepare the crossing of the land army by conquering the coastal towns of that area. And he did so notwithstanding the fact that at that moment the Scipios had scarcely crossed from Brindisi to the Balkan Peninsula and would spend more than half a year still in reaching the Hellespont, and though he had been taught by the experience of the preceding year that the Rhodian squadron, even though it numbered now 36 sail, could not pass Polyxenidas' fleet (which was now up to the mark again) in the waters of Ephesus, without running a serious risk of being destroyed! So the evil results of this wrong policy were not long in coming: a great part of the Rhodian squadron got lost; and though the Rhodian admiral was certainly responsible for this disaster, Livius could and must have prevented it. In my opinion the whole year 190 is marked by the fact that the thoughts of Roman naval head-quarters centered far too much on the Hellespont. In this respect the Roman admirals were just as truly Roman and just as little real navy as the government at home and the Scipios: they were fascinated by the route of the land army, which crossed the Hellespont, and therefore paid too much attention to that area and too little to their own naval task. They failed to discern sufficiently the effectiveness of *the strategy working at a distance*, which often plays such an important part especially in naval warfare: they didn't realize sufficiently that it was their only task to crush Polyxenidas off Ephesus and Hannibal off Side and that, if they succeeded in doing so, the Hellespont would become clear automatically. With the fool Regillus this error gained large and dangerous dimensions: the Rhodians who naturally viewed the situation in the right light had to keep him back almost by main force from sailing to the Hellespont at the critical moment and neglecting his primary duty. But even C. Livius, though being an able admiral, was not free from it. So he now started on a quite useless campaign of conquest on the shores of the Hellespont, seven months before the Roman army would reach it by land, while in the meantime 20 precious Rhodian ships, which ere long would be bitterly needed, got

lost to the Roman navy and were added by Polyxenidas to the Syrian fleet. Naturally the sad result of this strange aberration was . . . that he was now forced in his turn to evacuate the Hellespont! But we must allow the events to speak for themselves.

In the early spring ⁴⁸⁹ of 190 (*aequinotio verno*, that is to say in the last days of March) Pausistratus sailed with 36 ships from Rhodes to the north in order to join the Romans. But meanwhile the Roman admiral who ought to have sailed to Samos to meet the Rhodian squadron, ⁴⁹⁰ had made for the Hellespont with 30 Roman ships and 7 Pergamene quadriremes (Eumenes accompanied him), in order to prepare the crossing of the Roman army, which he expected by land. ⁴⁹¹ In Troas Alexandria and Ilium already maintained relations with Rome; now Rhoeteum and Dardanus, and Elaeus in the Chersonese, joined the Romans without offering resistance. When Livius had reached the narrowest point of the Hellespont, where Abydus and Sestus lay opposite each other, he left 10 ships behind for the present to blockade Abydus and crossed to Europe in order to storm Sestus first; but the town surrendered without resistance. Abydus on the other hand, which was held by a royal garrison, proved unwilling to capitulate, so that Livius was forced to take measures for the storming of this town. ⁴⁹²

Meanwhile Pausistratus' fleet had been left to its own devices: Livius

⁴⁸⁹ For the following events Liv. 37, 9, 5 sq.; App. Syr. 23, 112—113; Pol. 21, 6, 7.

⁴⁹⁰ Indeed Pausistratus didn't pass beyond Samos (*v. i.*); Appian's assertion that Livius left behind Pausistratus (Appian calls him erroneously Pausimachus) and the Rhodian ships with the rest of his own fleet in Aeolis (that is to say at Canae, the Roman base), is flagrantly wrong, as the whole situation proves: in this case the Rhodian squadron wouldn't have been captured by Polyxenidas.

⁴⁹¹ He cannot have been *informed* of it (as Appian wrongly asserts) in March, at the moment when the Scipios were crossing from Brindisi and there was as yet no question of an armistice with Aetolia, but he can at best have surmised it: word of it did not reach the Roman fleet before May-June at Samos after the conclusion of the armistice (Pol. 21, 8). So it is evident that Livius neglected his primary task (of joining the Rhodian fleet) for the sake of an enterprise quite useless at that moment.

⁴⁹² Apparently Antiochus had only garrisons in Lysimachia and Abydus, though Appian (Syr. 21, 98) expressly mentions Sestus among the towns on the Hellespont, reinforced by Antiochus in the summer of 191 (*v. s.* p. 295). So he probably had withdrawn his troops from Sestus, when in 191 he evacuated the Hellespont on receiving the news that Livius' fleet was on the way to Asia.

himself was operating in the Hellespont with a squadron and the rest of his fleet was still lying at Canae.⁴⁹³) Pausistratus sailed northward as far as Samos (he couldn't pass beyond it by his own independent action without falling a certain prey to the much stronger Syrian fleet, which lay at Ephesus), to meet there with perdition.⁴⁹⁴) He stationed his ships — probably on the northern coast of Samos⁴⁹⁵) — in a harbour called Panhormus, enclosed by two capes and having only one narrow way out to the sea, not only because he wished to wait here for the Roman fleet, but also because he entertained hopes of venturing some attempt from here upon the Syrian fleet. Pausistratus was a good admiral, but he was not cautious enough⁴⁹⁶) and as a result of this foible he suffered himself in this case to be trapped by Polyxenidas. For the latter, a Rhodian exile, entered into negotiations with him, offering to hand over to him the Syrian fleet on the understanding that he should be allowed to return to his country; a letter written by the Syrian admiral himself convinced him firmly that he need not be afraid of a trap, and from that moment he neglected the necessary precautionary measures himself, sending even a number of ships to Halicarnassus in order to fetch victuals and others to the town of Samos. After having lulled asleep his adversary in this way, Polyxenidas suddenly launched a surprising attack: during the night he stationed his ships on either side of the narrow outlet of the harbour of Panhormus, at the same time ordering the pirate Nicander, who co-operated with him,⁴⁹⁷) to approach secretly the hostile base from the land side with armed men. Pausistratus, who was completely taken by surprise, decided first to defend himself on land: he placed armed men on the two capes enclosing the harbour, in order to harass the hostile ships from there with missiles. But when Nicander appeared

⁴⁹³) Liv. 37, 12, 4.

⁴⁹⁴) For the following events Liv. 37, 10—11; 45, 22, 12—13; App. Syr. 24.

⁴⁹⁵) For the situation of Panhormus see de Sanctis IV, 1, 184, 116.

⁴⁹⁶) Pol. 21, 7, 5 sq., see v. Gelder 135.

⁴⁹⁷) That not only the pirates of Cephallenia, but also privateers and pirates in the service of Antiochus tried to molest the Roman convoys with victuals, goes without saying. Besides Nicander privateers are mentioned, who operated from Abydus (Liv. 37, 14, 3), and pirates in connexion with the battle of Myonnesus (Liv. 37, 27; Pol. 21, 12; Ziebarth 29 connects the latter with Nicander). Patara may also have been one of their haunts. Finally it is probable that also Crete profited by the fact that the Rhodian fleet was wholly occupied by the war to resume piracy endemic there, see Liv. 37, 60. I'll come back to it afterwards.

in his rear on the land side, he shifted his ground and decided to embark and to make an attempt at forcing his way out of the harbour. It stands to reason that such a desperate venture must result in a catastrophe: Polyxenidas had flanked the narrow exit on both sides with his ships and his numerical superiority was overwhelming (he had embarked upon this expedition with the entire battle-fleet of 70 sail, Liv. 37, 11, 5 and *v. s. p.* 314 sq.). Pausistratus' flagship, which headed the attempt at breaking through, was immediately surrounded and destroyed by 3 quinqueremes; the admiral himself was killed. The bulk of the other ships were captured, partly outside the harbour, partly within, and some were even seized by Nicander before they had shoved off from shore. Only 5 Rhodian and 2 Coan⁴⁹⁸) vessels succeeded in escaping, because they were equipped with fire-baskets.⁴⁹⁹) This new weapon was apparently an invention of Pausistratus, which was put into practice for the first time on this occasion; for, alas, only a small number of ships were equipped with it. Afterwards, in the battle of Myonnesus, this "fire-arm" would be employed on a larger scale by the Rhodians and would contribute considerably to the victory.⁵⁰⁰) According to the description of them, given by Polybius,⁵⁰¹) the fire-baskets were suspended from two poles projecting from the bows; probably some mechanism was connected with them, by means of which the basket could be opened at the moment of collision with a hostile ship, so that the blazing contents fell on her deck and set her on fire.⁵⁰²) But the fear of the fire-baskets played a more important part in the battle than the effect of the fire itself; Livy (37, 30, 3 sq.) has handed down to us that during the battle of Myonnesus the Syrian ships flinched from the fire-baskets in order to shield their prows from the destroying fire and thus exposed their sides to the Rhodian ram.⁵⁰³) Perhaps Tarn is right in supposing this to have been

⁴⁹⁸) For the ships from Cos *v. s. p.* 271 and c. Gelder 136, 1.

⁴⁹⁹) For these fire-baskets Tarn, *Developments*, 147 and Graefe, *Hermes* 57, 433 sq.

⁵⁰⁰) *V. i.* my discussion of the battle of Myonnesus.

⁵⁰¹) Pol. 21, 7, 1—4; App. Syr. 24, 114; Liv. 37, 11, 13.

⁵⁰²) Graefe 434.

⁵⁰³) As far as we know, the fire-baskets were only put into practice in the battles of Panhormus and Myonnesus; in the battle of Side which took place in between, they were apparently not employed and after Myonnesus we do not hear of them again, which is only natural, because in the second century scarcely any naval battle was fought since 190. But a late Ptolemaic graffito which represents a ship with a fire-basket proves perhaps that Pausistratus' invention was copied elsewhere, Tarn *l. l.*, Graefe 436.

the principal purpose of the device. So the 7 ships at Panhormus which were equipped with fire-baskets succeeded in escaping safely from the harbour, because the hostile ships in spite of their superiority kept at a respectful distance from the terrible blaze; the others fell into Polyxenidas' hands. Appian (24, 120) fixes the number of captured ships at 20; Livy does not mention the number of Rhodian losses. We may trust this communication of Appian, because both he and Livy (= Pol.) expressly inform us that several Rhodian ships were absent during the catastrophe.⁵⁰⁴) The 20 captured ships apparently were added to the Syrian fleet, as Polyxenidas had 70 sail at Panhormus, 89 or 90 in the battle of Myonnesus.⁵⁰⁵) The Rhodian ships which escaped (the vessels that succeeded in breaking through thanks to the fire-baskets as well as those absent from Panhormus during the disaster) must have sailed back to Rhodes: immediately afterwards the Romans were furnished with 23 ships *from Rhodes* and this number must have included the vessels saved from the calamity, because at the moment of the catastrophe the Rhodians did certainly not possess more than 43 ships.⁵⁰⁶) Some Erythraean triremes, sent to support the Rhodian fleet (apparently this was all that had been done from the side of the allied fleet to assist the Rhodian squadron!), arrived just in time to be informed of the disaster by the fleeing ships; so they turned back and sailed to the Hellespont, where they brought the bad news to C. Livius.⁵⁰⁷) To make matters worse, this misfortune did not come single: at about the same time Phocaea was taken back by Seleucus.⁵⁰⁸) In the autumn of 191 the town had received the Romans; but the populace continued to lean towards Antiochus and for this reason Livius had garrisoned the town with 4 quinqueremes towards the winter.⁵⁰⁹) The requisitions made for the sustenance of this garrison weighed heavily upon the population and matters were made worse by lack of grain, which still during the winter compelled the 4 galleys to join the rest of the fleet at Canae.⁵¹⁰) Thus Phocaea having

⁵⁰⁴) Thus rightly Nissen 190, v. Gelder 136, 2; wrongly Kromayer II, 159, 2. V. s. footnote 330.

⁵⁰⁵) V. s. p. 275.

⁵⁰⁶) V. s. p. 270.

⁵⁰⁷) Liv. 37, 11, 14.

⁵⁰⁸) V. s. p. 315.

⁵⁰⁹) Liv. 36, 45, 8.

⁵¹⁰) Liv. 37, 9, 1-4.

been left to herself, the pro-Syrian popular party got the upperhand and early in the spring Seleucus succeeded in winning back the town. Cyme and other cities of the same coastal area followed the lead of Phocaea.⁵¹¹⁾

Though the disaster of the Rhodian fleet was due to the heedlessness of the admiral Pausistratus, C. Livius was as well responsible for it (*v. s.*). The importance of the distance-strategy was now brought home to him in a particularly harsh and painful way: he ought to have gained the Hellespont by joining the Rhodians and defeating Polyxenidas in the waters of Ephesus with their aid and *not* by embarking upon a quite superfluous expedition to the Hellespont itself; now his blunder was immediately followed by its natural punishment: the calamity of the Rhodian fleet forced him... to evacuate at once the Hellespont he had tried to conquer in such an untimely way, just as in the summer of 191 Antiochus had been forced to withdraw from there on receiving the news of Livius' approach. So he gave up his action against Abydus,⁵¹²⁾ which had already entered into negotiations and was on the point of surrendering, and cleared the Hellespont, because he feared that during his absence Polyxenidas, encouraged by his success, should venture an attack upon the 50 Roman ships he had left at Canae and which indeed would have been no match for the Syrian fleet. So he returned to Canae in a hurry and ordered the ships stationed there to put to sea and join his squadron; Eumenes, who had accompanied him with some vessels to the Hellespont, made for his base Elaea in order to fetch his own fleet. In the meantime Livius sailed to Phocaea with the entire Roman fleet and 2 triremes from Mytilene that had joined him;⁵¹³⁾ but he came too late: the town was held by a strong Syrian garrison and Seleucus had his quarters in the neighbourhood; so the only thing he could do was to plunder the surroundings of the town. Eumenes having joined him here with his fleet,⁵¹⁴⁾ he now directed his course to Samos; that is to say

⁵¹¹⁾ *V. s.* footnote 462; Liv. 37, 11, 15; Pol. 21, 6; App. Syr. 25, 121, who mentions Samos among the cities fallen away from Rome; a heavy blunder: the island was one of the principal bases of the allied fleet during the whole year!

⁵¹²⁾ *V. s.* p. 318.

⁵¹³⁾ *V. s.* p. 271; we do not know, at what moment Mytilene had joined the Romans; but that in the main the islands (Lesbos as well as Samos and Chios) joined Rome, if not from the very beginning, at least at an early date, goes without saying.

⁵¹⁴⁾ How many ships were furnished by Eumenes in 190, has not been handed down; but his contingent will have been of about the same strength as in the preceding year, *v. s.* p. 270.

that he now realized at last, where his task lay: *not in meddling prematurely with the Hellespont, but in the action against the hostile fleet at Ephesus, after joining the Rhodians.*⁵¹⁵⁾ So Samos became the principal base of the allied fleet for the rest of the year; for it was not only the natural rallying point for the allied squadrons, but its situation was also highly suitable for cutting off Hannibal from Polyxenidas, in case the former should return from Syria with a second fleet.

The Rhodians had very quickly recovered from the panic and mourning, naturally brought upon them by the loss of almost half of their navy, crews and all; as Polybius rightly remarks,⁵¹⁶⁾ it stands to reason that the consciousness of owing this calamity to the artful fraud of a banished fellow-citizen roused their vindictiveness and stirred them into activity. Very soon they sent again 20 ships to the north under command of the new admiral Eudamus, who was not regarded as the equal of Pausistratus, but who was expected to act more cautiously than his predecessor; next to him Pamphilidas was to take part in the operations of this year as vice-admiral.⁵¹⁷⁾ Neither of the two would disappoint the trust put in them.

Meanwhile the Roman and Pergamene squadrons had reached Corycus, after an intermediate landing on Erythraean territory.⁵¹⁸⁾ Polyxenidas realized that the allied fleet would try to reach Samos in order to join the Rhodian squadron there. So it was perfectly natural that he tried to prevent this or at least to damage the hostile fleet as much as possible before it could join the Rhodians; for this purpose he stationed his entire fleet, which at that moment may have already comprised some 90 battle-ships (his effective in the battle of Myonnesus),⁵¹⁹⁾ at the Isle of Macris, off Cape Myonnesus.⁵²⁰⁾ Apparently it was not his intention at that moment to risk a pitched battle — already before joining the Rhodian

⁵¹⁵⁾ Liv. 37, 12, 1—6; App. Syr. 25, 121.

⁵¹⁶⁾ Liv. 37, 12, 7—8.

⁵¹⁷⁾ Liv. 37, 12, 9; App. Syr. 25, 121; for Eudamus, besides Liv. *l. l.*, Pol. 21, 7, 5—7. That Suidas in extracting this passage of Polybius must have replaced erroneously the name of the admiral Eudamus by that of his second-in-command Pamphilidas, is proved by a comparison with Liv. 37, 12, 9, a passage which has been translated from Pol. 21, 7, see also Pol. 21, 10, 5. Thus rightly v. Gelder 136, 3.

⁵¹⁸⁾ For the following events Liv. 37, 12, 10—13, 7.

⁵¹⁹⁾ The Rhodian ships captured at Panhormus without much fighting could be ready for battle again by this time.

⁵²⁰⁾ Just as before the battle of Myonnesus, Liv. 37, 28, 5.

squadron the allied fleet was probably stronger than his own (*v. i.*) and for this reason he will have intended to put off the decisive battle till the arrival of Hannibal's squadron —, but to pick up stragglers or to launch a surprising attack on the rear of the column itself at the moment when the hostile fleet should pass him while crossing from Corycus to the northern coast of Samos.⁵²¹) Before daybreak,⁵²²) that is to say before the weather had declared itself, the allied fleet had put to sea from Corycus in order to cross to the northern coast of Samos; after getting outside, it was overtaken by a northerly storm. Seeing that the hostile ships were dispersed by the strong wind, Polyxenidas at first believed that a fair chance of attacking the enemy was offered to him; but, when the increasing strength of the wind prevented him from reaching his adversaries without exposing his own fleet to serious storm-risk,⁵²³) he crossed the Bay of Ephesus (which was comparatively sheltered from the northerly wind) to the island Aethalia: he intended to wait there for the hostile ships and to fall upon them next day, if, battered and exhausted by the storm, they should try to reach the town of Samos.⁵²⁴) Part of the Roman fleet succeeded in reaching towards nightfall a deserted harbour on the northern coast of Samos;⁵²⁵) the rest followed towards daybreak, sorely battered after passing a rude night at sea, but apparently without losses. As they learned from country-people that the hostile fleet was lying on the look-out for them at Aethalia, they took counsel, whether they should accept a decisive battle at once or put it off till

⁵²¹) Liv. 37, 13, 1.

⁵²²) Hence we may perhaps conclude that Livius was acquainted with the presence of Polyxenidas' fleet at Myonnesus and that he tried to elude him.

⁵²³) The allied fleet sailed to Samos *before* the northerly wind; but Polyxenidas, sailing against the Romans from Macris, would have been attacked by the storm in his flank.

⁵²⁴) The position of Aethalia is obscure, but the situation proves that it must have commanded the straits of Mycale and the access to the town of Samos; so it was either one of the islets off the north-eastern coast of Samos or one of the two islets in the straits of Mycale themselves east of the town of Samos. Probably Polyxenidas would now have been willing to fight a decisive battle, on account of the exhausted condition of his adversaries; for the same reason the latter wanted to avoid it at this juncture.

⁵²⁵) That by Samia (terra) the island Samos is meant (Liv. 37, 13, 4), follows from the whole narrative (37, 12, 6; 12, 11; 13, 1; 13, 3); and that the port must be sought on the northern coast of the island, is evident.

they had joined the Rhodian squadron. They decided not to risk a battle now and returned to their starting point Corycus; Polyxenidas also withdrew to Ephesus, after lying in vain on the look-out at Aethalia. The way now being barred no longer, the Roman fleet crossed for the second time and succeeded in reaching the town of Samos, where the Rhodian fleet also arrived after some days.

The strange "to and fro" of the allied fleet (it sailed twice from Corycus to Samos!) might induce us to suppose that Livy was fast asleep when he translated this passage of Polybius and therefore spoilt it; but on second thoughts the narrative seems to be quite congruous. C. Livius had more ships than Polyxenidas (at least 100 battle-ships⁵²⁶) against 90); that in spite of this superiority he had tried already at Corycus to elude the hostile fleet (footnote 522), is quite natural, because he wished to join the Rhodian squadron before he risked a decisive battle.⁵²⁷) A fortiori he must stick to this line of conduct, when after the storm he had reached the northern coast of Samos: at that moment his ships were battered and his men quite exhausted and sea-sick. But why did he return to Corycus? Couldn't he remain where he was? He could not; for in the first place Polyxenidas would have remained in this case at Aethalia and have barred his way to the town of Samos, where he was to join the Rhodian fleet; and secondly he was lying in a deserted harbour, where lack of victuals would soon have involved him in difficulties (the crews of his strong fleet numbered 30,000 men at the least). But why didn't he try to reach the town of Samos by rounding the western side of the island? The answer to this question must probably⁵²⁸) be sought in the circumstance that the Icarian waters were notorious for their gales: Livius had just weathered one storm between Corycus and Samos without fatal consequences; it is only natural that he felt little inclined to brave a second. So he had no choice but to return to the starting point Corycus, in order to restore there his battered ships and

⁵²⁶) 80 Roman + at least 20 Pergamene ships, not to speak about the vessels from Mytilene; that Livius had left no ships at Canae, follows from Liv. 37, 12, 5; the fact that after his departure for Samos privateers from Abydus preyed upon Roman transports in the waters of Chios (37, 14, 3), seems also to prove that he had not left a squadron in the northern waters.

⁵²⁷) Let us not forget that the terrible defeat of the Rhodians will have weakened the morale of Livius' crews: he must now be especially cautious.

⁵²⁸) Livy does not touch upon it at all.

his exhausted crews and to wait for the moment Polyxenidas should withdraw from Aethalia to Ephesus. Polyxenidas did withdraw ⁵²⁹) and so the way was now open and the allied fleet could at last reach the town of Samos and unite with the Rhodians. In a word, I believe that Livy's (= Polybius') account may be accepted on the understanding that in reading 13, 3 and 6 we think of the *town* of Samos and that we do our level best to read between the lines and to picture the situation to ourselves as vividly as possible.

Now the allied fleet need not fear the enemy any longer and so it made immediately for Ephesus in order to fight a decisive battle or, in case the enemy should not accept battle, to wrest from him the acknowledgement of Roman naval supremacy. It stands to reason that Polyxenidas could now no longer think of risking a battle against overwhelmingly superior numbers (more than 120 battle-ships against 90) and consequently remained within the harbour, just as in 191 after the battle of Cissus. So the Romans could do no more than make a naval demonstration in front of the harbour and ravage the surroundings of the town with little advantage. Thereupon the united squadrons returned to Samos in order to watch and keep at bay from here the Syrian fleet at Ephesus (May 190). ⁵³⁰)

From Samos C. Livius ⁵³¹) sent 2 triremes of Italian allies and 2 Rhodian triremes under command of the Rhodian Epicrates ⁵³²) to the waters of Cephallenia in order to suppress the piracy which since the spring of 191 seriously molested there the transports with victuals intended for the Roman navy; according to Livy (= Polybius) at that moment matters had even come to such a pass that *clausum iam mare commeatibus Italicis erat!* But.... those ships never reached their destination: by order of the senate L. Aemilius Regillus, C. Livius' successor, had left for the same purpose 18 out of his 20 ships in the waters of western Greece, when he passed there on his voyage to the East. When subsequently he crossed the path of Epicrates and his flotilla at the Piraeus, he decided

⁵²⁹) Why didn't he remain at Aethalia? The answer is probably that, when he perceived that the allied fleet returned to Corycus, he realized that it would not appear for the second time before ships and crews had perfectly recovered the evil consequences of the storm. So he could now no longer risk a decisive battle against odds.

⁵³⁰) Liv. 37, 13, 7—11; App. Syr. 25, 122—123.

⁵³¹) Liv. 37, 13, 11—14, 4; App. Syr. 25, 123. V. s. p. 261 sq. and 311.

⁵³²) See van Gelder 137, Dtb.³ 582.

to take the 4 ships back to Asia, because he himself had only 2 quinqueremes left and because after the serious defeat of the Rhodians it was certainly not advisable to weaken needlessly the allied naval forces in the Aegean; some open Athenian ships also accompanied him.⁵³³) From the Piraeus he crossed to Chios, a route not explained by Livy, but which seems very strange, because Aemilius must have been informed by Epicrates of the fact that the allied fleet had now fixed its headquarters at Samos: why for heaven's sake must he sail first north-east to Chios and from there southward to Samos? Was it again the fear of the Icarian waters⁵³⁴) that determined this line of conduct? Or was it the evil of piracy that drove Regillus to open his year of command with a tour of inspection to Chios, because this island was the centre of revictualling for the Roman navy, whither the transports with victuals from Italy used to direct their course?⁵³⁵) Or was this long detour nothing more than an unaccountable caprice of the fool Regillus? We cannot answer these questions: we simply do not know it. But at any rate Chios was his first destination. Here the Rhodian captain Timasicrates paid his respects to him; he had come at dead of night from Samos with 2 quadriremes in order to police the waters of Chios, because since the departure of the entire allied fleet from the northern waters privateers from Abydus used to sail as far as Chios in order to prey upon Roman merchantmen.⁵³⁶) That Timasicrates should have been sent to Chios in order to protect Regillus (who had more than 6 warships of his own!) against the lembi of the Abydene privateers or to escort him on his way to Samos, is a mere invention of v. Gelder (137) and Rodgers (407): it is pure nonsense and we are not told so by Livy. As a matter of course Timasicrates remained in the waters of Chios in order to protect there

⁵³³) For the co-operation of open Athenian ships with Rhodes and Rome during the second Macedonian war *v.s.* p. 224 and 228.

⁵³⁴) *V.s.* p. 325.

⁵³⁵) Liv. 37, 27, 1 and *v.s.* p. 310 sq.

⁵³⁶) So C. Livius had not only taken measures against piracy in the Cephallenian waters, but also against privateering in the Aegean itself (see footnote 497). From the couple of ships he regarded as sufficient in this case we may safely conclude that we must not form a too terrible idea of those acts of privateering; the same follows from the fact that on the Hellespont Antiochus possessed only Abydus (besides Lysimachia, which, however, was not situated on the coast) and that he had no warships in that area (his fleet was concentrated at Ephesus). So the privateers must have been lembi, which could be checked by a few galleys.

the merchantmen against the privateers from the Hellespont.⁵³⁷) Regillus had warships enough of his own to cross from Chios to Samos without Timasistrates' aid and, moreover, he had a good pilot in Epicrates; during his crossing to Samos he was joined by two Rhodian quadriremes sent by C. Livius to meet and accompany him for honour's sake and naturally also by the ideal client king Eumenes with 2 quinqueremes. After his arrival at Samos Regillus took over the naval command from C. Livius; but the latter did not immediately return to Italy: he remained for some time on service as *praefectus* of Regillus.⁵³⁸) The number of Roman ships in the Aegean was scarcely changed by the arrival of the new commander: in 191 Livius had brought 75 Roman and 6 Punic battle-ships to Asia (together 81); out of this number one Punic ship had been lost in the battle of Cissus (80); now the 2 quinqueremes of Regillus raised the sum total to 82; but as C. Livius must have taken at least one battle-ship to Italy, when shortly afterwards he returned home (Liv. 37, 16, 14), the original effective of 81 was reached again.

The position of the allied fleet was rather dispiriting. After the rose-coloured prospects the year 191 had closed with (the Hellespont, evacuated by Antiochus, seemed to be within the Roman grasp and naval supremacy seemed to have passed definitively into Roman hands in consequence of the battle of Cissus), the first months of 190 had brought with them a very sore disappointment. Not only had Polyxenidas brought his fleet up to the mark again during the winter, but, moreover, Livius' premature expedition to the Hellespont had caused the loss of 20 good Rhodian ships and of a number of coast towns and, to make matters worse, the defeat of the Rhodian fleet had forced him to clear the Hellespont again. No doubt, the Romans now commanded the sea again in so far as with their total effective of some 125 battle-ships they doomed the 90 of Polyxenidas to idleness at Ephesus, but... they got no opportunity of beating him, and Hannibal's shadow lay gloomily upon the allied prospects. If they remained where they were (at Samos), Hannibal's squadron was sure to turn up sooner or later (after the catastrophe of Panhormus the Rhodians had sent almost all their remaining ships to Livius and were

⁵³⁷) That Timasistrates paid his respects to the Roman admiral after arriving at Chios, goes without saying and proves by no means that his mission had any relation to Regillus' presence at Chios.

⁵³⁸) See Tarn, *Companion*, 760.

not able to bar his way in the southern waters) and, in case Polyxenidas and Hannibal should both manoeuvre adroitly, the allied fleet would run the serious risk of getting between two fires itself and of being outnumbered by the two Syrian squadrons operating coordinately. And if, on the other hand, the Romans decided to divide their battle-fleet, their separate squadrons were sure to be outnumbered by Polyxenidas and Hannibal respectively, because the allied powers had not only to fulfil the task of blockading Polyxenidas and cutting off Hannibal, but had also to reserve a modest number of ships for the purpose of ferrying the land army across the Hellespont, in case a decision at sea should not have been obtained before. In a word, they were in a rather constrained position, caused on the one hand by the shameful carelessness of the senate, who had neglected to build in good time a reasonable number of new battle-ships for the Asiatic waters, on the other hand by the loss of 20 Rhodian ships at Panhormus, a loss which made itself doubly felt, because in this case Polyxenidas' fleet was reinforced with ships deducted from the allied naval forces. No wonder that the allies at Samos were not in high spirits at the moment of Regillus' arrival⁵³⁹) and that the new admiral immediately called a council in order to examine the situation thoroughly.⁵⁴⁰)

The plan, brought on the carpet in this council of war by the shrewd C. Livius, arose in a natural way from the ticklish situation itself. The allies were in a serious predicament, because they had no ships enough to keep in check two adversaries at the same time (Polyxenidas and Hannibal) and to keep apart a small squadron for the Hellespont too;⁵⁴¹) now then, they must try to obtain elbow-room and freedom of movement by eliminating one of the adversaries. So Livius recommended that transports laden with ballast should be sunk in the narrow outlet of the harbour of Ephesus and that thus Polyxenidas should be prevented once for all from putting to sea. Alas, we are not told, what Livius' *plan de campagne* for the allied fleet was after blocking the harbour of Ephesus in such a way; but we may be pretty sure that he reasoned in

⁵³⁹) Thus rightly Holleaux, C. A. H. VIII, 220.

⁵⁴⁰) For the following events Liv. 37, 14, 4—15, 9.

⁵⁴¹) At about this time the naval head-quarters must have been informed by the Scipios that they had concluded an armistice with Aetolia and that the army had started on its march in the direction of the Hellespont, Pol. 21, 8.

some such way as this. Either, assuming Livius' barricading measure to be final, in other words assuming, that Polyxenidas would never be able to clear the harbour-entrance, the allies might now divide their naval forces, that is to say send a strong squadron southward in order to intercept and destroy Hannibal's fleet and another northwards to the Hellespont. Or, if they reckoned with the possibility of Polyxenidas clearing the mouth of the harbour during their absence, they might limit themselves to the sending of a small squadron to the Hellespont and remain before Ephesus with the bulk of the fleet in order to prevent Polyxenidas from clearing the channel. No doubt, in this case they would not be able to bar Hannibal's way; but... they could now safely wait for him in the waters of Ephesus and beat him there by means of their overwhelmingly superior numbers, as Polyxenidas, watched by the allies up to the moment of the battle, would not get the opportunity of clearing his channel in time to come to the aid of his partner. So Livius' plan was by no means inconsiderate or incongruous; but it met with strong and successful resistance from the side of Eumenes and the Rhodians. The former pointed out that if after blocking the harbour of Ephesus the allied fleet sailed away, the enemy would certainly soon succeed in clearing the exit again; and if the bulk of the fleet remained on the spot in order to prevent Polyxenidas from doing so, it would have to do without a safe harbour and the highly vulnerable men of war would be exposed night and day to the whims of wind and weather.⁵⁴²) So the council of war rejected Livius' proposal and accepted the project of the Rhodian Epicrates, which, though undoubtedly inspired by Rhodian self-interest, was nevertheless very sound at the same time: he proposed to send part of the fleet to Lycia and to conquer the Lycian town Patara. Antiochus had occupied this town, when he made his first appearance in the Aegean,⁵⁴³) and it was now a very annoying thorn in the side of Rhodes: not only the Rhodian possessions on the mainland were

⁵⁴²) C. Livius' barricading plan stands practically alone in ancient naval history, at least as an *offensive* arm (Pol. 1, 47 is not strictly parallel); we must give him the honour of considering the possibility of a military device which at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century would be put into practice in a serious way by the American and Japanese navies, though — it must be expressly stated in honour of Eumenes and the Rhodians — with very slight success, see de Sanctis IV, 1, 185 and Graefe, *Hermes* 57, 441 sq.

⁵⁴³) V.s. p. 255 sq. and de Sanctis 122.

menaced from Patara, but the town will also have been a starting point for acts of piracy and privateering which Rhodes could scarcely oppose with success, because after the catastrophe of Panhormus she had sent almost all the still available men of war to C. Livius. If therefore the allies succeeded in mastering this important base, the Rhodians would be able to concentrate all their strength and attention upon naval warfare and, moreover, an excellent basis in the southern waters would be at the disposal of the allied powers for the purpose of barring Hannibal's way and preventing him from joining Polyxenidas. In a word, Epicrates' proposal was reasonable enough; but... the allies accepted it without facing its unavoidable consequences and for that very reason they failed. For, if Patara was conquered, a strong squadron had to be stationed there — it was the chief object of the whole enterprise —, which would really be able to confront Hannibal; and as Polyxenidas and the northern waters couldn't simply be left to themselves, Epicrates' project implied *that the allied naval forces had to be divided definitively, with the probable result that they would be outnumbered by Hannibal and Polyxenidas both*. It was this consequence the allies did not venture to face, though it was unavoidable. Of course shortly afterwards they were simply forced to divide their naval forces, because Hannibal *was* on the way; but for the present they followed a kind of ostrich policy and stuck more or less to the indivisibility of the navy. Instead of immediately accepting the unavoidable consequences of the plan they had adopted and sending at once a strong squadron to Patara, they dispatched C. Livius with a ridiculously small number of ships, so that the expedition proved a failure, Regillus with the bulk of the fleet demonstrating in the meantime — naturally in vain — before Ephesus. And thereupon the incapable Roman admiral suddenly ran from one extreme into another: this time he sailed with his entire fleet to Patara, but... on the way it occurred to him that he couldn't leave the northern waters to Polyxenidas without a blow and so he turned on his heels half-way, so that Patara remained in Antiochus' hands! In a word, the Roman strategy of this period displayed — to say the least of it — a rather wild, haphazard, unprincipled character, but for the fact that it stuck obstinately to the principle of indivisibility and therefore shrank from dividing the naval forces. Indeed its fundamental error lay in the very fact that the inevitability of dividing the navy was not yet faced and the indivisibility blindly stuck to; so

the expedition against Patara came to nought.⁵⁴⁴) It must now be related here in a few words.

C. Livius⁵⁴⁵) was sent to Lycia with 2 Roman quinqueremes, 4 Rhodian quadriremes and 2 open vessels from Smyrna, with the order to touch at Rhodes on his way southward and take counsel there. The cities he passed (Miletus, Myndus, Halicarnassus, Cnidus, Cos) fulfilled his orders with zeal; ⁵⁴⁶) at Rhodes the plan for an expedition against Patara was received with enthusiasm and 3 quadriremes were given to Livius,⁵⁴⁷) so that his effective now amounted to 11 sail. But even now it was naturally too slight. At first Livius had hoped to approach the town at unawares before a favourable wind and to take it by surprise. But the wind veered; and though the Romans managed with great pains to approach the town by rowing in the teeth of the wind, they were forced to withdraw and seek shelter, because the possibility of staying before the mouth of the hostile harbour by night and a rough sea could not even be considered.⁵⁴⁸) So they made for the port of Phoenicus, situated in the immediate neighbourhood of Patara; here the ships found a safe anchorage in calm water, but it was commanded by high cliffs, which were soon occupied by royal garrison- and citizen-troops from Patara. So a land fight ensued, in which not only the soldiers, but also the rowers, who had been armed in a hurry, were successively involved.⁵⁴⁹) No doubt, the Lycians were put to flight at last; but the Romans had suffered bloody losses: among others L. Apustius had been killed in the battle.⁵⁵⁰)

⁵⁴⁴) Perhaps the splitting up of the naval forces was put off by head-quarters until the new Rhodian ships, which had been laid down after the defeat of Panhormus, should have been launched (*v. s.* p. 270). This is very reasonable and probable indeed; but then why not adopt for the present at least C. Livius' scheme, instead of making an abortive attempt at conquering Patara with a few ships? You cannot eat your pie and have it.

⁵⁴⁵) Liv. 37, 16.

⁵⁴⁶) Whether they furnished Livius with *ships* on this occasion, we are not told, *v. s.* p. 271.

⁵⁴⁷) So the Rhodians had furnished a total amount of 23 ships since Panhormus, which was probably all they possessed after the loss of 20 sail, *v. s.* footnote 331.

⁵⁴⁸) The helplessness of the ancient man of war by rough weather is clearly demonstrated here.

⁵⁴⁹) For the Issaeian auxiliaries who suddenly appear on the scene on this occasion, *v. s.* footnote 336.

⁵⁵⁰) *V. s.* footnote 476.

So Livius gave up the enterprise against Patara: the Rhodian ships were sent home; ⁵⁵¹) Livius himself, who had commanded the expedition as *praefectus* of his successor Regillus ⁵⁵²) and was certainly not responsible for its failure, sailed back to Italy via Greece, where he gave an account of the state of affairs to the Scipios, who by this time had reached Thessaly on their way to the Hellespont. Considering the inability of his successor, he will have looked forward with serious misgivings to the results of the naval operations ⁵⁵³) (last days of May or first days of June 190).

After Regillus, whose demonstration before Ephesus had naturally been unsuccessful, ⁵⁵⁴) had been informed at Samos, that the expedition against Patara had failed and that C. Livius had departed for Italy, ⁵⁵⁵) his indignation at this shameful result (for which, however, he was largely responsible himself) caused him to run from one extreme into another, which was at least as bad: ⁵⁵⁶) the naval forces he had first sent against Patara had been so weak that the attempt *must* fail; now on the contrary he decided to sail there with the entire allied fleet and

⁵⁵¹) Of the 20 Rhodian ships sent to reinforce the Roman fleet after Panhormus still 16 remained at Samos with the main body of the allied naval forces, while 7 now returned to Rhodes; this will have been necessary, because the Rhodians had scarcely a warship left at home, see footnote 547.

⁵⁵²) V. s. footnote 538.

⁵⁵³) It is strange that on his home voyage Livius did not touch at Samos in order to give a personal account of his expedition to head-quarters; the fact that he neglected to do so is the more striking, because Samos lay on his route from Lycia to Thessaly! May we infer from it that he was not on good terms with Regillus? It seems far from impossible: when he was ordered to conquer Patara, he had probably warned the admiral against giving him such a ridiculously small number of ships for this purpose; and after the failure anticipated by him, he will have declined to catch a rebuke into the bargain from the side of the fool, who had replaced him in an evil hour. Whether C. Livius was allowed to triumph after his return, we do not know; de Sanctis (185, 120) presumes it on account of his further distinguished career and I hope sincerely he is right in doing so. For one thing is evident: of the Roman admirals in the Syrian war Livius is the only one who deserved a triumph, a hundred times more than Regillus and Labeo together, whose *triumphi navales* are, alas, not at all subject to doubt.

⁵⁵⁴) Liv. 37, 15, 9; 17, 1.

⁵⁵⁵) If we suppose Livius to have sailed home with one quinquereme, we may presume that the second Roman quinquereme and the two open ships from Smyrna returned to Regillus; the Rhodian ships had gone home (v. s.).

⁵⁵⁶) For the following events Liv. 37, 17.

attack the town with might and main. He forgot, however, that in this way he would give Polyxenidas a free hand in the northern waters. The instinctive tendency to prevent above all things the allied naval forces from being split up, links together those two lines of conduct with respect to Patara, which at first sight seem to be diametrically different. On his way southwards he interrupted the expedition in order to make an attempt at mastering Iasus. The town was held by a garrison of Antiochus, so that the citizens got no chance of capitulating and Regillus decided to storm her; but the Rhodians, who of old had entertained friendly relations with Iasus and wanted to save the town, interceded on her behalf and succeeded in persuading Regillus to give up the attempt. So the fleet sailed on in the direction of Patara, but.... it did not pass beyond Loryma, a harbour on the mainland opposite Rhodes. Here resistance arose among Regillus' subordinates against sailing still farther southward and continuing the expedition against Patara: the tribunes who served in the navy⁵⁵⁷) complained of the fact that the fleet was sailing far away from the principal theater of action near Ephesus and that in the meantime Polyxenidas was given a free hand to embark upon whatever undertakings he liked against the towns of the allies. These murmurs reached Regillus' ears and immediately impressed the fickle man, who was wholly dependent on his surroundings. Instead of sending a strong squadron on to Patara and returning himself with the rest of the fleet to the waters of Ephesus, he completely put about again and, after seeking and finding a suitable pretext to justify his abandoning the plans against Patara in the eyes of the Rhodians, sailed back with the whole fleet to Samos! We will say here no more about the complete lack of constancy and prestige displayed by this parody of an admiral, though it cries to heaven: the matter speaks for itself. And the distressing result was that the attempt to conquer a good base on the southern coast of Asia Minor for the operations against Hannibal had now failed twice in consequence of the admiral's fickleness, the first time, because he had sent a far too weak squadron, the second time, because he sailed southward with the entire fleet and suddenly began to realize on the way that he couldn't give Polyxenidas a free hand in his rear,⁵⁵⁸) that is to say both times,

⁵⁵⁷) V. s. p. 277.

⁵⁵⁸) How Polyxenidas availed himself of Regillus' absence, has not been handed down to us; so his achievements can scarcely have been important. That he should

because he refused to take into consideration the possibility of dividing the naval forces. So the allies were now back at Samos again, without having advanced one step since their council of war, but considerably more discouraged than they had already been at that moment. And the cup of bitter surprises was not yet filled to the brim.

For Seleucus, who had passed the winter in Aeolis and *i. a.* had reconquered Phocaea and Cyme,⁵⁵⁹) now profited by the absence of Eumenes, who accompanied the Roman and Rhodian squadrons to Lycia, to invade his kingdom. After a demonstration under the walls of Elaea he launched an attack against the royal residence Pergamum itself, where Attalus, Eumenes' brother, was forced to yield to superior numbers, retreat within the walls and sustain a siege. And also Antiochus himself invaded Eumenes' territory with the main body of his land army. This bad news reached the allies at Samos, where they had meanwhile returned from Lycia; as a matter of course Eumenes made immediately for Elaea with his fleet, in order to take part in the defence of his own country: from Elaea he succeeded in entering safely into Pergamum, in spite of the besiegers. A few days afterwards the Roman and Rhodian squadrons followed him to Elaea, in order to assist their ally (and to maintain the sacred unity of the navy!), a very dangerous experiment, because this time Polyxenidas was given a perfectly free hand in the *southern* waters and because Hannibal, if his fleet had been ready, might have sailed without a blow to Ephesus and joined hands with Polyxenidas. But.... the Syrian squadron was *not* ready and Hannibal would only make his appearance in August; the clumsiness of his military organization yielded bitter fruit to Antiochus at this juncture.⁵⁶⁰) Already at an earlier date

have profited by the southward expedition of the allied fleet to sail northwards himself and support the Syrian land army in its action against Pergamum and that on receiving this news the allied fleet should have returned from Loryma to Samos, is a wholly arbitrary invention of v. Gelder (137): it is quite certain that Polyxenidas remained at Ephesus. Why did he *not* sail to the north? Probably because he feared to be cut off from Ephesus by the allied fleet returning from the south: his chief purpose was and remained to join hands with Hannibal; if he sailed far northwards, the enemies could easily frustrate this primary object of Syrian naval warfare.

⁵⁵⁹) *V. s. p.* 315 and 321 sq.; for the following events *Liv.* 37, 18—22; *App. Syr.* 26; *Pol.* 21, 3^b. 9—10.

⁵⁶⁰) Why didn't Polyxenidas profit by the absence of the entire allied fleet to sail southwards in order to meet Hannibal? He will have been informed that for the present Hannibal could not yet be expected, and secondly he may have feared to be cut off from his basis at Ephesus and even to see it conquered by the enemy.

he had been informed by the Aetolians that they had concluded an armistice and that the Roman army had started on its march to the Hellespont; ⁵⁶¹) as he now learned that the Scipios had already reached Macedonia, ⁵⁶²) he profited by the presence of the allied fleet at Elaea to enter into negotiations with the Roman admiral. Without any doubt this was a manoeuvre: he will have hoped to obtain a long truce, thus to be enabled to finish quietly his military preparations (especially in the naval sphere!) and then to start the war afresh in 189 together with the Aetolians. ⁵⁶³) It seems far from improbable that the Roman praetor, who was not blessed with large quantities of insight and discernment and who, moreover, was seriously discouraged by the adversities he had sustained, might have acquiesced in an armistice; but Eumenes, who saw through the little game of the Syrian king and whose self-interest demanded that the war should be continued, opposed strongly the idea of an arrangement in the council of war ⁵⁶⁴) and he carried it: answer was given to Antiochus that before the arrival of the consul ⁵⁶⁵) there could be no question of negotiating about peace. ⁵⁶⁶) The Syrian king ravaged the Pergamene country in reply, but thereupon he marched away in the direction of Adramytteum. As he had left Seleucus with only weak forces before Pergamum (4000 foot-soldiers and 600 horsemen, Liv. 37, 20, 7) and as, moreover, Eumenes received *ex foedere* (Pol. 21, 3^b) an excellent auxiliary corps from the Achaean league, the Pergamene king

⁵⁶¹) Pol. 21, 8.

⁵⁶²) Liv. 37, 18, 10.

⁵⁶³) De Sanctis IV, 1, 186; that the negotiations between Rome and Aetolia would result in a rupture again, could be easily foreseen.

⁵⁶⁴) He had been summoned from Pergamum to Elaea to take part in the conference, Liv. 37, 19, 1.

⁵⁶⁵) Pol. 21, 10, 11 we must read with Reiske ὕπατον instead of ἀνθύπατον, cf. Liv. 37, 19, 6 *ante consulis adventum* (from Pol.).

⁵⁶⁶) For the negotiations Liv. 37, 18, 10—19, 6 = Pol. 21, 10. The Rhodians (besides Eudamus the vice-admiral Pamphilidas was also present in the council of war, cf. Pol. 21, 10, 5) did not oppose peace; alas, their considerations have not been handed down. But from the very beginning they were not disposed so unfriendly towards Antiochus and so favourably towards Rome as Eumenes and, small as she was, the Rhodian republic had naturally always favoured a policy of equilibrium; so the Rhodians will certainly not have wanted to see Antiochus crushed in favour of Rome. Moreover, piracy thrived vigorously during the war and, as the Rhodians needed all their warships for the war against Antiochus, they could do little or nothing against it: so Rhodian trade must have suffered severely from the war. See v. Gelder 138.

got his hands free again for naval action: the entire allied fleet ⁵⁶⁷) sailed from Elaea to Adramytteum in order to protect the town against Antiochus and meanwhile the Achaean auxiliary corps succeeded in inflicting such severe losses upon Seleucus' troops that he evacuated the Pergamene territory. Naturally Antiochus could do nothing against Adramytteum, now that the town was protected by the complete allied navy; he ravaged the country and conquered some secondary places, but thereupon he returned to Sardes in order to prepare his land forces for the decisive struggle, now that his attempt at negotiating had failed; only Seleucus was left behind with his troops in the coastal area. The allied fleet, the presence of which was no longer needed at Adramytteum since Antiochus' retreat, returned to Elaea via the friendly Mytilene and then made an attempt at surprising Phocaea, just as in the spring; but the town had been reinforced with troops in good time, so that the attack failed again.

Now at last ⁵⁶⁸) it began to dawn upon the Roman admiral (we need not doubt that the Rhodians and Eumenes made it clear to him) that he must stop running to and fro with the entire fleet and leaving Polyxenidas and Hannibal to themselves, in other words that the fleet must be divided. A measure that ought to have been taken already at the time of the expeditions against Patara was now forced upon him by the circumstances. The Roman land army was already in Macedonia and so the moment began to draw near when it would become urgent to make arrangements on the Hellespont for the crossing of the army; moreover, the northern coastal area was in need of protection, because here Seleucus had been left behind with his troops. So Eumenes was now sent home with all his ships in order to fulfil both of these tasks; indeed he did not take part in the following naval operations against Hannibal and Polyxenidas. On the other hand the Roman and Rhodian squadrons returned to Samos in order to keep Polyxenidas in check. But soon after their arrival at Samos for the second time a squadron must be separated from the main body, because the news reached Roman head-quarters that Hannibal was now on the way at last: the Rhodian navy was charged with the task of barring Hannibal's way in the south; the Roman fleet, reinforced with no more than 3 Rhodian ships, would remain at Samos

⁵⁶⁷) Also the Rhodian squadron, Liv. 37, 19, 8 *coll.* 21, 6.

⁵⁶⁸) Liv. 37, 22.

to face Polyxenidas. I remarked before, that such measures ought to have been taken earlier. Not only had both attempts upon Patara failed, because the Roman admiral stuck obstinately to the indivisibility of his naval forces; but also afterwards he had played with fire by sailing northwards with all his ships: if Hannibal had been more early and Polyxenidas more resolute, they would have joined hands without pains, while the allied fleet was lying in the northern waters, and the latter would have got into very serious difficulties against a united Syrian fleet of almost 140 sail. On the other hand Regillus — let us give him his due — may have put off the dividing of his naval forces until the new Rhodian ships laid down after the defeat of Panhormus should be ready for action (but then why embark upon an expedition against Patara which could not be successful without a strong squadron being set apart for this purpose?); and I must admit that even then the measure of dividing the navy, necessary though it might be, was nevertheless a *pis aller*. For now the Roman fleet against Polyxenidas (84⁵⁶⁹)—89 sail) as well as the Rhodian against Hannibal (36—47)⁵⁷⁰) would have to face superior numbers. The *vitium originis*, which was at the base of all the difficulties of the Roman navy in this year, was and remained the fact that the senate had neglected to build new ships in good time and that for this simple reason the Romans had not ships enough in the Asiatic waters, whether they divided their forces or not. So they had to face towards August 190 a deadly crisis which only thanks to the zealous devotion and the excellent seamanship of the Rhodians they succeeded in surmounting; *the Rhodians* and not Eumenes, who was absent, nor the Roman admiral, who was a *non-valeur*, won both the decisive battles against odds. But *revenons à nos moutons*.

On receiving the news that Hannibal's squadron was on its way from Syria to the Aegean,⁵⁷¹) Eudamus sailed with 13 Rhodian ships and 2 quinqueremes from Cos and Cnidus from the head-quarters at Samos

⁵⁶⁹) 81 Roman + 3 Rhodian ships.

⁵⁷⁰) These are the numbers of the battle of Side.

⁵⁷¹) For the following events Liv. 37, 22, 2—24; 45, 22, 12—13; App. *Syr.* 22, 109; 28; 138; Zon. 9, 20, 2; Nepos *Hann.* 8, 4. For the battle of Side we are almost wholly thrown upon Livy's account (= Pol.); even Appian, who for the rest has derived from Polybius rather extensive communications about the naval operations of the Syrian war, is almost silent about this battle.

to Rhodes, so that only 3 Rhodian vessels remained with the Roman fleet.⁵⁷²) Before we accompany Eudamus on his voyage, we will first say a few words about the Roman squadron remaining at Samos, because we can make short work of it, for the present at least. With its 84 battle-ships it was slightly outnumbered by Polyxenidas with 89; if, moreover, we take into consideration that Regillus was not to be compared with Polyxenidas as an admiral, that he must now do without the aid of a strong Rhodian squadron and an able Rhodian naval commander, and that he could easily be tempted into accepting a decisive battle, because he joined lack of insight to a sweeping pugnacity, it is perfectly clear that Polyxenidas ought to have profited by the absence of the Rhodians to defeat and, if possible, to destroy the Roman fleet. That he did not even make an attempt in this direction, is the most serious blunder he committed during the war. Did he prefer to wait for Hannibal? It is possible; but he knew the wonderful nautical skill of his fellow-countrymen and consequently ought to have reckoned with the possibility that Hannibal would be defeated by them, as happened indeed, and that thereupon they would return immediately in order to join and increase the Roman fleet again, as also happened in reality. If at this juncture Polyxenidas had availed himself resolutely of Regillus' temporary isolation and had eliminated the Roman fleet, the war might still have taken another turn, even in spite of the victory gained over Hannibal by the Rhodians; that he allowed the psychological moment to slip by, remains one of the unexplained mysteries of this war. The phenomenon is probably rooted in a certain lack of promptitude in Polyxenidas' character; for his temporizing attitude at this juncture apparently correlates with the fact that in the autumn of 191 in the waters of Cissus he had suffered C. Livius to slip by on his way to the north. — In a word, nothing happened in the waters of Samos and Ephesus during the absence of the Rhodian fleet, at least as far as we know: the ancient authorities are silent on this point, but this silence makes it pretty certain that no important events took place in this area at the time of the battle of Side. So we may now return to Eudamus: on arriving at Rhodes he learned

⁵⁷²) Of the 20 ships, sent by Rhodes to the Romans after the catastrophe of Panhormus, 4 had sailed with C. Livius to Patara and from there had returned home (Liv. 37, 16, 1. 13); of the remaining 16 vessels 13 now sailed southwards.

that his second-in-command Pamphilidas⁵⁷³) had been sent out against Hannibal two days before; he had taken with him from Rhodes a number of 13 ships, to which he had added on the way 4 vessels stationed on the Carian coast. Eudamus followed him at once with the 15 ships brought from Samos, to which number 6 open vessels had been added at Rhodes; Pamphilidas' squadron having been detained by some small operations on the coast of the mainland opposite Rhodes, he succeeded in coming up with it off Megiste. From there the united fleet of 38 sail made for Phaselis, where Eudamus intended to wait for the enemy, because the town suited such a purpose excellently on account of her situation.⁵⁷⁴) But an unforeseen circumstance forced him to sail on: an epidemic — it was in the dog-days⁵⁷⁵) — affected the crews, so that Eudamus decided to leave as quickly as he could the focus of contagion in order to preserve, if possible, the precious rowers from harm on the eve of the decisive battle and moved farther east to the river Eurymedon. Here he learned from the Aspendians that the enemy was approaching Side.⁵⁷⁶)

⁵⁷³) Pamphilidas had taken part together with Eudamus in the campaign of the allied fleet to the northern waters (*v. s.* footnote 566); so he must have been sent ahead from the head-quarters at Samos to Rhodes some days before his principal, naturally after receiving the news of Hannibal's approach.

⁵⁷⁴) The fleet of 38 sail was composed of the following items: 17 Rhodian ships of Pamphilidas, 13 *naves tectae* and 6 *apertae* (all Rhodian) of Eudamus, together 36 Rhodian vessels (30 armoured vessels and 6 open ships), besides two quinqueremes from Cos and Cnidus (*Liv.* 37, 22, 2—4). Immediately before the battle the strength of the Rhodian fleet is fixed by Livy (37, 23, 4) at 32 quadriremes and 4 triremes (again a total amount of 36 sail). Note in the first place that apparently the 4 triremes + 2 quadriremes were open vessels (there were 6 in all), which is quite unusual with regard to the latter type; secondly that the 2 quinqueremes of Cos and Cnidus are left out of account in the last-quoted passage; thirdly that the comparatively light quadrireme was the type of battle-ship normal with the Rhodians. So the total effective of Rhodian naval forces amounted at this moment to 39 ships, 3 being still at Samos with Regillus' fleet; as Rhodes could not dispose of more than 23 ships after the defeat of Panhormus, it follows that some 16 new ships were built between the battles of Panhormus and Side, *v. s.* p. 270. *This brilliant energy of the little ally painfully contrasts with the laziness of the Roman senate, who did not send one new ship to the Asiatic waters in 190, though reinforcements were bitterly needed there!*

⁵⁷⁵) The fact that the Etesian winds had detained the Syrian fleet (37, 23, 4), proves that these events must have taken place in July-August, see de Sanctis 394.

⁵⁷⁶) Livy's vague expression *ad Sidam hostis esse* must not be interpreted in too strict a sense, as at that moment Hannibal's squadron had certainly not yet arrived at Side: next day the two fleets sailed to meet each other and encountered east of the

Hannibal's fleet, which had been detained by the Etesian winds, consisted of 3 hepteres, 4 hexeres, 30 penteres and tetreres and 10 trieres, together 47 battle-ships, seconded by a number of open vessels: ⁵⁷⁷) here too (just as at Ephesus) the type of battle-ship had been adapted to the Roman style of fighting, because in the battle of Cissus the smaller types hadn't stood their ground against the heavy Roman ships, but. . . in the battle of Side Hannibal's squadron had only to confront the skillful Rhodians with their nimble tetreres, so that the heavy and unwieldy new battle-ships proved to be of no use. However, this would only become apparent in the battle itself: it stands to reason that Hannibal, who outnumbered his adversaries considerably, did not think a moment of refusing battle, when he was informed of the presence of the hostile fleet. On the next day the two fleets sailed to meet each other; when the Rhodians (sailing in line ahead) had rounded the promontory of Side, they saw the hostile fleet before them, ready for battle in line abreast: Hannibal commanded the left wing on the side of the open sea, Apollonius, a Syrian courtier, the right wing on the land side. ⁵⁷⁸) With the Rhodians the admiral Eudamus led the van, the center of the column being commanded by his second-in-command Pamphilidas and the rear by Chariclitus. In this first phase of the battle the Rhodian admiral scarcely justified the reputation for circumspect cautiousness he enjoyed. ⁵⁷⁹) He knew that the enemy was at a short distance and that he would have to fight him that very day, but nevertheless he continued sailing in line ahead to the very last moment and suffered himself to be taken by surprise. And to this serious mistake he added another. For, though he immediately stood off with the leading squadron in the direction of the open sea in order

promontory of Side; this would have been impossible, if Hannibal had already reached Side the day before. Compare de Sanctis IV, 1, 187, 123.

⁵⁷⁷) Liv. 37, 23, 5; 24, 6, v. s. p. 275.

⁵⁷⁸) On account of the fact that the admiral used to command the right wing Rodgers assumes that Apollonius was commander-in-chief and Hannibal only second-in-command; but he is certainly wrong in doing so: the admiral as commander of the right wing is by no means a law of the Medes and Persians; Polyxenidas for instance commanded the left wing himself at Cissus as well as at Myonnesus! It is perfectly natural that many an admiral, knowing that *normaliter* the commander-in-chief was on the right, for that very reason took charge of the left himself, in order to tackle personally the admiral of his adversaries.

⁵⁷⁹) V. s. p. 323; for the battle of Side the reader may compare de Sanctis 187 sq., Rodgers 408 sq.

to form the right wing of the battle array and to gain room for the following ships to come up into line on his left, he didn't stand far enough off shore in executing this sideward movement. The evil results of this blunder were twofold: in the first place no sufficient room was now left on the land side for the rear to come up into line; and secondly, Eudamus' right wing not standing aside far enough in a seaward direction, Hannibal's left got a still far greater surplus of ships and elbow-room for outflanking and envelopping the enemy's right than it had already *normaliter* by reason of a numerical superiority of some 10 ships. To make matters worse Eudamus opened the battle in a hurry by charging the enemy with 5 ships, so that the seaward wings were already engaged in a very unequal struggle, while on the land side the Rhodian rear was still in vain seeking room to come up into line! Considering these facts we have no choice but to suppose that Eudamus had lost his head; so much the more the skillful efficiency of Rhodian seamanship is demonstrated by the fact that after such an unfortunate start they succeeded in recovering themselves and even in gaining a brilliant victory over a much stronger enemy: we may realize this the more keenly, if we take into consideration that the admiral was wholly occupied by the unequal struggle he had head over heels embarked upon and consequently could no longer govern the movements of his fleet as a whole, so that all was left to Pamphilidas and Chariclitus and to the personal initiative of the individual captains. It was thanks to them that the lack of elbow-room, occasioned by the admiral's haste, was quickly made up for: a number of ships in the rear, seeing that there was no place for them on the land side, immediately stood off to seaward,⁵⁸⁰) so that on the side of the coast sufficient room was gained for deploying the battle formation in a regular way. And also the battle itself, which now began to develop all along the line, is a fair sample of Rhodian naval tactics and swiftness of action. It goes without saying that for the Rhodian fleet the real danger lay on the seaward flank: there Hannibal had a surplus of at least 10 ships, which he was free to employ for the purpose of working round the right flank of his

⁵⁸⁰) They must have come up into line *on Eudamus' right*, as the latter had already closed in upon the enemy and therefore could not move farther seawards himself. The ships of the Rhodians were the nimblest, their rowers the best in the world: they could outrow anyone; in the battle of Myonnesus we shall meet with another sample of it.

adversaries, and consequently Eudamus was hard put to it to stand his ground, in spite of superior tactical skill and impetuous bravery. But... before Hannibal's left wing could succeed here in enveloping and crushing the Rhodian right, on the landward flank and in the center the Rhodians had already done with Apollonius! Here nautical skill and ramming tactics ranked uppermost. Apparently the unwieldy Syrian vessels could not defend themselves efficiently against the *διέκπλους*, the deadly manoeuvre in which a ship forced its way at full speed between two hostile vessels, sweeping away their oars, and then swung round and rammed the disabled enemy from the stern (see Tarn, *Developments*, 146), a manoeuvre which was practised by the Rhodian captains with the utmost skill; ⁵⁸¹) in this way one of the heaviest Syrian battle-ships, a hepteris, was disabled in the twinkling of an eye. ⁵⁸²) And though the Rhodians did not succeed in sinking the heavy Syrian men of war, they crippled many of them, so that Apollonius soon inclined to take to flight. When therefore Eudamus, who after hard fighting threatened to be envelopped on the right, hoisted the signal of distress on his flagship, the battle had already been decided on the land side and plenty of ships were now available there to come to the aid of their admiral off shore at lightning-speed. ⁵⁸³) So Hannibal now also realized that the battle was lost, and the seaward flank of the Syrian fleet took to flight in its turn. At first the Rhodians did not think of pursuing the enemy, because the disease caught at Phaselis had weakened their rowers; ⁵⁸⁴) but when they saw the miserably disabled hostile squadron trudging away laboriously (little more than 20 ships were uncrippled; the rest was towed away by the open vessels, which probably had scarcely taken part in the battle), they decided at last to organize a chase. But the attempt failed; when Hannibal, after the chase

⁵⁸¹) Liv. 37, 24, 2.

⁵⁸²) After the battle the ship was tugged to Phaselis, though not without great pains (Liv. 37, 24, 9); consequently the assertion of the same Livy (24, 3: *demersa*) that she was sunk must be a slip.

⁵⁸³) Liv. 37, 24, 4 (*in dextro cornu*) the right wing of the Syrian fleet (on the land side) is meant; Rodgers, whose account of the battle of Side is very good in many respects, has wholly misinterpreted this passage (410), a derailment which results from the fact that he regards Apollonius as the Syrian admiral.

⁵⁸⁴) V. s. p. 340; but in spite of this weakness the Rhodian fleet had proved capable of very quick manoeuvres during the battle; this little fact proves better than anything else the tremendous superiority of the Rhodians in the maritime sphere!

had been continued for some time, directed his course to the shore, his pursuers were afraid of being wind bound on a hostile coast and returned to Eudamus, who had taken no part in the chase, as his own ship was badly crippled. So their only prize was the hepteris which they succeeded in tugging to Phaselis at the cost of great pains; but, though the Rhodians were not content and fell to loggerheads on the return-voyage (indeed Eudamus had given some cause of complaint), the real object of their campaign had been attained: Hannibal was eliminated.

A few closing remarks about the battle of Side may be added here, before we pass on to the discussion of the ensuing events. In the first place I must repeat here once more that the adaptation of the Syrian fleet to another method of fighting had yielded very bitter fruit. In the battle of Cissus Polyxenidas' light battle-ships (chiefly trieres) had got the worst of it against the boarding tactics of the heavier Roman vessels and for this reason heavier ships had been built during the winter of 191—190 at Ephesus as well as in Syria in order to adapt the Syrian fleet to the Roman style of fighting. But, when in the battle of Side Hannibal had only to fight the nimble Rhodian tetreres and not the Romans, this very adaptation occasioned the *débâcle*. For in the first place the Phoenicians (as well as the Rhodians) had always relied on the nautical manoeuvre and ramming tactics and therefore were quite unfamiliar with the new style of fighting with heavier ships which favoured boarding tactics: it is extremely risky to imitate alien tactics without having time to become quietly and thoroughly familiarized with them. And secondly it was easy for the Rhodians with their nimble ships and superior nautical skill to elude the grapnels of the unwieldy Syrian dreadnoughts and to set their own seal to the battle, in which indeed nautical movements and ramming tactics clearly ruled the roast. In the battle of Myonnesus we shall meet with similar phenomena. — It is very strange that the fire-baskets which were put into practice by the Rhodians at Panhormus⁵⁸⁵) as well as at Myonnesus are not mentioned by the ancient authorities à propos of the battle of Side which took place in between. Is it to be regarded as an incidental omission? Especially with respect to naval affairs we must always reckon with the possibility of such omissions in Roman historiography; but in this case it is far from probable. Especially the fact that numerous Syrian ships were seriously

⁵⁸⁵) V.s. footnote 503.

crippled, but that not even one was destroyed, seems to prove that on this occasion the Rhodians had left their fire-baskets at home. Why they did so, is another question, which we are by no means able to answer from the available data. — As Kromayer rightly remarks,⁵⁸⁶ we must regard the battle of Side as the real turning point of the naval war as a whole rather than the ensuing battle of Myonnesus which is much more celebrated by historiography.⁵⁸⁷ For Hannibal's defeat at Side baffled the concentration of Syrian naval forces and this meant that Antiochus' attempt to confront the Roman navy in the Aegean with equivalent or even superior forces had substantially failed. Nevertheless, even after the victory of Side a considerable part of the Rhodian fleet must remain in the southern waters in order to watch Hannibal (his fleet had been badly crippled, no doubt, but it was not destroyed), so that the Syrian king could venture a last attempt at raising the blockade of Ephesus, defeating the Roman fleet and retaining the Hellespont. As we remarked before, such an attempt should have been made earlier, that is to say at the time, when the Rhodians were yet wholly kept engaged by Hannibal; for now, after the battle of Side, part of them at least could hurry to the north in order to support Regillus. But we must now first follow the Rhodians on their return-voyage.

From Phaselis, to which place they had sailed after the battle, they apparently returned at once to Rhodes.⁵⁸⁸ Though Hannibal did not make an attempt at continuing his expedition to the Aegean, because the greater part of his fleet was severely injured and the morale of his crews had been badly weakened by the defeat suffered at the hands of numerically inferior forces, the Rhodian government decided for safety's sake to send 20 men of war under command of Chariclitus to the waters of Patara and Megiste, in order to bar his way if need be and especially to prevent him from reaching the important Syrian base Patara. Eudamus was ordered to return with 7 of the heaviest ships (that is to say with quadriremes) to the Roman head-quarters at Samos and to egg Regillus on once more to an expedition against Patara; the vice-admiral Pamphilidas accompanied him.⁵⁸⁹ Hence it follows that some 10 men of war

⁵⁸⁶) II, 159 sq.

⁵⁸⁷) Quite naturally the battle of Myonnesus was pushed into the foreground by historiography, because the Romans had taken no part at all in the battle of Side.

⁵⁸⁸) Liv. 37, 24, 10—13.

⁵⁸⁹) This follows from Liv. 37, 25, 3.

remained at Rhodes, as the Rhodian fleet had suffered no losses in the battle of Side: these ships had probably been crippled during the battle, so that they needed repair. The Romans at Samos welcomed with enthusiasm the news of the victory of Side and the subsequent arrival of Eudamus with his flotilla; but Regillus rightly declined to embark at that moment upon an expedition against Patara, however desirable the conquest of the town might be in itself: as Antiochus had left Sardes for Ephesus after an abortive attempt at inducing Prusias of Bithynia to side with him against Rome,⁵⁹⁰) the Roman admiral deemed it his duty to remain where he was in order to protect the coasts of Ionia and Aeolis. So he only sent 4 Rhodian ships under command of Pamphilidas to Lycia in order to reinforce the Rhodian squadron patrolling that area. Consequently there remained 87 battle-ships at Samos (76 Roman + 5 Punic + 6 Rhodian ships), while 24 Rhodian vessels were cruising in the Lycian waters and some 10 were being repaired at Rhodes.

Polyxenidas had been lying idle at Ephesus since the spring, when he had vainly tried at Macris and Aethalia to prevent the Roman and Pergamene squadrons from joining the Rhodians;⁵⁹¹) he had not even profited by the absence of almost the whole Rhodian fleet (which had made for the southern coast of Asia Minor in order to fight Hannibal) to inflict a crushing defeat upon the Roman praetor, while he must do without the support of the excellent Rhodian squadron and (which was still more important) without Eudamus' sound advice.⁵⁹²) Apparently he had decided to wait for Hannibal's arrival, a sore miscalculation. Now at last, after the most favourable moment had been allowed to slip by, as Eudamus, albeit with only a few ships, had returned to Samos, it began to dawn upon Syrian naval head-quarters that an attempt must be made to defeat the Roman naval forces. The greater part of the Rhodian fleet was still on guard in Lycia against Hannibal, while Eumenes for some time past remained with his whole fleet in the northern waters in order to protect his own kingdom and to prepare the crossing of the

⁵⁹⁰) Letters dispatched by the Scipios and the tact of C. Livius, the admiral of 191, who now came to him as an envoy from Rome, kept Prusias back from such a step; so he remained neutral, in spite of his enmity against Eumenes, cf. Liv. 37, 25; Pol. 21, 11; App. Syr. 23, 111. Appian wrongly asserts that Prusias threw in his lot with the Romans against Antiochus.

⁵⁹¹) V. s. p. 323.

⁵⁹²) V. s. p. 338 sq.

Roman land army over the Hellespont.⁵⁹³) If at this juncture the Syrian navy continued to remain inactive, it could as well give the matter up. For in the first place the Roman fleet could never become weaker than it was at that moment, but only grow stronger by being reinforced with Rhodian ships; and secondly, if Polyxenidas continued to lie idle at Ephesus, suffering himself to be blockaded quite unnecessarily (for he was not inferior in numbers!), the Roman land army would quietly be ferried across the Hellespont by Eumenes' fleet, as soon as it arrived at its shore: the fact that Lysimachia and Abydus were in Antiochus' hands could not prevent its crossing, as the Syrian king had no fleet in the Hellespont. *So an attempt must be made to recover maritime supremacy by means of a victory gained over the Roman fleet off Ephesus; thus the Syrian navy would free its hands and be able in the nick of time to prevent the Roman land forces from crossing the Hellespont.*⁵⁹⁴) In a word, after his arrival from Sardes at Ephesus Antiochus resolved to fight a decisive naval battle; for this purpose he projected an attack upon Notium, the seaport and successor of Colophon, which had lost its old importance by this time:⁵⁹⁵) the town was situated in the immediate neighbourhood of Ephesus and she sided with the Romans.⁵⁹⁶) No doubt, Antiochus wanted to master the town partly for her own sake, because she bordered upon Ephesus and consequently nothing could be undertaken from the Syrian naval base without the inhabitants of Notium perceiving it immediately and sending word to Roman head-quarters; but first of all the attack was a manoeuvre to force the allied fleet into battle: Antiochus expected and hoped that it would turn up from Samos in order to support the allied town. So he himself marched against Notium with the land army, while Polyxenidas appeared before the town with the fleet, on the one hand in order to take part in the siege on the sea side, on the other hand because they expected the Roman fleet to come to Notium and therefore hoped to fight the decisive battle in these waters.⁵⁹⁷) And really the menaced town immediately sent envoys to Samos in order to

⁵⁹³) V. s. p. 337.

⁵⁹⁴) Pol. 21, 11, 13; Liv. 37, 26, 1—4.

⁵⁹⁵) For Notium and Colophon cf. Weissenborn ad Liv. 37, 26, 5.

⁵⁹⁶) We do not know, at what time she had joined the Romans; perhaps already after the battle of Cissus in the autumn of 191. For the following events Liv. 37, 26, 5 sq.

⁵⁹⁷) That the Syrian fleet made for Notium, is not mentioned *suo loco* by Livy (37, 26, 5); but it becomes apparent afterwards (37, 28, 4).

invoke Regillus' aid. The Roman admiral, who was lacking in insight, but by no means in courage and energy, had already for a long time felt terribly irritated at the idling at Samos, but — it is very remarkable — he did not realize that Polyxenidas, who had kept his fleet within the harbour of Ephesus for such a long time, now at last had left the harbour and taken part in the attack upon Notium for the very purpose of seeking a naval decision. So he felt little inclined to comply with the request of Notium, but wanted rather to make for the Hellespont, because he deemed it beneath his dignity that Eumenes should enjoy the privilege of assisting the consul and ferrying the legions to Asia Minor with his fleet, while he himself had to fulfil the humble and thankless task of lending assistance to the besieged Notium. We remarked before ⁵⁹⁸) that the thoughts of Roman naval head-quarters centered far too much upon the Hellespont. Even the sensible C. Livius had seriously sinned in this regard in the early spring of the year; but the attitude of the fool Regillus now verged upon madness. He was all on fire to distinguish himself and to do something after such a long inactivity, but did not realize that it was via that very Notium that he could find an opportunity of beating Polyxenidas and thus deciding for good and all the naval war; instead of seizing this chance with both his hands he wished to leave his post at the critical moment and sail to the Hellespont, where he could do nothing at all. For the land army had not yet reached the straits ⁵⁹⁹) and even if this had happened soon, Eumenes' fleet would have sufficed to ferry it, whereas Regillus' task consisted in enabling Eumenes to do this by keeping Polyxenidas at bay in the waters of Ephesus and beating him, if possible. For in this case the Hellespont would fall to the Romans automatically; but if Regillus should have given free course to his whims, Polyxenidas would have got an opportunity of defeating the small Rhodian fleet in the southern waters and joining hands with Hannibal at the eleventh hour: then everything would have been set adrift again and the struggle for the Hellespont would have started afresh. But if Regillus did not realize the efficiency of distance-strategy, Eudamus did: luckily for the Roman cause this excellent admiral was now present at

⁵⁹⁸) V. s. p. 317.

⁵⁹⁹) At that moment it was September and the land army would only reach the Hellespont towards November.

Samos again and he succeeded in averting follies.⁶⁰⁰) Partly at least; for the fleetnumbers of the battle of Myonnesus, which was fought shortly afterwards, prove conclusively that Regillus, though he suffered himself to be persuaded by Eudamus into facing Polyxenidas personally to the bitter end, nevertheless only yielded by halves and sent no less than 23 Roman battle-ships (and probably the light craft of the Italian allies too) to the north (to the Hellespont)!⁶⁰¹) For in the battle of Myonnesus Regillus' fleet consisted of 80 ships (58 Roman and 22 Rhodian vessels, Liv. 37, 30, 1); consequently he must have sent away 23 Roman ships before the battle, as the Roman fleet in the Asiatic waters comprised 81 sail, including the Punic battle-ships; and it stands to reason that they were sent to the Hellespont and that the admiral decided to do so in the council of war, where he yielded unvoluntarily to Eudamus' arguments, by way of a counterpoise to this "defeat", in order to maintain his "prestige".⁶⁰²) That such a compromise could not be justified either, goes without saying. It was bad enough that the Romans had been forced to leave Eumenes with his fleet in the northern waters; but at any rate this was a *necessary* evil. For, if the entire fleet had been employed for guarding Polyxenidas in the waters of Ephesus, the latter could have prevented the Roman army from crossing the Hellespont by remaining within the harbour, because in this case no allied ships would have been

⁶⁰⁰) For his arguments the reader is referred to Liv. 37, 26, 13; as a matter of course they have been rendered in my text.

⁶⁰¹) Thus rightly Kromayer II, 160.

⁶⁰²) Livy makes a highly abrupt transition from 37, 26 to 27 (the end of the council of war); even the praetor's decision to yield to Eudamus' arguments is not mentioned: it must be inferred from the following events. Did Livy (or Polybius before him?) suppress here the decision to send no less than 23 ships to the Hellespont, for the purpose of not compromising *altogether* the Roman naval policy? It seems far from improbable; but on the other hand it is also possible that Regillus had come to this resolution at a somewhat earlier date, as we are told by Livy (37, 26, 12) that already before Eudamus had had to keep him back from sailing to the Hellespont; at what moment, we do not know. — It is not easy to explain the presence of 22 Rhodian ships in the battle of Myonnesus: after Pamphilidas' departure (*v. s.* p. 346) there were only 6 Rhodian vessels at Samos; the other 16 must have been ordered from the southern waters in order to replace at least partially the Roman ships sent to the Hellespont (probably the \pm 10 ships that had been crippled off Side and meanwhile had been repaired at Rhodes + 6 from the Lycian squadron). Or must we suppose with Kromayer (II, 160, 1) that the 22 Rhodian ships included auxiliary contingents of Cos, Cnidos etc.? It is possible, but quite hypothetical.

present in the straits for the purpose of ferrying the army. So the very fact that Eumenes had been detached to the Hellespont forced Polyxenidas to seek a decision; but so much the more it was necessary to keep the fleet that had to fight him as strong as possible instead of weakening it by detaching numerous Roman ships to the Hellespont, where Eumenes could easily do without them. If Regillus had not committed this folly, he would have outnumbered Polyxenidas in the battle of Myonnesus⁶⁰³) instead of fighting it against odds (80—89). The fact that thanks to the brilliant achievements of the Rhodians all came right in the end, does not diminish or excuse in the least degree the folly of Regillus' line of conduct.

We may take it for granted that Regillus, when he yielded involuntarily to Eudamus' authority, promised to Notium the assistance he was asked for,⁶⁰⁴) though, as we remarked before, Livy passes over his decision in silence. Being, however, in want of victuals, he was forced⁶⁰⁵) to fetch them before he could make for the menaced city and so he intended to cross first from Samos to Chios, which was the centre of revictualling for the Roman navy.⁶⁰⁶) When the fleet had reached the northern coast of Samos, the praetor received a letter from Chios with the news, that a large quantity of grain had arrived there from Italy, but that the ships carrying wine had been detained by stormy weather. At the same time he was informed that Teos (a town on the coast of Asia Minor between Corycus and Myonnesus) had furnished the Syrian fleet abundantly with victuals and had promised a large quantity of wine into the bargain. The combination of these two pieces of information caused Regillus to change his plans: he suddenly resolved to make for Teos instead of sailing to Chios, in order to force the town into giving him "voluntarily" the victuals intended for his adversary or, in case she should refuse obedience, to

⁶⁰³) If we reckon only with the \pm 10 ships that had been repaired and leave out of account the 6 ordered from Lycia (footnote 602), we get some 97 sail (81 Roman + 6 Rhodian + the ships repaired at Rhodes) againsts Polyxenidas' 89.

⁶⁰⁴) That this should not have been the case or that Regillus should have forgotten on the way his task of assisting Notium, appears by no means from the following events: that the praetor thought of revictualling *first*, was sensible and necessary. It is unfair and unnecessary to lay follies at Regillus' door which he did *not* commit: his register of sins is large enough without the addition of imaginary ones!

⁶⁰⁵) For the following events Liv. 37, 27, 1 sq.

⁶⁰⁶) V. s. p. 310 sq.

chastise her.⁶⁰⁷) This time Regillus' line of conduct was anything but foolish: Teos lay much nearer the aim of the expedition (Notium) than Chios; moreover, he had just been informed that he could get wine for his crews at Teos (for there large quantities of it lay waiting for Polyxenidas!) and not at Chios. If we take into account that for Mediterranean people wine belongs to the absolutely indispensable necessities of life (the rowers of the Roman fleet could no more dispense with it than the modern soldier with tobacco), we must acknowledge that Regillus' change of route was perfectly rational, especially because he would deprive Polyxenidas' rowers of the tonic he provided his own crews with! But the expedition to Teos would also be interrupted, though temporarily, because ± 15 pirates' boats were sighted, which had plundered the coasts of Chios⁶⁰⁸) and were now on their way home, laden with booty. At first Regillus believed them to be ships of the Syrian fleet⁶⁰⁹) and he started upon a chase; but the light craft succeeded easily in escaping to Myonnesus, where the Roman ships did not venture to approach the projecting cliffs which had been occupied by the pirates.⁶¹⁰) The rest of the day was rather foolishly spent in watching vainly those petty adversaries; so Teos was only reached on the next. Here the ships occupied the harbour called Geraesticus north of the town on the mainland (Teos herself lay on a headland)⁶¹¹) and soldiers were sent out to ravage the countryside. In this way the inhabitants of Teos were forced to enter

⁶⁰⁷) Teos occupied a rather ambiguous position between Rome and Antiochus: the town did not side with the Romans, as appears *i. a.* from the fact that she supplied the Syrian fleet with victuals; but on the other hand she had entertained friendly relations with Rome for some years past, see Dtb.³ 601 and de Sanctis IV, 1, 131, 45, Heuss 97.

⁶⁰⁸) The small squadron of Rhodian ships, sent by C. Livius to the waters of Chios in the spring of this year against the privateers from Abydos (*v. s.* p. 327), apparently was now no longer present there: it will have been recalled in connection with the mobilization of the Rhodian fleet against Hannibal.

⁶⁰⁹) Whether this was again a ridiculous blunder of Regillus (Rodgers 413), seems questionable: the Syrian fleet comprised a great number of light vessels, among which there were undoubtedly *lembi* and *celoces*.

⁶¹⁰) For the pirates' episode cf. (besides Liv. 37, 27, 4—8) Pol. 21, 12. Were these pirates identical with Nicander and his men, who played a part in the battle of Panhormus (p. 319)? It is possible, but not ascertainable; at any rate these too sided with Antiochus, as appears from the plundering of Chios.

⁶¹¹) See Weissenborn ad Liv. 37, 27, 9.

into negotiations; ⁶¹²⁾ Regillus demanded from them that they should provide the Roman fleet with the same necessities they had given or promised to Polyxenidas: only in case they should comply with this claim, the plundering would be stopped. Thereupon Teos resolved to acquiesce in the Roman demands and the Romans might thank their stars for this quick resolution, because otherwise their fleet might probably have suffered the same fate as the Rhodian squadron in the early spring at Panhormus. For on that day Polyxenidas had put to sea from Notium with the Syrian fleet and, on learning that the allied fleet was lying in the harbour Geraesticus, he had ambuscaded his own fleet at the Isle of Macris off Myonnesus, just as he had done before in the spring. ⁶¹³⁾ For the harbour occupied by the Roman fleet strongly resembled Panhormus: two capes enclosed the entrance, which was so narrow that scarcely two ships could pass through at the same time. So Polyxenidas formed the plan of surprising the Romans as he had surprised the Rhodians at Panhormus: he intended to station ships on either side of the harbour-mouth during the night to attack the issuing Roman vessels from both sides; from the rest of his fleet he would land soldiers, in order to surprise the enemy at sea and ashore at the same time, just as he had done at Panhormus. If Teos had not complied with Regillus' demands, this plan of Polyxenidas might possibly have succeeded; but now the fleet was transferred from the back harbour Geraesticus to the other harbour in front of the town, because it was situated more conveniently for the purpose of shipping the supplies the citizens of Teos had promised. Two accessory reasons had also contributed to this removal: in the first place the collision of two ships in the narrow entrance had occasioned Eudamus to warn Regillus of the danger connected with Geraesticus; and secondly Antiochus' quarters were not far away, so that, Geraesticus being situated on the mainland, an attack upon this harbour from the side of the Syrian land army lay not without the range of possibilities. So the Roman fleet escaped from the mousetrap in the nick of time.


Polyxenidas' surprising attack could now no longer be launched; ⁶¹⁴⁾

⁶¹²⁾ For the following events Liv. 37, 28.

⁶¹³⁾ *V.s.* p. 323.


⁶¹⁴⁾ For the following events Liv. 37, 29—30; App. *Syr.* 27; de Sanctis IV, 1, 190 sq., Rodgers 414 sq.

for the harbour now occupied by the Roman fleet did not lend itself to such a purpose. But, nevertheless, he attempted next day to surprise his adversaries here as well, during the hot midday hours, while the crews were ashore for their siesta and for the purpose of shipping the supplies. And really the Roman fleet had a narrow escape, because the Romans did not know that Polyxenidas was in the neighbourhood; only at the very last moment the praetor was informed that the hostile fleet had been lying at Macris since the day before and was now preparing to get under way. So the Romans got the opportunity of sounding the recall and manning the ships, albeit amidst indescribable confusion. The Roman praetor was the first to sally from the harbour: he stood off shore in the direction of the open sea in order to form the right wing and gain room for the following ships to come up into line on his left. Eudamus with the Rhodian squadron left the harbour last of all; for the Rhodian ships were by far the fastest and so the Rhodian commander was left ashore to superintend the embarkation of the stragglers and to see that the ships left the harbour in due order. This implies that Eudamus and the Rhodian squadron were to form the left wing of the battle array on the land side.⁶¹⁵) In this formation the allied fleet sailed to meet the enemy; but from Livy's narrative it becomes apparent that the battle line formed in this way continued to bear the marks of its precipitate formation: Regillus' right wing on the side of the open sea, which had left the harbour first, had naturally got the start of the rest of the fleet and the latter — probably by reason of the praetor's undue haste — could not gain sufficiently upon Regillus' leading squadron to come up with it regularly into line abreast, so that the battle line ran slantingly backwards from the right to the left; so Regillus continued to lead the van and the Rhodians to bring up the rear, that is to say that the battle array was an intermixture



⁶¹⁵) App. 27, 133, where Eudamus' name has been corrupted into Eudorus.

of line abreast and line ahead.⁶¹⁶) A very serious blunder, because Regillus, who was lacking in tactical insight, would now have to bear the brunt of the battle, while the excellent Rhodian ships with their experienced admiral threatened to be excluded from it. The enemy who had hoped to surprise the Roman ships within the harbour, was now taken by surprise himself: he was still sailing in cruising order (in double column), when he saw the adversaries in battle array before him. So the Syrian fleet too had to form line in a hurry: Polyxenidas who was leading the van stood far off in the direction of the open sea in order to form there the left wing opposite Regillus and to outflank and envelop the Roman right (for he had some 10 ships more⁶¹⁷) than the allies and he could employ this surplus for enveloping the enemy's seaward flank as on the land side the wings were covered by the shore). Now the same happened on the Syrian side as a moment before on the Roman: because the manoeuvre of passing from line ahead into line abreast must be executed in a hurry, it remained unfinished, so that here too the battle line ran slantingly backwards from Polyxenidas' left wing on the side of the open sea to the right landward flank; so the natural outcome of the situation was that the seaward wings were already engaged, while the landward wings (the Syrian right and the Rhodians on the Roman



⁶¹⁶) Thus rightly de Sanctis, cf. Liv. 37, 29, 7.9 (*Eudamus cogebat agmen*) and 30, 7, where it becomes apparent that the wings on the land side scarcely took part in the battle.

⁶¹⁷) For the Roman fleet see p. 349: there were 58 Roman quinqueremes and 22 Rhodian ships (probably quadriremes), together 80 (according to App. 27, 132, who fixes the number of Rhodian ships at 25, 83). For the Syrian fleet *v. s.* p. 275: it numbered 89 (or according to Appian 90) sail and was composed of 2 hepteres, 3 hexeres, 18 penteres and tetreres and 47 trieres, to which had been added 19—20 Rhodian vessels captured at Panhormus (probably tetreres). Polyxenidas had fought the battle of Cissus with trieres only, but he had tried to adapt his fleet to the Roman style

left) were still comparatively far removed from each other.⁶¹⁸) The Roman position on the seaward flank was highly precarious, because here Polyxenidas had an overlap of 10 ships, so that Regillus' right threatened to be enveloped. But Eudamus at once perceived the danger with his experienced eyes and, though being rather far behind and aside on the left wing he took the matter into his own hands and saved the situation. As the landward wings were still too far removed from each other to engage (*v. s.*), he profited by this circumstance to come up (of course behind the line) at lightning-speed on the menaced right flank and post the Rhodian squadron on Regillus' right in order to ward off the turning movement of the enemy.⁶¹⁹) The ships equipped with fire-baskets (apparently only part of the squadron carried this weapon, as had been the case at Panhormus) led the way⁶²⁰) and caused a panic among the enemies, who made already sure of victory. Fire- and ramming tactics combined ranked now uppermost on the seaward flank: many a Syrian ship flinched from the fire-baskets and thus exposed its side to the Rhodian ram, while others were destroyed by the fire thrown upon their decks. In such a way Polyxenidas' plan of working round the Roman right flank was brought to a standstill and this Rhodian achievement was of the greatest moment for the result of the battle; for the Roman ships in the centre (to which Regillus now also belonged, since Eudamus had come up into line on his right) could now apply themselves quietly and vigorously to their own favourite tactics without the fear of being menaced on two sides. No doubt, Polyxenidas had built heavier ships during the

of fighting by building heavier ships since; nevertheless even now the greater part of the Syrian fleet (47) consisted of trieres, whereas the Roman fleet was mainly composed of heavier vessels. The numerous light craft of the Syrian fleet did not play a part in the battle of Myonnesus: they had not answered the expectations in the battle of Cissus, *v. s.* p. 274.

⁶¹⁸) This has not been handed down *totidem verbis* (though Liv. 37, 30, 7 hints at it), but the whole situation implies it: otherwise the now following manoeuvre of Eudamus would have been impossible.

⁶¹⁹) Liv. 37, 29, 9, App. 27, 133; the manoeuvre is almost the same as was executed in the battle of Side; the only difference is that at Side it took place at the end of the battle, after the left wing had already gained the victory over its opponents, but at Myonnesus at the very beginning of the fight, *before* the left wing could engage its own opponents. In both cases the Rhodian rowers achieved wonders of speed. *V. s.* p. 342 sq.

⁶²⁰) App. 27, 133, see Graefe, *Hermes* 57, 436, 1. For the fire-baskets *v. s.* p. 320 sq.; Liv. 37, 30, 2—5; App. 27, 134.

winter in order to be able to confront the Roman boarding tactics with better success than before and put it into practice himself; but the Roman soldiers were much better than the Syrian ⁶²¹) and, moreover, the Syrians were not familiar with the new method; and Regillus, who was a very bad tactician, was a brave fighter. So the Romans soon gained the upperhand in the centre and here they succeeded in breaking through the Syrian line, so that Polyxenidas' extreme left, which could scarcely stand its ground against the Rhodians alone, was now also attacked in the rear by the Romans. ⁶²²) This event turned the scale definitely in favour of the Roman cause: Polyxenidas gave the signal for flight. At that moment the Syrian right wing had scarcely entered into conflict with its opponents ⁶²³) and this was a very lucky circumstance for the Romans, because the success of Eudamus' daring manoeuvre depended on it; for on the Roman left flank the departure of the Rhodians had naturally produced a terribly large gap and here, on the land side, the Roman line might have been enveloped in its turn, if the struggle had dragged on for a longer time. So Eudamus' scheme depended entirely on speed and it speaks volumes for his insight and promptness that he really succeeded in deciding rapidly the struggle on the seaward flank before his absence could occasion a calamity on the landward wing. So the Syrian right was still intact, when Polyxenidas gave the signal for retreat, and it succeeded easily in escaping to Ephesus before the wind with hoisted dolons; but the left wing was all but destroyed and the centre had also suffered severe losses: almost half the Syrian battle-fleet, 42 ships, of which 13 were captured, 29 destroyed by fire or sunk, got lost during the battle; ⁶²⁴) that the lion's share of them had been destroyed by ram or fire-basket proves conclusively that the Rhodians had contributed to the victory in a much higher degree than the Romans: the 13 captured ships probably formed the Roman boarding spoils in the centre, the 29 that had been destroyed were well-nigh the complete left wing, from

⁶²¹) Liv. 37, 30, 2. 6.

⁶²²) Liv. 37, 30, 6; App. 27, 135; the latter, however, spoils his description of the events by concentrating his attention upon a quite secondary incident, see Nissen 191.

⁶²³) Liv. 37, 30, 7.

⁶²⁴) Liv. 37, 30, 7—8; App. (27, 136) fixes the total number of ships lost by Polyxenidas at 29, one of his usual careless mistakes. It is highly characteristic that in Regillus' *tabula triumphalis* (Liv. 40, 52) all the 42 ships are mentioned as captured. of course by the Romans!

which scarcely one ship succeeded in escaping.⁶²⁵) The Romans had lost two ships, the Rhodians one, which thanks to a queer whim of fate was captured by the enemy.⁶²⁶)

The battle of Myonnesus, which took place in September 190,⁶²⁷) ended definitively the naval war.⁶²⁸) The distance-strategy with regard to the Hellespont, which Eudamus had had to protect with great pains against Regillus, now appeared to have been the right system. For, after Hannibal had been defeated and the fleet at Ephesus had been halved, Antiochus could naturally no longer think of disputing Roman naval supremacy and from this fact he immediately drew the unavoidable conclusion: he evacuated his outposts on the Hellespont, Lysimachia and Abydos, to concentrate all his forces in the interior of Asia Minor for the decisive battle on land.⁶²⁹) This line of conduct is regarded by our ancient authorities (and under their influence also by many a modern critic) as an unparalleled blunder of a mind disordered by the gods;⁶³⁰) but, as Kromayer has conclusively demonstrated, they are perfectly wrong in thinking so. Now that the Romans commanded the sea for good and all, Lysimachia *could* no longer be maintained: of course Antiochus might have defended this stronghold for a considerable time, but by reason of its isolation it would at last have been forced into surrender, which would only have meant the useless sacrifice of precious troops that were needed for the decisive battle in Asia Minor. Moreover, even if Antiochus had decided to maintain Lysimachia at any cost, he would not have been able to bar here the way of the Roman land army: in case the Scipios should have declined to spend time and men in besieging the town, they might simply have passed by! For, though Lysimachia was situated on the neck of the Chersonese, the town lay on both sides at a distance of several kilometers from the sea. And even if Antiochus had prevented the Romans from passing here by barricading the Chersonese from sea to sea with a wall starting on both sides from Lysimachia and by defending

⁶²⁵) It seems not improbable, that only Polyxenidas' flagship escaped here from destruction.

⁶²⁶) Liv. 37, 30, 9—10; App. 27, 134—136; the description of the capture of the Rhodian ship is a mystery to me, see Weissenborn ad Liv. *l. l.*

⁶²⁷) De Sanctis 394.

⁶²⁸) The following remarks are derived from Kromayer (II, 160 sq.).

⁶²⁹) Liv. 37, 31, 1—2; App. Syr. 28 and 37; Pol. 21, 15, 7—9; Diod. 29, 5.

⁶³⁰) See especially App. 28, whose judgment certainly rests upon Polybius (cf. Liv. *l. l.*, Niese II, 737).

this wall with considerable forces, this would not have profited him: in this case the Scipios could simply leave Lysimachia on their right. For the Romans now commanded the sea and consequently also the Hellespont *cum annexis*: the allied squadrons could ferry the land army from Tiristasis to Parium as well as from Sestus to Abydus or Lampsacus. But was it justifiable from a Roman point of view to leave such a stronghold unconquered in one's back? Why not? The Romans now needed no longer the miserable communication by land through Thrace, where thanks to Philip's faithful devotion the land army during its march to Asia had been laboriously provided with the most indispensable necessities: for the operations in Asia Minor Pergamum and the western coast formed the natural basis and the Roman communications with it ran via Greece by sea, where Rome was now master, and not via Thrace by land. All this was quite independent of the possession of Lysimachia. But what about Abydus? Oughtn't Antiochus, if he was forced to sacrifice Lysimachia, to have tried to command the Asiatic coast of the Hellespont at any cost and prevent the Scipios from landing here? This too was quite impracticable. The defence of straits more than 100 kilometers long by a land army without a fleet against an adversary who commanded the sea was like looking for a needle in a bottle of hay; we must not forget that Abydus was probably the only city on the coast of the Hellespont that was in Antiochus' hands and that at any rate he did *not* possess Lampsacus, Dardanus and Rhoeteum, which sided with the Romans.⁶³¹) So the allied squadrons could ferry the land army, wherever they liked. No, the king was perfectly right in avoiding every useless engagement with the enemy in the rocky coast area, where he couldn't prevent him from landing and where his own best arm, the cavalry, was of no use, and in concentrating at once the whole of his forces in the interior, where he could quietly choose a suitable ground for the final battle which was now fast approaching. The only fault we may lay at his door is not the evacuation of Lysimachia and Abydus as such, but the fact that in the former stronghold all stores were left behind undestroyed: that he made a present of these stores to the Roman land army, exhausted as it was by its march through Thrace, is indeed an inexplicable and unnecessary blunder.

But the victory of Myonnesus had still other consequences:⁶³²) not

⁶³¹) Liv. 35, 42, 2; 37, 9, 7; *v. s.* footnote 462 and p. 318.

⁶³²) For the following events Liv. 37, 31, 3—32.

only was the Hellespont entirely cleared by Antiochus, but he also raised at once the siege of Notium nor did he stir a finger to prevent Phocaea from being retaken by the Roman navy. Immediately after the victory Regillus had demonstrated with the fleet before Ephesus (of course Polyxenidas remained wisely within the harbour with his halved fleet) and thereupon he had sailed to Chios, where it had been his original intention to go before the battle.⁶³³) The vessels injured during the fight having been repaired here, he sent 30 ships to the Hellespont in order to assist Eumenes in ferrying the land army (now, after the decisive victory had been gained, this could indeed be done without any risk) and allowed the Rhodians to return home.⁶³⁴) But they offered voluntarily to co-operate with the other naval forces in ferrying the land army; only after this had been achieved, they sailed back to Rhodes from the Hellespont. With the rest of the Roman fleet — no more than 28 sail⁶³⁵) — the praetor made for Phocaea and began to assault the town. At first the citizens bravely offered resistance, but when Regillus declared to be ready to accept their submission on the same terms, on which they had formerly surrendered to C. Livius,⁶³⁶) and when, moreover, they had, by means of an embassy, obtained the certainty, that Antiochus wouldn't stir a finger to assist them, they opened their gates. But in flat defiance of the terms that had been stipulated and of the praetor's express command the soldiers, exasperated by the untrustworthiness displayed by the Phocaeans during the last year, started plundering. Regillus, whose prestige — we had to state it before⁶³⁷) — was none too great, was not able to prevent them from having their way; but he took the free inhabitants under his protection and gave them back their town, territory and laws. The fleet remained at Phocaea for the purpose of hibernation. — The

⁶³³) V. s. p. 350.

⁶³⁴) Were the 13 Syrian ships that had been captured in the battle given away to the Rhodians? It seems not improbable and may perhaps be inferred from Livy's words (37, 31, 6): *Rhodium parte praedae et spoliis navalibus decoratos domum redire iubet.*

⁶³⁵) Or did the Rhodians accompany Regillus to Phocaea before they made for the Hellespont? Livy's narrative does not suggest it; but on the other hand 28 ships with a garrison of little more than 3000 soldiers are but a weak force for an assault upon Phocaea.

⁶³⁶) These terms are not mentioned by Livy à propos of the occupation of Phocaea by C. Livius (36, 43, 11; 45, 7; 37, 9, 4); but it seems probable that at that moment the town had been allowed to retain her autonomy or that at least a promise had been given in this direction, cf. 37, 32, 14.

⁶³⁷) V. s. p. 334.

raising of the siege of Notium and the abandoning of Phocaea were in perfect harmony with Antiochus' plan of war and are no more to be regarded as blunders than the evacuation of the Hellespont: with a view to the final battle he wanted now to concentrate all his forces in the interior and consequently gave up the entire coast except Ephesus (here Polyxenidas remained till after the battle of Magnesia with the remains of the fleet). Had he acted otherwise, he would have split his forces quite uselessly. ⁶³⁸⁾

The happy news of the victory of Myonnesus and of the evacuation of Lysimachia reached the Scipios, when they had already passed the territory of Maronea and Aenus. ⁶³⁹⁾ Soon (probably in the second half of October) ⁶⁴⁰⁾ they entered Lysimachia unhindered; here the army, exhausted as it was by the long, laborious march through Thrace, greeted with cheers the Syrian stores that had been left behind undestroyed. The troops remained for some days in the town, waiting for the numerous invalids left behind along the road in Thrace, and then they entered the Chersonese and arrived at the Hellespont. Here a great number of Roman ships (probably 53 battle-ships and a number of light craft), the Rhodian squadron and Eumenes' fleet were ready for ferrying the army to Asia, which — it needs no explanation after what has been said about Antiochus' plan of war — took place without any difficulty or resistance. We may make short work of what followed, as it does not belong to our subject: a few months later, in the dead of winter (190—189), the war was definitely decided in favour of Rome in the great land battle of Magnesia; ⁶⁴¹⁾ but.... it was the preceding naval operations that had paved the way for this decision: without them it would not have been possible.

So our task is now almost at an end; for it goes without saying that in the years following the battle of Magnesia scarcely any maritime event of importance took place in the waters of Greece and Asia. Before we pass on to a short discussion of those trifling naval achievements and of the peace with Antiochus, which exerted a strong influence upon the

⁶³⁸⁾ De Sanctis 192.

⁶³⁹⁾ They will have passed round those cities themselves, as they were still held by Syrian garrisons, *v. s. p.* 256 and cf. Liv. 37, 60, 7. For the following events Liv. 37, 33; App. Syr. 29, 142; Diod. 29, 5.

⁶⁴⁰⁾ De Sanctis 393.

⁶⁴¹⁾ For the battle of Magnesia the reader is especially referred to Kromayer II, 163 sq.

maritime history of the ensuing epoch, we shall do well to look back once more to the operations in the Asiatic waters we have just discussed and which occupied exactly one year (from September 191 to September 190). I do not know the feelings of my readers in perusing the long tale of these operations; but I do know that they awake a certain uncomfortable sensation in myself, in spite of the fascinating positional struggle displayed by them. I will not speak here again about the strategic blunders committed on either side: they have been sufficiently discussed and, moreover, they are rather irrelevant to the point at issue here, because strategic mistakes are committed in every war, though they were pretty numerous in this case and though the fact that a man of Regillus' inability could be appointed admiral for the decisive year 190 remains a disgusting result of the Roman oligarchic régime. But both the Roman and the Syrian government come off miserably! On the one hand the clumsy machinery of an unwieldy empire without real energy or efficiency: in the autumn of 191 Antiochus had not yet united his whole fleet in the Aegean; only during the winter, after the first defeat, he decided to build new ships and to order the Syrian home fleet to Ephesus, and only in August 190 the latter would make a weak and abortive attempt at appearing in the Aegean. On the other hand the Roman senate, strenuous and efficient enough, but downright neglectful and short-sighted in the maritime sphere; why else were the new ships never launched, though the resolution to build them had been passed and though they were bitterly needed in the Aegean, so that the Romans had to squeeze themselves twice through the eye of a needle? This maritime war has something in itself of a fight between a lame and a blind man; but the blindman enjoyed the precious support of the Rhodians: *they* won the game for Rome.⁶⁴²⁾

The immediate result of the defeat of Magnesia was⁶⁴³⁾ that Polyxenidas, who up to that moment had maintained Ephesus, now

⁶⁴²⁾ Polybius, whose version of the Syrian war has been handed down to us by Livy and Appian both, derived his description of naval warfare in the Asiatic waters chiefly from Rhodian sources and therefore described it more or less from a Rhodian point of view (see *i. a.* Nissen 191 sq.); but this does not mean that his representation of the facts should be inaccurate or unreliable: the plain description for instance of the mistakes, made by the Rhodian admiral in the battle of Side, proves the contrary.

⁶⁴³⁾ Liv. 37, 45, 1—2.

evacuated the town and with the remains of his battle-fleet, 47 ships ⁶⁴⁴) — the light craft were probably left behind at Ephesus ⁶⁴⁵) —, sailed to Patara in Lycia. He did not venture to proceed further for fear of the Rhodian fleet at Megiste: he left the ships at Patara, where afterwards they would be destroyed in accordance with the terms of peace, ⁶⁴⁶) and made for Syria by land himself. ⁶⁴⁷) Immediately after his departure Ephesus had gone over to the Romans.

Of the consuls elected for 189 (M. Fulvius Nobilior and Cn. Manlius Vulso, Liv. 37, 47, 6 sq.) Fulvius had been charged with the command against Aetolia (the negotiations with the Aetolians had resulted in a failure again, so that the conflict must be finished by main force), while Asia had fallen to Manlius' share; the naval command in the Asiatic waters had fallen by lot to the praetor Q. Fabius Labeo (Liv. 37, 50). Special instructions had been given to Fulvius to bring now also into definite subjection the island Cephallenia, the pirates of which were being checked since the spring of 190 by a squadron of 18 sail (Liv. 37, 50, 5; v. s. p. 261 sq.). The news of the victory of Magnesia did not cause these arrangements to be changed: notwithstanding Antiochus' defeat Manlius was to go to Asia as successor of Scipio in order to settle accounts with the Kelts who had supported the Syrian king and who, moreover, terrorized the whole of Asia Minor by means of their raids (37, 51, 8—10). The campaigns of Fulvius against Aetolia and of Manlius against the Kelts, both of which met with success, lie outside the range of our subject; suffice it for me to say a few words about the petty naval achievements of Regillus' ⁶⁴⁸) successor Q. Fabius Labeo and about the

⁶⁴⁴) Of the 89 ships 42 had been lost at Myonnesus; the number is not mentioned here, but it is afterwards fixed by Livy at 50, evidently a rounded-off number (Liv. 38, 39, 2—3, à propos of the destruction of the Syrian fleet).

⁶⁴⁵) V. s. p. 274.

⁶⁴⁶) Liv. 38, 39, 2—3.

⁶⁴⁷) De Sanctis (IV, 1, 204, 140) suspects the authenticity of the communication about Polyxenidas' fear of the Rhodian fleet. But we must not forget that after the assistance, lent by the Rhodians to the other allied naval forces in ferrying the land army across the Hellespont, the entire Rhodian fleet (some 40 sail) was now again in the southern waters: it is fairly possible (though it has not been expressly handed down to us) that all these ships were lying at Megiste, as Hannibal's squadron was still extant after all. And that P. avoided an engagement with the Rhodians, though he had a few ships more, is quite natural after Side and Myonnesus.

⁶⁴⁸) We remarked several times before, that Regillus was allowed an undeserved *triumphus navalis* after his return to Rome. See for this triumph Liv. 37, 58, 3—4;

expedition of Fulvius against Cephallenia; in conclusion we shall for a moment concentrate our attention upon the peace with Antiochus.

That little remained to be done in the Aegean for Q. Fabius Labeo, goes without saying: the battle of Myonnesus had practically brought naval warfare to an end and, moreover, hostilities between Rome and Antiochus had been stopped wholly since the battle of Magnesia. In order to do at least something and not remain wholly inactive ⁶⁴⁹) he resolved to interfere with the affairs of Crete, where the everlasting internal dissensions had once more resulted in a war (of Cydonia against Cnossus and Gortyn) and where it was said that numerous Roman and Italic prisoners were kept as slaves. So he put to sea with his fleet from Ephesus, which had become the Roman naval base since the battle of Magnesia and the evacuation of the town by Polyxenidas, and after his arrival in Crete he addressed a proclamation to the Cretans that they should stop fighting, hand over the prisoners and send envoys to him in order to deliberate on the matters concerning Crete and Rome equally. But the Cretans took it very coolly; only Gortyn restored the prisoners. Thus runs the account of Polybius as it is rendered by Livy; but the latter adds that according to Valerius Antias 4000 prisoners should have been handed over, not by Gortyn alone, but by the whole island, and that Fabius, who had achieved nothing else, should have obtained a naval triumph for this reason. At first sight we feel naturally inclined to prefer Polybius' account to that of the born forger Antias, which in a general way is indeed to be regarded as the only reasonable method; but in this case we get into a blind alley by doing so. For thanks to an incidental remark of Livy (38, 47, 5), to coins "immortalizing" the fact and to the recent discovery of a fragment of the *Fasti triumphales* ⁶⁵⁰) we know

40, 52; Pol. 21, 24, 17 and the fragment of the *Fasti triumphales*, discovered in 1927 (Colini, *Bull. della Comm. arch. com. di Roma* 55, 1927, 271).

⁶⁴⁹) Liv. 37, 60.

⁶⁵⁰) See Nissen 201, Klotz 93, de Sanctis IV, 1, 224, 181 and for the fragment of the *Fasti triumphales* discovered in 1927 Colini, *Bull. della Comm. arch. com. di Roma* 55, 1927, 269 sq. Thanks to this fragment we now know that Labeo triumphed *ex Asia de rege Antiocho*, and not *ex Creta*! This is, however, not inconsistent with the view laid down in my text, because as a matter of course the triumph could *officially* be granted only on account of a war conducted by the commander concerned and never on account of the liberation by means of negotiations of a number of prisoners, however great it might be. So the senate must formally have based the granting of the triumph on Labeo's achievements against Antiochus (the clearing of Aenus and Maronea and the destruction of the Syrian fleet at Patara in accordance

for a certainty that Fabius *did* triumph; and as this happened in spite of the protest of a number of tribunes who argued that Labeo had not seen war at all, we are forced to assume that he really obtained his triumph on account of the liberation of prisoners in Crete, an assumption which necessarily implies that the great number of freed prisoners handed down by Antias must be correct. For if the matter had turned on a few hundreds of prisoners, he would certainly not have been granted a triumph, however void of reason the senate's attitude on this occasion may have been. It is possible that Labeo himself exaggerated the number of freed prisoners in order to obtain the triumph; the condition upon which the granting of a triumph primarily depended, that is to say at least 5000 enemies must have been killed in battle, often induced commanders to falsify the numbers, and something like this may have played a part in Labeo's game as well.⁶⁵¹) On the other hand this seems not very probable, because the senate could more easily control the number of freed prisoners, who naturally must have returned to Italy, than the numbers of enemies killed on a far distant battle-field. Be this as it may, *if* a forger has had a finger in this pie, it must have been Labeo himself and not poor Antias; and at any rate Labeo's triumph remains one of the most ridiculous or disgusting events in Roman history: even Regillus' triumph was quite deserved in comparison with this one! The man must have had powerful relations; but let us not concern ourselves with the dingy, unsavoury *dessous* of the Roman oligarchic régime. — The question, who were those freed slaves, is of far greater importance: were they prisoners from the second Punic war, sold by Hannibal to Greeks (de Sanctis 224)? Or did they come from Roman transports, captured by Cretan pirates during the Syrian war (Ormerod 188—189)? The latter seems more probable to me than the former; for, if they were prisoners from the second Punic war, why didn't the Roman government already take action on their behalf during the second Macedonian war, when, after the winding-up of the war between Rhodes and Crete, at least part of the Cretan cities

with the terms of the peace; that was all! *V.i.*), but nevertheless the liberation of the prisoners in Crete will have been the chief motive for granting it (thus rightly Colini 272—273). Naturally this does not tend to make the matter less disgusting, on the contrary it becomes still more crooked: the tribunes were perfectly right in protesting against this unworthy comedy.

⁶⁵¹) See Klotz *l.l.*

sided with Rome and Athens against Philip,⁶⁵²) or in 195,⁶⁵³) when Nabis was chastised by Flamininus and separated from his Cretan fellow-pirates? Moreover, we know for a certainty that the Rhodians, who in the main policed the Greek waters excellently from 200 to 167, bitterly needed all their warships for the operations against Antiochus during the Syrian war, so that in those years piracy began to flourish again dreadfully. Apart from the Cephallenian pirates, who profited for a full year by the neglectfulness of the senate,⁶⁵⁴) we hear of the pirate Nicander who co-operated with Polyxenidas,⁶⁵⁵) of Abydene privateers, who marauded the waters of Chios, the centre of revictualling for the Roman navy,⁶⁵⁶) and of pirates who had plundered the coasts of Chios and came across the Roman fleet in the neighbourhood of Myonnesus.⁶⁵⁷) Against Cephallenia the Roman government sent at last 18 ships, but in the Aegean we only hear of 2 Rhodian vessels, sent by C. Livius to the waters of Chios in the spring of 190 in order to fight the pirates.⁶⁵⁸) So it would have been nothing short of marvellous, if the Cretans, with whom piracy was as endemic as their internal feuds, should *not* have availed themselves of such a splendid opportunity to get a share of the plunder. Might this be true, then the matters concerning Romans and Cretans equally (Liv. 37, 60, 4) must have comprised Cretan piracy above all other things. Was it at the request of the Rhodians that Labeo embarked upon this Cretan expedition?⁶⁵⁹) It is possible, but has not been handed down; no doubt, it concerned the Rhodians deeply,

⁶⁵²) V. s. p. 224.

⁶⁵³) V. s. p. 253; this argument is the more conclusive, because at that time T. Quinctius provided for the liberation of Italic prisoners in Greece itself, Liv. 34, 50; Plut. *Flam.* 13. The relations between Rome and Crete from 195 to 189 are quite obscure; for instance we do not know at all, what became of the Cretan towns Nabis was forced in 195 to hand over to Rome. From the events of 189 we may safely conclude that the Romans had not occupied these towns in 195; but at any rate they had a strong fleet in the Greek waters (and a strong army in Greece) at the moment of Nabis' fall and by means of this they might easily have wrested from the Cretans the enslaved prisoners, if these had been present in the island at the time. So they probably were not.

⁶⁵⁴) V. s. p. 261 sq. and 326.

⁶⁵⁵) V. s. p. 319.

⁶⁵⁶) V. s. p. 327.

⁶⁵⁷) V. s. p. 351 and for all these facts Ormerod *l. l.* and Ziebarth 28 sq..

⁶⁵⁸) V. s. p. 327.

⁶⁵⁹) Niese II, 750, 2.

that the internal war of the Cretans should come to an end and that their piracies should be suppressed. But on the other hand we must not forget that after the battle of Magnesia they could again dispose of their entire battle-fleet for the purpose of fighting the evil of piracy; and they will immediately have taken this task into their own hands and pursued it vigorously. *Non liquet*. — From Crete Fabius returned to Ephesus; from there he embarked upon an expedition to the Thracian coast in order to clear Aenus and Maronea of the Syrian garrisons still present there and he restored both cities to freedom.⁶⁶⁰) We shall presently meet Fabius Labeo again, because he played a part (but once more a very modest part!) in the execution of the terms of peace. Now we must first discuss the conquest of Cephallenia by Fulvius Nobilior.

Here too an affair of piracy had to be wound up. Already in the first year of the war the island had to be kept in check by Roman men of war; these warships having withdrawn from the waters of western Greece in the spring of 191, the islanders had immediately joined the Aetolians again and had practised piracy at the expense of the Roman transports for almost a full year; since the spring of 190 they were again kept at bay by Roman men of war, but apparently had not been fully subdued. So they must now be definitely subjected to the sway of Rome. It stands to reason that here the success was greater and the action more vigorous than in Crete, where the praetor had only addressed a proclamation to the obstinate pirates. Already on the occasion of the dividing of the *provinciae consulares* for 189 the senate had given special instructions to the consul obtaining the command against Aetolia to subdue also Cephallenia (Liv. 37, 50, 5). Consequently, after the consul M. Fulvius Nobilior had forced the Aetolians into submission, in the treaty of peace Cephallenia had been expressly separated from the Aetolian league, to which it had belonged up to that moment, because the Romans wanted to possess the island themselves.⁶⁶¹) After settling accounts with Aetolia Fulvius crossed to Cephallenia; ⁶⁶²) the 18 ships policing the waters

⁶⁶⁰) V.s. footnote 639. According to Livy (37, 60, 7) Fabius sent 3 ships to the Thracian coast in order to accomplish this task; but 39, 27, 10 it becomes incidentally apparent that he had been present there himself for the purpose of settling the boundaries between Maronea and Philip's territory: so Livy must have expressed himself carelessly in the first-quoted passage. See Niese *l.l.*

⁶⁶¹) Liv. 38, 9, 10; 11, 7 = Pol. 21, 30, 5; 32, 12.

⁶⁶²) Liv. 38, 10, 2; 28, 5—30, 1; Pola 21, 32^b; Zon. 9, 21, 4.

of western Greece since the spring of 190 assisted him in this enterprise.⁶⁶³) At first the towns of the island submitted voluntarily and gave hostages; but subsequently one of them, Same, suddenly revolted again, because the inhabitants (probably not without valid reasons) feared that they should be forced by the Romans to evacuate the town. So Same had to be besieged and thanks to the stubborn resistance of the citizens the siege dragged on for 4 months; when the town fell at last, the inhabitants must pay for their brave behaviour with their freedom: they were enslaved; a Roman garrison was stationed at Same. So, besides Corcyra, ⁶⁶⁴) Zacynthus ⁶⁶⁵) and Cephallenia were now also in the power of the Romans: they wanted to have the islands in the waters west of Greece under their own control, because, learned by the experience of 191, they declined henceforth to run the risk of their maritime lines of communication with the Aegean being interrupted by piracy again.

The siege of Same probably lasted from the autumn of 189 to the beginning of 188; ⁶⁶⁶) embroilments in the Peloponnese between Sparta and the Achaean league coincided with it. Though being herself a member of the Achaean league since 192, ⁶⁶⁷) Sparta had made an attempt upon one of the Laconian coast towns that had been taken from Nabis in 195 and had been placed by Flamininus under the protection of the Achaean league. ⁶⁶⁸) This attack called forth a harsh counteraction from the side of the Achaeans, while Rome remained more or less neutral: Sparta was now forced to give up her time-honoured institutions that had been respected in 192 and to conform wholly to Achaean views. From this state of things new conflicts would arise in the future; ⁶⁶⁹) but the most troublesome fire-brands in Greece, the Aetolians, had been humbled by Rome for good and all.

We may now close this chapter with a few remarks upon the peace with Antiochus which came off in 188; we cannot discuss here all the

⁶⁶³) *V. s.* p. 262; perhaps the vessels of Pleuratus and of the Achaeans which during the struggle with the Aetolians had plundered their shores (*Liv.* 38, 7, 2—3) also assisted him in his expedition against Cephallenia. But it has not been handed down to us.

⁶⁶⁴) For the Roman control of Corcyra cf. *Liv.* 38, 11, 5 = *Pol.* 21, 32, 6 and Weissenborn ad *Liv. l. l.*; for a different view Zippel 89 sq., 94.

⁶⁶⁵) *V. s.* p. 293.

⁶⁶⁶) For the chronological problem de Sanctis IV, 1, 396; *C. A. H.* VIII, 228, 1.

⁶⁶⁷) *V. s.* p. 285.

⁶⁶⁸) *V. s.* p. 253.

⁶⁶⁹) *Liv.* 38, 30 sq.

terms of the treaty, but only those material to maritime history.⁶⁷⁰) In the first place Antiochus had to renounce Cistauric Asia; ⁶⁷¹) secondly he must hand over to the Romans his warfleet and also in future he was not allowed to possess more than 10 armoured vessels, while he was forbidden altogether the possession of *lembi* with more than 30 oars and of *moneres* (nearly identical with *pentekonteres*), except in case of a defensive war; ⁶⁷²) thirdly with the few men of war left to him he was not allowed to sail west of the mouth of the river Calycadnus and Cape Sarpedonium in Cilicia. ⁶⁷³) The first term left the whole of Cilicia to Antiochus, that is to say also the western part of this country, the so-called "Rough Cilicia" (*Cilicia Trachea*); ⁶⁷⁴) but... the third term made this possession all but illusory! For Cilicia Tracheia lies west of the Calycadnus and Sarpedonium; so the effect of the ordinance was that this part of the country became practically independent: the Syrian king could no longer reach it by sea and invasion by land could be attempted only by the coast-road, much of which is impracticable for a large force. ⁶⁷⁵) The country, therefore, ceased to be of interest to the Syrian kings; it was left to itself. This fact exerted a serious influence upon the maritime history of the ensuing epoch; for in consequence of the useless and foolish Roman ordinance Cilicia Tracheia became now more and more a hotbed of piracy; and those pirates were practically quite independent. No doubt, the results of this deplorable state of things would not become clearly perceptible at once; for in those very years that followed the Syrian war (188—167) Rhodes was at the summit of her power, policed the Greek seas strenuously and will certainly have extended this control to the Cilician waters for the sake of her own trade with the East, exactly because the Seleucids could no longer intervene in that area.

⁶⁷⁰) For the terms discussed here cf. Liv. 38, 38; Pol. 21, 43; App. Syr. 39.

⁶⁷¹) For a thorough discussion of the extent of this area the reader is referred to de Sanctis IV, 1, 207. I cannot enter into this question here.

⁶⁷²) For the fleetnumbers Mommsen, *R. F.* II, 532 sq., de Sanctis IV, 1, 207, 146; in the accounts of Polybius and Livy both the passage containing the regulations regarding the limitation of the Syrian navy is corrupt; Appian fixes the number of cataphracts at 12 instead of 10. That also in later years Rome saw strictly that this ordinance was fulfilled, appears from App. Syr. 46, 239—240, see Clark 61.

⁶⁷³) See *i. a.* de Sanctis 208, 149 against Mommsen, *R. F.* II, 534 sq.

⁶⁷⁴) Appian mistakenly assumes the Calycadnus and Sarpedonium to have become the territorial boundary of the Syrian empire in Cilicia, a blunder which certainly does not originate with Polybius, but results from Appian's carelessness.

⁶⁷⁵) See Ormerod 199 sq., especially 204, and Ziebarth 31 sq.

But, when after 167 Rhodes was seriously humiliated and weakened by Rome on account of her attitude during the third Macedonian war, when accordingly the energy displayed by the Rhodians in policing the seas also began to fade, when Rome herself began to neglect her navy to such an extent that at last she had practically no longer any navy at all, and when — last, but not least — the growing of large estates in Italy and their urgent demand for numerous cheap slaves (of which commodity the pirates were the chief furnishers) caused the traditional Roman indifference with respect to piracy to pass into connivance (alas, the senate was the stronghold of the landlords), ⁶⁷⁶) all barriers against piracy were removed and the corsairs of Cilicia began to rule the roast in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, and even not there alone. It is worthy of note that those same *latifundia* that by means of their urgent demand for slaves had strongly furthered the rise of piracy, on the other hand also gave the impulse to the revival of the Roman navy in the first century b. C., as they deprived Italy of its agrarian autarky and made it dependent on transmarine import of grain, so that to shield Italy from starvation the Roman government was forced willy-nilly to create a navy again.... against the beloved pirates! The peace of 188 laid down the first foundation for this fatal and shameful development, which covered almost a full century.

But.... these evils would only come to the surface in later years: in 188 Rhodes was at the summit of her glory; richly rewarded she came out of the war which indeed had chiefly been won thanks to her excellent services. In 188 the Romans did not yet think of transforming Asia Minor into a Roman province; so they gave it away. ⁶⁷⁷) Rhodes received Caria south of the Maeander and Lycia except Telmessus; but Eumenes got the lion's share, that is to say all the rest of the territory in Asia Minor evacuated by Antiochus (also Ephesus and, as an enclave in Rhodian territory, Telmessus) besides the Chersonese with Lysimachia in Europe. In this way Pergamum was at one sweep transformed into a powerful empire, intended by Rome to serve as a buffer state between Macedon (it was separated from Pergamene territory by the two free cities Aenus and Maronea which Eumenes and Philip grudged each other) and Syria. That Rome leant more to the submissive, devoted client-king than to the proud, self-reliant republic, appears especially from the treatment of

⁶⁷⁶) Strabo 14, 668—669 and Ormerod 207.

⁶⁷⁷) For the following events Liv. 38, 39, 5 sq.; Pol. 21, 46; App. Syr. 44.

the Greek cities in Asia Minor. The Rhodians had pleaded earnestly with the senate for bestowing upon these cities the autonomy, for the sake of which Rome *i. a.* had gone to war against Antiochus; the practical result of such a policy would probably have been that the free cities would have placed themselves under the protectorate of Rhodes. This was, however, not in accordance with the Roman intentions; they were ready to grant the republic the minimum she had deserved on account of her brilliant achievements in the war, but they were not willing to make her too powerful. So the senate followed chiefly the advice of Eumenes, who had opposed the Rhodian proposal,⁶⁷⁸) and gave the autonomy only to those cities that had been subjected to Antiochus, but had sided with Rome during the war: all the rest, that is to say those that had already formerly been tributaries of Eumenes and those that had stuck to Antiochus, came under the sway of Pergamum. The freedom and autonomy of the Greek cities in Asia Minor had been for Rome a rallying-cry against Antiochus, not a real ideal which she was ready to maintain even in the face of Eumenes' interests.⁶⁷⁹) So on the one hand it is certainly true that the power of Rhodes was strongly increased by the peace regulations of 188; but on the other hand those same regulations reveal a certain cool reserve of Rome towards the Rhodian republic, which foreboded little good. Indeed menacing clouds were gathering: the Rhodians would become painfully aware of the fact that the presents of Rome had only been given *precario* and that by helping the Romans to victory in the struggle with Antiochus they had made themselves wholly dependent on the good graces of Rome.

After the peace between Rome and Antiochus had been brought about in Asia Minor under the auspices of the proconsul Cn. Manlius Vulso, the latter ordered Q. Fabius Labeo, who after his expedition to Crete, Aenus and Maronea⁶⁸⁰) had been lying with his fleet at Ephesus, to sail to Patara and destroy the royal ships left there by Polyxenidas.⁶⁸¹) Labeo fulfilled this task and, besides, forced Telmessus into obedience. The town had probably revolted, because she was the only Lycian city

⁶⁷⁸) For the debates in the senate Liv. 37, 52—54 = Pol. 21, 18—24; for the old antagonism between Pergamum and Rhodes *v. s.* p. 205 and 225 sq. Compare de Sanctis IV, 1, 226 sq. and C. A. H. VIII, 230 sq.

⁶⁷⁹) *V. s.* p. 257.

⁶⁸⁰) *V. s.* p. 363 sq.

⁶⁸¹) *V. s.* p. 362.

assigned to Eumenes and because she refused to be separated from the others; as we remarked before, the rest of Lycia, including Patara, came under Rhodian control. Thereupon Labeo returned with the entire fleet to Italy, where he was to receive an exceedingly undeserved triumph, like his predecessor Regillus.⁶⁸²⁾

In the summer of 188 Cn. Manlius also set out on the homeward journey with the land army.⁶⁸³⁾ Just as the Scipios on the outward journey, he marched through Thrace, a risky enterprise, because he went now in the opposite direction, so that he must do without Philip's support and preparatives which had enabled the Scipios to march through the inhospitable country; so it is no wonder that a fleet of transports laden with victuals followed him along the Thracian coast.⁶⁸⁴⁾ The evil results were not tardy in presenting themselves: the Thracians made surprising attacks upon Manlius' forces, robbed them of part of the enormous booty from Asia they dragged along with them and inflicted losses upon them. Appian (Polybius?) rightly asks the question, why Manlius didn't transport his army home by sea; indeed, we made the same remark with respect to the outward journey to Asia and here it is all the more appropriate, because now Rome commanded the seas perfectly. But... the Romans remained Romans after all: they never transported an *army* round Malea, neither in the second Macedonian war nor in the Syrian war; to avoid this they did not shun the worst hardships and dangers on land. But Manlius could at least have crossed to Greece by sea, in order to avoid the dangerous march through Thrace; that he neglected to do so, remains a serious blunder. For now the army suffered severe losses and, moreover, it arrived only late in the autumn at Apollonia, where it passed the winter to reach Italy at last in the spring of 187. This time it is Livy's turn to make the ironical remark⁶⁸⁵⁾ that his own contemporaries were no longer afraid of crossing from Illyria to Brindisi during the winter. Indeed, during the civil wars Cesar and others did little care about winter-storms on this passage; but Livy forgets that already in 191 Acilius Glabrio had ventured to cross from Brindisi to Illyria in the dead of winter⁶⁸⁶⁾ and

⁶⁸²⁾ Liv. 38, 39, 2—4; Pol. 21, 44, 3. The anecdote of Valerius Maximus (7, 3, 4) cannot be authentic, because it is inconsistent with the terms of the treaty of peace; for Telmessus see Weissenborn ad Liv. *l. l.*; for Labeo's triumph *v. s.* p. 363 sq.

⁶⁸³⁾ Liv. 38, 40—41; App. *Syr.* 43, *Mac.* 9, 5.

⁶⁸⁴⁾ Liv. 38, 41, 8.

⁶⁸⁵⁾ 38, 41, 15.

⁶⁸⁶⁾ *V. s.* footnote 403.

that Cesar's foolhardiness was just as typical of the Roman landlubberish mentality as Manlius' fear. These unimportant events which conclude the Syrian war are as it were symbolic for it at the same time: the Romans owed very much to the navy in this war, but nevertheless they carried it on in the genuine Roman style, that is to say in a state of mind that cannot be called real navy.

C: the third Macedonian war. Introduction. A detailed discussion of the factors that brought about the decisive measuring of strength between Rome and Macedon is out of place here; ⁶⁸⁷) suffice it to say that after the Syrian war Rome looked with suspicious eyes at the exertions of Philip and subsequently of his successor Perseus to make of Macedon a powerful state again and that she tried to thwart these endeavours as much as she could, so that the relations between the two powers got more and more strained. Nor can I enter here into the question of guilt; but it seems certain that Perseus did not want the war and that Rome on the other hand provoked the conflict deliberately, albeit at the instigation of Pergamum (compare the antecedents of the Syrian war). As for the Greek world, the lower classes in this country had leant to Macedon for a long time past and this tendency was considerably strengthened by the fact that the well-to-do now shamelessly oppressed them under the protection of Rome; but the anti-Roman feelings in Greece did not remain limited to the populace. For here too Rome, true to her principle *divide ut imperes*, inclined to prevent every concentration of power, that is to say the formation of potential focuses of resistance, and this policy had painfully brought home to numerous moderates that the existence of a strong Macedonian state was highly desirable as a counterpoise against Rome, that on the other hand the destruction of Macedon resulting in an unrestricted and unmenaced Roman rule must be regarded as detrimental to the Greek world. As a matter of course such moderately anti-Roman sentiments prevailed with Rhodes. The proud, self-reliant republic had never been strongly pro-Roman: she had never concluded a formal alliance with the Romans and, though she had strenuously supported them in the second Macedonian and Syrian wars, she had done so on a purely practical base. This keen sense of independence did not please the Romans. No

⁶⁸⁷) For a thorough discussion of the antecedents of the war the reader is referred to Niese III, 3 sq., de Sanctis IV, 1, 235 sq., C. A. H. VIII, 241 sq.

doubt, after the Syrian war they had presented the Rhodians with Caria and Lycia in return for their important services; but afterwards they partly revoked this donation, thus countenancing — undoubtedly on purpose — the Lycians in their resistance against Rhodes. These entanglements brought about a strong estrangement between Rhodes and Rome, while the old antipathy between Rhodes and Pergamum⁶⁸⁸) was sharpened by it, because Rome's most zealous and submissive servant Eumenes was immediately induced by the senate's attitude to oppose for his part also the Rhodian interests on the mainland of Asia Minor and thus to support the Lycians.⁶⁸⁹) It stands to reason that under these circumstances the old Macedonian sympathies⁶⁹⁰) revived among the Rhodians and that they began to realize keenly the dangers of an absolute and unrestricted Roman rule. To be sure, this does not mean that Rhodes threw in her lot with Perseus in the third Macedonian war: officially she even declared her willingness to support Rome and really furnished a number of ships (though a very small number!) during the first year of the war; but she kept aloof since and the Macedonian sympathies of a considerable part of the Rhodian population revealed themselves clearly in attempts at mediation and such like. In discussing the events of the war we shall consider these things in detail; for the moment it may suffice to state that, apart from the aid of the always zealous Pergamum, the Romans were all but thrown upon their own forces in the third Macedonian war.

Especially in the maritime sphere this was not without risks. In the Syrian war the Romans owed their naval victories chiefly to the Rhodian navy; but now these eminent sailors would almost wholly stand aloof. Would the Roman navy be able to manage this time without the priceless Rhodian support? The prognosis could not be very favourable. It is certainly true that Perseus could only dispose of a weak fleet consisting chiefly of very light vessels, whereas Antiochus had thrown into action a strong navy in the Syrian war. But.... in the roughly 20 years that separated the third Macedonian war from the Syrian, the Roman navy had not thriven either; if we bear in mind the Roman inclination to extempore methods, we may easily realize that its strength must even

⁶⁸⁸) *V. s.* p. 205.

⁶⁸⁹) Compare the good and detailed discussion of these events by van Gelder 142 sq.

⁶⁹⁰) *V. s.* p. 204.

have been sinking fast during that period. Already in the Syrian war the Romans had by no means exerted themselves strenuously for the purpose of strengthening their naval forces, because they counted upon the auxiliary squadrons; probably they had not built new vessels during that war, but had managed to muddle through with the extant old stock of ships.⁶⁹¹⁾ Were there reasons for building new vessels *after* the Syrian war, between 188 and 172? Less than ever! For it was an episode of quiet in the maritime sphere: the Romans policed the Italian waters and even this humble task was not fulfilled regularly, but incidentally, in reply to outbursts of piracy. Naturally this task was an extremely light one, as is proved by the fact that for this purpose Rome now made use again of the dear old institution of the duumviral flotillas, which between 311 and 264 had been put in commission intermittently for the sake of the Italian coast defence, but had completely vanished during the great wars, when strong fleets were needed.⁶⁹²⁾ Of course the Romans could easily form these small twin squadrons of 2×10 ships from the old stock of vessels lying in the dockyards since the Syrian war. If it is true that no new ships had been built during the Syrian war, the vessels still extant at Rome in 172 must have dated from the second Punic war and have been 40 years old on a average.⁶⁹³⁾ That among these the number of ships reasonably fit for service must have rather decreased since the Syrian war, goes without saying and is, moreover, proved by the fleetnumbers of the third Macedonian war, which are rather low from the beginning to the end; that nevertheless in 172 and the next years the Romans continued to manage with this old material and did not think of building new ships, is a serious symptom of decline. In truth there is some reason to date the fleetless era from 188! The inertness displayed by the Roman navy in the third Macedonian war results — partly at least — from these factors; and at the same time it illustrates once more in a striking way the enormous services little Rhodes had rendered to Rome in the naval war against Antiochus.⁶⁹⁴⁾

⁶⁹¹⁾ *V. s.* p. 263 sq.

⁶⁹²⁾ *V. s.* p. 201; in my discussion of naval warfare in the western waters I shall treat of this point in detail.

⁶⁹³⁾ *V. s.* p. 267 sq.

⁶⁹⁴⁾ No doubt, similar symptoms reveal themselves in warfare on land during the third Macedonian war: the Romans now imagined themselves to be invincible and therefore clearly underrated the difficulties of the war against Macedon. But on land

The fleetnumbers. In order to determine the Roman naval effective during the third Macedonian war, we will start again from the fleetnumbers of the operations.⁶⁹⁵) According to Polybius (Liv. 42, 48, 5 sq.) in the first year of the war (171) 40 quinqueremes were taken from Rome to Greece by the praetor C. Lucretius, to whom the naval command had fallen by lot.⁶⁹⁶) This proper Roman squadron remained in the Aegean during the whole war and, as far as we know, it was never reinforced; but already at the end of 171 it lost 4 ships in consequence of a successful surprising attack launched by the Macedonian fleet near Oreus.⁶⁹⁷) Without apparently being conscious of the fact that he is telling twice the same events from different sources, Livy reproduces, besides Polybius' account of Lucretius' sailing, also the annalistic version of the Roman naval preparatives and of the praetor's departure (42, 27. 31. 35). In some respects this version is inconsistent with Polybius (and even with itself!) — I will discuss this point afterwards — and as a matter of course in such a case the Greek historian takes precedence of the annalists. This does, however, not mean that *all* the informations about the naval preparatives derived by Livy from his annalistic authority (from book 39 onward he follows chiefly Claudius Quadrigarius, cf. Klotz 49 sq.) must be regarded as forged: as a rule a genuine nucleus is hidden under the annalistic forgeries and it is our task to separate it from its spurious accretions. That the preparations were started as early as 172 (42, 27), we may readily accept, the more so because this communication is corroborated by Cato's testimony.⁶⁹⁸) That 50 (and not 40) quinqueremes were fitted out (Liv. 42, 27, 1. 2. 6. 7), we may also regard as correct,⁶⁹⁹) because we are expressly told by Polybius himself (Liv. 42, 48, 5) that,

they had sound military traditions and so could easily recover themselves; in the maritime sphere, on the other hand, this traditional element was very weak. That the quality of the Roman naval personnel had badly sunk during the long period of comparative quiet which preceded the third Macedonian war, appears clearly during this war.

⁶⁹⁵) For the fleetnumbers the reader may compare Kromayer II, 347—348.

⁶⁹⁶) The quinquereme sent ahead with M. Lucretius belonged in my opinion to the total effective of 40 and we must not add her to it, as does Kromayer (II, 347).

⁶⁹⁷) Plut. *Aem.* 9, 3, cf. Liedmeier 120.

⁶⁹⁸) Fr. 180 (Malcovati) = Festus (L.) 266, 27.

⁶⁹⁹) It is certainly astonishing that 12 of these ships came from Sicily, as no Sicilian squadron is mentioned after 189 (*v.s.* p. 261); but especially in Roman naval history we must be cautious about deriving arguments from the silence of the authorities.

when in 171 C. Lucretius departed for Greece with 40 ships, a number of other vessels were retained at Rome for other purposes: it seems reasonable to suppose that originally the whole effective of 50 ships had been intended for the war in the Greek waters, but that afterwards this number was limited. And that the 50 ships were all old ones (42, 27), is certainly authentic, as no annalist would ever have invented such a communication which, in truth, did Rome no credit at all.

The ships kept in reserve will have been chiefly employed for the transport of envoys and such like. Two of such missions deserve our attention during the war: in the first place that of Marcius Philippus in 171 with at least 2 quinqueremes⁷⁰⁰) to Greece, where, after achieving some small operations, he made his appearance at Chalcis, the Roman naval base in this war (Liv. 42, 47, 9; 56, 7); afterwards we do not hear of these ships again; they will not have been added to the Roman fleet at Chalcis, but have returned to Rome with Marcius, who in 169 was to conduct the war on land as consul. Secondly we must mention here the embassy of C. Popilius, C. Decimius and C. Hostilius who in 168, on their way to Egypt, joined for some time with their 3 quinqueremes⁷⁰¹) in the struggle with the Macedonian fleet at Delos (Liv. 44, 19, 13; 29; 45, 10, 2).

But, apart from such small temporary missions, for which 10 ships were kept in reserve at Rome, the Roman warfleet against Macedon consisted of 40, after the surprising attack near Oreus of 36 quinqueremes. Since 170, however, another Roman squadron was present in the Illyrian waters. The Illyrian king Genthius was suspected by the Romans of sympathizing with Macedon; indeed he would throw in his lot with Perseus in 168. So the senate decided in 170 to send 8 ships with 2000 soldiers to the envoy C. Furius, who was already at Issa⁷⁰²) (which was allied with Rome) in order to watch Genthius, but had no more than two Issaeen vessels at his disposal. Thus we are told by Livy (43, 9, 4 sq.);

⁷⁰⁰) The absence of the number in Livy's text (42, 47, 9) is probably due to a clerical error; but at any rate the naval forces of this "envoy" cannot have been strong.

⁷⁰¹) Livy says (44, 29, 1) that they sailed with 3 quinqueremes from Chalcis to Delos; but this naturally does not prove that their ships came from the Roman fleet in the Aegean, which, moreover, was not at Chalcis at that moment, but at Oreus (44, 13, 11; 30, 1): every Roman envoy used to have one quinquereme at his personal disposal; so the 3 envoys must have sailed from Rome with 3 quinqueremes and only have touched at Chalcis on the way.

⁷⁰²) See Zippel 95.

but Weissenborn (ad loc.) rightly remarks that a number of 2000 soldiers is much too great for 8 warships (the heaviest type, the quinquereme, numbered 120 marines at the outside) and he supposes therefore that the relative passage of Livy is corrupt and that we must read *X et octo navis* instead of *et octo navis*, so that the senate should not have sent 8 ships to Issa, but 18.⁷⁰³) The fact that in 168 the praetor Anicius easily defeated 80 *lembi* of Genthius (Liv. 44, 30, 13—15; App. *Ill.* 9, 26), which he could scarcely have managed with only 8 ships, points in the same direction. For the same reason we cannot regard this passage of Livy as a product of annalistic fantasy; for it is quite certain that the praetor Anicius defeated Genthius' fleet in 168, and, that he made use of a fleet for this purpose, stands to reason and has, moreover, been expressly handed down to us (Liv. 44, 30, 15; App. *l. l.*; Liv. 45, 35, 4; 43, 7). Now then, this fleet must have been identical with the squadron sent to Issa in 170; for in 168 Anicius himself brought no warships from Italy and in a general way the sending of a fleet to Illyria is nowhere mentioned but here. Naturally the number of 18 ships remains hypothetical, though Weissenborn's conjecture seems very acceptable to me. The type of the ships sent to Illyria is not mentioned, but the number of soldiers seems to imply that they were quinqueremes (some 110 men a ship, if we base our calculation on a number of 18 ships).

So we arrive at a total effective of 68 Roman ships for the third Macedonian war, or, if we reckon with the possibility that part of the 10 ships kept in reserve for special purposes was absorbed by the Illyrian squadron of 18 sail in 170, at more than 60 ships. We must therefore assume that in 171—170 the senate put a number of extra ships in commission besides the 50 vessels fitted out originally. That these too were old, patched-up ships, is not subject to doubt.⁷⁰⁴)

⁷⁰³) The 2 (!) Issaeen ships Furius could dispose of are still more surprising than the 8 Roman vessels: in the second Macedonian war the island had supported the Romans with 20 and even with 30 *lembi* (v. s. p. 214) and now, in 170, 12 Issaeen *lembi* were with the Roman fleet in the Aegean (Liv. 42, 48, 8); so the number of *lembi* available at Issa must have far exceeded 2. Perhaps we must add here once more the figure X to Livy's text: a "home fleet" of 12 *lembi* (that is to say a total effective of 24) seems quite reasonable.

⁷⁰⁴) We are told by Livy (45, 2: from an annalistic source) that in 168 an (unmentioned) number of ships was lying ready to be sent to the Macedonian front in case of emergency; on receiving the news of the victory of Pydna the senate should

Let us now pass on to the auxiliary squadrons furnished by Rome's allies. As a matter of course Eumenes was the chief contributor. We know for a certainty that in 169 he supported the Romans with 20 cataphracts (Liv. 44, 10, 12 from Polybius). We do not know the numbers of the naval forces furnished by him in the preceding years; but it is highly probable that from the beginning of the war Eumenes' naval effective had been the same as in 169. The numerical strength of the squadron which accompanied him to Chalcis in 171 is not mentioned; but we know that of the 7000 soldiers transported to Chalcis 5000 marched with Eumenes to the Roman army in Thessaly, 2000 being left behind at Chalcis (Liv. 42, 55, 7—8 from Pol.): if we suppose these 2000 men to have been the regular garrison of the warfleet which had arrived at Chalcis with Eumenes (really these troops co-operated shortly afterwards with the Roman marine troops, Liv. 42, 56, 5), we arrive at a Pergamene naval contingent of \pm 20 sail for 171, just as for 169 (the other 5000 soldiers may have been carried by transports), and it is only natural to assume the same effective for the intermediate year 170 (conquest of Abdera by the Roman and Pergamene squadrons, Liv. 43, 4, Diod. 30, 6). It strikes us all the more that the naval activity displayed by Eumenes in the decisive year 168 was very slight. In the early spring of that year we find a Macedonian fleet of transports blockaded at Tenedos by an apparently small number of Pergamene men of war: they were very easily put to flight by the Macedonian warfleet which only consisted of light craft (Liv. 44, 28, 4—5 from Pol.). The Pergamene fleet of cavalry transports intended for the Roman army in Macedonia, which was subsequently destroyed by the Macedonian fleet in the waters of Chios, was apparently not escorted by warships (Liv. 44, 28, 7 sq.). And when thereupon the Macedonian *lembi* were stationed at Delos in order to capture from there the transports bound for the Roman encampment in Macedonia, no more than 5 Pergamene quinqueremes tried to oppose them, together with the 3 Roman quinqueremes already mentioned before (Liv. 44, 29). If in this year Eumenes had furnished 20 warships again, the activity of the light Macedonian fleet, which put to shame the allied navy in such a terrible way, would scarcely have been possible. So the supposition seems not to be out of place that the seemingly quite

have put them out of commission again. In my opinion this piece of information is not very credible and at any rate, if these ships did really exist, they played no part at all in the war.

unreasonable suspiciousness and resentment shown by the senate towards Eumenes after the victory were after all not wholly unfounded. Did the Pergamene king, impressed by the power of resistance displayed by Macedon, shift his ground in 168 and keep himself aloof as much as he could in view of an eventual Macedonian victory? We shall never know it to a certainty; but at any rate the difference between Eumenes' naval exertions in the years 171—169 and his slackness in 168 remains a very striking one.

In 169 5 cataphracts of Prusias, king of Bithynia, co-operated with the Roman fleet (Liv. 44, 10, 12 from Pol.). This fact is probably to be regarded as quite isolated: Prusias was a lukewarm ally, as the Bithynian dynasty had always been on bad terms with the Attalids and strongly gravitated towards Macedon.⁷⁰⁵)

Just as in the Syrian war⁷⁰⁶) the Roman fleet was now also reinforced with contingents furnished *ex foedere* by Greek maritime towns in Italy. In 171 the praetor C. Lucretius sent his brother Marcus ahead from Rome with 1 quinquereme, in order to collect these ships: he gathered 7 triremes, 1 from Rhegium, 2 from Locri, 4 from Thurii (according to Horn 85, who follows the reading of the mss., these 4 ships came from the Apulian Uria; but this seems not probable to me), that is to say a much smaller number than in the Syrian war, when the Italiot towns had furnished 24 light vessels⁷⁰⁷) (Liv. 42, 48, 6 sq.). Furthermore Dyrrhachium furnished 10, Issa 12, Genthius 54 *lembi*, together 76 (42, 48, 8).

When the Roman fleet had reached Chalcis, it was joined there by 2 Carthaginian quinqueremes,⁷⁰⁸) 2 triremes from Heraclea Pontica, 4 from Chalcedon, 4 from Samos, finally 5 Rhodian quadriremes (Liv.

⁷⁰⁵) See de Sanctis IV, 1, 362, 325.

⁷⁰⁶) V. s. p. 269.

⁷⁰⁷) It is very strange that this time Naples and the other towns of that area did not supply the Romans with ships as in the Syrian war (Liv. 36, 42, 1), and there are certainly reasons to suppose that they did furnish ships, but that Livy neglected to mention it. For he tells us first (42, 48, 5) that the praetor C. Lucretius departed with the fleet from Rome and then (without a word of explanation, § 9) that he departed from Naples. This is rather surprising, to say the least of it! Was Polybius' account shortened here by Livy and are we to suppose that, while M. Lucretius was collecting the contingents of the allies on the southern coast of Italy, the praetor himself fulfilled this task at Naples? It seems far from improbable, but naturally remains purely hypothetical. Might this be true, then the Italian contingent of course would have amounted to more than 7 sail.

⁷⁰⁸) In the Syrian war 6, v. s. p. 269.

42, 56, 6 sq., for the Rhodian ships also Pol. 27, 7, 14 sq.). But the praetor sent these contingents home again, *quia nusquam erat maritimum bellum* (Liv. and Pol. *l. l.*)! In the survey of the events we shall speak about the foolishness of this line of conduct; ⁷⁰⁹) here we must only add a few words about Rhodes. In spite of their being rather estranged from Rome (*v. s.*) the Rhodians had in 171 declared their readiness to support Rome; an excellent fleet of 40 sail ⁷¹⁰) was available for this purpose (Pol. 27, 3; Liv. 42, 45). But.... when Lucretius from Cephallenia invited them urgently to furnish a naval contingent (Pol. 27, 7, 1 sq.), they sent no more than 6 ships: 5 came to Chalcis (*v. s.*), 1 sailed to Tenedos, where she captured a Macedonian ship, crew and all (Pol. 27, 7, 14 sq.; 14, 1 sq.). And that was all, nor did the Rhodians ever send a contingent again during the following years of the war. ⁷¹¹) To justify the fact that they had not supported the Romans after 171, they could certainly appeal to the circumstance that C. Lucretius had immediately sent home again the contingent he had called out himself (Liv. 45, 23, 6). But on the other hand the Romans were not altogether wrong in not regarding a contingent of 5 quadriremes as a loyal form of support; compare the Syrian war, when Rhodes threw the whole of her navy into action on the Roman side, without any reserve and even building hurriedly new ships for the sake of her powerful Roman allies, who were too lazy to do so themselves.

If finally we record the fact that in the spring of 168 some Athenian ships assisted the Roman and Pergamene vessels at Delos in their struggle with the Macedonian fleet, ⁷¹²) we have made the round of the Roman naval forces, as far at least as our knowledge reaches.

⁷⁰⁹) In the following years these contingents do not make their appearance again; Kromayer (II, 348) supposes that the *lembi* of Genthius, Issa and Dyrrhachium were also sent home on this occasion: it is not impossible, but quite uncertain.

⁷¹⁰) The supreme limit of Rhodian naval efforts always lay in the neighbourhood of 40 ships, *v. s.* footnote 331.

⁷¹¹) The open ships which lay in the harbour of Tenedos in the spring of 168 (Liv. 44, 28, 3) and were carefully spared by the Macedonian fleet (of course Perseus was anxious to treat the wavering Rhodians compliantly) need not have been intended for the war against Macedon: it may have been their task to protect Rhodian maritime trade against privateers and pirates during the war.

⁷¹²) Liv. 45, 10, 2, but the reading is uncertain, cf. Weissenborn ad loc. and de Sanctis IV, 1, 346, 288. Already during the second Macedonian and Syrian wars Athenian ships had co-operated with the Roman navy, *v. s.* p. 224, 228 and 271.

Let us sum up: in 171 the Romans could dispose in the Aegean of at least 62 battle-ships (40 + 20 of Pergamum + at least 2 of Marcius Philippus), in 170 of 56 (36 + 20 of Pergamum), in 169 of 61 (36 + 20 of Pergamum + 5 of Prusias), in 168 of 44 (36 + the 3 Roman and 5 Pergamene vessels at Delos). To these effectives must be added the numerous light vessels, 7 (?) of the Italiot towns, 76 *lembi* from the waters of Western Greece and in 168 some Athenian ships; but, whether the *lembi* (or perhaps part of them) were sent home before the end of the war, we do not know.

These modest naval effectives would certainly have been quite sufficient for keeping at bay the weak Macedonian fleet, if ships and personnel (not to speak about the commanders!) had come up to a reasonable standard. But the fact of the matter is that the quality of both was very low during the whole war, as is proved most conclusively by the fact that in the spring of 168 the bulk of the Roman fleet was lying helpless and idle at Oreus, while the Macedonian fleet could sail with impunity round the Aegean and finally settle down at Delos, capturing systematically from there the transports revictualling the Roman army in Macedonia.

In conclusion a few words about the Macedonian fleet. The effective of Perseus' navy was in perfect accordance with the terms of the peace of 196, when Philip had been forced to hand over to the Romans all his armoured vessels (except 5 and his *ἐκκαυδεήρης*), but had been allowed to retain his light craft (*lembi* and *πρίστεις*).⁷¹³ Really Perseus was still in possession of the *ἐκκαυδεήρης*, a parading horse as old as Methuselah: in 167 Aemilius Paullus took the ship to Italy and made his state entry in it up the Tiber;⁷¹⁴ perhaps some of the 5 armoured vessels Philip had been allowed to retain were also extant still and suffered the same fate.⁷¹⁵ But, as far as we know, these few big ships did not take part in the operations: Perseus' fleet consisted chiefly of light vessels, *lembi* and *πρίστεις*, which had also predominated in Philip's fleet⁷¹⁶ and which he had not been forced to give up in 196. The type of the ships, employed for the surprising attack in the winter of 171—170

⁷¹³) V. s. p. 249—250.

⁷¹⁴) V. s. footnote 263.

⁷¹⁵) Perhaps we may infer this from Liv. 45, 42, 12; but the passage is of a low annalistic quality, and Polybius (36, 5, 9) and Livy himself in another passage (45, 35, 3) speak only of the *ἐκκαυδεήρης*. Cf. Weissenborn ad loc.

⁷¹⁶) V. s. p. 203.

(Plut. *Aem.* 9, 3), has not been handed down to us; but in 169 10 *lembi* came to the aid of the besieged Cassandrea from Thessalonice (Liv. 44, 12, 6 from Pol.) and the squadron operating in the Aegean in the spring of 168 consisted of 40 *lembi* and 5 *πλοῖα* (Liv. 44, 28, 1 from Pol.). The total number of light craft at Perseus' disposal has not been handed down; but beyond any doubt his fleet was much weaker than that of Philip in the second Macedonian war.⁷¹⁷ If we wish to form an estimate of the decline of Roman sea-power, it is recommendable to compare the second Macedonian war, when Philip's fleet couldn't leave the harbour for a moment, with the third Macedonian war, when Perseus' much weaker fleet could venture to do this repeatedly and during the first months of 168 did what it liked in the Aegean with impunity.

The naval personnel. During this war the *socii navales* were recruited from the same groups as before: freedmen, Italian allies and Sikeliots. For the 50 ships fitted out in 172 for the war against Perseus half of the *socii navales* were recruited from freedmen, the rest from Italian allies (Liv. 42, 27, 3), the former by the *praetor urbanus* C. Licinius (cf. 42, 10, 14; the freedmen were citizens), the latter by the *praetor peregrinus* Cn. Sicinius (the allies were *peregrini*). This annalistic piece of information seems trustworthy, because it is partly covered by the fragment of Cato already cited before (footnote 698). According to the annalistic tradition the proportion of freedmen to allies was, however, changed in 171 (Liv. 42, 31, 6—7): the senate should have ordered the naval praetor for 171 (C. Lucretius) to test the quality of the *socii navales* enlisted in 172, to dismiss the unfit and to replace them by freedmen only, to such an extent that freedmen and allies would now be in the ratio of two to one; did the senate intend to spare the allies by means of such a measure? We might feel inclined to suspect the authenticity of this communication, because in the same passage the fleet is assumed to be present at Brindisi, whereas we know from Polybius (*v. s. p.* 375) that in 171 the Roman fleet sailed from Rome and not from Brindisi to Greece. But usually the annalistic tradition is a queer intermixture of truth and fiction; and the new ratio between *libertini* and *socii* is corroborated by a later enlistment for the year 169, when the ratio *libertini* : *socii* = 2 : 1 was really put into practice again (on that occasion 1000 *libertini*, 500 *socii* from Italy, 500 Sikeliots were enlisted for naval service, Liv. 43, 12, 9).

⁷¹⁷ For, besides his numerous light craft, Philip had had more than 20 battle-ships.

The quality of the *socii navales* was very low during this war, partly through the fault of the naval praetors of 171 and 170, C. Lucretius and L. Hortensius, who, being miserable wretches themselves, encouraged rather than restrained the undisciplined behaviour of their subordinates. This is proved by the complaints of the inhabitants of Chalcis in 170, which town enjoyed the dubious honour of being the chief Roman naval base.⁷¹⁸) That this lack of discipline also resulted in desertion, is only natural: we should have to assume it, even if it had not been handed down; but the envoys who in the winter of 169—168 inspected the state of affairs on the Macedonian front stated it expressly; their report runs as follows (Liv. 44, 20, 6): *ad classem se ex castris profectos sociorum navalium partem morbo audisse absumptam, partem, maxime qui ex Sicilia fuerint, domos suas abisse et homines navibus deesse; qui sint, neque stipendium accepisse neque vestimenta habere*. The deplorable condition the Roman fleet was in at the beginning of the decisive year of the war, is vividly painted here. In consequence of the lack of discipline and control things had come to a very strange pass: fancy the Sicilian *socii navales* running quietly away from Euboea to Sicily, as stowaways on merchantmen!⁷¹⁹) The Roman government itself was partly responsible for these abuses; for, that the senate had badly neglected to provide the naval personnel with pay and clothes, appears from the report of the envoys. In the light of these facts it is perfectly comprehensible that in the spring of 168 the Roman navy could not stir a finger to put an end to the privateering practices of the Macedonian fleet; that a great number of new *socii navales* had to be enlisted in order to make naval action possible again (Liv. 44, 21, 10: 5000), goes without saying.

In conclusion a few words about the marine troops. As in the Syrian war (v. s. p. 277) we meet here once with a case of allies serving as marines:

⁷¹⁸) Liv. 43, 7, 11: *Ex instituto C. Lucreti Hortensium quoque in tectis hieme pariter atque aestate navalis socios habere et domos suas plenas turba nautica esse; versari inter se, coniuges liberosque suos, quibus nihil neque dicere pensi sit neque facere*. The senate took measures against these abuses; i. e. they forbade the *socii navales* to be quartered upon the inhabitants (*sociorum navalium neminem praeter magistros in hospitia deduci aequum censere*, 43, 8, 7). It stands to reason that these things cannot have been forged by the annalists: they do Rome no credit; on the contrary!

⁷¹⁹) During the Syracusan revolt in the second Punic war numerous Sicilian *socii navales* had also run away and joined the Syracusans (v. s. p. 196); but that was quite another pair of shoes, because on that occasion the Sicilian *socii navales* were on service in their own island and naturally went over to rebellious fellow-countrymen.

I mean the garrison of the squadron sent to Illyria in 170 (*v. s. p.* 376). We might infer this from the fact that these soldiers were enlisted by the *praetor peregrinus* (cf. Weissenborn ad Liv. 43, 9, 6) and from the Italian district they came from. But neither argument is perfectly conclusive.

The naval command. The Roman admirals of this war were appointed in exactly the same way as during the Syrian war: ⁷²⁰) the naval command fell by lot to one of the annually elected praetors. Thus C. Lucretius was naval praetor in 171 (Liv. 42, 31, 9), L. Hortensius in 170 (43, 4, 8, cf. Weissenborn ad 3, 7), C. Marcius Figulus in 169 (43, 15, 3), Cn. Octavius in 168 (44, 17, 10). As in the Syrian war, the naval command was never prolonged during the war against Perseus. A propos of the preceding war I have amply discussed the serious objections that can be raised against this system; but now the evils connected with it displayed themselves in a much more obtrusive way. That not only incapable, but also positively abject individuals like Lucretius and Hortensius could obtain the praetorship by popular favour and family-intrigues and subsequently the naval command (in such an important war too!) by lot, smells to heaven; and, though Figulus and Octavius were apparently not of such a terribly low standard as their two predecessors had been, they did not give proof of any special naval capacities either. Octavius owed his naval triumph exclusively to the fact that he had taken king Perseus prisoner at Samothrace, a rather conspicuous, but wholly unimportant achievement that did not require any admiral's qualities!

In the two first years of the war there was no co-operation between land- and naval forces, though such a co-operation was a prime requisite for bringing the war to a successful end: the naval praetors followed simply their own bent. Only in 169 and 168 a system of co-ordinated attacks was started, which led to the aim. The events of these two last years of the war prove that the independent praetorian naval command was not necessarily inconsistent with an effective co-operation between land- and naval forces; for in virtue of his *imperium maius* the consul commanding the land army could force the praetor to act according to a definite strategic scheme. The lack of co-operation in the two first years of the war was not entirely imputable to Lucretius and Hortensius, but also to the consuls commanding on land against Macedon, who in

⁷²⁰) *V. s. p.* 278 sq.

those years were almost as unequal to their task as the rogues commanding the navy. When strong personalities like Marcius Philippus (169) and Aemilius Paullus (168) were charged with the command of the land army, the necessary co-operation between army and navy came also into being automatically. Nevertheless the system followed in the second Macedonian war (delegation of the naval command by the consul to a *legatus pro praetore*) would have answered much better the requirements of the war against Perseus than the independent praetorian naval command of the Syrian war.

That the praetor who commanded the fleet could delegate his authority to a *praefectus* appointed by himself, goes without saying.⁷²¹ C. Lucretius (171) not only sent his brother M. ahead from Rome with one ship in order to gather the naval contingents of the allies (Liv. 42, 48, v. s.), but he also ordered him to conduct the whole fleet from Cephallenia round Malea to Chalcis, while he himself made for Creusa in Boeotia with one trireme and from there proceeded further by land (42, 56). Illness of the praetor and the desire to intervene as soon as possible in Boeotia were apparently the reasons for this delegation of the naval command. In the praetor's name M. Lucretius also interfered with the siege of Haliartus (§ 3).

But besides the principal squadron commanded by a praetor, smaller flotillas under command of "envoys" also took part in the naval actions against Macedon.⁷²² In 171 Marcius Philippus led some small operations in the Greek waters and in the spring of 168 three envoys joined in the action against the Macedonian fleet at Delos with 3 quinqueremes, while being on their way to Egypt. Similarly the envoy C. Furius who was already at Issa for the purpose of watching Genthius was entrusted in 170 with the newly-formed Illyrian squadron. This was, however, only a temporary arrangement: when in 168 the Romans had really to make war upon Genthius, the Illyrian squadron passed also into praetorian hands. The praetor L. Anicius, who brought a considerable army, but no fleet from Italy, was undoubtedly also charged with the command of the squadron at Issa, though this fact is not mentioned; for he defeated Genthius' fleet and he could not do so without ships. Moreover, we learn afterwards on the occasion of his triumph that he really had commanded

⁷²¹) See Tarn, *Companion*, 760.

⁷²²) V. s. p. 375 sq.

a fleet besides a land army.⁷²³) In a word, in contradistinction to the naval praetor who commanded nothing but naval forces, Anicius' command embraced both land- and naval forces. As *praetor peregrinus* he had been charged by the senate with the Illyrian command; ⁷²⁴) and, though the lot played a certain part in his appointment, he was in every respect superior to all the four naval praetors and he is the only Roman commander in this war who deserves to be mentioned honourably besides Aemilius Paullus and Marcius Philippus. Whether he personally commanded the fleet that defeated Genthius' *lembi* or delegated the naval command to a *praefectus* while remaining with the land army himself, cannot be ascertained, because a gap in Livy's text (44, 30, 15) has swallowed almost his entire account of naval warfare in Illyria. But Livy's words immediately preceding this hiatus (*tenuit impetum eius fama lemborum vastantium maritimam oram*) and Appian's very short account of the Illyrian campaign (λέμβους τε τοῦ Γενθίου τινὰς ἔλεν ἐπιπλεύσας καὶ κατὰ γῆν αὐτῷ συνενεχθεῖς ἐκράτει τὴν μάχην, *Ill.* 9, 26) make it probable at least that he personally commanded both at sea and on land successively. In contradistinction to Cn. Octavius, this man had fully deserved his triumph, though his task had not been particularly heavy.

- 171 *Survey of the events.* In my opinion it is certainly true that in most of the great wars waged by the Romans they themselves were the assailants, if not formally (in this respect they always tried to cover themselves cunningly and hypocritically and to represent themselves as acting in legitimate self-defence), at least actually; but it is very remarkable that notwithstanding this undeniable fact they often were not ready to wage a war they had deliberately provoked themselves: this applies to the third Macedonian war as well as to the Syrian. So the only thing achieved in 172 was (apart from the fact that the fleet was fitted out and made seaworthy, *v. s.*) that about November the praetor Cn. Sicinius crossed with modest forces to Illyria in order to pass the winter there; for the rest the negotiations with Perseus were artfully protracted during the winter in order to gain time for preparations.⁷²⁵) Only in the spring of 171 the consul P. Licinius departed for Thessaly with the land army

⁷²³) Liv. 45, 43, 7.

⁷²⁴) Liv. 44, 17, 10; 21, 4.

⁷²⁵) Liv. 42, 36, 8—9 (Pol.), Zon. 9, 22, 5 *coll.* Liv. 42, 27, 5 sq. (ann.), Kromayer II, 233, 1; 346; Liv. 42, 43, 1 sq.; 47.

and the praetor C. Lucretius for Chalcis with the fleet. Livy has handed down to us from Polybius a rather detailed account of the voyage of the fleet, which interests us here in the first place (42, 48, 5 sq.): C. Lucretius put to sea from Rome⁷²⁶) with 40 quinqueremes (more accurately with 39, *v. s.*), after sending ahead his brother Marcus with one quinquereme in order to receive from the allies the ships due *ex foedere* and join the main body of the fleet again at Cephallenia. M. Lucretius received 1 trireme at Rhegium, 2 at Locri, 4 at Thurii and then he crossed to Dyrrhachium, where he received 10 *lembi* from the Dyrrhachines themselves, 12 from Issa⁷²⁷) and 54 from Genthius⁷²⁸);

⁷²⁶) According to annalistic tradition the fleet should have been concentrated at Brindisi as early as 172 and have been intended to cross with Cn. Sicinius to Illyria at the end of this year (42, 27); but according to this same tradition the fleet still lay at Brindisi in 171 and sailed from there to Greece with the praetor C. Lucretius (42, 31 and 35). So this piece of annalistic information is not only inconsistent with Polybius, who makes C. Lucretius depart in 171 from Rome with the fleet, but also with itself and naturally Polybius' account takes precedence of it (*v. s. p.* 375; the words *Cn. Sicinius, qui priusquam magistratu abiret Brundisium ad classem et ad exercitum praemissus erat*, written by Livy 42, 36, 8, where he already follows Polybius, do not originate with Polybius, but are to be regarded as a reference to 42, 27, added by Livy himself in order to connect the narrative derived from Polybius with the preceding annalistic version). According to Klotz (69 and 91) the annalistic tradition about the departure of the Roman fleet from Brindisi should be correct and Polybius should only have shortened this version in making the praetor depart with the fleet from Rome. This opinion is quite untenable; from Polybius' narrative it appears clearly that C. Lucretius departed with the fleet from Rome in 171: he touches at Naples (42, 48, 9) and passes through the straits of Messina, whereas Brindisi is mentioned nowhere; moreover, he sends his brother ahead from Rome with 1 quinquereme in order to gather the naval contingents of allies on the southern coast of Italy (42, 48, 6 sq.). These facts absolutely exclude the possibility of an abbreviation as supposed by Klotz: it is perhaps conceivable that something to this effect: "C. Lucretius marched by land from Rome to Brindisi to sail from there with the fleet to Greece" should have been shortened by Polybius into: "C. Lucretius sailed with the fleet from Rome to Greece", but... in this case he couldn't have given details about the *voyage by sea* from Rome southwards round Italy; and Polybius does give such details! And that we cannot suppose Polybius to have forged these details, goes without saying.

⁷²⁷) For the contingents furnished by Issa in the second Macedonian and Syrian wars *v. s. p.* 214 and footnote 336, cf. Zippel 92.

⁷²⁸) Niese (III, 141, 3) rejects Livy's communication that M. Lucretius should have seized the *lembi* of Genthius, *simulans se credere eos in usum Romanorum comparatos esse* (that is to say that they should not have been intended for the Romans), because he received these vessels at Dyrrhachium, which town did not belong to Genthius' territory and where consequently Genthius' *lembi* could only have come in reply to a

from there he sailed via Corcyra to Cephallenia. In the meantime the praetor himself had also departed from Rome; he had touched at Naples ⁷²⁹) and, after passing through the straits of Messina, had directed his course to Cephallenia, which he reached after a forced voyage. ⁷³⁰) At Cephallenia the united fleet remained for some time, waiting for straggling merchantmen (apparently a fleet of transports sailed with Lucretius' warships and was escorted by them); from here the praetor sent a letter to Rhodes to demand naval support from the Rhodians. ⁷³¹) Early in 171 Rhodes had already declared her readiness to support Rome against Perseus and no less than 40 men of war were available for this purpose; but, when the Roman demand from Cephallenia reached them, they furnished only 6 ships, 5 of which sailed to Chalcis, 1 to Tenedos!

From Cephallenia ⁷³²) the praetor himself sailed with 1 trireme (she must have been one of the vessels furnished by the Italian allies) to Creusa on the Corinthian Gulf in order to reach Boeotia as quickly as he could, where the towns Haliartus, Thisbe and Coronea had thrown in their lot with Perseus; ⁷³³) he temporarily delegated the naval command to his brother, who was to take the fleet round Malea to Chalcis as *praefectus*

Roman demand. Possibly Niese is right in thinking so; but it is also possible that the ships had accidentally touched at the harbour of D. at the moment of Lucretius' arrival and that Livy's account is correct. Be this as it may, at any rate Genthius had not yet broken with Rome in 171.

⁷²⁹) Had he gathered here some ships of allies due *ex foedere*? *V.s.* footnote 707.

⁷³⁰) *C. Lucretius ab Neapoli profectus, superato freto, die quinto in Cephalleniam transmisit* (42, 48, 9). As it stands (that is to say if Livy did not shorten here Polybius' narrative), this communication implies that Lucretius did not hug the coast, but crossed the open sea from Rhegium to Cephallenia. According to Demosthenes 32, 5 a merchantman covered the distance between Syracuse and Cephallenia (259 sea-miles) within three days and so we may regard it as possible that by a favourable wind the distance Rhegium—Cephallenia, which is a trifle shorter, was covered by Lucretius' warships + fleet of transports within five days as the crow flies; on the other hand he could never have reached Cephallenia from Rhegium within that space of time, if he had hugged the coast. The crossing of such a large tract of open sea with vulnerable warships was an extremely bold venture, which used to be avoided if possible; the fact that C. Lucretius did not shrink from such a daring enterprise, proves — let us give the devil his due — that he was no coward, but one of those foolhardy Roman landlubbers who were not afraid of the sea, because they didn't know its dangers.

⁷³¹) *V.s.* p. 379 sq.

⁷³²) Liv. 42, 56 (Pol.).

⁷³³) See *i.a.* Pol. 27, 5, 2 sq., Liv. 42, 46, 7 sq., where Thebes (instead of Thisbe) is a slip.

classis. But illness retarded the praetor's voyage (probably this had already been one of the reasons that had induced him to avoid the voyage round Malea), so that his brother could earlier intervene in Boeotia via Chalcis than the praetor himself via Creusa. For M. Lucretius, learning at Chalcis that Haliartus was being besieged by the envoy P. Lentulus,⁷³⁴) ordered the latter in the praetor's name (he was his deputy) to stop the siege and took over this task himself with the naval troops (10,000 armed men)⁷³⁵) besides the 2000 marines from the Pergamene squadron which meanwhile had also arrived at Chalcis.⁷³⁶) The incident is characteristic of the abominable quality of the Roman commanders during the first years of this war: they made it their study to snatch the booty away from each other instead of waging the war as strenuously and efficiently as they could. For, when about this time 2 Punic quinqueremes, 2 triremes from Heraclea Pontica, 4 from Chalcedon, 4 from Samos and 5 Rhodian quadriremes reached Chalcis,⁷³⁷) the worthy praetor, who meanwhile had also arrived there via Creusa, sent these contingents home again, *quia nusquam erat maritimum bellum!* I readily believe that the Macedonian fleet abstained from action at the moment and did not leave the harbour; but the Roman fleet had got another task, which was at least as important as that of keeping the Macedonian fleet at bay: I mean the co-operation with the land army in Thessaly, by means of which Perseus might have been involved in serious difficulties.⁷³⁸) For such a purpose Lucretius might have employed the allied contingents he now sent thoughtlessly away; but the naval praetor preferred to plunder the Boeotian towns, where a rich and easy booty was waiting for him.

⁷³⁴) Cf. Liv. 42, 37, 1; 47, 12. Lentulus had only few soldiers from Italy at his disposal and was assisted in the siege by pro-Roman Boeotians (42, 56, 4).

⁷³⁵) The 40 quinqueremes carried maximally a number of 4800 marines, the 6 triremes from Southern Italy (one had sailed to the Corinthian Gulf with the praetor) \pm 500, the 76 *lembi* \pm 3800 men (if we reckon 50 men a ship), together 9100 men; the rest must have consisted of armed *socii navales*.

⁷³⁶) Liv. 42, 55, 7 sq. and v. s. p. 378. Eumenes himself marched with his brother Attalus and 5000 men from Chalcis to the Roman army in Thessaly: the fleet with 2000 marines was left behind at Chalcis.

⁷³⁷) V. s. p. 379; Liv. 42, 56, 6, Pol. 27, 7, 14 sq. About this time Q. Marcius Philippus arrived also at Chalcis with some quinqueremes, after conquering Alope in Phthiotis and assaulting in vain Larissa Cremaste (Liv. 42, 56, 7, v. s. p. 376). According to Liv. 43, 6, 2 Lucretius also refused ships offered to him by Athens; this too may have happened about this time.

⁷³⁸) I'll come back to this point afterwards.

Was he indignant at the slight contingent sent by Rhodes and was it his intention to bring home to those proud allies by sending away their ships that the Romans could easily do without their naval support? A splendid attitude, on the understanding that the Romans were capable of living up to it; but they were not. Now the only result of Lucretius' ridiculous line of conduct was this, that the despised allies (naturally first of all the already none too zealous Rhodians) declined in the following years of the war to risk a second refusal and that the miserable helplessness of the Roman navy was displayed in the most painful way during the whole war.

So the fleet was lying idle at Chalcis, while the land army of the consul P. Licinius in Thessaly, which consisted for the most part of untrained recruits, could achieve almost nothing against Perseus and even suffered not inconsiderable losses and while the praetor Lucretius ransacked Boeotia in the most brutal way and pocketed the swag himself. Haliartus was swept away from the surface of the earth, the inhabitants, as far as they had not been massacred, were sold into slavery and a rich booty of art-treasures was carried off to Chalcis. ⁷³⁹⁾ Thereupon Thisbe, ⁷⁴⁰⁾ which had been rebellious likewise, gave up resistance; but, though she capitulated, this town was also treated harshly. Probably Coronea too submitted voluntarily to the praetor, ⁷⁴¹⁾ though this fact is not mentioned; but at the end of the year the consul P. Licinius, who had already ravaged Thessaly and now wished to get a share of the Boeotian plunder, made the town suffer the same fate as Haliartus. ⁷⁴²⁾ He wintered with part of his troops in Boeotia; C. Lucretius had returned to his fleet at Chalcis, where he passed the winter and bullied and robbed the faithful Chalcidians as if they were enemies. ⁷⁴³⁾ Meanwhile the inactivity of the Roman fleet naturally provoked a reaction from the side of the Macedonian navy.

⁷³⁹⁾ Liv. 42, 63, 3 sq. (Pol.).

⁷⁴⁰⁾ Liv. 42, 63, 12: as is proved by Dtb. II³, 646, Thebes instead of Thisbe is a slip, just as in the passage 42, 46 (*v.s.* footnote 733), see Niese III, 127, de Sanctis IV, 1, 292.

⁷⁴¹⁾ This seems to follow from the fact that the senate afterwards blamed the behaviour of the consul P. Licinius towards the town and tried to make amends for it, see Niese III, 128, 1.

⁷⁴²⁾ Liv. 42, 67, 6 sq.; 43, 4, 11; Zon. 9, 22, 6; Livy's account of the maltreatment of Coronea has been swallowed by the great gap 43, 3—4 (cf. Weissenborn ad loc. and *per.* 43).

⁷⁴³⁾ Liv. 42, 63, 12; 43, 7, 5 sq.

At the end of 171 a fleet of Roman transports escorted by men of war was successfully surprised near Oreus by Macedonian naval forces (their base was probably Demetrias, which since the Syrian war was in Macedonian hands again) ⁷⁴⁴): 20 transports were captured, the other vessels laden with grain were destroyed and, to make matters worse, even 4 Roman quinqueremes were sunk. ⁷⁴⁵) Nusquam enim erat maritimum bellum! The incident forms a worthy conclusion of the term of office of the villain C. Lucretius.

Let us sum up: ⁷⁴⁶) the year 171 was very unfavourable for the Romans and the complete lack of co-operation between army and navy was one of the principal causes of this bad success. If the Roman naval troops, instead of applying themselves to the useless conquering and sacking of petty Boeotian towns, had attempted a landing near Pydna, ⁷⁴⁷) they would, as Kromayer rightly remarks, have lamed and even made impossible at one blow Perseus' warfaring in Thessaly, because by ensconcing themselves south of Pydna they would have commanded all southward roads and consequently cut off the revictualling of the Macedonian army in Thessaly. But... precious booty was the only thing C. Lucretius cared for and this could be obtained much better and much easier in Greece than in Macedonia. No wonder that the unworthy admiral was afterwards severely punished at Rome. ⁷⁴⁸)

⁷⁴⁴) V. s. p. 291 sq.

⁷⁴⁵) Plut. *Aem.* 9, 3, Liedmeier 120; she will be right in supposing that there is a connection between the loss of the fleet of transports off Oreus and the fact that C. Lucretius ordered Athens to furnish a large quantity of grain (Liv. 43, 6, 3). The general remark of Zon. 9, 22, 10 probably embraces the surprising attack off Oreus as well as the achievements of the Macedonian fleet later on in this war.

⁷⁴⁶) Compare Kromayer II, 252 sq.

⁷⁴⁷) This was by no means impossible: at the time of the siege of Haliartus the marine troops of Rome and Pergamum numbered together 12,000 men (v. s. p. 389) and, if the contingents of the Rhodians etc. had been incorporated with the Roman navy instead of being foolishly sent home, a still more considerable landing army would have been at the disposal of the naval praetor.

⁷⁴⁸) Liv. 43, 4, 5—7; 8; according to Zon. 9, 22, 6 the consul Licinius was also punished for his behaviour towards Greek cities (of course especially towards Coronea). The wrong done to Thisbe and Coronea was partly redressed (Dtb. II³, 646 and Liv. 43, 4, 11) and the senate also satisfied the complaints of the Chalcidians against Lucretius and his successor Hortensius (Liv. 43, 7—8, v. s. footnote 718). The chief reason for this accommodating line of conduct will have been, that, the Roman arms failing of success for the present, the senate did not want to estrange the Greek world

However, the fault rested not only with this individual, but also with the government at Rome. I will leave out of account the fact that only an untrained army of recruits had been sent with the consul to Thessaly. But at any rate besides the consular army in Thessaly a second army ought to have been sent immediately in the first year of the war to Illyria, in order to attack Macedonia on two sides at the same time (from the west *and* from Thessaly).⁷⁴⁹ If such a twofold attack had been combined with a landing of the naval forces south of Pydna, Perseus might have been manoeuvred into a desperate position from the very beginning. But in reality a considerable army was only sent to Illyria in 168, after Genthius had thrown in his lot with Perseus. In a word, the absence of a great, co-ordinated plan of attack characterizes the first years of the war: only in the third year a system of co-operation between army and navy came into being, only in the fourth a vigorous action was launched in Illyria. No wonder that in this way the war must drag on for years.

170 We are ill acquainted with the events of the year 170, because Livy's account of the military operations of this year has been swallowed for the greater part by a great gap in his text (43, 3—4).⁷⁵⁰ But anyhow it is quite certain that the result of this year of the war was as bad for Rome as that of the preceding year; perhaps it was even worse. The attempts of the consul A. Hostilius Mancinus to penetrate from Thessaly into Macedonia could not meet with success, because there was as yet no trace of an efficient co-operation between army and navy; so these attempts were repulsed with bloody losses for the Romans. No doubt, the fleet, which was now under command of the praetor L. Hortensius, operated against Macedon in this year, which certainly meant an improvement in comparison with the preceding year of the war; but, as there was no trace of a real co-operation with the land forces, this independent naval action met with slight positive result. As far as we

from Rome still more: even without Roman abuses the Greeks leant rather strongly to the Macedonian cause. For Haliartus nothing was done. Compare de Sanctis IV, 1, 293.

⁷⁴⁹) Only a weak Roman force, which could do almost nothing, lay in Illyria, v. s. p. 386. An attack from Illyria upon Macedonia might now have been launched much easier than in the second Macedonian war, because since the peace of 196 the Roman possessions in Illyria extended much farther eastwards than they had done before; v. s. footnote 253.

⁷⁵⁰) See Weissenborn ad loc.

know, Hortensius' operations remained limited to an expedition to the Thracian coast, which he undertook together with Eumenes; ⁷⁵¹) Amphipolis, Maronea and Aenus shut their gates, ⁷⁵²) but Abdera opened negotiations. Hortensius' harsh terms (the payment of 100,000 denarii and the furnishing of a large quantity of grain) drove the Abderites to send envoys to the consul in Thessaly. But during their absence a traitor let in the enemies, whereupon the town was maltreated as brutally as the Boeotian towns in the preceding year; the inhabitants were sold into slavery. ⁷⁵³) This was probably the only result of the whole expedition; for the rest of the year the Roman fleet lay idle again at Chalcis, ⁷⁵⁴) where Hortensius demonstrated as cynically as at Abdera that he was the equal of his predecessor in abjectness. So the senate had to take measures against Hortensius no less than against Lucretius and Licinius: satisfaction was given to Abdera as well as to Chalcis and measures were taken to prevent a repetition. ⁷⁵⁵)

If we finally remind the reader that in this year Rome sent a squadron to Issa in order to watch Genthius, ⁷⁵⁶) we have made the round of the poor military achievements of the Romans in 170. All the more had been done, however, on the Macedonian side and, though these achievements do not belong to the sphere of naval warfare, they are so

⁷⁵¹) Diod. 30, 6, v. s. p. 378; in the autumn of 171 Eumenes had returned with his fleet to Pergamum for the purpose of hibernation, Liv. 42, 67, 8.

⁷⁵²) Liv. 43, 7, 10; at the end of the Syrian war Aenus and Maronea had been cleared of their Syrian garrisons and had recovered their freedom, but in the following years they had become a bone of contention between Macedon and Pergamum; now they apparently sided with Macedon.

⁷⁵³) Liv. 43, 4, 8 sq., Diod. 30, 6. The latter's account proves that it was Eumenes who succeeded in mastering the town by treason; but the maltreatment of the town must have been the work of the Romans, as Eumenes naturally hoped to obtain her for himself and it was therefore his interest that she was not destroyed. Niese III, 129, 7; de Sanctis IV, 1, 298.

⁷⁵⁴) Apparently Eumenes returned with his squadron to Elaea, Liv. 44, 10, 12.

⁷⁵⁵) Liv. 43, 4, 11 sq.; 7—8 (v. s. footnotes 718 and 748). Though the consul A. Hostilius was by no means an able commander, he was, in contradistinction to L. Hortensius, C. Lucretius and P. Licinius, at least a respectable man: he did his level best to restrain his undisciplined soldiers and to protect the allies against arbitrary exactions (Liv. 44, 1, 5) and he sent envoys all through Greece in order to inform the Greeks of the senatusconsultum forbidding requisitions by the Roman commanders without a special authorization from the senate (Liv. 43, 17; Pol. 28, 3 sq.; de Sanctis IV, 1, 298).

⁷⁵⁶) V. s. p. 376.

highly important for the general situation of the war that they must briefly be mentioned here.⁷⁵⁷)

Already in the spring of 170 the Molossians in Epirus had joined Perseus,⁷⁵⁸) a serious loss for the Romans, because the most direct line of communication between Italy and Thessaly (the way from Apollonia to Thessaly through the pass of Metzovo) was cut off by it. But, moreover, Perseus succeeded in the autumn in breaking through the weak Roman frontier-defense in Illyria and getting into direct contact with Genthius. Now the fact that Rome had neglected to send a strong army to Illyria immediately in 171 yielded very bitter fruit:⁷⁵⁹) to be sure, not before 168 Genthius would definitively join Perseus; but the Romans couldn't know this in 170: the defection of the Illyrian king could be expected every moment and in this case even the maritime communication between Italy and the Illyrian coast would be seriously menaced⁷⁶⁰) by his numerous *lembi*.⁷⁶¹) So the position of the Romans was extremely uncomfortable and it was lucky for them that Perseus' winter-expedition to the Aetolian fortress Stratus failed, though it came very near succeeding: if he had conquered this town, even the important Roman line of communication with Thessaly via Ambracia would have been cut off. It was a cold comfort: as long as Perseus achieved successes and on the other hand Roman warfare failed miserably and indulged only in maltreating innocent Greek cities, the Romans could by no means rely upon the state of mind of Central Greece, which had been wavering from the beginning; every moment they might have to face the fact that *all* their communications by land with Thessaly got lost. Naturally they could continue in such a case of emergency to revictual the army in Thessaly by sea (round Malea and from Asia Minor); but would the decaying Roman navy really prove able to protect these transports by sea sufficiently against the Macedonian privateering practices?⁷⁶²) The

⁷⁵⁷) Compare the excellent discussion of these facts by Kromayer (II, 256—267).

⁷⁵⁸) In consequence of this event the consul A. Hostilius had scarcely escaped from being kidnapped in Epirus on his way to the army in Thessaly, Pol. 27, 16, Diod. 30, 5^a.

⁷⁵⁹) V. s. p. 392.

⁷⁶⁰) Pol. 29, 4, 1—2; it was at least a good thing that a squadron (though by no means a very strong one) had been sent in good time to Issa.

⁷⁶¹) Liv. 45, 43, 10.

⁷⁶²) Kromayer (II, 266—267) thinks much too highly of the strength of the Roman navy. The Roman government took serious measures for providing the military

events of the spring of 168 would show otherwise, as the surprising attack near Oreus at the end of 171 *had* already shown otherwise. It was high time indeed to entrust an able and strenuous general with the chief command, a man who would prove capable of introducing unity of action into Roman warfare and of putting bounds to Perseus' successes.

It was the consul Q. Marcius Philippus who in 169 would fulfil this task successfully. In the spring ⁷⁶³) he started from Brindisi together with the new naval praetor C. Marcius Figulus; both of them took fresh forces to Greece. ⁷⁶⁴) The consul landed at Ambracia and marched from there to Thessaly, where A. Hostilius had fixed his head-quarters near Palaepharsalus; the naval praetor made for Creusa on the Corinthian Gulf (as C. Lucretius in 171) and from there reached the naval base Chalcis through Boeotia. But it would at once become apparent that Roman head-quarters had done with systemless warfare: the naval praetor came immediately from Chalcis to the head-quarters near Palaepharsalus in order to take part in the council of war and here the resolution was formed to force the access to Macedonia by means of a co-ordinated operation of army and navy. ⁷⁶⁵) The ensuing events prove that it was Marcius' intention to penetrate through the mountains into Macedonia with the land army; on the other hand it was the task of the warfleet to sail northwards together with a fleet of transports laden with victuals and to reach the southern coastal plain of Macedonia in good time to join there the land army. This co-operation between army and navy was put into practice in a very deficient way, but the plan in itself meant already an enormous improvement in comparison with the haphazard warfare of the preceding years.

The difficult problems of the passage of the Olympus miraculously achieved by the Roman land army cannot be discussed here; they do not

forces with victuals during the war; *i. a.* we hear of grain furnished by Apulia and Calabria (Liv. 42, 27, 8), by Africa (42, 29, 8; 45, 13, 12 sq.), by Sicily and Sardinia (42, 31, 8), by Asia Minor (44, 28—29). These revictualling measures were careful enough in themselves, but it was the lines of communication that repeatedly menaced to be cut off in consequence of the miserable inertness of Roman warfare.

⁷⁶³) Liv. 44, 1.

⁷⁶⁴) Figulus 2000 *socii navales*, Liv. 43, 12, 9, *v. s. p.* 382.

⁷⁶⁵) Liv. 44, 2, especially §§ 2—3: *placuit non ultra morando in Thessalia tempus terere, sed movere extemplo castra atque pergere inde in Macedoniam, et praetorem dare operam ut eodem tempore classis quoque invehatur hostium litoribus.*

belong to my subject and, moreover, they have been disentangled by Kromayer in an insurpassable way.⁷⁶⁶) It is our only task to determine the share the fleet had in the operations. In the first place the Roman naval forces acted as a retaining force, that is to say that they succeeded in binding and keeping inactive part of Perseus' forces during the passage of the mountains by the Roman land army. The king had thrown $\frac{3}{4}$ of his strong army into the mountain-passes in order to bar the way of the Roman land army; with the rest (naturally the cavalry belonged to this force) he was himself on guard on the coast at Dium and here, says Polybius,⁷⁶⁷) he rode restlessly forth and back with his cavalry along the beach between Dium and Phila, *ut obtorpuisse inops consilii videretur*. As Kromayer rightly remarks,⁷⁶⁸) these last words do not state a fact, but only contain a judgment of Polybius, and certainly a wrong one. For why did the king continuously patrol the Macedonian coast with his cavalry, instead of employing his remaining troops for the purpose of reinforcing the menaced mountain-passes? Of course not because he had lost his head, but because he expected a *co-ordinated* attack of army and navy⁷⁶⁹) and therefore deemed it advisable not to denude the coast. No doubt, the Roman fleet was not present at that moment: only some days after the passage of the Olympus by the consul it would make its appearance on the Macedonian coast; but by the very fact of its existence and the possibility of its approaching it bound Perseus' troops to the coast, a striking instance of a fleet in being.

The news that the Roman army had penetrated into Macedonia induced Perseus to evacuate Dium, retreat to Pydna and recall hither the troops stationed in the mountain-passes, so that his entire land army was now concentrated again. This line of conduct has often been censured: if Perseus had remained himself at Dium and had not evacuated the mountain-passes either, the numerous Roman army, finding itself in the small coastal plain of Southern Macedonia without victuals, would have been caught in the trap like a mouse, in spite of the successful

⁷⁶⁶) II, 267 sq.

⁷⁶⁷) Liv. 44, 2, 12.

⁷⁶⁸) II, 279.

⁷⁶⁹) Did Perseus only guess at such an attack or had he been informed somehow of the Roman scheme? The latter seems more probable to me: everywhere in Greece he had supporters and so some information about the Roman naval plan may very well have reached him from Chalcis.

passage of the Olympus; for the transports with victuals, which had formed an essential part of the great plan of attack, did unexpectedly not come up with the Roman warfleet (*v.i.*). But Kromayer has rightly defended the king against undeserved blame. Perseus' force was not strong enough to face the complete Roman army near Dium ($\frac{3}{4}$ of his troops lay in the mountain-passes) and, moreover, he would have run the risk of falling short of victuals and of being attacked on two sides in consequence of a landing of the Roman fleet south of Pydna. On the other hand the evacuation of the mountain-passes by Perseus saved — it cannot be denied — the Roman army from starvation, as it could now be revictualled by land from Thessaly; but... Perseus knew that a fleet of transports laden with victuals for the Roman army was on the way ⁷⁷⁰) and he could *not* know that this fleet would (contrary to expectation) fail to come. If it had arrived according to plan, not the Roman army would have been forced into surrender by lack of food, but Perseus' own troops in the mountains. So he acted correctly in withdrawing these troops and concentrating his army again. As Kromayer rightly remarks, only a military genius would have felt intuitively that there was a chance of destroying the Roman army and would have maintained instinctively (seemingly quite unreasonably) the positions in the mountains; but Perseus was no military genius, he was only a good officer. And it is rather unreasonable to blame a person for not being a genius. So here again the Roman navy fulfilled the task of a fleet in being, in spite of its making default: Perseus firmly believed that the fleet of transports would make its appearance and this conviction dictated to him the evacuation of the mountain-passes, which saved the Roman army.

All the same it remains true that the co-ordinated plan of action was put into practice by the Romans in a highly defective way. The warfleet reached the land army at Dium, which had been evacuated by Perseus, but... the transports with victuals had been left behind on the coasts of the peninsula Magnesia. ⁷⁷¹) Why this had happened, will probably never been explained; possibly the merchantmen, being sailing-vessels, were wind-bound on their northward voyage. Starvation was now close at

⁷⁷⁰) *V.s.* footnote 769.

⁷⁷¹) Liv. 44, 7, 10 (Pol.); the locative *Magnesiae* lends probability to the conjecture that Livy inadvertently took Magnesia for a town, a quite comprehensible mistake considering the fact that there were cities of this name in Asia Minor, but which is naturally not imputable to Polybius himself, but to his translator Livy.

hand; but the evacuation of the passes by the Macedonian troops saved the Roman army from perdition. The consul has often been censured by critics who regarded the passage of the Olympus as a rash enterprise which only succeeded by chance. Wrongly in my opinion: Kromayer has conclusively demonstrated that this enterprise was a respectable combination of audacious bravery and calculating slyness; and at any rate Marcius could not know that the transports with victuals would make default. But he *did* make a grave mistake in evacuating Dium and retreating southwards to Phila in order to be nearer to Thessaly for the revictualling of his troops. He should have maintained Dium with part of his troops at any cost ⁷⁷²) and this might certainly have been possible, as the victuals for these troops could easily be transported northwards to Dium. Now Perseus marched southwards again from Pydna with his united forces and ensconced himself near Dium in the impregnable positions on the Elpeus. So the Romans had only advanced one step by crossing the Olympus and next year they would have to confront afresh a barrier quite as difficult; Marcius might have avoided this by maintaining Dium. But the fortress Heracleum, situated between Dium and Phila, was immediately conquered by the Romans. ⁷⁷³) Here again a co-ordinated system of attack was put into practice, though on a very small scale: the fleet took part in the assault on the sea side. Henceforth the Roman head-quarters were alternately at Heracleum and at Phila. For the sake of the revictualling of the army the most careful attention was devoted to the communication by land with Thessaly.

After the conquest of Heracleum the Roman fleet was no longer needed in the coastal plain of Southern Macedon for the rest of the year, as the decisive attempt to force the line of the Elpeus was put off till next year and consequently there could no longer be question of co-operation between army and navy on this front in 169. So the naval praetor concluded the season by embarking upon an expedition from Heracleum against Macedonian Chalcidice. ⁷⁷⁴) But it remained all but fruitless. No doubt, numerous descents were made (successively near Thessalonice, Aenea, Antigonea, Cassandrea, ⁷⁷⁵) Torone) and again and again the

⁷⁷²) Liv. 44, 8; de Sanctis IV, 1, 304.

⁷⁷³) Liv. 44, 8, 8—9.

⁷⁷⁴) For the following events Liv. 44, 10, 5—13 (Pol.).

⁷⁷⁵) Here Eumenes and Prusias joined the Roman fleet, with 20 and 5 *naves tectae* respectively, v. s. p. 377—378.

countryside was laid waste; but, where an attempt was made upon the cities themselves, this resulted in a complete failure; and no wonder, as they were held by strong Macedonian garrisons ⁷⁷⁶) and the power of resistance and fighting spirit of the Roman marine forces was slight. Only the attempt upon Cassandrea was serious enough to force the Macedonians into a precarious situation; but at last the assault was repulsed with bloody losses for the Romans and, when they laid siege to the town, 10 *lembi* of the Macedonian fleet, sent from Thessalonice with reinforcements, succeeded in running the blockade under the cover of night and throwing fresh troops into the town: the result was that the siege had to be raised. Near Antigonea the Romans had also suffered considerable losses. From Torone, the last place in Chalcidice which enjoyed a visit of the allied fleet, it sailed back to Thessaly, where a fruitless attempt was made to master the stronghold Demetrias. In order to support this enterprise and in behalf of the revictualling of the army ⁷⁷⁷) the consul simultaneously dispatched troops for an attack upon Meliboea. But here too the result was negative. The praetor stationed part of the fleet at Sciathus for the purpose of hibernation; the remaining ships wintered at Oreus in Euboea: the town was very favourably situated to provision from there the armies in Thessaly and Macedonia. ⁷⁷⁸) But the fighting power of the Roman navy, which had been slight from the very beginning of this war, had dreadfully declined through the misgovernment of the two first naval praetors and through lack of care of the senate: according to a report of Roman envoys, who had inspected the state of affairs on the Macedonian front in the winter of 169—168, part of the *socii navales* had died of disease, part (especially the Sikeliots) had run away home, so that the ships could no longer be manned properly; the men who were still present had received no pay and did not possess clothes. ⁷⁷⁹) What wonder, that in the spring of 168 this fleet could do nothing against the acts of privateering on the part of the Macedonian *lembi*, which seriously menaced the revictualling of the Roman army, and that numerous fresh *socii navales* had to be sent from Italy to make naval action possible again?

But on the whole the year 169 shows a considerable improvement

⁷⁷⁶) See for these garrisons Kromayer II, 339—340.

⁷⁷⁷) Kromayer II, 289, 2 and 293.

⁷⁷⁸) Liv. 44, 13, 10—11; Eumenes returned to Pergamum, after paying his respects to the consul in Macedonia.

⁷⁷⁹) Liv. 44, 20, 6; v. s. p. 383.

from a Roman point of view in comparison with the two preceding years. The haphazard "methods" of warfare had at least been given up and co-ordinated operations of army and navy had been set on foot. However clumsily this co-operation was put into practice, it nevertheless resulted immediately in the first great Roman success of this war: I mean the favourable issue of the attempt to force the Olympus and to invade Macedonia; the fleet too had a share in bringing this about, however modest and latent it might be. To be sure, the Roman army had by no means gained elbow-room by this success, on the contrary it had got into a blind alley: it stood in Macedonia, but was immediately arrested by a second line of defence, which seemed as impregnable as the Olympus. But the co-operation between army and navy would prove able to force the line of the Elpeus in 168 as it had forced the Olympus in 169.

But before we pass on to a discussion of the decisive operations in the last year of the war, we must for a moment turn our attention to Rhodes.⁷⁸⁰ Since 171, when C. Lucretius had sent home the Rhodian contingent,⁷⁸¹ the republic had kept aloof; Perseus' successes, the slackness of Roman warfare and the fact that Rhodian trade was suffering severely from the war had naturally not improved the disposition of the Rhodians towards Rome, which already before the war had been none too cordial in wide ranges of the population. It stands to reason that this attitude of Rhodes roused the discontent and suspicion of Rome. So it is only natural that the moderates who still predominated at Rhodes wanted to defend themselves and their country against Roman imputations: in the spring of 169 they succeeded in carrying a resolution to send embassies to Rome and to the Roman commanders on the Macedonian front (the consul Q. Marcius Philippus and the naval praetor C. Marcius Figulus). Whatever the senate's feelings towards Rhodes might be, the Roman Fathers did not deem it advisable in the present state of affairs, which was rather unfavourable for the Roman cause, to strike a sullen attitude and thus to estrange altogether from Rome the republic the influence of which was very great throughout the Greek world: after the victory there would be time enough to settle accounts with Rhodes.

⁷⁸⁰) For the following remarks cf. Pol. 28, 2. 16. 17, v. Gelder 148—149; the Rhodian embassy of 169 (Liv. 44, 14—15) which should have demanded from the senate to put an end to the war in an arrogant way and under threats, is an annalistic forgery intended to justify the harsh treatment of Rhodes after the war.

⁷⁸¹) V. s. p. 389.

So they received the envoys compliantly and allowed the Rhodians at their request to export a large quantity of grain from Sicily. The other embassy was also received very friendly by the consul and the praetor; the consul even went the length of asking one of the envoys confidentially, why Rhodes did not make an attempt at mediation between Rome and Perseus. Undoubtedly this was a trap: the sly man, who was angry with the Rhodians on account of their attitude during the war, wished to induce the republic to commit herself. The trick was successful: partly under the impression of Marcius' advice, Rhodes really made an attempt at mediation in 168, which would furnish Rome with a cudgel to beat the dog.⁷⁸²)

The battle of Pydna would decide the war in a few moments on the 22nd of June 168; but before that day came the Romans would still have to pass through half a year full of uneasiness. Though they had passed the Olympus in 169 and now were standing in Macedonia, they had immediately been arrested again by a second line of defence, which seemed as unsurmountable as the preceding; and the general state of affairs had even considerably worsened since last year. The alliance between Genthius and Perseus, which according to ancient tradition had been hindered for a long time by the latter's miserliness, came off at last at the beginning of 168, so that Rome was now forced to send also a considerable army to Illyria under command of the praetor L. Anicius.⁷⁸³) To make matters worse, the light Macedonian fleet appeared suddenly on the scene in the early spring of 168 (Perseus will certainly have known that in default of sufficient man power the Roman fleet would scarcely

⁷⁸²) De Sanctis (IV, 1, 315, 207) feels inclined to regard the story of Marcius' advice as invented by the Rhodians in order to justify their attempt at mediation of 168; the fact that the advice should have been given confidentially in a private conversation, seems indeed to point in this direction. Nevertheless I believe that Polybius' narrative may be regarded as trustworthy: it is in perfect accordance with what we know about the character of Q. Marcius, who was not only an audacious general, but also a crafty, none too squeamish diplomatist. It was he that had artfully protracted the negotiations with Perseus during the winter of 172—171, when Rome was not yet ready to go to war, v. s. p. 386 and Liv. 42, 43. 47.

⁷⁸³) He was also charged with the command of the squadron lying at Issa since 170, v. s. p. 385.

be able to put to sea before new *socii navales* should have arrived from Italy, ⁷⁸⁴) *v. s.* footnotes 769—770) and did what it liked in the Aegean. Thus the maritime lines of communication of the Romans and therefore also the revictualling of army and navy were menaced from all sides at the same time and, moreover, the Roman prestige in the Greek world was badly impaired by the audacious action of the Macedonian navy and the shameful default of the Roman fleet. So we must now first discuss the operations of the Macedonian naval forces, before we return to the front in Southern Macedonia.

In the early spring of 168 ⁷⁸⁵) Perseus sent 40 *lembi* and 5 *pristes* ⁷⁸⁶) under command of Antenor and Callippus to Tenedos in order to protect transports laden with grain that were bound for Macedonia and to intercept Roman transports. ⁷⁸⁷) The fleet put to sea from Cassandrea and, on arriving at Tenedos, it found there a number of open Rhodian ships in the harbour under command of Eudamus. ⁷⁸⁸) These ships need not have been intended for the war against Macedon and for convoying Roman transports: it seems more probable that it was their task to protect Rhodian maritime trade; ⁷⁸⁹) however this may be, the Macedonians carefully abstained from molesting the Rhodian vessels, but suffered them to get away unhindered: especially at that moment Perseus was naturally anxious to gain the wavering Rhodians over to his side. On the other

⁷⁸⁴) *V. s.* p. 399.

⁷⁸⁵) For the following events *Liv.* 44, 28—29 (*Pol.*); *App. Mac.* 18, 4; *Zon.* 9, 22, 10.

⁷⁸⁶) *V. s.* p. 381.

⁷⁸⁷) Appian's and Polybius' accounts prove clearly that this was the twofold object of the expedition and that Macedon as well as Rome imported grain for their armies from Asia Minor (and from the Pontus: the action in the waters of Tenedos and Sigeum points in this direction). The fact that Perseus could obtain grain for his armies from Asia Minor, though this country was practically a Roman protectorate, proves that strong Macedonian sympathies prevailed here as everywhere in the Greek world; the Romans could scarcely prevent the Macedonian king from doing so, first on account of the decline of their own navy and secondly on account of the Rhodian estrangement. Compare the behaviour of the Lesbian town Antissa towards the Macedonian fleet (*v. i.*).

⁷⁸⁸) Probably the famous admiral from the Syrian war is meant, who had defeated Hannibal in the battle of Side and Polyxenidas off Myonnesus; it is the last time he appears on the scene. He probably died in 168, as, in spite of the enormous services he had rendered to the Romans, he had no share at all in the Rhodian attempts at reconciling Rome immediately after the war. Cf. *de Sanctis* IV, 1, 313, 204.

⁷⁸⁹) *V. s.* footnote 711.

hand the Macedonians naturally took action against some Pergamene men of war, which on the other side of the island were blockading a fleet of 50 transports bound for Macedonia: the apparently small squadron having been put to flight by the Macedonian fleet without any pains, ⁷⁹⁰) the transports were escorted to Macedonia by 10 *lembi*; after fulfilling their task these returned to the main body which was now lying near Sigeum. Thereupon the Macedonian naval forces sailed southwards: the Lesbian town Antissa admitted them into the harbour and provided them with victuals, an act of hostility towards Rome for which she would soon be punished with destruction. ⁷⁹¹) But the aim of the expedition lay more southward: the fleet ensconced itself at the Isle of Sybota, between Elaea and Chios, ⁷⁹²) and from here it succeeded in surprising a fleet of military transports on its way from Elaea to the Roman army in Macedonia: it consisted of 35 cavalry transports carrying more than 1000 Keltic horsemen, sent by Eumenes to his brother Attalus, ⁷⁹³) but apparently not escorted by men of war, because the Macedonian fleet was not expected to maraud in those waters. ⁷⁹⁴) The convoy was sailing from Elaea to Phanae, the southern point of Chios, in order to cross from there to Macedonia. Thus we are told, *totidem verbis*, by Livy (from Polybius), but nevertheless this trustworthy piece of information makes us open our eyes. Why for heaven's sake choose such a roundabout way to reach the Pierian coastal plain from Elaea? Elaea—Phanae—Heracleum, that is something like sailing along the two right-angle sides of a right-angled triangle instead of following the hypotenuse, that is to say that an enormous southward detour was preferred to the straight and shortest route! And this happened notwithstanding the fact that every needless deviation in a southward direction had to be avoided in the Aegean on account of the predominance of northerly winds. As far as my knowledge

⁷⁹⁰) V. s. p. 378; that the Pergamene ships fled to Elaea, goes without saying: Eumenes who had passed the winter at Pergamum (footnote 778) must therefore have been informed of the presence of the Macedonian fleet at Tenedos.

⁷⁹¹) Liv. 45, 31, 14; Plin. N. H. 5, 139.

⁷⁹²) Alas, the position of the island cannot be exactly determined, so that it is difficult to form an adequate idea of the following operations.

⁷⁹³) Attalus co-operated with the Roman army on the Macedonian front, v. s. footnote 736.

⁷⁹⁴) *Nihil minus credere praefecti Eumenis quam Macedonum classem in illo vagari mari* (44, 28, 9).

reaches, no historian ever asked himself this question, not to speak about answering it. And yet the solution of this little problem is rather easy. The Macedonian fleet had driven away from Tenedos a number of Pergamene men of war; it goes without saying that these warships had returned to the Pergamene naval base Elaea and there had informed Eumenes of the presence of the Macedonian fleet in the waters near the Hellespont.⁷⁹⁵) Hence the military transports were ordered to sail far southwards via Phanae to the Macedonian front in order to keep them out of the reach of the Macedonian fleet which was wrongly deemed to be still cruising in the northern waters near Tenedos. For the same reason the convoy was not escorted by men of war: apparently Eumenes and his staff did not reckon for a moment with the possibility that the light Macedonian naval forces should venture to sail so far southward and so near the much heavier and stronger Pergamene fleet and that they should be so bold as to make an attack upon a Pergamene convoy almost within the reach of the Pergamene navy. A comprehensible way of reasoning, but nevertheless a serious miscalculation perfectly squaring with the negligence Eumenes gave proof of in the last year of the war.⁷⁹⁶) Was the destruction of the convoy perhaps a put-up job between Eumenes and Perseus? I think not; but it would be no wonder, if Rome had regarded it as such: there were also other equivocal rumours afloat about Eumenes' attitude. But let us now return to the cavalry transports.

When Antenor was informed of the approaching of the convoy, he put to sea from Sybota and met the enemy in the straits between Chios and the mainland.⁷⁹⁷) There could scarcely be question of resistance: the cavalry transports were unwieldy vessels and the Kelts were more or less sea-sick. So safety was sought in flight: part of the Pergamene ships really succeeded in escaping to the mainland; others landed on the coast of Chios, whereupon the men tried to reach the town, the horses being

⁷⁹⁵) V. s. footnote 790.

⁷⁹⁶) V. s. p. 377 sq.

⁷⁹⁷) According to Livy Sybota was situated between Elaea and Chios, but it cannot be localized more exactly. So it is scarcely possible to form an adequate idea of the movements of the Macedonian naval forces and it is especially difficult to understand, how, after departing from Sybota, they could meet the convoy approaching from Elaea *in the straits of Chios*: it seems probable that the convoy had a start and that the light Macedonian boats succeeded in coming up with the heavy transports; but Livy does not expressly say so.

left behind. But the swift Macedonian *lembi* succeeded in landing armed men at a point nearer to the town, who intercepted the Kelts and cut them to pieces on the road and before the gate. For the inhabitants of the town Chios had shut the gates, as they didn't know, who were the parties engaged.⁷⁹⁸) Thus 800 Kelts were killed and 200 were taken prisoner; the latter and a number of captured horses were transported to Macedonia, again by 10 *lembi*. After achieving their task these joined the main body at Phanae; thereupon the united fleet made for Delos.

Here Antenor quietly continued his naval action, covered by the neutrality of the sacred island. The Roman fleet was lying helpless at Oreus; only few ships of the allied powers were present at Delos to face the Macedonian fleet: 5 quinqueremes of Eumenes,⁷⁹⁹) 3 Roman quinqueremes of the envoys C. Popilius, C. Decimius and C. Hostilius,⁸⁰⁰) who were on the way to Alexandria in order to intervene in the war which had broken out between Egypt and Syria, but who realized that, as long as no victory should have been gained on the Macedonian front, Antiochus would not lend an ear to their protests, and therefore remained for the present at Delos, waiting for successes in Macedonia; finally some Athenian ships.⁸⁰¹) Popilius did what he could to suppress the Macedonian privateering practices. But at that moment Rome could not afford to hurt the religious feelings of the Greek world by violating the neutrality of Delos, however *louche* this neutrality might be; so the Roman, Pergamene and Macedonian crews had friendly intercourse with each other in the island, and outside the harbour the numerous nimble *lembi* of the Macedonians, which, moreover, often operated by night, usually succeeded in adroitly eluding the heavy and not very numerous ships of the adversaries. So the merchantmen laden with necessities for the Roman forces (or rather all transports not bound for Macedonia itself) were systematically destroyed or plundered and thus the revictualling of army and navy in Greece and Macedonia was seriously endangered.

For Rome this was perhaps the most painful, humiliating moment of the whole war: thanks to the line of defence on the Elpeus Perseus' position in Macedonia seemed more unassailable than ever, Genthius had

⁷⁹⁸) If they had known this, they ought to have admitted Eumenes' troops into the town, as they were allies of Rome, see Weissenborn ad Liv. 44, 28, 13.

⁷⁹⁹) V. s. p. 378.

⁸⁰⁰) V. s. p. 376.

⁸⁰¹) V. s. p. 380.

made common cause with him and to these adversities was now added the audacious action of the Macedonian fleet, which, quite apart from the dangers threatening the revictualling of army and navy, plainly demonstrated the helplessness of the Roman fleet and menaced to destroy utterly the Roman prestige in the Greek world, especially with the Rhodians. And really the deep impression, made upon Rhodes by the action of the Macedonian navy and especially by the destruction of the Pergamene convoy, and the arrival of a joint embassy from Perseus and Genthius gave the decisive impulse to a resolution that might have been expected of Rhodes from the beginning⁸⁰²⁾ and had been strongly encouraged by Marcius Philippus' intrigues in the preceding year: to make an attempt at mediation between Rome and Macedon and to send envoys for this purpose to Rome and to Perseus and the consul in Macedonia.⁸⁰³⁾ And even this step was a manifestation of a moderate policy of equilibrium and it did not imply a declaration of war upon Rome; but the pro-Macedonian party began to stir more and more violently under the impression of the events and could scarcely be kept in check by the less radical elements. What would happen, if the Rhodians were driven into Perseus' arms, because Rome refused to satisfy their desire for peace? Wouldn't Rome run the risk in this case of being wholly driven from the sea by the united fleets of Macedon and Rhodes and wouldn't the result of the whole war be seriously menaced by the cutting off of the lines of communication, especially because even Eumenes now began to display a remarkable lukewarmness in the naval sphere? In truth, it was high time to gain at last a brilliant victory on the Macedonian front; and, luckily for Rome, the senate showed to realize this necessity. The consul L. Aemilius Paullus, a thoroughly experienced general, had been entrusted *extra sortem* with the command of the land army against Macedon;⁸⁰⁴⁾ the naval command had fallen to the praetor Cn. Octavius,⁸⁰⁵⁾ while the *praetor peregrinus* L. Anicius was ordered by

⁸⁰²⁾ The notion that a complete victory of Rome attended with a definite elimination of Macedon was undesirable, had been impressed upon the Rhodians for a long time past; moreover, they had always stuck to a policy of equilibrium and mediation.

⁸⁰³⁾ Pol. 29, 10—11; Liv. 44, 29, 6—8; v. Gelder 150—151; de Sanctis IV, 1, 314—315; Kromayer II, 295 sq.

⁸⁰⁴⁾ According to some of the ancient authorities he was appointed by lot, but the other version seems more probable, cf. Liedmeier 130.

⁸⁰⁵⁾ Liv. 44, 17, 10.

the senate to depart for Illyria with a considerable army in order to wage war upon Genthius: he was also charged with the command of the squadron stationed at Issa since 170.⁸⁰⁶) A great number of *socii navales* were enlisted in order to restore the fighting power of the Roman navy.⁸⁰⁷) In the spring the new commanders departed for the East.⁸⁰⁸)

We may make short work of the Illyrian war: Genthius proved to be a not very frightful adversary. After 80 of his *lembi*,⁸⁰⁹) which had been sent out to plunder the territory of Dyrrhachium and Apollonia and consequently endangered the maritime communications of the Romans, had been defeated and captured by Anicius' fleet, a short and easy land campaign sufficed to force the king himself into capitulation. The Illyrian war was brought to an end within a month.⁸¹⁰)

After reaching the fleet at Oreus⁸¹¹) and inspiring it with some fresh vigour by means of the new *socii navales*, Cn. Octavius wisely abstained from taking action at the eleventh hour against the piracies of the Macedonian fleet, which, moreover, (probably on receiving the news of Octavius' arrival at Oreus) had retreated from Delos to Phanae in order to get out of the reach of the revived Roman navy:⁸¹²) first of all Perseus himself must now be defeated by means of a co-ordinated plan of attack and for this purpose the Roman fleet was needed at Heracleum. For the line of defence on the Elpeus could not be forced by means of a frontal attack;⁸¹³) so a combinative system of attacks had to be started again, in order to manoeuvre the adversary out of his impregnable position. In the council of war the proposal was made to send the fleet to the neighbourhood of Thessalonice and to force Perseus by plundering the coasts of that region to divide his army and thus to weaken the forces defending the position on the Elpeus.⁸¹⁴) But such a diverting manoeuvre

⁸⁰⁶) V. s. p. 377 and 385.

⁸⁰⁷) V. s. p. 383.

⁸⁰⁸) A discussion of the chronological problem is out of place here; see Liedmeier 269 sq.

⁸⁰⁹) These were no more than a part of his fleet, which comprised a total number of 220 *lembi*, Liv. 45, 43, 10.

⁸¹⁰) V. s. p. 385 sq., where the passages relating to the naval war have been discussed.

⁸¹¹) Liv. 44, 30, 1.

⁸¹²) Liv. 45, 10, 1; Niese III, 155.

⁸¹³) For the following remarks cf. the excellent discussion of the situation by Kromayer II, 297 sq.

⁸¹⁴) Liv. 44, 35, 8; Kromayer II, 301 sq.

offered little or no prospect of success: from the beginning of the war Perseus had reinforced the Macedonian coast towns with strong garrisons (naturally in view of eventualities like this) and at Thessalonice and Aenea these garrisons had even been supplemented with extra soldiers in 168.⁸¹⁵) The very presence of those strong Macedonian garrisons had caused the Roman naval expedition against Chalcidice in the preceding year to result in a failure: the countryside had been ravaged, but no town had been conquered. Now that the coastal garrisons had even been reinforced, a positive result could not be expected either and the Romans would have cherished an illusion, if they had hoped to force Perseus in this way to withdraw even one man from the line of defence on the Elpeus. Serious objections could also be raised against a landing south of Pydna in order to cut off the Macedonian army on the Elpeus from its revictualling base or to attack it from two sides simultaneously: such a landing had to be executed under the eyes of the complete hostile army on a coast affording little accommodation.⁸¹⁶) And a fortiori the Romans could not take into consideration an attempt at transferring the whole Roman army northwards by sea, which on account of the available ship-room should have been made piecemeal and therefore would have involved the necessity of dividing the Roman army temporarily in a dangerous way.

So Aemilius Paullus decided⁸¹⁷) to work round the enemy by land. A strong corps of picked soldiers was sent back under command of P. Scipio Nasica through the Tempe-pass, with instructions to force the Pythium-pass on the western side of the Olympus and thus to penetrate into Macedonia at the rear of the line on the Elpeus. In order to deceive Perseus the expedition was given the sham character of an outflanking movement by sea: the consul ordered the fleet to come to Heracleum and to keep ready a large quantity of cooked victuals; then he bade Scipio march southwards⁸¹⁸) with his corps to Heracleum, there pick up the victuals from the fleet and march inland by night (we may suppose that Scipio's expedition was a nightly one from the beginning to the end). In this way Aemilius Paullus effected that Scipio's corps seemed to be

⁸¹⁵) Liv. 44, 32, 5 sq.; for the Macedonian coastal garrisons Kromayer II, 339—340.

⁸¹⁶) Kromayer II, 301 sq.; in 169 the opportunity for such an action had been more favourable, because only a small part of Perseus' troops were present at that time in the coastal plain, *v. s.* p. 397.

⁸¹⁷) For the following events Kromayer II, 303 sq.

⁸¹⁸) The Roman army lay north of Heracleum before the Elpeus-line.

intended for the fleet and that the turning movement by land was masked as it were by the navy;⁸¹⁹) but of course this implied that the fleet must really sail northwards at the same time or shortly afterwards, because otherwise Macedonian head-quarters would rather too easily have got wind of the trick. Indeed the Roman fleet did sail northward: in this stage of the positional struggle its task did not only consist in masking Scipio's outflanking movement, but also in co-operating by sea with this movement by land. The only source of our knowledge on this point is a short communication of Zonaras,⁸²⁰) which proves that, when Perseus learned that Scipio with his corps had succeeded in penetrating west of the Olympus into Macedonia behind the line of the Elpeus, he evacuated his position for fear lest Scipio should attack him in the rear or should occupy Pydna, *because at the same time the Roman fleet sailed northward along the coast.*⁸²¹) Of the two possibilities reckoned with in Zonaras' text the latter seems more probable to Kromayer than the former; and I think he is quite right. Pydna was the revictualling base of the great army on the Elpeus; simply by ensconcing himself south of the town with his corps (it was not even necessary to occupy her) Scipio could cut off the Macedonian army from supplies and thus force it within a few days to evacuate its position on the Elpeus; on the other hand his own corps could not only be supplemented with extra soldiers, but also revictualled by the fleet. So Perseus was forced to evacuate his seemingly unassailable position by a two-sided outflanking movement; the necessity of such a resolution resulted logically from the situation: if he had not withdrawn immediately, he would simply have been forced to do so by lack of food within a few days and, moreover, he would have had to fight Scipio in this case in order to restore the communication with his base Pydna: immediately before the decisive battle, which could now no

⁸¹⁹) Liv. 44, 35, 13 sq.; Plut. *Aem.* 15, 7 sq.

⁸²⁰) Livy's account of these events has been swallowed by a gap in his text (44, 35—36); Plutarch follows the report of Scipio who only described his own expedition, and, moreover, he has no military understanding. See Kromayer II, 309—310.

⁸²¹) Zon. 9, 23, 4: ὁ μαθὼν ὁ Περσεύς, καὶ δεισας μὴ κατὰ νότον αὐτῷ προσπέσῃ ἢ καὶ τὴν Πύδναν προκατάσχει (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ναυτικὸν ἅμα τὸ τῶν Ῥωμαίων παρέπλει), τό τε ἔργον τὸ πρὸς τῷ ποταμῷ ἐξέλιπε καὶ πρὸς τὴν Πύδναν ἐπειγθεὶς πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο. How Scipio succeeded in forcing the Pythion-pass (which of course had been garrisoned by Perseus) and accomplishing his mission, we cannot explain here; for a thorough discussion of these events the reader is referred to Kromayer.

longer be avoided, such a line of conduct would have been foolish — to say the least of it.

Our discussion of naval warfare in the third Macedonian war is now practically at an end. For the battle of Pydna, which decided the war, was a land battle,⁸²²⁾ though it is true that the Roman fleet was lying inshore during the struggle and assisted the land forces in destroying the Macedonians who fled into the water.⁸²³⁾ And also the arrestation of king Perseus at Samothrace is mentioned here only for completeness' sake: though Cn. Octavius owed a rather undeserved naval triumph to this "achievement", it nevertheless did not belong to naval warfare, notwithstanding the fact that this job had naturally to be done by the Roman navy.⁸²⁴⁾ No, the battle of Pydna put an end to the naval as well as to the land war. This follows also from the fact that Antenor, who was at Phanae with the Macedonian fleet,⁸²⁵⁾ immediately stopped his action on receiving the news of the Roman victory and sailed back to Cassandrea.⁸²⁶⁾ As long as nothing had been decided on land and the attitude of Rhodes, even perhaps of Pergamum, seemed ambiguous, the Macedonian fleet could do useful work; but the immediate result of the destruction of the Macedonian army must be that Rhodes and Pergamum would be perfectly cured of certain pro-Macedonian tendencies and, as the Roman fleet had also revived from its lethargy, the Macedonian admiral had no other choice left than to return home.⁸²⁷⁾ For where could he have found a base in the long run, now that the whole of Macedon submitted to Rome in a short space of time. Thus the Macedonian fleet fell into Roman hands without a blow. The Roman envoys who had tried at Delos to protect the transports bound for the Macedonian front against the hostile fleet now no longer saw any reason to linger here; they sent home the Athenian ships that had assisted them and continued their voyage to Egypt, where Antiochus, impressed by the Roman victory, now immediately submitted to their peremptory sentence.⁸²⁸⁾

⁸²²⁾ For the battle of Pydna Kromayer II, 310 sq.; Ed. Meyer, *Kl. Schr.* II, 465 sq.

⁸²³⁾ Liv. 44, 42, 4 sq.; Zon. 9, 23, 7.

⁸²⁴⁾ For Perseus' flight and arrestation Liv. 44, 43 sq.; 45, 5—6; Plut. *Aem.* 23—26; Zon. 9, 23, 8 sq.; Dio fr. 66, 3—4; Just. 33, 2, 5. Meliboea in Thessaly (in 169 the Romans had vainly tried to conquer the town) was taken and sacked by Cn. Octavius after the battle of Pydna, Liv. 44, 46, 3.

⁸²⁵⁾ *V. s.* p. 407.

⁸²⁶⁾ Liv. 45, 10, 1.

⁸²⁷⁾ *C. A. H.* VIII, 271—272.

⁸²⁸⁾ Liv. 45, 10, 2 sq., *v. s.* p. 405; about the same time the 5 Pergamene quinqueres

Taking now a general view of the war as a whole, we must state that in spite of all the miserable laziness lavishly displayed by the Roman navy it nevertheless fulfilled a useful task during the last two years of the war in the system of co-ordinated operations which finally made possible the decisive battle of Pydna. No doubt, even in those years (not to speak about the first years of the war) the function of the Roman fleet was chiefly that of a fleet in being: it hardly took part in the real military actions, especially in 169, when the co-operation between army and navy was so utterly defective that the effectiveness of the naval forces lay more in what Perseus expected from them than in what they really did; but even this was important enough.

For the rest we may be brief. Neither Macedon nor Illyria were annexed by Rome: they retained their "autonomy", but lost their monarchical system of government, both of them being divided into a number of republics carefully separated from each other. It stands to reason that henceforth there could be no longer question of an Illyrian or Macedonian navy. Genthus' 220 *lembi* were divided among the neighbouring Greek cities, Corcyra, Apollonia and Dyrrhachium,⁸²⁹) a procedure often put into practice in Roman maritime history. Undoubtedly the Romans intended that the Greek cities allied with them should employ this present for the suppression of piracy endemic in the Adriatic. We are not so well acquainted with the fate of the Macedonian fleet. That it fell into the hands of the Romans, is quite certain;⁸³⁰) and that Rome aimed at excluding once for all the possibility of a Macedonian navy being created again, nay even the possibility of Macedonian navigation in general, appears from the fact that the treaty of peace contained a term forbidding the Macedonians to fell timber themselves *and* to allow others to do so.⁸³¹) But what became of the captured Macedonian warships? The *ἐκκαυδκήρης*, the flagship advanced in years, was triumphantly taken to Rome by Aemilius Paullus and henceforth kept there as a trophy;⁸³²) and, if Perseus still possessed some other old armoured vessels, these probably

will have returned to Elaea.

⁸²⁹) Liv. 45, 43, 10; Zippel 98, Ormerod 184.

⁸³⁰) V. s. p. 410.

⁸³¹) Liv. 45, 29, 14; de Sanctis IV, 1, 340. Probably the last-mentioned prohibition was especially directed against the Rhodians, who now after the victory had to put up with the full weight of Roman resentment; cf. *i. a.* Pol. 25, 4, 10 and v. Gelder 155, 2.

⁸³²) V. s. footnote 263.

suffered the same fate.⁸³³) We do however not know, what became of the rather numerous light craft, the *lembi* and *pristes*. We might feel inclined to infer from Liv. 45, 44, 16, where it is hinted that king Prusias of Bithynia should have been presented with a fleet by the Romans, that the Macedonian *lembi* were given away to him.⁸³⁴) This is certainly not impossible: Prusias had been a very lukewarm supporter of Rome during the war;⁸³⁵) but... in Asia Minor he was the natural rival and enemy of Eumenes and this may have been a sufficient reason for the senate to increase his power and show him special distinction, as it was now rather rudely brought home by the senate to Eumenes that he had incurred the displeasure of the Roman Fathers by his attitude during the war; moreover, Prusias was a base, cringing flatterer, a quality not displeasing the senate. On the other hand, however, the quoted passage of Livy is of a very low annalistic quality, so that precaution is advisable: after all it is fairly possible that the Macedonian "Schnellboote" were destroyed.⁸³⁶)

All three commanders of 168, L. Aemilius Paullus, L. Anicius and Cn. Octavius, obtained a triumph. There was scarcely a valid reason for Octavius' triumph; no doubt he was granted this honour on account of the conspicuous fact of king Perseus' arrestation, which was, however, quite foreign to naval warfare and to Octavius' merits as an admiral.⁸³⁷)

Rome had certainly no reason to pride herself upon the way she had muddled through this war; but... she came out of it all-powerful and so it is no wonder that she now took an ample vengeance on all those who had sided with Macedon during the war and on those who had kept aloof or shown a half-hearted disposition. The brutal punishment inflicted upon Epirus is one of the blackest pages in Roman history; but we may pass it over here, just as the other measures of retaliation taken in Greece. The treatment of the Rhodians, however, who had now to put up with the full weight of Roman rancour, is of the greatest importance for our subject. The irony of Fate would have it that one of the two mediatory embassies⁸³⁸) arrived at Aemilius Paullus' head-quarters shortly before

⁸³³) V. s. p. 381.

⁸³⁴) Cf. Weissenborn ad locum.

⁸³⁵) V. s. p. 378.

⁸³⁶) Pol. 30, 18, though speaking of Prusias, does not hint at the naval gift.

⁸³⁷) For Cn. Octavius' naval triumph cf. Liv. 45, 42; Diod. 31, 8, 10 and many other passages, see de Sanctis IV, 1, 352, 305.

⁸³⁸) V. s. p. 406.

the decisive battle, so that the latter by putting off his answer for 14 days made every answer superfluous, ⁸³⁹) and that the other embassy reached Rome almost simultaneously with the news of the victory, so that the envoys had to transform their offer of mediation off-hand into a servile congratulation. ⁸⁴⁰) But the senate's anger could not be appeased in such an easy way: proud little Rhodes must be cured for good and all of her self-reliance. I am glad that it does not belong to my task to follow here the Rhodians on the long way of their undeserved humiliation; ⁸⁴¹) suffice it for me to say that by the authoritative decision of the senate they lost a great part of their possessions on the mainland of Asia Minor, that Delos, which now passed into Athenian hands in return for the willingness displayed by Athens during the war, ⁸⁴²) was declared a free port in order to damage the commercial interests of Rhodes and that the alliance with Rome which had always been despised by the proud republic, but for which she now urgently asked was at last condescendingly granted by the senate in 164. This behaviour of Rome towards Rhodes was unfair as well as ill-judged. Unfair; for Rhodes had not sinned at all: she had only sent a small naval contingent to Chalcis in 171, but she had a right to do so, as in default of a formal alliance she was bound to nothing; she had kept aloof since, but to justify this line of conduct she could appeal to the fact that in 171 C. Lucretius had immediately sent home again the Rhodian naval contingent; she had made an attempt at mediation between Rome and Macedon, but this was not a hostile act against Rome and, moreover, the Rhodians could appeal to the circumstance that Q. Marcius Philippus, the consul of 169, had incited them to it; she had clearly shown that she did not wish a crushing Roman victory and a definite elimination of Macedon, but, as even Cato frankly acknowledged in his plea for the Rhodians, ⁸⁴³) they were perfectly right in thinking so from their own point of view and, moreover, you cannot punish a man for harbouring a disposition which does not lead to punishable acts. Ill-judged; for by the afore-said measures of the senate the financial strength of Rhodes and consequently also the strength of her navy was seriously weakened: the very considerable revenues the republic had drawn

⁸³⁹) Liv. 44, 35, 4—6; Zon. 9, 23, 3; v. Gelder 151.

⁸⁴⁰) Pol. 29, 19; Liv. 45, 3, 3 sq. and other passages, see v. Gelder *l. l.*

⁸⁴¹) See v. Gelder 151 sq. for a detailed discussion of the facts.

⁸⁴²) De Sanctis IV, 1, 346.

⁸⁴³) Fr. 163 sq. (Malcovati).

from her possessions on the mainland now got lost to a great extent and Rhodes was forced to reduce considerably the rate of her own duties in order to match the attractions of the free port at Delos; ⁸⁴⁴) what wonder then that such a radical financial bleeding had a very evil effect upon a costly instrument as the Rhodian navy was? This weakening of the Rhodian navy was to have disastrous results; for Rhode's principal contribution to human civilization lay in policing the seas and fighting the pirates, and, apart from the Syrian war, when her whole navy was kept engaged by the war against Antiochus' squadrons, she had excellently fulfilled her natural task since the year 200. After the Syrian war Rome had already opened the possibility of undisturbed growth to Cilician piracy by limiting uselessly and foolishly the sphere of action of the weakened Syrian navy; ⁸⁴⁵) now the Rhodian navy being seriously weakened in its turn, piracy more and more got a free hand in the Aegean too, and the more so because Rome now also began to thwart the purposes of Eumenes in Asia Minor on account of his attitude during the third Macedonian war. In the Aegean area piracy was especially endemic in Crete; since 200 ⁸⁴⁶) the Rhodians had exerted themselves for the suppression of it and, except for the Syrian war, ⁸⁴⁷) they had fairly succeeded in their aim; still in 168 ⁸⁴⁸) they had made an attempt to come to an understanding and conclude an alliance with the whole of Crete, the object of which would naturally have been to put a definite stop to the eternal feuds between the Cretan towns *and* to Cretan piracy. Of course all this came to nothing now: the war that was carried on between Crete and Rhodes from 155 onward would already prove clearly that the Rhodian navy had lost its old fighting power and that it was no longer capable of policing the seas efficiently. ⁸⁴⁹)

So the prospects offering to the Mediterranean world since 168 were gloomy indeed. The Roman navy was decaying fast and, after playing a last and very modest part in the third Punic war, it would almost

⁸⁴⁴) Pol. 30, 31, where we must read *ἐνδοίωνες* (§ 12); C. A. H. VIII, 289—290 and 631.

⁸⁴⁵) V. s. p. 368.

⁸⁴⁶) V. s. p. 224.

⁸⁴⁷) V. s. p. 365.

⁸⁴⁸) Pol. 29, 10, 6.

⁸⁴⁹) Ormerod 188—189; C. A. H. VIII, 291—292; v. Gelder 160—161; Segre, *Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica*, N. S. 11 (1933), 379—392.

vanish without leaving a trace; moreover, the Rhodian navy was deliberately emasculated, in a word Rome no longer contented herself now with disarming her adversaries in the naval sphere, but, wrongly believing herself to be all-powerful, she disarmed even herself and her naval allies. And the traditional Roman indifference with respect to piracy would soon pass into connivance in consequence of the growing of large estates in Italy and their urgent demand for numerous cheap slaves, of which commodity the pirates were the chief furnishers and Delos, Rhodes' rival, the most important market. But... those same *latifundia* that now strongly furthered the rise of piracy would also give the impulse to its suppression afterwards; for they deprived Italy of its agrarian autarky and made it dependent on transmarine import of grain, so that in the first century b. C. the revival of the Roman navy and the extermination of the omnipotent pirates would become a question of vital importance to Italy, menaced as it was with starvation.

II

Naval war in the western waters.

My discussion of naval warfare in the eastern waters in the period from 201 to 167 b. C., which has just been brought to an end, fills many pages of my book; on the other hand warfare of the same period in the western waters can be disposed of in a few words. This is quite natural: in those years Roman imperialism gravitated towards the East, where empires had to be confronted which could dispose of considerable land and naval forces both and where consequently the Roman navy had to fulfil an important task shoulder to shoulder with the land army, especially in the Syrian war. On the other hand after 201 the West enjoyed the honour of Roman interest in a much less degree than the Greek world: here the Roman aspirations remained limited to the consolidation of the (for the present scarcely more than formal) possession of Spain, which had been acquired in the second Punic war, and the pacification of Gallia Cisalpina and Liguria. No doubt, the war in Spain and Liguria had the character of an often bloody and difficult guerrilla that would drag on for years to come and give the Romans a peck of troubles; but... this guerrilla was fought predominantly on land. So

there are only a few data about convoying measures, the policing of the sea and the suppression of piracy which in this period arrest our attention in the West: we shall discuss them not generically, but locally, that is to say that we shall first say a few words about Spain and Sicily and then speak of the measures taken for the policing of the Italian waters.⁸⁵⁰⁾

Spain. In Spain the Romans had to face a guerrilla war on land, in which the Roman navy could scarcely play a part: the only episode of the Spanish war in which a Roman squadron appeared on the scene is the year 195, when the senate was driven by the very unfavourable turn the Spanish affairs were taking to send one of the consuls with considerable forces to the West.⁸⁵¹⁾ This task fell to the share of the great Cato; we are rather accurately acquainted with his expedition, because with his natural vanity he dwelt at length upon his Spanish expedition in one of his speeches, fragments of which have been handed down to us⁸⁵²⁾ and from which Livy's account of these events also ultimately originates.⁸⁵³⁾ Besides a considerable land army, Cato took 25 warships to Spain, 20 Roman vessels and 5 of Italiot towns.⁸⁵⁴⁾ As for the Roman ships, it is evident that 20 sail were easily available for this purpose: it is certainly true that the Roman squadron which had taken part in the second Macedonian war was still in the Greek waters, in connexion with the operations against Nabis; but, this squadron certainly not amounting to more than 75 sail, 20 were easily disposable at Rome for the West, as is proved by the number of old ships afterwards available for the Syrian war. The employment of Italiot naval contingents for expeditions far from Italy was put into practice for the first time on this occasion: in the second Macedonian war there had as yet been no question of this system; but in the Syrian and the third Macedonian

⁸⁵⁰⁾ For this chapter the reader may compare de Sanctis IV, 1, 407—485 and, as far as piracy is concerned, Ormerod 162—186.

⁸⁵¹⁾ There was a moment of quiet in Gallia Cisalpina, in the East the second Macedonian war had been brought to an end and the conflict with Antiochus was as yet in its primary stage: here only Nabis of Sparta had to be subdued in 195.

⁸⁵²⁾ In the edition of Malcovati fr. 23—57.

⁸⁵³⁾ See Klotz 35.

⁸⁵⁴⁾ Liv. 33, 43, 3; 34, 8, 4. Livy speaks only of *sociorum*, but the route as described 34, 8, 4 sq. proves that the allies who furnished the ships must have been *Italiots* and not for instance *Massaliots*.

wars it would also be applied to warfare in the East. It seems rather strange that for this Spanish expedition Rome did not prefer to appeal to Massilia, which at the beginning of the second Punic war had faithfully come to her aid and had had a large share in gaining the victory off the Ebro in 217. Probably we have to seek the reason for this seemingly unpractical line of conduct in the fact that the Ligurians were very turbulent during this period and that they inclined to practise piracy besides the guerrilla on land: in the main Rome left to Massilia⁸⁵⁵) the task of suppressing the piracy along the Riviera, which was of the greatest importance for the maritime communications between Italy and Spain, and therefore she will have deemed it undesirable to weaken the naval forces of this ally for the sake of the Spanish expedition.

We are acquainted with Cato's voyage to Spain from the fragments of his speech *de consulatu suo* and from Livy (34, 8, 4—7), whose account, as I remarked before, originates ultimately from Cato's speech. He departed — probably in May⁸⁵⁶) — with his warfleet from Rome to Luna (Spezia), where he had ordered the land army to assemble and whither (by means of an edict proclaimed along the coast) he requisitioned in a very short time a great number of merchantmen, for the transport of the troops and necessaries.⁸⁵⁷) The fleet of transports was ordered to sail from Luna to Port de Vendre, from where the warships and transports would make together for the hostile country:⁸⁵⁸) this means that the transports were not strictly convoyed during the first part of the voyage, first because they were sailing vessels and therefore must have some elbow-room according to the direction of the wind and secondly because transports laden with troops had little or nothing to fear from the side of the Ligurian pirates; but the wind was favourable during the passage, so that the fleet did not disperse.⁸⁵⁹) Hugging the coast, it reached Port de Vendre within the time fixed by Cato and from there it continued its voyage to Spain. Rhodae, the most northern Spanish frontier-town, was in the hands of the enemies;⁸⁶⁰) but they were easily expelled, where-

⁸⁵⁵) Cf. *i. a.* Strabo 4, 180 and 184, Ormerod 164.

⁸⁵⁶) For the chronology de Sanctis (IV, 1, 388) may be compared.

⁸⁵⁷) Liv. *l. l.* and Cato fr. 30.

⁸⁵⁸) Liv. 34, 8, 5, Cato fr. 32.

⁸⁵⁹) Cato fr. 31: the southerly wind kept the ships together near the coast.

⁸⁶⁰) That even this place on the frontier of Gaul was in the hands of the Spanish rebels, proves clearly, how terribly weak the Roman position in Spain was.

upon the fleet reached the naval base Emporiae by a favourable wind. Here the troops were disembarked, except the *socii navales*.

From that moment, however, the task of the warfleet was practically at an end: it had escorted the transports to Spain, but in the Spanish war itself it played almost no part at all; naturally not, as this war had wholly the character of a struggle on land. Only twice ships are mentioned: for the sham expedition to support the Ilergetes⁸⁶¹) soldiers were embarked (and immediately disembarked again!), without the ships being specified as transports or as men of war; and according to Appian (*Ib.* 40, 162) Cato should have sent all the ships to Massilia before the decisive battle on land in order to inculcate upon the soldiers' minds that they had to choose between victory and perdition.⁸⁶²) A rather negative way of employing the navy!

Apart from Cato's expedition of 195, we do not know whether or not Roman warships were employed in this period for the voyage to Spain and for service in the Spanish waters: neither when new troops are going to Spain (for instance in 182: Liv. 40, 1; naturally this did not happen every year) nor when the new governor departs from Rome with a small retinue to take over from his predecessor the army in Spain, we are told anything about the genus of the ships employed. In the latter case the commander and his retinue will undoubtedly have been transported by one or two men of war;⁸⁶³) but, whether in the former

⁸⁶¹) Liv. 34, 12, 6—13, 1.

⁸⁶²) Livy (34, 14, 1 sq.) says only that for the same purpose Cato posted his army behind the camp of the enemies, and this communication is corroborated by the fr. 38 and 39 of Cato's speech. So we cannot check the correctness of Appian's assertion; intrinsically improbable it is certainly not.

⁸⁶³) That even in this case it was advisable (in spite of the protection, offered by a few men of war) to be on one's guard against the Ligurians, seems to follow from the fate of the praetor L. Baebius, who in 189 was surprised by Ligurians on his way to Spain and, wounded himself, narrowly succeeded in escaping with only few men of his retinue to Massilia, where he died of his wound, cf. Liv. 37, 57, 1—2. But whether indeed he was travelling to Spain *by sea* — in this case he was naturally not surprised by Ligurian pirates on sea (even a few heavy Roman galleys could easily defend themselves against the small boats of the pirates), but after a landing on the Ligurian coast —, cannot be inferred with certainty from Livy's narrative; it is often supposed (but it seems far from probable to me) that he was travelling to Spain by land, cf. de Sanctis IV, 1, 422, Ormerod 165; on the other hand Liedmeier 92, Weissenborn ad locum, Heitland II, 136.

case the fleet of transports carrying the troops was convoyed by men of war as in 195, cannot be made out in consequence of the silence of the ancient authorities. On the one hand the fascinating personality of Cato and the fact that he himself had written circumstantially about his Spanish expedition drew the attention of historiography especially (and much more than it deserved in itself) to this expedition and induced the historians to relate Cato's voyage to Spain in detail, the fleetnumbers for instance being mentioned and specified in this special case; hence we might feel inclined to conclude that in other cases of troops being transported to Spain without an escort of warships being mentioned these must be supposed to have been present as well as in 195. But on the other hand it is also possible that by the very experiences of the expedition of 195 the senate was taught that it was practically superfluous to send warships to Spain: in the Spanish waters they were not needed and the transports laden with troops ran no risk at all of being molested by the Ligurian pirates. In a word, we do not know it; ⁸⁶⁴) but, be this as it may, we may take it for granted that never *strong* squadrons were sent to the Spanish waters (even Cato's naval effective in 195 was very modest), and during the great wars in the East the senate will certainly have avoided to send men of war to the West.

Sicily. The island itself did not occasion military actions of any kind during this period. But in 192 a squadron of 20 sail was sent to the Sicilian waters for fear lest Antiochus should try by means of Hannibal to draw Carthage into the war or to launch a diverting offensive against Sicily. These ships remained in the Sicilian waters from 192 to 189, that is to say during the whole Syrian war; their task was a purely prophylactic one and it remained limited to patrolling services, the expected diverting offensive failing to come and Carthage taking part in the war against Antiochus on the Roman side. This squadron, though on service in the Sicilian waters, belonged in reality to the effectives of the Syrian war. ⁸⁶⁵)

In 172 warships appear to be present again in the Sicilian waters —

⁸⁶⁴) That also after 168 naval contingents of Italian towns were sometimes called out for the war in Spain, appears indirectly from Pol. 12, 5, 2 (exemption of Locri); this must be a warning to us to be cautious about drawing inferences from the silence of the authorities. But at any rate it is practically certain that there were never sent considerable squadrons to Spain.

⁸⁶⁵) *V. s.* p. 261.

according to the annalists 12 were sent from there to form part of the squadron of 50 sail that was being fitted out against Perseus ⁸⁶⁶) — and this is very surprising indeed. The squadron of 20 sail mentioned before had been recalled to Rome towards 188 and since that moment we never hear again of warships being sent to Sicily; moreover, it is difficult to understand, why these ships were sent there, because, as far as we know, peace was not disturbed in the island itself and because after Hannibal's fruitless intrigues in the nineties there was certainly nothing to be feared from the side of Carthage. Must we regard this tradition as an annalistic falsification? I think not; in Roman naval history omissions are the order of the day and so we shall do well to put up with the sudden (or rather suddenly appearing) presence of this squadron near Sicily, though we are by no means able to account for it in a reasonable way (*V. s.* chapter II, footnote 563).

The policing of the Italian waters. Navigation in the Italian waters was menaced on both sides of the peninsula by a focus of piracy: on the west-side by the Ligurians, in the Adriatic by the inhabitants of the eastern shores, the Dalmatians, Illyrians and such like. The evil was chronic and old, but in the period now under discussion it reached a stage of acuteness on both fronts at the same time. Against the Illyrian pirates the Romans had twice acted vigorously in the period between the first and second Punic wars and conditions had since been satisfactory here for more than 30 years, because the Illyrian kings Skerdilaidas and Pleuratus successively co-operated in a loyal way with Rome as vassals and apparently suppressed with might and main the tendencies of their subjects towards piracy: at least we do not hear of complaints under their reigns. So the Romans had transferred here the task of policing the seas to the kings of the Illyrians themselves and it goes without saying that the efficiency of this system depended wholly on the strength and the good will of the client-king concerned: it must fail, when in the person of Pleuratus' successor Genthius ⁸⁶⁷) a weak and untrustworthy man came to the throne, who, in accordance with the views prevailing of old in Illyria, regarded piracy as a natural means of subsistence of his subjects, which it was not the task of the Illyrian government to impede and in which it probably even participated behind the scenes. Against Ligurian

⁸⁶⁶) *V. s.* footnote 699.

⁸⁶⁷) He must have come to the throne before 181, cf. Liv. 40, 42, Ormerod 181, 6.

piracy the Romans were also forced to act about the same time. No doubt, here too they used to transfer the task of policing the seas to others, in casu to Massilia, which, being a very important commercial town on the southern coast of Gaul, was deeply interested in the suppression of piracy;⁸⁶⁸) but now they could no longer stick to this line of conduct. For the Ligurians exhibited an extraordinarily turbulent disposition and restless activity after the second Punic war; and, though the guerrilla Rome since 200 had to carry on year by year against those stubborn mountaineers, was fought predominantly on land, the complaints of Massilia, which apparently was no longer able to police alone the seas of that area in a sufficient way, and the notion that a co-ordinated action of land- and naval forces would have a better effect against the Ligurians than expeditions by land alone, compelled Rome to start also a naval action in this area.⁸⁶⁹) In a word, in the year 181 the Romans were forced to act against Ligurian and Illyrian piracy at the same time and it is interesting to see how they organized this maritime police-service.

For this purpose they restored to life the old institution of the *duumviral* flotillas, which had been out of use for a century (that is to say during the great wars, when strong fleets were needed).⁸⁷⁰) The magistracy of the *duumviri navales* had been established in 311 *classis ornandae reficiendaeque causa*⁸⁷¹), but also to command this fleet, as the history of the institution proves. It stands to reason that it was an office of quite secondary significance and that the *duumviri navales* were wholly dependent on the consuls, to whose competence the naval command as part of the general command legally belonged. Hence the peculiar doubleness of the *duumviral* command: to either consul one *duumvir* was added with a squadron of 10 sail.⁸⁷²) The *duumviri navales* were elected by the people under the presidency of the consuls,⁸⁷³) probably in the *comitia tributa*. The office was, however, not filled annually; for the Romans had never standing fleets before the imperial age and consequently *duumviri navales* used only to be appointed when a war broke out which required that a

⁸⁶⁸) V. s. p. 416 sq.

⁸⁶⁹) The attack made upon the praetor L. Baebius in 189 (v. s. footnote 863), which at the time had remained unavenged, may also have contributed to this resolution.

⁸⁷⁰) Compare for the following remarks Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht* II², 565 sq.

⁸⁷¹) Liv. 9, 30, 4.

⁸⁷²) Liv. *per.* 12, App. *Samn.* 7, 1; Liv. 40, 18, 7; 41, 1, 2—3, cf. Tarn, *Fleets*, 49.

⁸⁷³) Liv. 40, 18, 7: *duumviros in eam rem consules creare iussi*.

fleet should be fitted out. In the period from 311 to 264 we find this magistracy twice in function, for the first time (immediately after its institution) in 310 in Campania ⁸⁷⁴), a second time in 282 in the waters of Tarentum; ⁸⁷⁵) and also after its revival in the period now under discussion it was only filled intermittently according to the need of the moment, not annually, as we shall see presently. It goes without saying that this subordinate double command of two insignificant flotillas wholly belonged to the humble sphere of Italian coastal warfare; this follows not only from the two cases of its appearance between 311 and 264, but also from the year of its institution, when Rome was still far removed from the hegemony over Italy and when scarcely one Roman statesman could think of an imperialistic policy of conquest outside Italy. So it is only natural that during the great wars from 264 to 189 it was simply shelved: Rome could by no means entrust such petty magistrates with the command of the strong fleets which in those wars helped her to conquer the world; (pro)consuls or (pro)praetors were always in command of them. But, as it is certainly not imputable to chance nor to the lacunary state of our historical knowledge that the *duumviri navales* make completely default during the great wars, ⁸⁷⁶) so it is not by chance either that exactly in the period of quiet from 189 to 172 the old magistracy was put into use again for coastal warfare and the suppression of piracy in the Italian waters, for which purposes it had been intended from the beginning. So the duumviral squadrons made their appearance again in Roman naval history, nearly a century after their last action in the Tarentine waters (282—181); it is a sad sample of regression, on the one hand perfectly tallying with the Roman state of mind, which always displayed a superstitious aversion from abolishing institutions once established; but, however genuinely Roman such a regression might be, it is nevertheless at the same time to be regarded as a serious symptom of the decay of the Roman navy since the second Punic war: Rome had come out of the Punic wars as a great naval power, but nevertheless she had scarcely been taught by this fact to realize her obligations as such, if now, albeit for the purpose of fighting piracy, she quietly rummaged up from the lumber-room an institution that belonged to the sphere of the modest Central-Ita-

⁸⁷⁴) Liv. 9, 38, 2—3.

⁸⁷⁵) Liv. *per.* 12, App. *Samn.* 7, 1.

⁸⁷⁶) Tarn, *Companion*, 755 and *v. s.* p. 201.

lian state of the Samnite wars and had rightly been shelved for a century! ⁸⁷⁷)

Towards 181 complaints reached the senate from Tarentum and Brundisium about their shores being scourged by the piracies of transmarine vessels as well as from Massilia about the pirates' boats of the Ligurians, who, as it was rumoured, molested oversea-trade as far as Gibraltar. ⁸⁷⁸) So the consuls were ordered to see that *duumviri navales* were elected by the people and that 20 ships were fitted out by these functionaries and manned with freedmen as *socii navales*. ⁸⁷⁹) The Italian coast was divided into two naval *rayons*, separated by the *promunturium Minervae* (opposite Capri): the coast north of this cape as far as Massilia was to be protected by one duumviral squadron of 10 sail (consequently this flotilla was intended to fight the Ligurian pirates), the coast south of it as far as Bari on the Adriatic by the other (so the action of this squadron was to meet the complaints of Tarentum and Brindisi). ⁸⁸⁰) C. Matienus and C. Lucretius were appointed to be *duumviri navales* and they took measures for the fitting-out of the ships; the northern coastal area (and consequently also the struggle with the Ligurians) fell to Matienus, the southern to Lucretius. ⁸⁸¹)

Before we discuss the operations of the two squadrons, we have, however, first to face a serious difficulty. For we are told by Livy that in connexion with the complaints from Brindisi and Tarentum the Histrians were added to Apulia, the province of the praetor L. Duronius, ⁸⁸²) a communication which, if correct, would imply that the incriminated acts of piracy should have been committed by inhabitants of Histria. Zippel

⁸⁷⁷) V. s. p. 200 sq.; it stands to reason that in the third Macedonian war (172—168) the magistracy of the *duumviri navales* was superseded again by the praetorian naval command. Also afterwards it never makes its appearance again: it probably deceased with the Roman navy itself and in the first century (at the time of the revival of Roman sea-power) it was not resuscitated for the second time.

⁸⁷⁸) Liv. 40, 18, 4; Plut. *Aem.* 6, 3. The communication about Gibraltar seems to be an indication that there were no Roman warships in Spain, v. s. p. 419.

⁸⁷⁹) Only the officers were to be free-born men.

⁸⁸⁰) Liv. 40, 18, 7—8. That the 20 vessels were taken from the old stock of ships lying in the dockyards since the Syrian war, goes without saying and, moreover, it has been handed down to us, see also p. 374.

⁸⁸¹) Liv. 40, 26, 8; this was the beginning of C. Lucretius' naval career, which ten years later would come to such a shameful end in the war against Macedon, v. s. p. 386—392.

⁸⁸²) Liv. 40, 18, 4.

is perfectly right in stumbling at this surprising piece of information.⁸⁸³⁾ For it is very strange that the south-easterly shores of Italy should have been scourged especially by pirates from the extreme northern end of the Adriatic; the phrase *latrocinia transmarinarum navium* in the complaint of Tarentum and Brindisi points indeed in the direction of Illyrian rather than of Histrian pirates. That Livy's communication must really be regarded as erroneous, follows from the fact that the war against Histria⁸⁸⁴⁾ was conducted in 181 by the praetor Q. Fabius Buteo from Gallia Cisalpina and not by L. Duronius from the far distant Apulia,⁸⁸⁵⁾ and from Duronius' report in 180: in 181 he had put to sea from Brindisi with 10 ships (that is to say with the second duumviral squadron), not to Histria, but to Illyria, and he reported that all the acts of piracy on the eastern coast of Italy had been committed by subjects of Genthius, that is to say by Illyrians.⁸⁸⁶⁾ So we are able in this case to correct Livy by means of his own account: not Histria, but Illyria had been added to L. Duronius' province Apulia⁸⁸⁷⁾ and it had been Illyrians and not Histrians that by their acts of piracy had provoked the complaints of Brindisi and Tarentum and the countermeasures of Rome.

Now we may pass on to the discussion of the operations of 181 and 180. Apparently in Liguria it was especially the tribe of the Ingauni that had committed piracy; against them at any rate the action of L.

⁸⁸³⁾ 81.

⁸⁸⁴⁾ No doubt, the relations between Rome and Histria were hostile at the time in connexion with the foundation of a colony at Aquileia, but only in 178 a duumviral squadron would co-operate here with the Roman land army (*v. i.*) nor do we ever hear of acts of piracy from the side of the Histrians in 181 and the following years.

⁸⁸⁵⁾ Liv. 40, 26, 2—3.

⁸⁸⁶⁾ Liv. 40, 42, 1—2.

⁸⁸⁷⁾ But it is also possible that Duronius was charged with the naval control of the entire eastern coast of the Adriatic, including the Histrian coast, and that Livy's inaccurate communication 40, 18, 4 is due to careless abbreviation (in this case Histria would include Illyria, as 41, 1, 3 inversely the Illyrians comprise Histria: the Histrians were probably Illyrians, cf. Heitland II, 142). We might perhaps infer this from the fact that in 180 Duronius *in regem Illyriorum Gentium latrocinii omnis maritimi causam avertit (ex regno eius omnes naves esse, quae superi maris cram depopulatae essent)*, which words (40, 42, 1—2) seem to imply an exculpation of others than the Illyrians, in casu of the Histrians. But this argument is not absolutely conclusive.

Aemilius Paullus ⁸⁸⁸) by land and of C. Matienus ⁸⁸⁹) by sea was directed in 181. Alas, we know next to nothing about the share taken by the fleet in this expedition, as Livy and Plutarch are both silent on this point and only inform us of the final result: the Ingauni submitted and had to hand over all ships with more than three thwarts (thus Plutarch; Livy mentions a number of 32 vessels captured by Matienus); the crews of the pirates' boats were hunted up and taken into custody; many people caught by the pirates were set free. ⁸⁹⁰) The Ingauni were treated mildly: no doubt, the interest of the Romans demanded that their communications with Spain and navigation in general should not be disturbed (remember the praetor L. Baebius, *v. s.* footnote 863), but on the other side they realized clearly that the Ligurians of the Maritime Alps constituted a useful barrier against Gallic aggression from the North; ⁸⁹¹) consequently radical measures were taken for the suppression of piracy, but for the rest they were not severely chastised. So the expedition of the consul A. Postumius in 180 with the fleet along the coast of the Ingauni and Intemelii will only have had the character ⁸⁹²) of a tour of inspection to control the fulfilment of the provisions against piracy and to demonstrate the Roman vigilance in the naval sphere; perhaps in this year an alliance was concluded with the tribe of the Intemelii, whose name lives on in the modern Ventimiglia. ⁸⁹³) Livy's brief communication about this expedition proves that the duumviral squadron of 10 ships was still present in the Ligurian waters in 180; the *duumvir* is not mentioned, because the consul himself was aboard and consequently the subordinate functionary was thrown into the shade by him. ⁸⁹⁴)

⁸⁸⁸) The same who would afterwards defeat Perseus in the battle of Pydna; he had passed the year 182 as consul in Liguria, but only in the spring of 181 he took the field against the Ingauni.

⁸⁸⁹) In the spring, shortly after his appointment, he had been ordered by the senate to depart for Liguria with his 10 ships and to co-operate there with the proconsul Aemilius (Liv. 40, 26, 8). Indeed the *duumviri navales* were normally subservient to the consuls, *v. s.* p. 421 sq.

⁸⁹⁰) Plut. *Aem.* 6, 6—7, Liv. 40, 28, 7; cf. Liedmeier 92 sq., Ormerod 164 sq. (the latter wrongly believes that the flotilla of 10 sail had received reinforcements). It is probably not imputable to chance that the sources are all but silent about the operations of the little squadron: the expedition certainly centered on Aemilius Paullus' land forces.

⁸⁹¹) Plut. *Aem.* 6, 5; Ormerod 165.

⁸⁹²) Liv. 40, 41, 6: *ad visendam oram*.

⁸⁹³) De Sanctis IV, 1, 420.

⁸⁹⁴) The question, who was this *duumvir*, will be discussed below.

By these measures the pacification of the Riviera was established for the present. About the simultaneous operations of the second duumviral squadron in the Adriatic we hear only afterwards through L. Duronius' report to the senate in 180 (*v. s.*). In 181 he had put to sea with 10 ships⁸⁹⁵) from Brindisi for a voyage of inspection to Illyria, which had been added to his province Apulia in connexion with the complaints about piracy. After his return in 180 he reported to the senate that Genthius was to be held responsible for all acts of piracy committed on the eastern coast of Italy: all the vessels concerned in this affair had come from his kingdom; he had sent envoys to Genthius about this matter, but they had not been admitted to his presence; he added in conclusion that many Roman citizens and Italians had suffered injury in Illyria and that it was rumoured that at that very moment Roman citizens were being detained at Corcyra Nigra.⁸⁹⁶) The senate decided that all of them should be brought to Rome (so their liberation must have been demanded from Genthius, though this is not mentioned) and that the *praetor peregrinus* C. Claudius⁸⁹⁷) should inquire into the affair; until this inquiry should have been finished, no answer would be given to the embassy sent by Genthius to excuse his not receiving the Roman envoys and to refute the charges brought against him.⁸⁹⁸) We do not know the result of the inquiry nor the answer given to Genthius' envoys; but we may safely suppose that no further measures were taken against the Illyrian king, but that the senate regarded his excuses and the liberation of the detained Roman citizens as sufficient for the moment. On the other hand the duumviral squadron certainly continued in 180 to guard the coasts near Brindisi; this follows from the fact that the other squadron also continued to operate in Liguria in this year (*v. s.*): the magistracy of the *duumviri navales* could not be partly maintained and partly shelved.

⁸⁹⁵) Naturally this was the second duumviral squadron under command of C. Lucretius, who, being a subordinate functionary, is not mentioned, because the praetor was aboard himself. In this case the duumviral squadron was not at the disposal of the consul (both consuls operated in Liguria this year), but of the praetor in Apulia, as it had especially to protect the shores belonging to his province.

⁸⁹⁶) Livy speaks of *Corcyra*, but he must mean Corcyra Nigra, as the other island was under Roman control and did not belong to Genthius' kingdom, Zippel 82, Weissenborn ad Liv. 40, 42, 4; wrongly Klotz 60 and 90.

⁸⁹⁷) Liv. 40, 35, 8 *coll.* 37, 4.

⁸⁹⁸) Liv. 40, 42, 1—5; cf. Zippel *l. l.* and Ormerod 180.

Who were the *duumviri* of 180, is quite another question. In this year L. Cornelius Dolabella is mentioned as *duumvir navalis*, whose refusal to abdicate his naval function on account of his having been nominated *rex sacrorum* raised a great dust.⁸⁹⁹) Whether he commanded the squadron in the Ligurian waters or in the Adriatic, we do not know. If Dolabella was really *duumvir navalis* in 180, it would follow that C. Matienus and C. Lucretius, the functionaries of 181, were no longer in office in 180, and Mommsen's opinion⁹⁰⁰) that the *duumviri navales* were not appointed for a year, but for a war would necessarily be wrong, as otherwise Matienus and Lucretius would certainly have retained their function in 180. However, Mommsen's opinion remains possible, if we suppose Dolabella to have been *duumvir designatus* for 179; but this cannot be regarded as probable, because the elections for 179 are mentioned by Livy after the contest about Dolabella's abdication. The problem is still further complicated by the fact that L. Cornelius Dolabella was also *duumvir navalis* in 178;⁹⁰¹) according to Mommsen (*l. l.*) he should have fulfilled this function uninterruptedly from 180 to 178. This is, however, downright impossible, because Livy expressly says of the *duumviri* of 178 that *both* of them had been appointed for the purpose of operating against the Illyrians and that for this purpose the coast of the Adriatic had been divided into two *rayons* (north and south of Ancona), whereas it is absolutely certain (*v. s.*) that in 180 one of the duumviral squadrons still operated in the Ligurian waters and that consequently the division of the *entire* Italian coast into two *rayons* (north and south of Sorrento) which had been established in 181 remained still in force in 180. So there are only two possibilities: *either* C. Matienus and C. Lucretius held the duumvirate in 181 and 180 (in the Ligurian and the Illyrian waters respectively) and L. Cornelius Dolabella with C. Furius held it in the years 179—178, both of them in the Adriatic (in this case the duumvirate was not an annual office); *or* (and this is more probable, because Livy mentions the elections for 179 after the controversy about Dolabella's abdication) the duumvirate *was* an annual office: in this case C. Matienus and C. Lucretius held it in 181, Dolabella with an unmentioned

⁸⁹⁹) Liv. 40, 42, 8—10. Finally Dolabella won the game, because religious objections were raised against his inauguration as *rex sacrorum*; so he remained *duumvir navalis*. Cf. Münzer 147.

⁹⁰⁰) 566.

⁹⁰¹) Liv. 41, 1, 3.

person in 180, Dolabella with C. Furius in 178. If this were true, Dolabella would have been re-elected. The slight, incidental attention, devoted by Roman historiography to these naval affairs (which were indeed of secondary importance), makes it impossible to choose definitely between these two alternatives. In this respect a particular drawback lies in the fact that we do not know, whether the regulation of 178 (both duumviral sections in the Adriatic) was already in force in 179, because the election of C. Furius and L. Cornelius is not mentioned by Livy *suo loco*, but afterwards à propos of the operations in Histria.

Be this as it may, after 180 at any rate the Roman exertions for policing the seas were concentrated upon the Adriatic: the Ligurian waters had been pacified for the present. So we find in 178 both duumviral squadrons in the Adriatic *adversus Illyriorum classem*: the sphere of action of the northern squadron under command of C. Furius reached from Ancona to Aquileia, the area of the southern squadron under command of L. Cornelius Dolabella from Ancona to Tarentum.⁹⁰²) We know nothing about the operations of the southern squadron: its task (the suppression of Illyrian piracy) will have been chiefly preventive. On the other hand Furius' squadron found its task in co-operating with the consul A. Manlius in the war against Histria;⁹⁰³) the consul invaded this country by land and Furius' flotilla escorted the transports which had to provide the land army with all necessities: the transport of these by land from Aquileia was too difficult and risky.⁹⁰⁴) So we meet here again with a duumviral squadron at the service of a consul, just as before in Liguria; but now its chief task consisted in the protection of the transmarine supplies: of co-ordinated operations we perceive nothing. Only once again this squadron appears on the scene in Livy's account of the Histrian war: when in consequence of a surprising attack an unworthy panic had arisen in the Roman camp, the troops, for the greater part unarmed, fled to the coast and tried to take refuge on the ships; but the consul had the sense to order the fleet to withdraw from the coast; so the panic-stricken troops had no choice but to stay ashore

⁹⁰²) Liv. 41, 1, 2—3.

⁹⁰³) The conflict with Histria, which had arisen from the foundation of Aquileia, compelled the Romans to have it out definitely with the Histrians, on the one hand in order to protect Aquileia herself, on the other hand in view of the unreliability of the southern Illyrians and the approaching conflict with Macedon.

⁹⁰⁴) Liv. 41, 1, 4 sq.; de Sanctis IV, 1, 430—431, Zippel 103 sq.

and the consul got an opportunity of recovering the soldiers from their panic and reconquering the camp he had shamefully lost.⁹⁰⁵) After this insignificant incident we lose sight of the squadron for good and all; but there is valid reason to suppose that it was still on service in 177 (when the war resulted in the subjection of Histria) for the purpose of protecting the supplies by sea for the land army operating in Histria. If this be true, we must naturally assume that the southern squadron also continued in 177 to fulfil its task against the Illyrian pirates; but we know nothing about the naval commanders of this year nor about the naval operations themselves.

It is absolutely certain, however, that the year 177 was the last year of the concentration of both the duumviral commands in the Adriatic: the war in Histria had ended in the subjection of the country and we may readily assume that also Genthius and his honest subjects had been sufficiently cowed — for the present at least — by the biennial presence of a Roman squadron. At any rate *both* the duumviral squadrons make their appearance in 176 in the waters of the Riviera, in connexion with a revolt that had broken out in Liguria: they had to second the operations by land against the rebels by means of a naval demonstration.⁹⁰⁶) It was the last time the duumviral squadrons appeared on the scene of Roman history; Livy does not enter into the details of the operations nor does he mention the names of the *duumviri*.

So the way of dividing the naval forces in those years betrays a certain systematism: in 181—180 one squadron of 10 sail in the West, one in the East; in 178—177 both in the East; in 176 both in the West. But it is the system of a man who tries to dispose of a disagreeable job at the easiest rate. That the evil of piracy could only be suppressed temporarily in this way, but not disposed of for good and all, goes without saying. In Illyria the atmosphere had not really been cleared, but mischief continued brewing. Though Genthius had been intimidated temporarily, his attitude remained equivocal, the more so because the eruption of the conflict with Macedon was fast approaching. In 172 envoys of the allied Issa complained at Rome of acts of plundering, committed by Genthius on their territory, and they charged him with playing into Perseus' hands and having sent spies to Rome under the

⁹⁰⁵) Liv. 41, 3, 1 sq.

⁹⁰⁶) Liv. 41, 17, 7.

mask of envoys. Thereupon the senate should have brought the Illyrian envoys to account and should themselves have sent an embassy of three men, A. Terentius Varro, C. Plaetorius and C. Cicereius, to Genthius in order to protest against his behaviour.⁹⁰⁷) This piece of information is rather suspicious; for shortly afterwards Genthius' attitude is qualified as wavering (which is quite another thing than treacherous)⁹⁰⁸) and L. Decimius now appears to go to Illyria as an envoy, while the 3 other envoys are no longer hinted at.⁹⁰⁹) If the story of the complaints of the Issaeans has some real foundation (and this is highly probable), they must at any rate have strongly exaggerated Genthius' sins; for still in 171 he furnished the Romans with a naval contingent and his attitude continued to be wavering till 168, when at last he decided to throw in his lot with Perseus. But, however exaggerated tales might be afloat at Rome about Genthius, the nucleus of these stories (*viz.* that Rome could not rely upon him) was certainly genuine, as is proved by the result. The rapid and unglorious fall of the Illyrian king was discussed by us in the chapter treating of the third Macedonian war; we stated there that after the fiasco of Genthius the Romans did not want to continue the experiment of an Illyrian client-kingdom, that they split up the country into a number of republics and divided the Illyrian fleet among the neighbouring Greek cities. This means that they did not think of policing the seas of that area permanently themselves, but, as usual, tried to transfer this task to others. That this couldn't be a definitive solution of the problem, goes without saying; especially the independent Dalmatia remained active and turbulent, in the maritime sphere as well as on land, so that in the long run Rome was forced to intervene nevertheless. But the complete pacification of the eastern shores of the Adriatic reaches far beyond the limits of the period discussed by us and, moreover, it was chiefly brought about by land.⁹¹⁰) The subjection of Liguria was not completed either within the period now under discussion; and here too the pacification was chiefly brought about from within, by land.⁹¹¹)

⁹⁰⁷) Liv. 42, 26, 2—7.

⁹⁰⁸) Liv. 42, 29, 11.

⁹⁰⁹) Liv. 42, 37, 2; 45, 8; Nissen 247.

⁹¹⁰) De Sanctis IV, 1, 435 sq.; Ormerod 184 sq.; from Pol. 12, 5, 2 it appears that after 168 naval contingents of Italiot towns were employed for the war against Dalmatia; but it is quite certain that the war itself was fought almost wholly on land.

⁹¹¹) De Sanctis IV, 1, 422 sq.; Ormerod 165 sq.

In conclusion a few words about Sardinia and Corsica. Whether the revolts in these islands were connected in some way with those in Liguria, is difficult to make out; ⁹¹²⁾ but anyhow it is certain that these revolts were not attended with eruptions of piracy: they broke out on land and were suppressed by land, though as a matter of course the Roman armies had to be transported to the islands by sea. So these events lie outside the range of our subject; suffice it for me to remark that in 177 the consul Ti. Sempronius Gracchus was allowed to dispose of 10 quinqueremes for the expedition to Sardinia, if he wanted to make use of them. ⁹¹³⁾ During the operations in Sardinia we do not hear of these ships; so we do not know, whether Gracchus did make use of them or not. If he did, there were 30 men of war in commission in 177, as the two duumviral squadrons were on service in the Adriatic during this year. ⁹¹⁴⁾ That those 10 vessels also belonged to the old stock of ships, has been handed down by Livy.

These are the little bits of knowledge available to us for a reconstruction of Roman naval history in the years 189—172. In truth, there are gaps enough, so that many details remain obscure; but... even the discovery of new data would scarcely modify the general idea of what this period was like, as it was formed by us by means of the scarce material now available: it was a period of comparative quiet, and of a rather rusty rest in the maritime sphere, which foreboded little good for the coming last round against Macedon.

⁹¹²⁾ De Sanctis IV, 1, 439.

⁹¹³⁾ Liv. 41, 9, 2.

⁹¹⁴⁾ V. s. p. 429.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF THE CORVUS

The problem of the so-called *corvus*, the boarding-bridge, by means of which the Romans gained their first great naval victories in the first Punic war (in the battles of Mylae and Ecnomus), is a very ticklish problem offering queer aspects to the mind of the inquirer; but the way historiography usually grapples with it (or rather does not grapple with it) is much queerer still. Here for once we meet with an important event in Roman naval history which arrests everybody's attention and enjoys everybody's predilection, but... in the main scholars carefully avoid to ponder on the problems it confronts them with: modern historiography never forgets to devote a fair bit of attention to this remarkable instrument, which enabled the Roman landlubbers to reduce a naval battle to a battle on land and thus to gain the victory over experienced sailors, and to describe it somehow after Polybius¹⁾ (even in the most unpretentious school-books Duilius' boarding-bridge is nearly always mentioned honourably); but as it were by tacit consent that same historiography usually gives a wide berth to the ticklish riddles it sets us. For the fact of the matter is, that the boarding-bridge, which had made its first appearance in Roman naval history in such a conspicuous and glorious way, vanishes after the battle of Ecnomus without leaving a trace: neither Polybius himself nor any other ancient authority ever hints at its having been employed since that battle, alas without giving reasons for this striking phenomenon or even pointing to it. So we must ask and answer this question: is it really conceivable that such an important military instrument should have been banished to the lumber-room after a few years, in spite of the fact that it had enabled the Romans to gain great naval victories and that it tallied in a wonderful way with Roman popular character?

We can try to solve this problem in more than one way. I. We may follow the lead of ancient historiography, bury our head in the sand and solve the problem by behaving as if it did not exist: we discuss the

¹⁾ I, 22.

corvus circumstantially and perhaps even enthousiastically à propos of the battle of Mylae, we mention it somewhat less detailedly à propos of the battle of Ecnomus and henceforth we are silent about it, as if such a method were the most natural thing in the world. If scientific problems could be decided by a majority of votes, this method would certainly be the best one, for alas it is put into practice by most historians;²⁾ but of course it is no method at all: in this way history would be wholly stripped of its scientific character. So we leave out of account this line of conduct in the following discussion, because it is quite untenable.

II. We may try to argue that also after the battle of Ecnomus the boarding-bridge continued to play a part in Roman naval history, but (through the whims of ancient historical tradition) anonymously or rather under other names. For after the battle of Ecnomus boarding-instruments under various names (*manus ferrea* and *harpago* are the most usual) play an important part in Roman naval history; isn't it possible that these terms are simply synonymous with *corvus*, in other words that the boarding-bridge always continued to exist, but... under a "pseudonym"? This seems to be the opinion of Weissenborn, who in the passage of Livy 36, 44, 8 (which belongs to the description of the battle of Cissus in 191, derived from Polybius, cf. App. Syr. 22, 105 and v.s. chapter III, footnote 452) renders *manus ferreae* by *Enterbrücken* (*deren ein Schiff auch zwei haben konnte!*), and of de Sanctis (IV, 1, 179), who in the same connexion speaks of *corvi*.³⁾ A certain support to such a point of view might be found in the really striking fact that only Polybius calls the boarding-bridges of Mylae and Ecnomus *κόρακες* (*i. e. corvi*): Zonaras (8, 11, 2) speaks of *χεῖρας περιπόντους σιδηρεῖς* (this means that *manus ferrea* here is synonymous with the *corvus*, which according to Polybius (1, 22) turned round a pole on the prow), Florus (1, 18, 9) of *ferreae manus machinaeque validae*, Frontinus (2, 3, 24) again of *manus ferreae, quae*

²⁾ The opinion of Tarn for instance (*v. i.*) is usually not refuted, but simply ignored.

³⁾ However, it is difficult to make out, what de Sanctis exactly means by *corvi*, as on a former occasion (III, 1, 128: à propos of the first introduction of the weapon) he is rather vague on this point. Does he perhaps share the opinion of Tarn, who regards the *corvus* as a grappling-iron; but then why not plainly say so and give reasons for this point of view? It is highly regrettable that the excellent de Sanctis, who always makes it a point of honour to penetrate as profoundly as possible into the problems of ancient history, expresses himself so vaguely and indistinctly on this occasion.

ubi hostilem apprehenderant navem, superiecto ponte transgrediebatur Romanus (with Florus and Frontinus both *manus ferrea* is the iron raven's beak which was fixed in the planks of the enemy's deck and which of course was attached to the boarding-bridge itself (*machina valida, pons superiectus*); but Frontinus at least no longer understood this last detail, as we get the impression from his account that, after the *manus ferrea* had been fixed in the enemy's deck, *subsequently* a bridge was thrown over it); finally *the actor de viris illustribus* (38, 1) says briefly that *Duilius classem validam fabrefecit et manus ferreas cum irrisu hostium primus instituit*.⁴) And yet this opinion must wreck on the facts of Roman naval history after Ecnomus: the character of the boarding-weapons employed after 256 cannot always be deduced with certainty from the descriptions of battles and the sense of terms like *manus ferrea* and *harpago* is naturally rather vague and floating (every instrument with an iron beak or hook may be meant by them and they are often interchanged); but nevertheless we are able now and then to ascertain exactly the sense of the words concerned and the extant material as a whole also points in the direction of the use of *grappling-irons* and not of *boarding-bridges* after the battle of Ecnomus. In the passage of Livy 30, 10, 16—17 (Pol.)⁵) the *harpago* is clearly described as a grapnel on an iron pole with chain and in another passage (24, 34, 10 = Pol. 8, 6, 2) the *manus ferrea* as a grapnel attached to a chain; the same may be assumed with respect to the passages where *harpagones* and *manus ferreae* are mentioned together without being described, for instance Caes. B. C. 1, 57, 2; 58, 4; Plin. N. H. 7, 209 (in such cases two kinds of grapnels are meant naturally and not grapnels side by side with boarding-bridges). That both terms were also interchanged, appears *i. a.* from Zon. 9, 12, 10 in comparison with Liv. 30, 10, 16; here too grapnels must be meant and not boarding-bridges. So there is a strong *a priori* probability that the same holds good with regard to passages like Liv. 26, 39, 12 and 36, 44, 8, where *manus ferreae*

⁴) In Latin literature the word *corvus* is never employed for the boarding-bridge described by Polybius: the use of *corvus* by modern historiography to denote this instrument rests exclusively upon Polybius' *νόσος*. However, this silence may be imputable to chance, as Livy's account of the first Punic war is not extant: it is highly regrettable that, apart from Polybius, we are only furnished with information about the *corvus* by late authors of brief and superficial compendia, who no longer understood the instrument they described.

⁵) V. s. chapter II, footnote 469.

are simply mentioned without being described; and in my opinion this can really be deduced from the descriptions of the battles concerned. For in the former case the Roman fleet consisted chiefly of light ships furnished by Italiot towns (it numbered only 3 quinqueremes, § 4); now then, if Tarn (*v. i.*) has some reason for doubting, whether the quinquereme could bear a large and top-heavy machine like the boarding-bridge described by Polybius, this must certainly be regarded as impossible with respect to lighter vessels. As for the passage 36, 44, 8 (the battle of Cissus), every doubt is here even excluded by the fact that the flagship of the praetor C. Livius boarded two hostile vessels at the same time with *manus ferreae*: the system of the boarding-bridge as described by Polybius, one of the most essential traits of which was that it could freely turn in every direction round a pole on the prow, naturally excludes the possibility of two boarding-bridges standing together on one prow, as is supposed by Weissenborn; moreover, if it is liable to doubt, whether a quinquereme could carry and launch one boarding-bridge without turning turtle, it must be regarded as utterly impossible that one ship of this class should have borne two of such colossuses! So the long and short of the matter is that we cannot find back Polybius' boarding-bridge in Roman naval history after the battle of Ecnomus under the pseudonym *ferrea manus* or *harpago*; and the only passage where a *corvus* (κόραξ) is mentioned in Roman naval warfare after the first Punic war, leads to exactly the same result. It is a passage of Appian (*b. c.* 5, 106, 441), where the battle fought in 36 off Mylae against Sextus Pompeius is described: in this battle the ships of Octavianus employed κόρακες ἢ χεῖρας σιδηροῦς. On account of their being mentioned together with *manus ferreae* it is natural to suppose, that the *corvi* (κόρακες) meant by Appian must have been *harpagones* (grapnels on iron poles) and not boarding-bridges; and really the correctness of such a supposition is conclusively proved by another detail: Appian informs us (438) that the ships had turrets on prow and stern; in my opinion the presence of a turret on the prow excluded the possibility of building in the selfsame place a boarding-bridge as described by Polybius, which was worthless, if it couldn't turn freely round its pole in every direction. Moreover, Agrippa's invention, which was put into practice for the first time in the engagement off Naulochus shortly after the battle of Mylae (App. *b. c.* 5, 118, 491), the so-called ἀροπαξ, a kind of harpoon, that is to say a grapnel on a pole covered with iron, which was fired to the hostile ship by means

of a catapult, whereupon this was hauled alongside and mastered by the legionaries, was nothing but a technical extension of the *harpago*, which again seems to prove that the *κόρακες* which were still employed in the battle of Mylae immediately before that of Naulochus had been ordinary *harpagones*. So the sense of the term *corvus* (*κόραξ*) was as floating ⁶⁾ as that of *manus ferrea*: as the latter term could be interchanged with *harpago* and also denote Polybius' boarding-bridge (see the passages from Zonaras, Florus and Frontinus, quoted p. 433 sq.), so *corvus* (*κόραξ*) on the other hand was not only used in the sense of a boarding-bridge (Pol.), but also of a *harpago* (App.). And that this had been the case of old, is proved by the use of the word already in the age of Alexander: among the siege-engines, invented by the Greek engineer Diades, a contemporary and co-operator of Alexander, a *corvus demolitor* is mentioned, *quem nonnulli gruem appellant*, which, considering the epithet *demolitor*, must certainly not be regarded as a storming-bridge, but as an iron wall-hook attached to a pole, ⁷⁾ that is to say a *harpago* used in warfare on land; and during the siege of Tyrus in 332 we find also in the hands of the besieged *manus ferreae* and *corvi*, which were employed to hook and draw up the besiegers: this method of employing them and the fact that they are mentioned together with *manus ferreae* prove that here again the *corvi* must have been *harpagones*, hooks attached to poles. ⁸⁾

In a word, it is impossible to maintain that the boarding-bridge described by Polybius under the name of *corvus* (*κόραξ*) continued to play a part in Roman naval history after the first Punic war: the instruments we find here under the names of *manus ferrea* and *harpago-corvus* were grapnels of various kinds, but not boarding-bridges. Some sort of boarding-ladders we find only in one case after the first Punic war: in the battle

⁶⁾ Naturally it could denote every instrument with an iron spike or hook resembling a raven's beak.

⁷⁾ Vitruv. 10, 13, 3, cf. Athen. *περὶ μηχανημάτων* (Wescher, *Poliorcétique des Grecs*, 10 and 15) and Anon. *πολιορκ.* (Wescher 238); Georges translates *Mauerbrecher, eine lange Stange vorn mit einem Widerhaken, um Mauern usw. einzureissen oder feindliche Belagerungswerke zu zerstören*. No doubt, Diades had also invented a boarding-bridge (see the passages just quoted), but it was apparently intended for sieges (not for naval warfare) and was not called *κόραξ*, but *ἐπιβάθρα* or *διαβάθρα*.

⁸⁾ Diod. 17, 44, 4; Curt. 4, 2, 12; 3, 24—26. In the first-cited passage Curtius wrongly identifies *manus ferrea* with *harpago*: not the *manus ferreae*, but the *corvi* mentioned together with them were *harpagones*; this slip is naturally due to the fact that really *manus ferrea* and *harpago* were often interchanged, *v. s.* p. 434.

of Cumae in 38 b. C. (App. *b. c.* 5, 82, 348); they are not called *κόρακες*, but *καταβάται* and they were only launched *after* the hostile ship had been boarded by means of *manus ferreae*, in order to facilitate the passing of the marines from their own ship to the hostile vessel; this means that they were no boarding-bridges in the Polybian sense of the word, but loose, undoubtedly very light boarding-ladders.

III. So this solution of the *corvus*-problem is impossible, because it is quite certain that after the battle of Ecnomus the Romans, though continuing to practise boarding-tactics, did so with grapnels and at the most with boarding-ladders, but *not* with boarding-bridges as described by Polybius; but its refutation in the preceding paragraph pushes automatically into the foreground the solution diametrically opposed to the former: if it is not possible to make Polybius' boarding-bridge live on after 256, doesn't it naturally follow that we must invert our method and radically banish from history this famous, but suspiciously shortlived instrument, that is to say that we must assume the Romans to have *always* operated with grapnels (also in the battles of Mylae and Ecnomus) and *never* with boarding-bridges? In other words, are we not to regard Polybius' description of the *κόραξ* as a mystification? This opinion has repeatedly been defended by Tarn, but alas always in a rather brief, apodictical way.⁹⁾ His line of thought may be rendered in some such way as this. In Roman naval history after 256 only grapnels are mentioned (*manus ferreae*, *harpagones*) and, where we meet here with the *κόραξ*, this term is clearly synonymous with *harpago* (*v. s.*); moreover, all the authors who discuss the boarding-tactics of Mylae and Ecnomus except Polybius (Zonaras, Florus, Frontinus, Auct. de vir. ill., *v. s.* p. 433 sq.) speak of *manus ferreae*, so that it seems natural to suppose that they too thought of grapnels and not of boarding-bridges. Finally objections of a practical nature can be raised against the boarding-bridge as described by Polybius: in the first place the Carthaginians would have been delighted with an arrangement that would have prevented more than two Romans coming aboard at once (cf. Pol. I, 22, 9); secondly even the quinquereme was a very light vessel: if such a ship had attempted to carry and use a boarding-bridge in the way Polybius describes she would have turned turtle; a quinquereme could not even throw a grapnel without the rowers keeping their oars in the water to hold her steady — *stabiliendae causa* is Livy's phrase (36, 44, 8) — and every rowing man will understand

⁹⁾ *Fleets* 51, 19; *Companion* 757; *Developments* 149.

what sort of a ship that means.¹⁰⁾ In a word, in Tarn's opinion the Romans employed only grapnels in the battles of Mylae and Ecnomus, just as afterwards, and this was puffed up by the annalist Fabius, who is Polybius' authority, into the renowned boarding-bridge, in order to introduce an element of wonder into the war. Simply to ignore this argumentation (as, alas, it is usual to do) is a foolish and almost impertinent piece of ostrich policy: Tarn's argumentation is strong and I will readily acknowledge that it has always strongly impressed me; nevertheless I believe after ample consideration that hypercriticism has had its little finger in this pie. The fact that Appian denotes a grapnel with the term *κόραξ*, does not exclude the possibility that this word could denote a boarding-bridge too: its sense is naturally floating and it may denote every instrument with an iron spike like a raven's beak. The evidence furnished by the passages of Zonaras, Florus and Frontinus is not conclusive, because none of them employs the term *manus ferrea* tout court, but all of them add a qualification pointing in the direction of the boarding-bridge described by Polybius: Zonaras *χεῖρας σιδηρᾶς περικρότους* (Polybius' boarding-bridge turns round a pole on the prow);¹¹⁾ Florus *machinaeque validae*; Frontinus *superiecto ponte*;¹²⁾ however shortened, vague and lacking in understanding these accounts may be, nevertheless they are all descriptions of the boarding-bridge, which (just as Polybius' account) ultimately originate from Fabius, nor can they be regarded and used as independent testimony for grapnels instead of boarding-bridges.¹³⁾ And even if this should be the case, it

¹⁰⁾ *Developments* 149—150.

¹¹⁾ Tarn's translation *a grapnel on a pole* neglects *περὶ* in *περικρότους*.

¹²⁾ *V. s.* p. 434.

¹³⁾ Only the Auctor de viris illustribus speaks briefly of *manus ferreae*, which Duilius *cum irrisu hostium primus instituit* (38, 1); but here the last words downright exclude ordinary grapnels, as these had been employed in naval warfare for a long time past and therefore couldn't be a source of ridicule in 260. So this anonymus only shortened his authority a little more than his companions. Eutropius (2, 20) does not mention the *corvus*; his remark that Duilius won the battle of Mylae *navibus rostratis quas liburnas vocant* seems pure nonsense to me: Giannelli (*Roma nell' età delle guerre puniche*, 292) is certainly wrong in inferring from it that the Roman boarding-bridge should have originated with the Illyrians; Polybius' description of the battle of Paxos (2, 10, 1 sq.) does not prove such a thing, on the contrary it proves that the Illyrians did not make use of boarding weapons at all (they suffered their own boats to be rammed by the Achaeans and then leapt on to the decks of the Achaean ships and overmastered them, in other words the boarding weapon of the Illyrians was... the enemy's ram!).

would be highly objectionable from a methodical point of view to prefer these late, inferior authorities to Polybius' testimony. Of the two practical objections the former does not hold good: if after having been boarded the hostile ship lay alongside of the Roman vessel, the Roman soldiers naturally used to jump over from all sides at the same time and did not make use of the boarding-bridge, as we are expressly told by Polybius (1, 22, 9). Only if the two ships lay prow to prow, they passed over the gangway of the raven itself in a close column, two abreast, protecting the front and the flanks with their shields: without a boarding-bridge they would in this case have been forced to jump over singly and unprotected from one prow to the other! ¹⁴⁾ The second practical objection is seemingly a very weighty one; but nevertheless it does not stand its ground on second thoughts. The passage of Livy (36, 44, 8) which is invoked by Tarn and which has already been discussed by us in this chapter, ¹⁵⁾ relates to the battle of Cissus in 191. And indeed, the boarding manoeuvre described here by Livy proves clearly that the Roman quinqueremes of 191 could by no means have carried the top-heavy boarding-bridges described by Polybius 1, 22. But... this argument is not conclusive at all, as it is absolutely certain that the Roman quinqueremes of the first years of the first Punic war were much heavier and unwieldier than those of 191. This stands to reason *à priori*, because it was the first time the Romans experimented with this type of ship; but, moreover, Polybius states it expressly, not only at the beginning of naval warfare in 260, ¹⁶⁾ but also *à propos* of the battle of Drepana. ¹⁷⁾ But in 242 the new fleet that would win the last and decisive battle was built on the model of the captured ship of Hannibal the Rhodian, a very nimble and swift type; ¹⁸⁾ and of this fleet the quinqueremes of 191 were the direct descendants. ¹⁹⁾ Consequently we cannot demonstrate the inconsistency of

¹⁴⁾ Cf. Holland Rose 98.

¹⁵⁾ V. s. p. 433 and 435 and cf. chapter III, footnote 452.

¹⁶⁾ 1, 22, 3.

¹⁷⁾ 1, 51.

¹⁸⁾ 1, 59, 8.

¹⁹⁾ The ships with which Rome began the second Punic war in 218 chiefly originated from the fleet of 242, v. s. chapter II, footnote 11; the ships built during the second Punic war were naturally constructed after the same type and were certainly not heavier than the vessels extant in 218; and these ships were probably still employed in 191, v. s. p. 264 sq.

Polybius' boarding-bridges with the quinqueremes of 260 by proving that the quinqueremes of 191 couldn't have carried them.

Finally the possibility of Tarn's supposition that Polybius' account of the boarding-bridge should originate in a piece of forgery of the annalist Fabius seems to be excluded by the fact that Polybius' description contains some technical finesses which could only have been invented by a highly ingenious forger who should even have been well versed in mechanics; so I give odds of ten to one that these technical details are *not* falsified, but founded in reality. 1°. The gangway²⁰) (6 fathoms long) was composed of two parts united by a joint, the shorter part (2 fathoms long), which always remained horizontal, and the longer part (4 fathoms high, the draw-bridge in the proper sense of the word), which could be drawn up at right angles to the horizontal part, thus reaching the top of the pole (also 4 fathoms high) and remaining vertical until lowered. The whole could be moved round the pole which pierced the boarding-bridge near the junction of the two parts. Now what was the function of the horizontal part of the boarding-bridge, which was separated by the pole from the proper draw-bridge and beyond any doubt was attached to the latter by means of hinges, and why was it no less than 2 fathoms long? Naturally it was there to make it possible to turn the colossus round the pole and its proportions had been carefully calculated in connexion with this purpose; for, if this horizontal part had not been present, or if it had been too long or too short, it would have been impossible or at least very difficult to move the heavy vertical draw-bridge round the pole; and this last point was essential, as the bridge was worthless, if it couldn't be moved under all circumstances in the direction of the hostile ship. Now then, the ratio of one to two (2 fathoms to 4) between the horizontal and vertical parts of the bridge guaranteed — it is clear at the first glance — the most efficient application of force in turning the weighty machine; no doubt two strong beams or handles will have been attached to the extremity of the horizontal part removed farthest from the pole, in order to enable the sailors to execute the turning movements. Am I going too far, if I contend that a falsifier in projecting an imaginary boarding-bridge would have forgotten this mechanically indispensable ground-part? 2°. The hole in the bridge (near the junction of the two parts), through which the pole passed, was *oblong*

²⁰) Pol. I, 22, 5—6, see Paton I, 61, a.

(Pol. 1, 22, 6); alas, this detail, though at first sight not quite clear, is not explained at all in Polybius' text. If we try to explain it ourselves, the solution of the problem must be widely different, according as we suppose the pole to pierce the horizontal part of the bridge or the movable part (the draw-bridge in the proper sense of the word). If the former supposition be right, the oblong hole seems quite incomprehensible; for to make the bridge turn round the pole in the most efficient way, the hole through which the *circular* pole passed must be *circular* itself or at least allow of a very slight degree of play: an oblong hole would have allowed far too much play to the pole and thus have impeded the turning movement. I know only one way out of this impasse: starting from the junction of the two parts of the bridge there was a *slot* in the horizontal part, a trifle wider than the diameter of the pole and perhaps a few meters long (this was Polybius' oblong hole); the part of this slot that was nearest to the junction (that is to say the part of it through which the pole passed) used to be closed by means of a strong bar, while the bridge was being turned round the pole, so that a square hole was separated from the rest of the slot and a minimum of play with a maximum of turning efficiency was obtained. But after the bridge had been pointed at the hostile ship by means of turning it, the bar was removed and, before the draw-bridge was launched, the horizontal ground-part could be pushed forward in the direction of the hostile ship. So the function of the oblong slot was to make it possible to prolong the draw-bridge after the turning manoeuvre with part of the ground-piece, according as the distance separating the Roman from the hostile ship required it. On the other hand it is also conceivable that the pole passed through the movable part of the bridge, immediately behind the junction of the two parts, and this supposition is far more probable than the former, because Polybius says expressly that the pole pierced the bridge *μετὰ τὰς πρώτας εὐθέως τῆς κλίμακος δύο ὀργυίας* (1, 22, 6; but he does not say that the horizontal part was *exactly* two fathoms long and the vertical part *exactly* four fathoms, so that the former solution also remains possible, though it is infinitely less probable). If this supposition be right, the hole *must* necessarily have been oblong, because otherwise the movable part of the bridge simply couldn't have been drawn up, in other words it wouldn't have been movable at all in a vertical direction; and the hole must even have been several meters long in order to make it possible to bring the draw-bridge into an approximately vertical

position. The absolute necessity of the oblong shape of the hole in this case is distinctly in favour of the solution now under discussion. But whether the one or the other of the two solutions of the problem be true, at any rate such a technical detail, which is apparently accurate, but remains wholly unexplained in Polybius' text, is scarcely conceivable in a tale invented by a falsifier: this detail as well as the former proves that Polybius' account of the boarding-bridge is founded on reality.²¹⁾

In short, I believe that Tarn's argumentation can be refuted from A to Z, however ingenious it may be. But I will also produce a positive argument which seems to prove that in 260 and the next years the boarding-bridges described by Polybius really played a part in Roman naval warfare: I mean the striking difference between the tactics put into practice by the Carthaginians in the battles of Mylae and Ecnomus. In the battle of Mylae they made a *frontal* attack, which, launched with confidence and a strong feeling of superiority, soon resulted in a severe defeat in consequence of the Roman boarding-tactics.²²⁾ But off Ecnomus they sang quite another tune: as Tarn himself has rightly remarked,²³⁾ the Carthaginian tactics in this naval battle resemble those put into practice afterwards by Hannibal in the land battle of Cannae; the Carthaginians weakened and kept back their centre for the sake of making two powerful wings and attempted to close on both the Roman flanks. Why else did they now carefully avoid a frontal attack, why else did they keep back their centre and did they attempt to envelop the Romans and attack them in the flank or, if possible, in the rear, why else, I say, than on account of the fact that they wanted to remain out of the reach of the *corvi* menacing from the Roman prows, the *corvi*, the efficiency of which they had so sorely experienced on the occasion of their frontal attack off Mylae? This striking tactical difference forces the supposition upon us that during their frontal attack in the battle of Mylae the Carthaginians had been beaten and frightened in such a terrible way that they now avoided those frontal tactics at any cost. That this terror should have been caused by simple boarding-tactics with grapnels on the Roman side, seems impossible: the grapnel had been employed in naval warfare for a

²¹⁾ I do not enter into a discussion of Polybius' account as a whole, because, apart from the two details discussed here, it speaks for itself.

²²⁾ Pol. I, 23.

²³⁾ *Developments* 150—151; Pol. I, 27 sq.

long time past, so that this weapon could certainly not surprise the Carthaginians in a deadly way in 260. No, Polybius' account must be accurate: it had been the boarding-bridges that in the battle of Mylae had turned the frontal attack of the Carthaginians into a disaster and which they now tried to avoid by means of sideward and enveloping movements.

IV. So we have to accept the fact — however unacceptable it may seem to be at first sight — that for a few years from 260 onward the Romans confronted the Carthaginians in naval warfare with Polybius' famous boarding-bridges, but that subsequently these engines suddenly vanished from Roman naval history, in spite of their conspicuous success. We cannot avoid this conclusion and it is our only positive task to make a serious attempt at understanding and explaining this seemingly so very strange phenomenon. But before we embark upon this enterprise we must first try to ascertain as exactly as possible, *at what moment* the boarding-bridges were abolished. A comparison between the battle of Ecnomus (256) and the battle of Drepana (249) proves that the change must have taken place in between. During the battle of Ecnomus one of the Roman squadrons lay pressed against the coast, where it was blockaded by the left wing of the Carthaginian fleet; but the Carthaginians did not venture on an attack for fear of the *corvi*, so that finally the Roman ships could be rescued from their dangerous position by other squadrons coming to their aid.²⁴⁾ In the battle of Drepana we meet with precisely the same situation: again the Roman fleet lay pressed against the coast; but . . . now there was no trace of reservedness on the Carthaginian side: they attacked the Romans strenuously and the battle resulted in a catastrophe for the Roman fleet.²⁵⁾ In other words it is quite certain that the boarding-bridges were abolished between 256 and 249; or, still more exactly, between 255 and 249. For the naval battle off the *Promunturium Mercurii*, which took place in 255 and in which the Romans gained a great victory and captured numerous Punic ships, undoubtedly still belonged to the period of the boarding-bridges, as the old fleet of Mylae and Ecnomus still operated here.²⁶⁾ But between 255 and 250 the

²⁴⁾ Pol. I, 28, 10 sq.

²⁵⁾ Pol. I, 51.

²⁶⁾ Pol. I, 36, 11; the battle is only briefly mentioned and not described, so that Polybius' silence about the *corvi* in this passage does not justify the conclusion that they were not present. On the other hand the battle of Drepana is described in detail

Roman fleet was almost entirely renewed and on this occasion the *corvi* will have been abolished. But why? Are we to suppose with de Sanctis ²⁷⁾ that the Carthaginians had found a sovereign remedy against the new Roman weapon, so that it automatically lost its importance? The Roman victories of Ecnomus and Hermaeum prove the contrary; and if you don't succeed in finding a remedy against a new weapon within 5 years, it seems pretty certain that you will never find it at all: between the battles of Mylae and Ecnomus 4 full years had elapsed, but in the latter the Punic contrivance to counteract the *corvi* consisted only in outflanking movements for the sake of eluding them and, in the case of the Roman squadron pressed against the coast, even in the complete avoiding of an engagement. A pretty remedy, to be sure! No, in my opinion there is only one reasonable motive that can have induced the Romans to abolish the *corvi* between 255 and 250: it does not belong to the military, but to the nautical sphere and it is connected with the calamities which in those years forced the Romans to renew almost their whole warfleet. For in that period the Roman warfleet was almost completely destroyed by two gales (in 255 and 253); ²⁸⁾ and though the fact that the Roman fleet was overtaken by these storms was exclusively due to the foolhardiness and self-conceit of the landlubbers who commanded it, ²⁹⁾ we may readily suppose that the presence of the *corvi* considerably aggravated the catastrophe: the Roman quinqueremes of this period were unwieldy and not very seaworthy — it was the first time the Romans experimented with this type of ship — and the high and heavy colossuses on their prows unavoidably made the ships top-heavy and consequently still less seaworthy than they were in themselves. ³⁰⁾ I believe therefore that, when the Romans were forced by the catastrophes just mentioned to build new fleets, they abolished the *corvus*, because the instrument had proved a

by Polybius, so that there be would certainly have mentioned the *corvi*, if they had played a part in it, as in the battle of Ecnomus; moreover, the character of this battle itself proves clearly, as we remarked above, that the *corvi* had been abolished before.

²⁷⁾ III, 1, 128.

²⁸⁾ Pol. 1, 37. 39.

²⁹⁾ See the first chapter p. 4.

³⁰⁾ In this sense Tarn's objection against the *corvus* retains its full strength: the heavy ships of the first Punic war could certainly carry this instrument and employ it in a battle by fine weather; but by stormy weather the top-heavy colossuses immediately formed a deadly danger: the pole on the prow and the vertical part of the boarding-bridge were both 4 fathoms (that is about 7 metres) high!

dangerous absurdity by stormy weather; of course this is only a hypothesis — the fact of the abolishing of the *corvus* is neither mentioned nor explained by the ancient authorities, but only tacitly presupposed —, but in my opinion a reasonable one. The type of the ships was, however, not changed: the Roman fleet in the battle of Drepana was as unwieldy as its predecessors. So it is not surprising that the first result of the abolishing of the *corvus* was a serious Roman naval defeat, in fact the only serious naval defeat they suffered in the first Punic war: no doubt, the catastrophe of Drepana was in the first place due to the recklessness of the Roman admiral; but the helplessness of the unwieldy vessels, which must do without their natural means of defence, the *corvus*, and were not able to adapt themselves to the nimbleness of the adversaries, also contributed to it in a high degree, as appears clearly from Polybius' description of the battle.³¹⁾ So after Drepana the Romans had to choose between two possible courses: they could turn their steps back, stick to the heavy, unwieldy type of ships and put the *corvus* into practice again, taking into the bargain the serious dangers this instrument occasioned by a rough sea; or they could take another step forward on the path they had entered upon and, after sacrificing the *corvus*, also try to adapt their type of ships to the Punic style of fighting. The latter course was adopted: when in 242 the Romans pulled themselves together for a last effort to seek a definitive decision at sea, they built the new quinqueremes on the model of the captured ship of Hannibal the Rhodian, which was renowned for its seaworthiness and fastness.³²⁾ This meant that the possibility of returning to the *corvus* was cut off for good and all: the Roman quinquereme, comparatively light and nimble as it was since 242, could no longer carry the colossus described by Polybius, not to speak about launching it.³³⁾ Consequently the battle off the Aegates insulae

³¹⁾ I, 51.

³²⁾ Pol. I, 59, 8.

³³⁾ Remember the boarding-manoeuve described by Liv. 36, 44, 8, which was discussed by us above. Formerly I felt inclined to suppose (of course the authorities are silent on this point) that already the building plan executed between 255 and 250 included a first step in the direction of lightening the Roman type of ships, which, together with the storm-risk, should have led to the abolishing of the *corvus*; this is, however, altogether excluded by Polybius' description of the battle of Drepana, in which the unwieldiness of the Roman vessels is emphasized again and again. So we must distinguish two stages: first the *corvus* was abolished on account of the storm-risk, but the heavy type of ships was maintained (255—250); then the type of the quinquereme was lightened, the possibility of returning to the *corvus* thus being cut off for good (242).

which immediately followed the new experiment of 242 shows a character wholly different from the preceding naval engagements: it is marked on the Roman side by the seaworthiness and agility of the ships and the well-trained condition of the rowers.³⁴⁾ The battle was fought by the Romans by rough weather and a heavy sea against the wind (Pol. 1, 60); if they had ventured on such an enterprise with the old, unwieldy type of quinqueremes, equipped with *corvi* too, probably a great part of the Roman fleet would have perished, without the enemy having to stir a finger!

In a word, I regard the abolishing of the *corvi* after a very short period of brilliant success as a link in the process of development to better seaworthiness and greater manoeuvring skill, which the Roman navy naturally had to pass through from its clumsy beginnings. But... nevertheless, the Romans remained Romans, that is to say landlubbers; in spite of the fact that the type of their ships had been lightened considerably since 242, their quinqueremes always remained somewhat heavier and more unwieldy than those of nations more attached to the sea, and so the boarding system, albeit no longer with boarding-bridges, but with *grapnels*, also continued for ever and a day to be preferred by them to the nautical manoeuvre and ramming tactics.³⁵⁾ The few naval battles of the second Punic war (in the main the task of the Roman navy was limited during this war to convoying and blockading services) demonstrate this clearly, as it is either expressly stated by the authorities or indirectly proved by the number of captured ships, which is always greater than the number of vessels destroyed and sunk, or by the great numbers of marines carried by the Roman warships. The fact that after the year 200 boarding tactics begin to recede into the background, is due to the auxiliary system, which in those years got more and more the upper hand in Roman naval warfare: in the naval wars in the East, especially in the Syrian war, Roman naval warfare did not centre on the Roman navy, but on the squadrons of allies like the Rhodians, who were able seamen and therefore preferred the nautical manoeuvre to boarding tactics; the Romans were realists and so they had the sense to let their sea-faring allies have their own way.³⁶⁾ In the first century after the revival of the

³⁴⁾ Pol. 1, 59—61.

³⁵⁾ The battle off the Aegates insulae was a more or less exceptional case, because the Carthaginians were badly handicapped by the fact that their ships were overburdened.

³⁶⁾ But, wherever the Roman fleet plays first fiddle, the boarding system also comes immediately to the front again, for instance in the battle of Cissus.

Roman navy from the great Pompey to his son Sextus the auxiliary system continued to prevail; so the nautical manoeuvre also continued to predominate. But, when at last Octavianus and Agrippa in their struggle with Sextus Pompeius established an Italian navy again, the sphere of the first Punic war revived as it were: against the better seamanship, the greater seaworthiness of the ships and in connexion with these points the predominance of the nautical manoeuvre with Pompey's peregrine squadrons Octavianus and Agrippa had to manage with inferior seamanship, heavier and clumsier ships and therefore with boarding tactics. The *ἄρπαξ*, Agrippa's invention (*v. s.*), was a technical extension of the *harpago* or *νόqaξ*, but it remained wholly within the sphere of the boarding system. And all this is in perfect accordance with the fact stated by Kromayer,³⁷⁾ that the number of marine troops on board the Roman galleys from the first Punic war to the last years of the republic always remained in the neighbourhood of 120 for quinqueremes and of 90 for triremes. These very high numbers — with the Greek triremes they varied from 10 to 40 — presuppose and prove boarding tactics first and last. In the history of Roman sea-power Polybius' renowned boarding-bridge enjoyed only an extremely short, though glorious existence; but in other forms the boarding system continued to rank uppermost in Roman naval history to the very last.

³⁷⁾ *Flotte* 481—491.

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1) Names like Rome, Italy, Rhodes, Polybius, Livy etc. etc., which appear on every page of my book, are not mentioned here; together with the index the detailed indications of the table of contents must always be consulted by the reader.

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